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The  present  study on  Agricultural Credit in  the  United  Kingdom  has 
been  carried out within  the  framework  of  the  study-programme  of  the 
Directorate-General  for  Agriculture,  Commission  of  the European 
Communities,  by 
Prof.  J.S.G.  WILSON, 
Professor of Economics  and  Commerce, 
University of Hull. 
The  results of similar studies for  Belgium,  France  and  the  G.D.  of 
Luxemburg  (1),  the F.R.  of  Germany  (2),  Italy  (3)  and  Denmark  have 
already been  circulated. 
The  divisions  "Balance-sheets,  studies,  statistical information"  and 
"Conditions of competition  and  market  structures" of  the  Directorate-
General  for  Agriculture have  participated in this project. 
* 
*  * 
The  present  study does  not necessarily reflect  the  opinion of  the 
Commission  of  the European Communities  and  does  in no  way  prejudice 
its future  standpoint  on  this subject. 
(1)  Informations internes  !'agriculture 
0  102  (french,  german)  sur  n 
(2)  Informations internes  !'agriculture 
0  104  (german)  sur  n 
(3)  Informations internes  !'agriculture 
0  113  (italian,  french)  sur  n (ii) 
N  0  T  E 
The  present study relating to  agricultural credit in the United 
Kingdom  as  one  of  the  New  Member  States has been prepared along 
the lines of  the initial study carried out  for  the original six 
Member  States.  This was  done  to  ensure  a  degree  of comparability 
between  the  relevant chapters of  the  several country studies, 
though at times  this has  been difficult because of differences 
in institutional structure and statistical collection.  There  may 
be  some  degree  of overlap  between chapters. S  u  m m a  r  y 
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'£he  present study of the availability of agricultural credit 
in the several new  Hember  States  of the European gconomic  Community 
is to be  related as  far as  J?Ossible  to simila,r studies  rt.lready 
completed for tho  original six Ivlember  States.  In addition,  structural 
changes  have  been taking place  in agricul-ture  (and policies  have  been 
favoured  to  encourage  the acceleration of  such  changes  - e.g.  the 
amalgamation  of  small  farming  units  into larger units)  and.  it is 
pertinent to enquire whether the  amounts  of capital and  cre.di  t 
available to a.gricul  ture are in fact likely to be  adequate to finance 
the  investments  consequent  upon structural change,  be it on  the 
production or  on the marketing side.  In particular, it is proposed to 
summarise  the  sources  of capital and credit available to agriculture 
in-the United Kingdom- e.g.  the  commercial banks;. the AgriCultural 
Mortgage  Corporation  (and in Scotland,  the Scottish Agricultural 
Securities Corporation);  the agricultural merchants  and machinery dealers; 
the  co-operatives;  and auctioneers;  as well as  private and  supplementary· 
sources.  It is also proposed to describe  some  of the  methods  of making 
the relevant finance  available.  Finally, it will be  necessary to consider 
ways  in which the institutional provision and/or the techniques  of lending 
might  be  appropriately modified in the future. -2-
A.  ~rhe Current Situation with  regard _to  Af"\.:-c::i.eu!.:_t_ural  Cred.i t 
Chapter  1:  Th~~ Relative  I_mportance  of Agricultural Credit with respect to the 
Cauital Narket 
It is not clear how  in this context  one  should define  •capital !Tk'1rket', 
but presumably the intention is  to discover the  relative importance  of  finance 
made  available to agriculture, as  compared with that made  available  to all 
sectors in the  economy.  On  the  basis  of United Kingdom  statistics, this is 
not very easy to establish and  one  must  therefor.e  be  content with approxima-tions. 
1fe  h.now  {on  the basis  of  the  sample  survey carried out for thH  years  1967/68 to 
1969/70 and published in 1973  as Availability of  Capital and  Credit to  United 
Kjngdom  ARriculture)  that bank advances  represent  one  important  source  of credit 
both for  owner-occupiers  and tenantso1  For England and Wales,  see Table  12 at 
p.  16  of  the Report quoted above,  reproduced at p.  18  of present Report,  where 
bank credit represented  on  average  34  P.er  cent.  of  o'·Tner-occupiers'  funds  and 
24 per cent.  of tenants  1  total borrow·ings,  to which  on  :the  institutional side 
should be  adrled  the finance  made  available by the  ANC  (to  O"'wner-occupiers, 
Bn  average  of  9  per cent.  over the relevant years;  amounts  lent to tenants 
are necessarily very small,  since they have  no  real estate to mortgage), 
t.he  other important sources  being private  (e.g.  family and relatives)  -
in total 23  per  ~ent. and  21  per. cent.  respectively - and the agricultural 
merchants and dealers,  co-operatives  and auctioneers  - in total 32  per cent. 
and  53  per cent.  respectively.  It should be  noted. that a  proportion -
probably significant - of this third group  (trade credit)  would itself derive 
from bank advancesQ  Somewhat  similar relationships applied for Scotland 
(see Report,  Tables  53  to  55,  pp.  59-60)  and for Northern Ireland  (see 
Report,  Tables  68  and  69,  p.  71),  though  in Northern Ireland the 
lo  The  sample  did not  include that large sector of  farming  in the United Kingdom 
where  farms  are partly owner-occupied and partly tenantedo -3-
figures  relate to  ow~er-occupiers only. 
Figures  are  published for Bank  .. t  .. dva.nces  in Great Britain - also 
for the Scottish Clearing Barurs  and Northern  Irela~d Banks.  To  the  extent 
that the  other lending sectors  behave  in a  similar fashion,  the relation 
between advances  to agriculture and total advances  (see  Tables  I, IIIand 
IV)  will be  indicative of the wider experience.  Separate figures  can 
also be  given of  lending by the A}V  and the SASC. 
At.the  same  time, it should be  remembered that for the  purpose  of 
these statistics of bank advances  11Agriculture,  Forestry and Fishingu 
includes  only farming  and stock rearing,  agricultural contracting,  and 
market  and nursery gardening.  Advances  to agricultural merchants  and 
other agricultural businesses  (e.g.  horse  and  livestock dealers),  which 
vould in part be  concerned with the marketing  of agricultural products, 
are  included elsewhere  (under  the heading  'other distribution')  and are 
not susceptible to further breakdown.  Figures for Fishing  (but  not 
Forestry)  are collected separately,  but are not published.  They are 
believed to be very small  (less  than 2  per  cent.  of the total  category). 
Finance  made  available by.the deposit banks  to Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing in Great Britain is one  of the larger categories 
1  in the distribution of  banlr  loans  by  economic  sectors.  In absolute  terms, 
and for Great Britain as  a  whole, it exceeded £800 million by November  1973. 
Experience back to February 1960 is given in Table  I  (but note that there 
was  a  change  in the basis  oi·  classification in February 1967).  Table  I 
also indicates the percentage that advances  to agriculture bear to total 
advances.  From these figures,  it can be  seen that since  (say)  1964 and, 
until the  increases that  began in 1971  (allowing for  some  seasonal 
f~uctuation) bank advances to agriculture in absolute  terms  had not  changed 
very much.  Moreover,  as  a  percentage  of total bank advances,  there had 
1. See  Table  ~'.Analysis  of advances  by banks  in the United Kingdom"  in Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin. -4-
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£m  £m  % 
325  3,243  10·02 
3.'i0  3,457  10·13 
368  3,516  J0-46 
372  3,570  10·43 
371  3,718  9·98 
388  3,886  9·99 
397  3,917  10·14 
376  3,691  10·20 
367  3,850  9·54 
381  3,912  9·73 
411  4,lH5  10·19 
415  4,006  10·36 
412  4,325  9·52 
422  4,504  9·37 
449  4,587  9·79 
457  4,565  10·01 
458  4,817  9·51 
478  4,912  9·74 
502  5,120  9·80 
515  5,24i  9·82 
505  5,3?.7  9-48 
513  5,473  9·37 
526  5,505  9·56 
524  5,362  9·78 
523  5,590  9·35 
529  5,750  9·21 
530  5,658  9·37 
512  5,391  9·51 
474  6,/23  7·62 
477  6,303  '?·57 
504  6,487  7·77 
511  6,681  7·64 
490  6,926  7·07 
508  7,\05  7·15 
528  7,072  7·46 
533  7,020  7·60 
52&  7,522  7·01 
519  7,739  6·70 
543  7,900  6·88 
527  7,595  6·94 
504  7,927  6·36 
505  8,290  6·09 
538  8,643  6·23 
536  8,602  6·23 
528  9,~63  5·70 
537  9446  5·68 
566  9:658  5·36 
591  10.110  5·85 
575  11,010  5·22 
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""'J  fctl.  .lS, 13!)  .).\l 
~  cp~  .lo, \l.1l  J .  .l3 
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~In }my  1972  there was  a  change  in the  basis  of  calculation of total advances 
when  £734  million fixed rate credits for  exports  and domestic  shipbuilding 
were  included for the first time.  Other revisions  increased total aclve.nces 
by £192  million.  As  neither revision affected the  figures  for  lending to 
agriculture,  this  caused a  drop in the  percentage  shown  as  going  to  agricultur~. 
frn November  1973  advances  by six former  finc:,nce  houses  '\•.rere  included for the 
first tirae. 
i"'ote.-A new quarterly cbs~ification 0f acivan..:cc; to c0ver all banks in Great Brnain was 
i..'1tr0~•.1C"Nl hy rh~ Hank of Em:lar.J in Fchu:~.ry 1967 to r,:-;place the more limited cme  previously 
published by til~ British B::m\..crs'  As5ociation.  Th~' bigg.::;t eHect of the ch<1nr,c on the ~'igun:s 
listed abov(' tkri\'~.:~ from tb.:. fuct  thii~ tl".~ bnks reponing fer the firs! t;mc lePt a ;oHiCl• ;;,l,a.!l.::r 
proportion of <hci: :\md.i to  agr!cu!~::rc th:m  those included in the ea1 :icr scri{'S,  thus caus;,,g a 
sharp drop in the pc~cent::~c in cc!u::m 3.  T!H:•  ti~urc·:; listed above exclude advancl!s by banks 
in  Nortt.~m Ireland (sec -1 o:.bie  lY), but indudc tho~c for Scotland . 
.  -Source: Bank cf  England Struis.th\7/ Abstract and Quarte~ly  Bulletin. 15 
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Bank  advances  in  Great  Britain 
Total  bank advances to agriculture as a  percentage of 
total advances to U.K. residents 
Total advances by banks  in  Great Britain  to U.K. residents 
Total  advances  by banks in Great  Britain  to agriculture 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 -6-
Table  II 
Agricultural Output and Employment  for the United Kingclom 
Agricultural output  Employees in employment 
at factor cost  in agricultun:, forestry 
and fishing* 
£m  as %of  000  as% of 
GDP  total employees 
1962  992  3·9  552  2·4 
1963  986  3·7  554  2·4 
1964  1,019  3·5  528  2·3 
1965  1,050  3·4  486  2·1 
1966  r,oss  3·3  467  2·0 
1967  1,135  3·3  433  1·9 
1968  1,139  3·1  413  1·8 
1969  1,194  3·1  392  1·7 
1970  1,261  3·0  370  1·7 
1971  1,363  2·9  345  1·6 
•  These series arc not strictly speaking continuous as there have been various changes in the 
compilation oft  he statistics. These occurred in 1964, 1966 and 1969, the clTec<;:; being to change 
the number of  employees in agriculture, forl!stry and fishing by about 1,000 tc 2,000 each time. 
Source: National Income and  Expenditure Blue Book. Department of  Employment 
Gazette. 
Table  III 
Advances by Scottish Clearing Banks* 
1967  Feb 
May 
1\ug 
Nov 
1968  Feb 
May 
Aug 
Nov 
1969  Feb 
·May 
Aug 
Nov 
1970  Feb 
May 
Aug 
Nov 
1971  Feb 
May 
Aug 
Nov 
Total Ad·;ances 
by Scottish 
clearing banks 
to agriculture 
£m 
78 
78 
81 
81 
77 
75 
78 
78 
78 
78 
82 
80 
77 
17 
83 
83 
82 
81 
88 
91 
Total Advances 
by Scottish 
clearing banks 
to UK residents 
£m 
484 
502 
496 
518 
510 
527 
503 
511 
532 
568 
566 
539 
SS1 
591 
596 
604 
630 
639 
626 
646 
1972  Feb  92  717 
Mav  95  793t 
Aug  107  <J\l 
Nov  112  t,o.a 
'ct13  ~  ...  b  \tb  ,,J..\ct 
l1o.y  "~  '· \1.2.  ""j  \'31  \,331 
Nev  \U  \,3Cf'i 
l~1ir  ~~  \4-J.  I, 5 oo 
\'\o~  \SO  I 
1 S t-S  A..,  1'13  \, ~,8 
N.ov  \11  \, ,,  l 
•  The Scottish figures also include advances by branches of  the Scottish banks in England. 
t  See footnot~o  Table I  . On a revised basis, this figure wai increased by £37 million, i.e.  on the 
old basis it was £756 million.  ' 
Source: Bank of  England Statistical Abstract and Quarterly Bulletin. -7-
Table  IV  Aclvanccs by Northern Ireland Banks 
Tota~  Advances  Total Advances 
by Northcm Ireland  by Northern Ireland 
banks to agriculture•  banks* 
£m  '£m 
1968  Feb  18  110 
May  18  116 
Aug  19  122 
Nov  18  127 
1969 Feb  19  129 
'May  20  137 
Aug  21  144 
Nov  21  145 
1970 Feb  19  146 
May  t  t 
Aug  t  t 
Nov  t  t 
1971  Feb  22  174 
May  21  152 
Aug  22  153 
Nov  23  147 
1972 Feb  24  154 
May  25  155 
Aug  26  169 
Nov  30  170 
\<t1.3  \.c.~  ll  \"  & 
t-\""'1  3'5  .2.ol.. 
~.....,  31  .l4\ 
\'-\(>"  4-0  .l.Str 
\'\1~ i=«.P  4~  ~~  (o 
H,.,.,  i+t.  .2.8~ 
Au.~  lt-5  ~\7 
•  In the Northern Ireland banks' figures, advances to overseas residents arc included indistinguishably 
with UK residents umkr the appropriate categories. Hence, for Northern Ireland, it has been 
necessary to list the figures for total ,<dvanccs. 
t  Figures for 't',lay, August and November 1970 are not available, became of  the effects of  a b:mk 
strike in the Republic of  I rcland, where two of the Northern Ireland b~nks  have their head offices. 
Source: Bank of  England Statistical Abstract and Quarteriy Bulletin. -8-
been a  distinctly declining trend since about  1966  (before that - bac~ 
to 1960- it had  been rather static).  At  the  same  time, it should  be 
remembered that since  1962 agricultural output at factor cost had declined 
as  a  percentage  of Gross  Domestic  Product  from  3.92 to  2.9 in 1971. 
For the rest,  the declining trend was  most  obviously due  to the 
relatively greater expansion  of bank lending to  other  economic  sectors. 
In part, this may  have  been due,  too,  throughout  much  of the  1960s  to 
the relative unprofitability of agriculture. 
Separate figures  for bank advances  for the Scottish clearing banks 
(included in the Great Britain total)  and additional figures  for Northern 
Ireland ure  given in Tablesiii and  IV. 
In addition to the  largely short-term lending  of the deposit 
1  banks,  the A}C,  which is regarded as  being in the private sector,  lent 
relatively large  sums  to agriculture in England and Vales  - as at ltJa.rch  31, 
1973  outstanding loans  were  £205.76 million -mainly at medium- and  long-term. 
To  some  extent,  the  breakdm·Tn  of  A.HC  lending  between short-,  medium-,  and 
long-term can he  established from  '!'able  VII where  loans  made  to finance 
working capital may  be  regarded as  being short-term;  those granted to 
finance  improvements  as  medium-term;  and those to finance  the  purchase  of 
a  farm,  to repay a  bank or a  private mortgage,  to defray death duties,  or 
to  finance  purchase  by a  sitting tenant may  be  regarded as  long-term. 
Other relevant statistics are set out in Tables V,  VI,  VIII and  IX.  A.s 
will be  seen,  much  smaller sums  were  lent by the  SASC  in Scotland. 
1.  For  some  indication of the  extent to which bank loans to farmers  may 
be at medium-term see TableXX[in Chapter 2. -9-
Table V  AGRICUL1·URAL  HORTGAGE  CORPOH  .. ATION 
Loans Granted as Per Publi'ihcd Balance Sheet Figures 
Year ended  Mortgage Loans  •Improvement  Total Loans 
31 March  Granted  Loans Granted  Granted 
£  £  £ 
1930  4,168,590  8,781  4,177,371 
1931  2,884,488  10,524  2.895,012 
1932  1,764,391  10,755  1,775,146 
1933  1,353,367  5,811  1,359,178 
1934  363,944  11,942  375,886 
1935  589,303  8,924  598,227 
1936  466,830  10,291  477,121 
1937  377,496  16,570  394,066 
1938  447,809  21,034  468,843 
1939  473,522  12,434  485,956 
1940  409,170  4,725  413,895 
1941  315,315  6,392  321,707 
1942  283,303  3,183  286,486 
1943  395.556  263  395,819 
1944  199,628  918  200,546 
1945  440,685  1,317  442,002 
1946  1,109,728  1,185  1,110,913 
1947  1,746,024  13,330  1,759,354 
1948  2,115,162  7,340  2,122,502 
1949  - 2,731,022  15,064  2,746,086 
1950  3,521,505  17,611  3,539,116 
1951  4,120,788  13,040  4,133,828 
1952  4,934,856  17,837  4,952,693 
1953  4.474,819  14,871  4.489,690 
1954  1,930,416  14,187  1,944,603 
1955  2,852,151  4,134  2.856,285 
1956  3,498,513  7,753  3,506,266 
1957  4,104,697  11.488  4,ll6.185 
1958  4,010,110  4,682  4,014,792 
1959  2,715,786  19,017  2,734,803 
1960  5,036 582  40,605  5,077,187 
1961  7,599,148  30,434  7,629,582 
1962  9,620,040  14,225  9,634,265 
1963  6.~7,420  22,339  6,069,759 
1964  10,602,367  7,552  10,609,919 
1965  11,337,673  6,071  11,343,744 
1966  11,301,600  2,517  11.304.117 
1967  19,934,525  19,934,525 
1968  21,300,781  21,300.781 
1969  31',377.242  31,377 242 
1970  31,726,173  31,726,173 
1971  24.125,826  24,125,826 
1972  19,060,342  19,060,342 
,q,l  3Cf,4lt..,b1i  ~~.  \4.,4-, \,,t 
\'\1~to  it-"1, ~qL.-,1'1 I  ~.,,,,'t-,1<fl 
•To Landowners for I mprovemcnts to Agricultural Land under the 
provisions of the Improvement of  Land Acts, 1864 and 1899. 
Source: Agrkultucal Mortgage Corporation. - 10-
Table VI  .AGRICULTURAL  NOHTGAGE  CORPORATION 
Loans Outstanding 31 March as Per Published Balance Sheet Figures 
Mortgage Loans  *Improvement  Total Loans 
Outstanding Loans Outstanding  Outstanding 
£  £  £ 
1930  4,151,431  8,781  4,160,212 
1931  6,928,001  18,986  6,946,987 
1932  8,491,205  29,162  8,520,367 
1933  9.451,837  33,637  9,485,474 
1934  9,363,348  43,538  9,406,886 
1935  9,317,213  50,119  9,367,332 
1936  9,247,200  59,127  9,306,327 
1937  8,868,921  68,580  8,937,501 
1938  8,673,546  82,869  8,756,415 
1939  8,636,118  87,699  8,723,817 
1940  8,579,900  84.498  8,664,398 
1941  8,360,062  80,860  8,440 922 
1942  7,974,728  76.071  8,050,799 
1943  7,640,190  69,058  7,709,248 
1944  7,118,401  63,738  7,182.139 
1945  6,883,963  56,159  6,940.122 
1946  7,169,881  51,282  7.221,163 
1947  8,205,842  54,253  8,260,095 
1948  9,483,263  55,913  9,539,176 
1949  11,169,301  66,045  11,235,346 
1950  13,746,844  80.237  13,827,081 
1951  16,893,632  86,900  16,980,531 
1952  20,743,256  97,079  20,840,335 
1953  23,982.498  107,159  2~.089,657 
1954  24,370,776  117,198  24,487,975 
1955  25,773,180  111,576  25,884,756 
1956  27,726,885  103,824  27,835,709 
1957  30,412,491  115,553  30,528,044 
1958  32,614,078  108,409  32,722,487 
1959  33,101,854  116,501  33,218,355 
1960  35,495,024  140,016  35,635,040 
1961  40,616,512  168,026  40,784,538 
1962  47,706,201  173,069  47,879,270 
1963  50,461,877  180,444  50,642,321 
1964  57,422,985  164,034  57,587,019 
1965  64,043,572  149,015  64,192,5e7 
1966  71,336,244  126,18~  71,462,426 
1967  86,946,893  103,299  87,050,192 
1968  103,057,164  89,205  103,146,369 
1969  127.986,833  76,441  128,063,274 
1970  153,411,232  64,964  153,476,196 
1971  170,283,913  ~9,932  170,343,845 
1972  178,853,962  4,087  178,908,049 
,q,J  ~S,11t.,t.'11  t.S,t...'"lb  .loS",,b1,\9"J  ,,.,Lr  ~\'+l1 1D1fl  \4-1,~5  ~~,\a~.oa• 
*To Landowners for Improvements to Agricultural L1nd under the 
provisions of  til<.: Improvement of  Land Ac!s, 1864 and 1899. 
Source:  Agri--ultural  Mortga~e Corporation - II-
Table VII 
The Agricu1.trral Mortgage Corporation Limited-Loans  Gr~nted:  Purposes 
Year 
1948 
1949 
JC,~('I 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1<157 
1958 
19~9 
1!160 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197! 
1972 
,~1) 
'",  ... 
Purchase of  F.r.:m  Repay Dank  Rrpay Private  Working Capital  Improvements  Provide  Death Duties 
No. 
2RO 
347 
:-.58 
377 
454 
362 
240 
:!i4 
351 
466 
443 
324 
3'.10 
4110 
616 
359 
507 
478 
440 
679 
645 
954 
1,022 
7'15 
691 
t,cw=t 
\\t2. 
Mortgage  Conversion  Fee~  (ii) 
£  No.  £  No.  £  No.  £  No.  .t  No.  f.  No.  f. 
1,222,549  73  405 648  (Incl.uded  66  250.978  157  222,627  27  13,360 
1,409,476  98  (.87,614  10  84  2R4,0!6  229  31.5.411  20  3,005  I  31,500 
1,511,901  1,,8  l,l05,01i2  Col. 3)  79  351.926  310  505,701  12  1,315  1  15,600 
1,834,322  138  1,021,730  37  331,991  73  368,267  341  41?,448  2  430  5  94,600 
2,253,269  134  1,102,503  68  423,344  107  533,112  394  622,(.28 
1,814,823  152  1,:!81,445  49  369,684  116  51"1,850  282  427,017 
1,160,665  62  253.R90  29  129.470  78  207,R44  160  178,547 
1,272.9:>7  108  619,315  67  419,725  64  233.910  21i0  306,264 
1,8 iO, 175  Ill  725,090  64  328,471  60  211,5SO  2.l5  383,297 
2,025,290  237  1,242,714  90  331,672  128  216,2~0  255  2118,731 
2,410,935  172  718,118  103  417.825  94  174,907  200  27.l.579  4  14,546 
1,871.011  5!1  22fi  ..  l00  49  182,180  44  232,715  132  198,5SO  2  s.ooo 
2,7€1>/iSO  Ill  705.400  111  .557,043  I 14  301.(,52  249  508,587  4  191.250 
3.65.1.240  192  1,093,610  130  621,442  161  1,144,301  400  1,049.430  6  32,125 
5,2n.s-u  2<>4  2,164.535  112  562,260  165  732,325  368  844,977  7  43,100. 
3,507.410  221  1,342,160  92  402,450  98  276,470  290  490,730  .5  28.200 
6,035,122  324  2.564,842  124  617,765  188  669.646  317  649,742  8  65,250 
6,871,338  317  2,681,405  89  491,130  162  479,280  222  665,R70  7  148,650 
6.405,975  325  3,199,296  82  490,530  179  532,014  193  673,785 
10,8:i5,2~8  578  5,914,050  fl&  766,:'35  323  1.03~.221  327  1,271,591  10  90.830 
12,657,3'18  470  5.022,277  141  I,0\1,100  314  1.257,938  771!  1,212,367  12  139,700 
18,514,62]  601  6,890,()')9  213  1,812,484  453  2,084,476  J45  1,910,674  14  164,887 
17,973,900  763  8,184,522  222  1,483,771  464  1,901,256  383  2,039,837  13  142,887 
14,144,372  548  5,786,217  158  1.307,692  363  1,426,995  269  1,395,017  12  65,534 
11,458,660  404  4,148,756  133  1,137,302  284  1,1!7,426  213  1,091,307  13  106,891 
,..,,5S"f,l..l.i  'lib  10,1'1.1,\iC.  US'  l,'l~,.,  ...  ,  Sib  3 esa,'l.l.l  ~I  3,17'1,~•9  .ll  S.lS,'rlo7 
JS;l4Aa.q43  $57  11,\SI,l.l.it- 1'\3  l,cu,..,,~s  l..jJo2  ,..,OI~,C.43  'S.Lit- ....  ~,3.81+1  \leo  ~.c..~ 
The above S::~tistics include many multiple purpose loans (broken down according to pu.-pose). 
(i) Also included .mdcr 'Purchase of  Farm'. 
(li) Loans made available to enable farmer! to pay the 5 per cent. fee charaed for the conversion 
of  loans to a 3! per cent. basis as .1  re~ult of  f:~lling: intere~t rates. 
Table VIII 
Loans 
As at 31 March  1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
)969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
ff73 
W1't-
SCOTTISH  AGRICULTURAL  SECURITIES  CORPORATION 
Secured on 
Agricultural Subjects 
f. 
2,621,358 
2,849,019 
3,369,312 
3,612,401 
4,425,544 
5,566,699 
5,904,331 
6,263,495 
6,565,421 
7,774,678 
8,771,733 
10,032,864 
10,313,755 
ao,qltJ,S'io 
,.,~.  .... ,15'7 
Under the 
Improvement of  Land 
Acts 1864 and 1899 
£ 
38,395 
41,062 
38,550 
40,697 
40.571 
39,767 
45-269 
50,661 
52,588 
55,400 
48,967 
39,200 
35,705 
l3.~ 
34-, ,.11 
Purchase by 
Sitting Tenant (i) 
No.  £ 
not known 
.. 
31'8.815  75 
117  546,3·l5 
89  441,710 
56  24!1,260 
not known 
.. 
61'b,940  111 
118  760,070 
10a  80~.450 
127  91i5,770 
85  '909,700 
174  2,196,650 
134  1,906,333 
90  1,256.500 
125  2,258,550 
103  1,942,785 
194  4,417,176. 
179  3,170,8!14. 
107  2,232,635 
152  2,361,155 
.J.I~  3,~48.-~U 
\ICj  3., Ol.tlc,054-- 12-
Table  IX  SCO'f'riSH  ;\GRICULTUlL\L  SE;CURI'l'IES  COH.PORA'l'IO}Y 
Purpose of  Borrowing-N~w  JJoans 1973/7:'+ 
Purchase of  Property 
Repayment of  Bonds 
Buying out of Relatives and/or Partners 
Purchase of  Stock 
Improvements 
Repayment of  Overdraft 
Miscellaneous 
.l 
1,\t.l,Ooo 
,...., 000 
t.:l-,000 
l.-0,000 
S7 ooo 
~)·  000 
\t:ooo 
j\, 4-,.l,OOo 
Table X  SCOTTI5~ AGRICULTURAL  SECURITIES  CORPORATION 
Purposc.ofBorrowing-'Ad<1itional' Loa:.s 1973/74 
Purc.hase of  Land 
Repayinent of  Overdraft 
Imp!·overnents 
Stock 
Miscellaneous 
so,ooo 
b1  000 
I;}.~ 000 
~·ooo 
b.: Oo~ 
).14.9, 000 
On  the  basis  of the Enquiry published in 1973  for the United 
Kingdom  (Ava.ila.bili  ty of Capital and Credit to United Kingdom  Agriculture 
referred to above),  it· is known  that merchants  and dealers  provide 
agriculture with an amount  of  finance  comparable to that supplied by 
the  commercial banks.  rrhus,  for England and \fales,  they provided 
33  per .cent.  of  farmers'  total borrowings  in 1967/68  (compared with  34  per 
cent.  for the'banks)  and,  in 1968/69,  34  per cent.  (32  per cent.  from the 
banks).  For Scotland,  the  relevant figures  were  31  per cent.  (25  perront.) 
and  26  per cent.  (30  per cent.)  and,  for Northern Ireland, it greatly 
exceeded the  provision made  by the  baru~s  - 50  per cent.  from merchants 
and dealers  in 1967/68  (27  per cent.  from all banks)  and,  for  1968/69, 
41  per  9ent.  (2'7  per cent.).  It should be  noted that the figures  are 
likely to vary  over the course  of the year,  because  of  the  incidence  of 
5easonal factors  On  the whole,  these figures  seem to be  rather higher than 
one would have  expected and it is clear  (by comparing  the declared 
percentages  from  other  evidence)  that they are inflated by the  inclusion - 13-
of figures  that should have related to  'co-operatives'  and also  of 
items  that should more  properly have  been classified under  'auctioneers' 
Nevertheless,  even if ,ve  deduct the  figures  for the  co-operatives,  ,vhich 
are known  (see below),  the credit provided by merchants  and dealers is 
still very considerable.  Later figures  for merchants  and dealers  as  such 
are not available,  though an  indication will be  given Wlder  short-term 
.loans  - 'creditors'  in Table XJ(Ir. (Chapter 2).  These  figures,  however,  relu.te 
only to a  sample  survey  (details given in Chapter  2)  and are  ~n £sper farm. 
Hence,  they can again only give  one  an indication about  relative shares  and 
the trend.  But,  to  the  extent that the figure  for  'creditors'  does  in the 
_main  represent  1Inerchants  and dealers', it is clear that this source  of 
_credit is approximately as  important as  bank loans  (short- and medium-term) 
for tenants,  though  rather less  important for  owner-occupiers  and  farms 
with mixed tenure. 
Additional finance is provided by the  requisite'  co-operative 
societies to finance  inputs  and by the marketing co-operatives  to finance 
marketing.  Figures  are available under both these heads  (see  The 
Plu1ikett Foundation for Co-operative Studies:  Agricultural Co-operation 
in the United Kingdom  Summnry  of Statisti  .. cs 1970/71  and  1972/73) •  ~·or 
'reouisite'  societies  (Table  11), total creditors for  1968,  1969,  1970,  1971 
and  1972  were  respectively £21.37 million,  £21.69 million,  £23.08  million, 
£22.74 million and £28.00 million.  For marketing societies  (Table  19)  the 
relevant figures  -w·ere  £7.53  million,  £8.26 million,  £9.46 million,  £9.38 
million and £9.07 million.  To  the  extent that  'reouisite'  societies market 
produce,  which they do  to  a  considerable  extent,  or marketing societies 
handle  'requisites', which they do  to a  much  lesser extent,  these figures 
cannot be  taken as  a  precise  indication of credit extended to farmers  or to 
the trade,  but they can be  regarded as  a  fair guide.  It should  be  noted,  too, 
that societies aim to close their books  at the point in the year when  trading - 14-
activity is at its lO\·rest;  to thu  t  extent therefore the debtors' 
figure  may  be  on  the  low  side.  A further factor to be  taken into account 
is that these totals do  not include  the figures  of.  agricultural 
co-operatives  registered under  the  Companies  Act.  There are not  so 
many  of these  and  the  business ,.,hich they do,  though significant,  is a  good 
deal  smaller than that of  co-operative societies.  Most  of these  co-oper~tive 
companies  are  engaged in marketing. 
To  a  not  inconsiderable  extent,  the agricultural sector is self-
financing.  This  ma.y  take  place in four different 1vays.  ( 1)  Family and 
relatives,  1-rhich  is the  most  important  means  1vhereby  the agricultural 
sector finances  itself.  On  the basis  of the  sample  used in the Enquiry 
referred to  above  and  averag.ed  over  the  three years· 1967/68 to 1969/70, 
this source  provided  17  per cent.  of total bonPwings  by  owner-occupiers 
in England and \·Tales  and  19  per  cent.  in the  case  of tenants  (see Report, 
Table  12).  It was  much  lower  in Scotland- depending  on  the  type  of  farmingt 
3  to 4  per cent.  for  owner-occupiers  and  4  to  5  per cent.  for tenants  (see 
Report,  Table  49).  It was  negligible in Northern Ireland  ('rable  65). 
(2)  There  are  the  credit balances  carried by farmers  with their banks. 
In the sa.mple  covered by  our Enquiry,  for  owner-occupiers  in England and 
Wales,  bank balances  approximated  3  per cent.  of total assets  and this 
should be  compared with average borrowings  from the banks  - 7  per cent.  of 
total liabilities  (including net worth)  - clearly indicating that in our 
sample  owner-occupiers  borrowed much  more  neavily from the banks  than they 
deposited with them.  (However,  on  the basis  of  our  sample,  there were  more 
farmers  - owner-occupiers  and tenants  - who  had no  borrowings  f~om the  joint 
stock banks  on  the basis  of  overdraft than had borrowed from these 
institutions.  There  were  also a  number .of farmers  with no  outside debts  of 
any kind and who  completely financed themselves.)  For tenants,  cash a.t 
bank amounted to  8  to  9  per cent.  of total assets  compared with borrowings 
from the  banks  equal to 7  per  cent.  of total liabilities, so that to some - 15-
extent tenants  did finance  themselves  in this 1\fay.  In Scotland,  for 
owner-occupiers,  cash at bank was  sr~~ll but,  for tenants, it was  relatively 
high for  upland farming  (7 per cent.);  about  4  per cent.  for rearing and 
arable  and  only  2  per cent.  for dairying.  For Northern Ireland,  in dairying, 
bank balances  exceeded borrowings  from the banks;  for  livestock,  they w·ere 
virtually in balance.  (3)  ·rhe  sale  of agricultural  land for  redevelopment 
purposes  is a  further means  of  self-fin~,ncing  and,  moreover,  there has  been 
no  capital gains tax on  the difference betw·een  agricultural value  and 
development value,  provided the moneys  w·ere  reinvested in agricultural  land 
within a  period of 12  months.  But,  in 1974,  the  'development  ingredient' 
in such sales  became  liable to  income  tax and this has  had the  effect  of 
reducing the importance  of this source  as  a  means  of  fina,nce,  though it might 
be  argued that it was  less  a  source  of  self-finance than a  means  of 
persuading industry or  (in the  case  of  roads  and housing  demands)  the rest 
of the  community to help finance  investment in agrictilliure. 
'agricultural element  in the  land sold  could  be  rolled 
Only the 
2 
over  •  This 
could mean  a  loss to agriculture  of  some  £150 million a  year.  (4)  On 
the basis  of the Farm  ~~nagement Survey  (details are  given in Chapter 2), 
it was  estimated that for  1969/70 26  per cent.  of total funds  available 
to  owner-occupiers  for investment in England and ·vales  derived from  retained 
farm  earnings  (25  per cent.  in 1970/71)  - this would  be  substantially due 
to higher valuations  and  take  the  form,  for  example,  of an  increase in the 
number  and vnlue  of livestock or in crops  in store;  the relevant·figures for 
tenants  were  15  per cent.  and 24 per cent.  respectively. 
1. It is only an indication,  because assets  other than  land are  regularly sold 
by farmers,  but for  m·tner-occupiers  in England  and Vales  in 1969/70 9  per 
cent.  of total funds  available derived from sale of assets  {11  per cent.  in 
1970/71);  for tenants,  the figure  "\lfas  12  per cent.  in each  co.se.  (Farm 
Management  Survey - Farm Liabilities and Assets  - England and 'vales.) 
2.  But for present position,see p.216,  Chapter 6. - 16-
Other  private  sources  include solicitors  (2  per cent.  of total 
borrowings  in England and \vales;  and  11  per cent. for hill sheep and 
upland farming  in Scotland). 
Ancillary  finance is provided for agriculture by finance 
companies  (e.g.  by way  of hire  purchase  clnd  loans);  other assistance 
is provided by means  of  contract hire  and leasing.  And  in Northern 
Ireland special arrangements  are  offered by the Department  of 
Agriculture  (formerly the Ninls-L<.ry  of Agriculture)  as  DANI  loans 
(formerly  ~~NI loans).  Some  facilit1es  are also provided by  ~ne  ~tilk 
Narketing Board in England and  \iales  to assist dairy farmers. 
So  far as hire  purchase  is  concerned,  for England and Vlalcs, 
it only accounts for  1  per cent.  of total borrmvings  by agriculture. 
'-Others'  bvhich 1-1ould  include the l<lilk  11arketing Board)  provided 2  per 
cent.  on  the  oasis  of  our  Enquiry.  These  figures  are approximately 
consistent ·with estimates  made  by the· trade,  1vhich suggested that 
finance  companies  might  have  been providing  over the  period of  our 
Enquiry credit of the  order  of £15  million  {whereas  our  survey suggested 
a  figure  of approximately £17  million in 1967/68 and £19 million in 
1968/69).  For Scotland,  the  relevant figuroowere  1  per cent.  of total 
borrowings  for both years;  'others'  were  as high as  7  per cent.  and  8  per 
cent.,  but ther.e  1-1as  no  information about  the  ma.ke-up  of these figures. 
And  in Northern  Ireland,  hire purchase  finance  was  quite significant,  being 
5  per cent.  of total borrowings  in 1967/68 and  10  per  cent.  in 1968/69. 
This was  markedly higher than for  other parts  of the United Kingdom.  MAN! 
loans were  also· significant,  amounting  to  6  per  cent.  and 8  per cent. 
respectively. 
It is also relevant to recall that in both England  and  ''~ales  and 
in Scotland more  use  seems  to have  been made  of hire purchase  by tenants - 17-
than by owner-occupiers.  Averaged  over the three years  of  our Enquiry, 
for England and \vales,  the :figures  wore  3  per cent.  of total borrowings 
for tenants  and  1  per cent.  for  m-:r1er-occupiers.  For Scotland,_ the 
relevant figures  were  3  per cent.  and less than  1  per cent.  For all 
practical purposes,  there are  only  owner-occupbrs  in Northern Ireland. 
Of  the  several types  of farm in England and Wales,  the sectors that used 
hire purchase  finance  most ,.;ere  mainly tenants  (the  exception was 
pigs  and poultry owner-occupiers)  and,  of these,  mixed  farming  used it 
most;  dairying,  too  (if we  include  other);  also,  livestock and  cropping to 
some  extent. 
Only small  amounts  are  lent to agriculture by the insurance 
companies  and  building societies. 
Chapter  2:  The  Indebtedness  of Agriculture 
As  a  mca.ns  of  in<I.icating the distribution of  indebtedness,  the 
distribution of  farmer  borrowings  for All Farms  in England and 'vales 
is given in Table XI,  which was  included as  Table  12 at p.  16  in our 
Report  on  Availabi~ity of Capital  and Credit to United  Kingdom  Agriculture. 
This  is  based  on  the  sample  used in our bnquiry and breaks  the figures 
down  bet,veen  owner-occupiers  and tenants. 
Similar information is given for Scotland - Tables XII, XIII, 
and XIV  and,  for Northern Ireland in Tables  XV  and XVI. 
Complete  balance sheets  are  given for England and  Wales  at Table 
XVII,  for Scotland at Table XVIII,  and for Northern Ireland at Table XIX •. 
The  only balance sheet for United Kingdom  agriculture,  which also 
gives  us  an approxitnate  idea of the  extent  of the  industry's  indebtedness 
is that prepared for June  1970  by the Ministry of Agriculture in the United 
Kingdom as  a  once for all exercise in connection with the Report  on the 
Availability of Capital and Credit to United Kingdom Agriculture - 18-
Table XI 
Distribution of Farmer BoiTowings-All Farms-England and Wales 
Owner-Occupiers  Tenants 
67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge.  67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge. 
%  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Institutional 
AMCl  7  10  11  9  1  1 
Joint stock banks-loans  8  8  5  7  1  1  1  1 
overdrafts  28  27  26  27  23  24  23  23· 
Other banks1 
Lands Improvement Company 
Other 
Insurance companies  1  1 
Building societies  1  2  1  1  1 
ICFC3 
Sub-Totall  45  46  43  45  25  26  26  26 
Private 
Family and relatives  16  16  19  17  19  18  21  19 
Others 
Solicitors  3  3  2  2 
Other  4  3  3  3  1  1 
Landlords'  1  1  I 
Sub-Total2  23  21  24  23  21  21  22  21 
Trade 
Hire  purc~1ase  1  1  2  2  3  3  3  3 
Merchants and dealers  29  30  29  29  48  46  44  46 
Auctioneers 
FMC• 
Co-operatives 
Syndicates 
Other farmers and growers 
Other  1  1  1  1  3  4  4  4 
Sub-Total3  32  3Z  32  32  54  53  52  53 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
No.  173  177  154  168  173  179  147  166 
Foot11otes to Table .  .AI 
1  Agricultural Mortgage Corporation. 
•  Includes merchant banks. 
a  Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation. 
'  For 0wncr-occupiers, this is a surprising item. The sample that was selected was ba:;cd.on re!urns 
in the  Cen~us  and were owner-occupiers pure and  simple. It  is possible that the returns were 110t 
completely accurate. Alternatively, these farmers may have rented hmd subsequent to the Census. 
•  Fatstock Marketing Corporation. - 19-
Table  XII 
Scotland 
Distribution of  Borrowings-Rearing and Arable (Non-Coys) 
Owner-Occupiers  Tenants 
67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge  67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge 
Institutional  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
SASC  9  9  9  9 
Joint stock banks-
loans  2  1 
overdrafts  24  33  24  27  33  41  35  36 
Insurance  companies  9  8  8  8 
ICFC  4  3  4  4 
Sub-Total1  46  53  45  48  35  41  35  37 
Private 
Family and relatives  19  16  13  16  20  15  15  17 
Others  4  4  3  3 
Landlords  2  2  2  2 
Sub-Total2  21  18  15  18  24  19  18  20 
Trnde 
Hire purchase  4  3  1  3 
Merchants and dealers  23  17  28  22  30  27  37  31 
Auctioneers  1  1  1 
Co-operatives  2  3  3  3  3  1 
Syndicates 
Other farmers and growers  2  2  1  1  2  2  2 
Others  6  8  1  7  6  4  6  s 
Sub-Total3  33  29  40  34  41  40  47  43 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Number of  Respondents  20  20  20  20  28  28  28  28 
Table  XIII 
Scotland 
Distribution of  Borrowings-Hill Sheep and Upland Farming (Non-Coys) 
Owner-Occupiers  Tenants 
67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge  67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge 
Institutional 
%  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
SASC 
Joint stock banks-
loans 
overdrafts  12  9  9  10  26  28  27  27 
Others  14  14  14  14 
Insurance  companies  6  s  s  s 
Sub-Total1  32  28  28  29  26  28  27  27 
Private 
Family and relatives  6  8  7  7  25  31  33  30 
Sol:dtors  11  11  11  11 
Sub-Total2  17  19  18  18  25  31  33  30 
Trade 
Hire purchase 
Merchants and  de~lcrs  37  43  40  40  38  24  27  29 
Auctioneers 
Co-operatives 
Syndicates 
Other farmers and growers  10  6  12  9  1  3  2  2 
Others  s  4  2  4  10  14  11  12 
Sub-Total3  51  53  54  53  49  41  40  43 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Nl•rnber of  Respondents  7  7  7  7  14  14  14  14 - 20-
Table XIV 
Scotland 
Distribution of Borrowings-Dairying (Non-Coys) 
Owner-Occupters  Tenants 
67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge  67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge 
Institutional  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  Y. 
SASC 
Joint stock banks-
loans 
overdrafts  18  14  15  16  33  26  27  28 
Insurance companies  3  3  3  3 
Sub-Tota11  21  17  18  19  33  26  27  24 
Private 
.  Family and relatives  20  27  19  22  15  22  21  19 
Others  2  2  2  2 
Sub-Total2  22  29  21  24  15  22  21  19 
Trade 
Hire purchase  2  3  2  8  8  7  I 
Merchants and dealers  46  40  47  44  38  40  36  38 
Auctioneers 
Co-operatives  t  1  1 
Syndicates 
Other farmers and growers 
Others  10  11  10  10  6  4  9  1 
Sub-Tota13  57  54  61  57  52  52  52  SJ 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100  100  too  100 
Number of  Respondents  2Q  20  20  20  4  4  4  " 
Table -A.'IT 
Northern Ireland 
Distribution of  Borrowings-Dairying (Non-Coys) 
Owner-Occupiers  Tenants 
67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge  67/68  68/69  69/70  Avge 
Institutional  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Joint stock banks-loans  8  3 
overdrafts  36  31  30  32 
Other banks  5  1  2  3 
MANI  6  4  2  4 
Sub-Totall  47  36  42  42 
Private 
Family  4  4  3  4 
Solicitors  10  8  6 
Sub-Tota12  4  14  11  10 
Trade 
Hire purchase  8  8  3  6 
Merchants and dealers  41  42  41  41 
.Co-operatives 
Syndicates 
Other  2  1 
Sub-Tota13  49  50  47  48 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100 
Number of  Respondents  20  23  28  24  1 - 21-
Table XVI 
Northem Ireland 
Distribution ofBonowings--Livcstock (Non-Coys) 
Owner-Occupiers  Tenants 
67/68  (.8/69  W/70  Avge  67/68  68/69  6'){70  Avge 
Institutional  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Joint stock banks-loans  15  10  7  11 
overdrafts  4  13  31  16 
Other banks  4  3  2  3 
Other  6  2 
MANI  6  10  6  7 
ICFC  2  1  1  1 
Sub-Tota11  31  37  53  40 
Private 
Family  12  12  9  11 
Sub-Tota12  12  12  9  11 
.Trade 
Hire purchase  4  10  8  7  59  20 
Merchants and dealers  53  41  30  42  41  100  100  80 
Co-operatives 
Syndicates 
Other 
Sub-Tota13  57  51  38  49  100  100  100  100 
TOTAL  ·too  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Number of  Respondents  20  21  28  23  2  2  2  2 
TableXvii 
Balance Sheet for England and \Vales 
(Average for 3 years-1967/63 to 1969/70) 
Based  on  sample  in \tilson R~~~~ 
Occupiers  Tenants 
Assets 
%  % 
Value ofland, buildings, etc.  70 
Land purchases, improvements, etc.  3  s 
Net machinery, etc.  7  29 
Tenant's valuation  IS  Sl 
Outstanding debtors  2  7 
Cash at bank  3  8 
Cashin hand 
TOTAL  100  100 
Liabilities 
Institutional: 
%  % 
AMC  2 
Joint stock banks-loans  2 
overdrafts  6  6 
Others 
Private: 
Family  4  s 
Solicitors  1 
Others  1 
Trade: 
Hire purchase 
Merchants  6  13 
Oth\<iS  1 
Net worth (residual)  78  73 
TOTAL  100  100 
Mean value of  assets  £47,602  £12,490 
Mean value ofliabilitics  £10,294  £3,416 
Average net worth  £37,309  £9,074 
Liabilities as %of  assets  2~  27 
Net worth as %  of  assets  78  73 - 22-
Table XVIII 
Balance Sheet for Scotland 
(Average for 3 year~-1967/68  to 1969/70) 
Based  on  sam~le in  All Tenants  All Owner-Occupiers  All Scotland 
rlilson H.epor  % 
O'  %. 
Assets 
/o 
Value ofland  3  67  so 
Land purchases. 
improvements, etc. 
Imrrovcments brought forward  4 
Improvements during year  1 
Net machinery, etc.  i9  6  10 
Tenant's valuation  63  21  32 
Outstanding debtors  s  2  3 
Cash at bank  s  3  3 
Cash in hand 
TOTAL  100  100  100 
Liabilities  %  %  % 
Institutional: 
AMC 
SASC 
Joint stock banks-loans 
overdrafts  7  4  4 
Other banks 
Others 
Private: 
Family 
Solicitors 
4  ·3  3 
Others 
Trade: 
Hire purchase  1 
Merchants  6  s  6 
Others  2  2  2 
Net worth  79  84  83 
TOTAL  100  teo  100 
Mean value of  assets £  19,279  i1,266  35,606 
Mean value of  liabilities£  3,954  8,342  6,194 
Average net worth £  15,325  -42,924  29,412 
Liabilities as %of  assets  21  16  17 
l'olet worth as·% of  assets  79  84  83 - 23-
Table  XIX 
Balance Sheets for Northern Ireland 
(Average for 3 ycars-1967/68 to 1969/70) 
Based  on sample  in \'lilson Re.port 
Owner-Occupiers 
Dairying  Livestock  All Farms 
Non-Co  Non-Co  in the Sample 
Number of  Respondents  24  23  47 
%  %  % 
Assets 
Value ofland  73  72  73 
Land purchases, improvements, etc.  l  4  3 
Improvements brought forward 
Improvements during year 
Net machinery, etc.  7  s  ,. 
u 
Tenant's valuation  14  15  14 
Outstanding debtors 
Cash at bank  3  3  3 
Cashin hand  1  1  1 
TOTAL  100  100  100 
Liabilities 
Institutional:  %  %  % 
AMC 
SASC 
Joint stock banks-loans 
overdrafts  1  2  2 
Other banks 
MANI 
Others 
Private: 
Family 
Solicitors 
Others 
Trade: 
Hire purchase 
Merchants  2  s  3 
Others 
Net worth  96  89  93 
TOTAL  100  100  too 
Mean value of  assets £  23,052  24,344  23,569 
Mean 'talue of  liabilities £  899  2,687  1,614 
Average nP.t worth £  22,153  21,657  21,955 
Liabilities as %of  assets  4  11  7 
Net worth as % of  assets  96  89  93 - 24-
published in 1973.  'rhis  appca.rs  as  Te..ble  XX.  and  should  be  rer..d  in 
con.iuction with the  Note  prepared by the Ninis-try  (attached).  It is 
highly  D p)roxim<).te.  As  at ,June  1970 nnd, on this basis,  the total amount 
of debt  of  United Kingdom  2..gricul  turo  8J1tOlUlt.cd  to about £1,320 million. 
By  the  oncl  of  19  ... /3,  taltint:;  into  account  the rise in prices that had  occurred 
this  mD.y  possibly hfl.ve  been  of tho  order  of £1,300 million. 
A Balance Sheet for United Kingdo1n Agriculture 
Estbnated balance sheet of  agriculture (including horticulture) in 
the United Kingdonz June 1970-all coJnnzercially significant holdings 
AssETS 
Physical 
Land, buildings, dwellings and fixed equipment 
Machinery, vehicle~ and movable equipment 
Livestock 
Crops, cultivations, stores 
Financial 
Debtors 
Cash in hand and at bank 
Total Assets 
LIABILITIES 
Debts 
£million 
5,800 
800 
1,300 
570 
200 
200 
8,870 
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, SASC & LIC, etc.  170 
Buildin~ Socktie::>, Insurance Companies, etc.  30 
Bank Credit  500 
Private Credit  350 
Hire Purchase  20 
Trade Credit  250 
Total Debt  1,320 
Net Worth  1,550 
Total Liabiliti'!S  8,870 
Note by l\1inistry 
Estimates of  the approximate aggregate value of  the main assets and liabilities 
of  U nitcd IUngdom agriculture have bccri published frorn time to time. In 
recent years, some of  the statistics used for such estimates have been improved 
or become more readily avai1able. For example, for England and Wales, the 
inforn1ation on land sales returned to the Inland Revenue, and the statements 
of  assets and liabilities for some 550 f~rn1s collected in the Farn1 -rv1anagcmcnt 
Sarvey. The estimates in the tnb1e above have been prepared by the Ministry 
from all such basic statisti~  .. s now available including the new information 
collected by Professor Wibon. The quality of  these basic statistics varied and 
different sources of  information for some items in the balance sheet sOindimes 
yielded different figures. Thus the estimates depend partly on judgement, and are 
reliable as broad indications rather than precise calculations. - 25-
METHOD  AND  SOURCFS 
This balance sheet is designed to show the approximate aggregate break-up or 
realisation value of total agricultural assets in the United Kingd01n at prices 
ruling in mid-1970 and the value of  the clain1s that each major supplier off..mds 
has on  tb~se assets. 
COVERAGE 
The estimates relate to all commercially significant holdings, that is, for Great 
Britain, all known agricultural and horticultural holdings with at lease 26 
standard man-days or I  0 acres of  crops and grass or one regular whole-time 
worker; for Northen1 Ireland, all holdings of I acre or more. 
The estimates relate, in principle, to the combined business interest in agriculture 
and horticulture of  the three groups owner-occupiers, tenants, and landlords. 
They are intended to exclude assets and liabilities held on priYate or domestic 
account, and liabilities of  one group to another, e.g., arrears of  rent owed to a 
landlord. However, because of  inadequate data some private debts of  farmers 
may be inc1uded, and the business debts of  landlords may be understated. 
LAND, BUILDINGS, FIXED EQUIPMENT, DWELLINGS 
The owner-occupied acreage returned in the June 1970 Agricultural Census has 
been valued, by acreage size group and region, by the average sale prices 
realised for land sold with vacant possession during 1970. Tenanted acreage has 
been valued at  -sale price ofland sold without vacant possession. The average 
sale prices for each acreage size group and region are derived from returns made 
to the Inland Revenue. These excll.ldc sales of  less than I  0 acres and of  land sold 
for development. The sale values include buildings, fixed equipment sold with 
the land, farm houses and cottages. Both farm houses and fann cottages let 
with holdings are business assets fron1 the landowner's point ofvievol; farm 
houses, to a minor degree, and farn1 cottages are business assets from the 
farmer's point of  view. In the context of  the national economy as a whole, 
they are part of  the sector 'All Dwellings' rather than 'Agriculture' and as such 
are excluded from the assets of  agriculture. Their market values with vacant 
possession and unco1U1ected \Vith the agricultural business exceeds their value 
as part of  the business, or tied value. This calculated as 25 years purchase of 
the current rent, attributable to them, is estimated at about £900 n1illion. 
MACIDNERY, Vc""HICLES-AND MOVABLE EQUIPMENT 
Current replacement costs for new assets written down by depreciation provi· 
sions to represent current market value. The life assumed for depreciation 
varies between n1achines, but is on average about 12 years. The number of 
machines is based on returns in the Agricultural Census. Costs are based chiefly 
on information about ex-factory values supplied to the Department of  Trade 
and Industry by manufacturers, and on inforn1ation about distributive margins 
between the factory and the farm-gate from the Census of  Distribution. 
LIVESTOCK, CROPS AND CULTIVATIONS 
The estimates for livestock are based on average market prices ruling in May. 
June and July minus e~timatcd  costs ofn1arketing. The estimates for crops and 
cultivations are valued at c0st of  production to the farmer, plus an addition 
for fanner's net income. - 26-
STORES 
This item comprises fertilizers, purchased feed and stocks of  hay and harvested 
cereals. 
DEBTORS, CASH IN HA~D  AND AT BANK 
The Farm Management Survey and Professor 'Vilson's ficld cnqujry supply 
average ratios.of debtors to total annual receipts, and of  cash holdings to total 
annual expenditure. These ratios have been applied to the estimates of  receipts 
and expenditure prepared in the calculation of  aggregate fanning net inco1ne 
for the Annual Review. 
LIABILITIFS 
AGRICULTURAL MORTGAGE CORPORATION, SCOTTISH AGRICULTURAL SECURITIES 
CORPORATION AND LANDS IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, ETC. 
Total loans at June 1970 by these bodies, and loans by smaller bodies, such as 
the ICFC and the Agricultural Finance Federation. 
BUILDING SOCIETIES, INSURANCE COMPANIES, ETC. 
Based on the Farm Management Survey and Professor Wilson's field enquiry. 
BANK CREDIT 
Based on returns by the cotnmercial banks; excludes loans to agricultural 
merchants and auctioneers, and loans to farmers and landlords for private 
purposes. It  includes meJium- and long-term lending for purchase and improve-
ment of  land. 
PRIVATE CREDIT 
This comprises loans from private persons, including relatives. It  is based on 
the Farm  ~A:anagement Survey and Professor Wilson's field enquiry. 
HIRE PURCHASE 
Based chiefly on retun1s by hire purchase finance houses to the Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
TRADE. CREDIT 
The margin of  error of  this figure is probably larger than for other items. It is 
based on the estimates of  annual aggregate farming expenditure prepared for 
the Annual Review, and on an annual enquiry to a small sample of  agricultural 
merchants about farmers' average delay in paying bills. The figure represents 
all unpaid bills. 
TAXATION 
No provisions have been made in the balance sheet for liability for income or 
capital gains tax or  for estate duty. 
SoURCE: Ministry of  Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. - 27-
l1
1or an analysis  of the  sources  and disposition of funds  in 
agriculture at the  aggregate  level,  see  Table XXI,  "\vhich  provides 
figures  for  the United  Kingdom  from  1965  to  1972. 
Table  XXI 
Analysis of  the Sources and Disposition of  Funds in Agriculture at the 
Aggregate Level 
United Kingdom-£ million 
Calendar years  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Sources of  Funds 
1.  Net Income(l)(')  466  476  509  504  535  597  669  15S 
2.  Net Rent(2)(')  46  48  51  53  54  55  53  '51 
3.  Depreciation provision(3)  130  140  148  158  173  189  213  241 
4.  Government grants on fixed assets(5)  19  18  23  35  39  45  61  71 
5.  (of which investment incentives)(')  (2)  (11)  (11)  (14)  (21)  (12) 
6.  Additional commercial credit(7)  34  17  26  34  14  6  31  54 
7.  ToTAL  695  699  757  784  815  892  1,027  1,172 
Disposition of  Funds 
Investment in: 
8.  Plant, Machinery and Vehicles  105  107  111  123  113  118  136  180 
.9.  Buildings and Works  67  6S  75  -88  99  114  140  167 
10.  Increased stocks and works in 
progress(')(8)  40  35  37  52  70  Jl6  158  164 
11.  Tota1 Investment  212  207  223  263  282  348  434  511 
12.  Statutory National Insurance 
contributions(•)  15  16  16  17  19  19  21  24 
13.  Income and Corporation Tax(1°)  55  61  66  15  79}  s2s}  sn}  J  4.  Domestic expenditure, land purchase,  637 
and off farm use(11)  413  415  452  429  435 
15. ToTAL  695  699  757  784  815  892  1,027  1,172 
Notes to Table 
(I) Aggregate net farm income including the valuation of  stocks and works-in-
progress shown in row 10 and before making provision for depreciation. 
(2)  Gross rent less landowners' share of1naintenance and depreciation. 
(3)  Depreciation, calculated at current replacement cost, on all fixed assets 
(row 8 plus row 9) on the  ·'national farm'. 
{4)  Estimated by taking /1 and f2 of  consecutive June/May year estimates. 
(5)  Government Gradts on all cnpital expenditure but excluding grants received 
for current expenditure (e.g., fertilizer subsidy) which are included in farm 
income. 
(6)  These were introduced at the end of  1966 and replaced investment allowances 
which reduced farmers' tax burden. 
(7)' Change in commercial borrowings from banks, including an amount for 
land purchases, from the Agricultu:-al Mortgage Corporation (and similar 
bodies), excluding funds lent for land purchase, and from hire purchase 
companies; changes ;,1 credit obtained from merchants are excluded. - 28-
(8)  Change in the valuation of  crops and livestock stocks, and works-in-
progress. In part represented by increasing unit values and in part by increased 
volume. 
{9)  Estimates of  national health and national insurance contributions paid by 
farmers at the self-employed rate and not dedncted as an expense before arriving 
at fann income.  '"' 
{10)  Estimates of  income and corporation tax; source: 'Inland Revenue 
Statistics 1972'. 
{11)  This is a residual item obtained by subtracting rows 11 to 13 from row 7. 
It represents the money available to farmers for do1nestic expenditure, land 
purchase and other off  farm uses. 
SouRCE: Ministry~~  Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. 
For more  recent information relating to the distribution of 
indebtedness  - ~ecifically for England  and  \~ales,  which represents 
approximately SOper  cent.  of agricultural activity in the United Kingdom  -
and also as  a  means  of assembling  appropriate balance  sheet information, 
reference is made  to -the  Farm 1-lanagement  Survey  of Liabilities and 
Assets.  This  wa.s  beguh in 1969/70,  when  10 University Departments 
of Agricultural Economics  in England and Wales  began collecting data for 
the Ministry of Agriculture.  This  relates to  some  600  farms  (i.e., to 
about  a  quarter  of  the  2,500 farms  in the Farm Hanagement  Survey}  and 
the figures  are  averaged as  £s  per farm. 
As  will be  apparent  from the  Tables,  the  sample varies slightly 
from year to year,  though there is  overlap.  Thus,  for  1970/71,  balance 
sheets have  been constructed for the beginning  of the accounting year  (1970) 
and the  end  of the accounting year  (1971)  for all types  of  farming 
(excluding horticulture).  For this series  of  calculations,  the  numbers  of 
farms  in the  samples  were  210 for tenanted farms,  189 for  owner-occupied, 
~nd 157 for  farms  with mixed tenure.  For the  1971/72  calculations,  the 
~elevant figures  were  238,  203,  and  191 and,  for 1972/73,  255,  222  and  208. 
The  overlap is  for  1971  and for  1972,  but clearly one  set of  calculations is not 
fully comparable with another because  or variation in the content  of the sample. - 29-
The  figures  refer - as  do all balance  sheets  - to a  point in time. 
In these  calculations,  the  average year  ending date is  about  mid-February 
and it must  be  realised that this  may  not give  a  representative picture 
of the financial position as it '\'l'ould  be  for the year  on  average.  For 
example,  at mid-February,  cropping  farms  have  generally sold much  of the 
previous year's harvests  and  more  than usual  of their assets will be 
financial rather than physical,  such as  growing  or  stored crops.  This  is 
also the position of  those  livestock fa.rmcrs,  vho  buy stores in the spring 
for  subsequent fattening,  but the  reverse  is true  of  most  farm businesses 
dependent  on  breeding sheep. 
It should be  emphasised that every effort has  been made  to  elimi~~te 
private  or domestic  liabilities or assets,  so that figures  refer  only to 
the  farming  business.  Hmvever,  because  of the  element  of  judgement 
involved in valuing certain assets  - in particular,  land,  buildings,  and 
residential improvements,  the absolute  level  of some  of the figures  should 
be treated with reserve  and  this  remains  true despite the attempt to value 
land,  buildings,,  and fixed  equipment at current market  prices at the 
beginnng  of the trading year.  Nevertheless,  the figures  do  represent broad 
differences in the  capita:).  position of the three types  of tenure  (tenanted, 
owner-occupied,  and partly owned/partly tenanted)  and for the size  of 
business  indicated  (275  to 4,199 SHDs  or  'standard man  days',  where  these 
represent 8  hours  productive work by an adult male  worker  'under average 
conditions').  Reference is to Table XXII.  Separate calculations are  made  for 
farms  under  275  SMDs  and for horticulture  (275  to· 4,199  SMDs).  {Tables XXIII 
and XXIV.) - 30-
LIAlliLITIES  AND  ASSETS  SURVEY,  ENGLAND  AND  WALES 
Bnlan_ce  ~eets fgr  th_?:_begi!:IP._i_!!£_!l!ld  el}!L9.Ll96~/'i0_~~-Q}lt:'Jin_g__ yoar_for  a]_L_ivpe5  of 
farming  (exdudi_.!JJL_horticul!J;..reLg.Y....i.Y.Qe  of t('nure  on  ta,np:-:;  275-4. 199  smd  (average 
full-timet  £'s per  farm 
Type  of Tenure  'l'E'i A!'!TED  OVrNER .. QCCL'!'I&.'D  FAR.'AS  WI Tii  MIXED  T~'1JRE 
No.  of Fanns  231  174  144 
Average  size of Business:  smd  874  818  972 
Average  size of Farm:  acres  203  178  208 
1969  1970  Chal!ge  1969  1970  Change  1~69  1970  Cn~ge 
ASSETS 
Fixed  Assets 
I 
l.and  &  builaings  1,031  1,394  363  30,385  31,057  672  20,646  21,011  365 
Machinery  & equipment  3,390  3,409  19  3, 037  3, 133  96  3,701  3,85~  152 
Breeding  livestock  2,803  2,993  190  2,803  3, 047  244  2,900  3,062  162 
Total  fixed  assets  7,224  7,796  572  36,225  37,237  1,012  27,247  27,926  679 
Current  Assets 
Trading  livestock  1, 702  l, 874  172  1, 592  1, 721  129  2, 072  2,221  119 
Crops  1,504  1,649  145  1,455  1,604  149  2,176  2,313  137 
Consumable  stores  520  630  110  346  393  47  509  463  :•116 
Debtors  849  991  142  856  808  •48  1,022  984  -38 
Cash  at bank  &  in hand  764  '117  ... 4'7  857  891  34  942  913  •29 
Total  current assets  5,339  5,861  522  5,106  5,417  311  6,722  6,895  173 
TOTAL  ASSETS  ~  12,563  13,657  1,094  41,331  42,654  1,323  33,969  34,821  852 
LIAGILITIES 
Long  &  Medium  Term  l.oans 
Agricultural Mortgage  Corpn- .  - .  836  996  160  805  959  15~ 
Lands  Improvement  Co  - .  .  3  3  ..  .  .  - Insurance  Companies  4  4  ..  40  39  ·1  9  9  . 
Building Societies  14  14  .  117  121  4  64  63  •1 
Bank  loans  191  233  42  1, 303  1,143  •160  800  816  16 
Loans  from  relatives  506  531  25  1,654  1, 742  88  1, 228  1,253  25 
Other  214  298  84  600  638  38  752  722  •30 
Total  long & medium 
t~rm loans  929  1,080  151  4,554  4,682  128  3,658  3,822  164 
Short  Term  Loans 
Hire purchase  79  48  •31  22  25  3  39  44  5 
Credftors  1,110  1, 287  177  795  788  •7  894  837  •57 
Bank  overdraft  1,251  1, 373  122  1,889  2,032  143  1,961  1, 711  01250 
Other  20  37  8  104  91  •13  38  29  •9 
Total  short term  loans  2,469  2,745  276  2,810  2,935  125  2,932  2,621  •311 
Net  worth  9,166  9,832  .666  33,967  35,036  1,069  2'7, 379  28,378  999 
TOTAL  LIABILITIES  12,563  13,657  1,094  41,331  42,654  1,323  33,969  34,821  8~2 
----- ---·-· 
p After depreciation sules  and  government ·grants. T
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'flible XXII  (iii) 
LIABILITIES  AND  ASSETS  sunv;;y,  EJWU•ND  AllD  WALtS 
£ 1 s  per far!:) 
- Type  of Tenure  TENANTED  mmER-CCCUP IED  FARMS  WITH  MID'D  'fENURE 
Nu.m'!:.cr  of Fartns  238  203  191 
Av(·ra.ge  sh:e of Business:  smd  897  8h7  1009 
AvcrRge  size of Farm:  acreg  191  171  226 
Change  Change  Change 
1971  1972  1971/72  1970/71  1971  1972  1971/72  1970/71  1971  1972  1971/72  1970/71 
.i.SSETS  r---
Fi:x:~d  Assets 
J..;.nd  &  buildings  1158  I  1489  331  208  .34424  3C900  1!176  798  26395  29979  3584  ~80 
(:;f which valuation change}  - - - - - - 3740  - 2312  -
t1achinery  and  equtpr:~nt  .3287  35'28  2h1  95  .3089  3358  269  130  4111  4426  315  158 
P.r~eding livestock  .317h  .3510  636  222  .3026  .3587  561  119  3185  3751  566  6.3 
(of Yhich valuation change)  - - 599  - 6.3'{  - 627  -
Total fixed As5ets  7619  8327  1208  525  405.38  458LS  5307  10!17  3.3691  .381.56  lili6.5  1201 
Current Assets 
Trading livestock  21.32  f  2689  557  173  2290  2861  571  117  231.5  .3181  866  291 
Crops  1640  1849  209  105  1454  1697  243  54  2328  2628  300  9 
Consumable  stores  565  6W"  eo  82  488  608  120  89  767  888  121  171 
Debtors  928  1210  282  7J  894  887  -7  19  1086  1319  233  163 
Cc.sh  at bank and in hand  876  885  10  128  1o62  1241  179  1.30  1125  1066  -59  282 
Total  Current Assets  6141  7277  11,38  561  6188  7295  1107  h69  7621  9082  1461  916 
TOTAL  ASSETS  p  13759  16105  2.346  1086  46726  53140  6414  1516  41312  47238  5926  2117 
LIABILITIES 
Lon&  &  Medium  Term  Loans 
Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation  - - - - 830  849  19  7  P.97  •044  147  12.3 
Building Societies  - - - - 37  36  -1  -6  57  92  35  1.3 
Other institutional  s  3  -2  - 117  15'7  40  _,  142  149  7  10 
Bank  loans  206  209  J  12  651  661  10  29  864  859  -5  -8.3 
Loans  from relatives  5'10  h57  -53  .34  1424  1284  -140  -43  139.3  1425  .32  79 
Othor  107  113  6  14  789  814  25  142  322  37.3  51  -266 
'l'otal tons & Medium  Term  loans  827  782  -45  60  3848  )802  -46  128  3673  .3941  268  -124 
~ort Term  Loans 
Hire  purchase  8.3  68  -15  - 25  36  1  1  -14  67  .39  -28  7 
Creditors  1".359  1/iliJ  84  232  913  877  -36  53  1014  1  111  97  .313 
~ank overdraft  1021  1261  240  19  1596  1761  165  173  1845  2197  .352  -99 
Other  48  65  17  2  50  53  3  19  36  53  17  -20 
.Total Short Term  Loans  2510  2833  328  253  2586  2727  141  2.31  2962  .3400  438  201 
'Net  worth  10422  12486  2064  77.3  40292  46610  6318  1157  .34677  39896  5219  2040 
TOTAL  LIABILITIES  13759  16105  2346  1086  46726  53140  6414  1516  41312  47238  5926  2117 
-- 4•---
P  After depreciation sales  and  goverrunent  grants. - 33-
'rable  :x~xrr  (iv) 
LI...BILITIE.'>  AND  ASSJ:.'T$  SURVEY 1  EH'JLAl\'D  ANL'  ~AL:t~~ 
-
Balance  chcc>ts  for  tr~__£Q_!llj._!lr;  ar.rl  e!'ld  of  ,~Uv-~::.£..o:L'l!ir:.E.J..eRr for  ("1_11  t.yues  of_f!lrn!ing 
(excludi.!!l;_ho:·ti cul,turi}J  by  tyre of tenure  on  fums  ?.'1:>-J.I,  -~~-?  E.~dfavern.;e  jull~t.Hi•tl) 
-· 
Type  of Tenure  TENAN1'ED  o:mER-OCCUP:::~'D  FAR·IS  'dlTH  tllJ\£1 J  Ti:liUI<B 
-
Nur:.bcr  of  funus  255  222  2o8 
Avf'r:Jr;e  Size of Business:  smd  911  854  969 
.\•!crag-;  Size 'Of .  .F'arm:  acres  212  188  201  - I 
1972  1973  Change  1972  1973  ~hange  1972.  1973  Change 
At.3ET3 
Fixed  Aosets 
L.:md  ru:d  buildings  1313  1663  }.50  43329  ,53;35  10656  26676  41159  'i4'•83 
(of \r!li ch  valuation ch-:mee)  - 9655  12004 
N::\chin<'ry  <llld  equipme-nt  3599  4296  697  3)46  3791  445  3963  4538  575 
Breeang livectock  4115  5197  1082  3?79  1•720  941  3727  48~4  1156 
(of 1-rhich  vnluation ch'lnge)  ?65  757  667 
Total  fixed  assets  ctJ2?  11156  2129  50454  62496  12C42  34367  .50501  16?.'14 
Cc.!'rent  :,osets 
Tr~ding liveztock  2725  3746  1021  2613  3518  905  31R3  4416  1?33 
Crop::;  1709  2276  56?  1863  ~226  363  2533  3197  664 
Consumable  stores  6;J)  829  179  595  710  116  697  866  169 
Debt'lrs  1073  1115  42  3?8  1110  182  116o  1161  1 
Ca£>.:  <it  ban!'  and in hand  862  84?  16  1374  1;,52  177  915  106o  1h4 
Total  cur~ent nr.setn  '7020  8812  1793  7372  9115  1743  8488  10699  2211 
'roTAL  A.SS:!-7.1'3  ¢  16o47  19969  3922  5782~  ?1611  13785  11?.855  6128o  18425 
----
Liri.BILI'l'Its 
Lon3  and  N!'diun  Term  Loans 
<~e:ricult\tral Hort;;age  Corpn.  13  13  - 968  939  -29  1074  1141  68 
Building Societieo  - - - 27  51  24  1tlo  155  - 5 
Other Institutional  11  16  5  33  30  ~ 3  75  71  - It 
Bank  loans  105  154  50  716  855  139  548  5.35  - 13 
Loans  fro~ relatives  516  493  - 23  1624  151)7  -57  877  894  17 
Other- 65  65  - 855  e.1P.  -37  220  231  12 
Total  lon!"  and medium  term loans  710  I  ?42  32  42?.3  42(0  38  2953  3026  73 
Short  ':'cr~ Loans 
IIil·e  purchase  74  89  14  28  29  2  52  6o  8 
Creditors  1335  1,508  173  1026  1104  78  949  1100  152 
Bank  overdr::~.fts  1192  1507  }15  1563  186o  297  236/i  2956  591 
Oth'!'r  .  35  6o  24  34  42  7  31  22  - 9 
Total short  term  loans  2637  3163  526  ?.651  3035  }84  3YT/  4139  742 
Net  worth  12700  16o64  ~3154  50952  64315  13363  36;J)5  54114  17609  -
'lUT!IL  U.\BILITI  1::.3  16o47  199159  )922  57826  71C11  13785  42855  61280  18425 
RATIOS 
Current  assete as ~ of current 
liabilities  266.2  278.6  - 278.1  300.3  - 249.9  25R.5  - Liquid aesets as %  pf current 
liabilities  73.4  62.0  - 86.8  87.7  - 61.1  .53.6  - Total ansets  ~s %  of total 
liabilities (less l'!ot  worth)  479.5  511.4  - 841.3  981.6  - 674.9  855.2  - Long  and  mediu~  t~rrns loans as 
%of net worth'  5.6  4.6  - 8.3  ~.G  - 8.1  5.6  -
¢ After depreciation,  sale:>  -"Ulrl  government  grants. - 33 a-
These  balance  sheets are  a.nalyseu  further in 'f[Lbles  XXV,  XXVI, 
and XVII  to  show  the main  sources  of  funds  and their disposition among 
the various  classes  of assets.  The  analysis  shows  that the  main sources 
of  funcls  for  investment 'vere  either from vtithin the  fevrm  business 
{retained  f~rm earnings,  depreciation provisions,  sale  of assets)  or 
from  ne,,r  cnpitfll  funds  introduced;  external sources  of  funds  (loans  and. 
~overmnent grr:,nts)  e;enerc.lly represented  less than a  quarter  of the 
n.dditiona.l  investment.  The  composition of  the  investment varied accordin,::; 
to the  type  of  tenure  and  type  of  fartninz.  Thus,  :for  1971/72,  investment 
in land and  buildings  on  owner-occupied  farms  '"'as  substhntially hieher 
than  on  tenn.nted  farms,  while  tenanted farms  put  a  greater proportion of 
investment  int.o breeding  livestock and  liquid assets.  Investment in 
machinery and  equipment  and  physical 1rorking assets  '\-m.s  hm.rever  much  the 
same.  The  total funds  available for  investment  increased. by about  40 per 
cent.  on  owner-occupied  farms  nnd  57  per cent.  on  tenanted  farr.1s  betw·een 
1970/il and  1971/72. 
Finally, it should be  observed that all averages  have  been 
calculated by 'veighting the  sample  results for England.  and  \vales  in each 
of-the three size  of business  groups  (275-599 and  600-1199  and  1200-4199 
.SlviD)  and  each  of the  five  types  of  farming  (dairying,  cattle and  sheep, 
cropping,  pigs  and  poultry,  mixed)  by the total number  of holdings  of that 
type  B.nd  size recorded in the  1971  June  Census. 
A  more  detailed analysis  of borro,ving habits  of  farmers  by type  of 
tenure,  and by  type  and size  of  farm,  is given in Ta.bles  XXVIII,  XXIX,  and 
XXX.  For  purposes  of  interpretation,  bank overdrafts might  be  regarded as 
..short-term accommodation,  i.e., normally repayable within a  year;  creditors 
(which would  include credit made  available  by agricultural merchants  and 
dealers)  would  again be  substantially short-term in character;  loans  from - 33 b-
relatives "\vould  be  almost  certainly medium- nnd  long-term;  and  ba.nk 
loans  ,.,rould  in general  be  medium-term,  i.e., not usually liable to early 
recall and  tending to run  on for  more  than 12  months. 
This  is  followed  by  a  similar P.nalysis  - on the  basis  of profit and. 
loss  account  - of  those  farmers  w·ho  paid  in-terest  on borrowed  moneys  - from 
whatever source  {see  'l
1able XXXI). - 34-
For the following Tables refer to Appendix  A: 
Table XXIII 
Table  XXIV 
Table XXV 
Table XXVI 
Table XXVII 
Table XXVIII 
Table :XXIX 
Table XXX 
Table XXXI - 35-
Chapter  3 
Influence  of  .Sta~e  .A~1-cies  on  the  Ay_ailabili ty of  Credits in Genet·al  a.nd 
of Agricultural Credits  in Particular 
Except  in Scotland,  '\'There  grants  and  loans are provided both by the 
IIighlands & Islands Development  Board and the Crofters Commission and,  in 
Northern Ireland, where  the Department  of Agriculture  (formerly the  ~linistry) 
1  provides  loans  for a  variety of agricultural purposes,  there are  no  State 
agencies  supplying-agricultural finance as  such in the United Kingdom,  that is, 
if we  exclude the  several grant  schemes  described below.  The  Agricultural 
Mortgage  Corporation  (see  pp.  76  ff.), which  might be  thou~ of as in this 
category,  is regarded as being in the private sector,  though it does benefit 
to  some  extent by receiving an interest-free loan  from the Minister  of 
Agriculture w·ith  the approval  of  the  Treasury to  ensm;e that loans are made 
to borrowers  on  favourable  terms  (seep. 77).  These advances  provide the basis 
for the Guarantee Fund  and this  enlarged capital base  serves as  'backing'  for 
any debentures  issued to the public.  In consequence,  it is hoped,  money will 
be  raised more  cheaply. 
Apart from  the  special regional institutions referred to above,  the 
lfinistry of Agriculture has  over the years  made  a  number  of grants available 
to assist  far~ers in the United Kingdom  and in a  variety of ways.  The  range 
of these grantsavailable over the years  1970-73 is summarised below: 
Grants Available to Agriculture in the United Kingdom  1970/73 
Farm  Improvem~nt Scheme  ) 
Investment Supplement  ) 
Investment Grants 
Buildings and Fixed Equipment 
Plant and :t-iachinery 
Tractors and Harvesters 
Grant percentage rates 
1970 
% 
25 
15 
30 
30 
30 
) 
) 
) 
) 
1971 
% 
1972 
% 
1973 
% 
Replaced by Farm Capital Grant Scheme 
30-10  10  10  (ended 31.3.73) 
Replaced bY:  investment allowances 
1. These arrangements will be  discussed in Chapter 5. - 36-
Grants Available to  Ag~iculture in the United Kingdom  1970/73  cont. 
Hill Land  Improvement  Scheme 
Field Drainage 
Normal  rate 
Hill rate 
Farm  '~Tater Supply 
Public  (+  Investment Supplement) 
Private  (+  Investment Supplement) 
Ploughing Grant 
Farm Structure Schemes 
Horticulture  Improvement Scheme 
Farm  Capital Grant Scheme 
Standard rate 
Hill Land  rate  (for hill land 
items} 
Drainage works: 
-(a)  in hill land 
(b)  other. areas 
Remodelling works 
Special Orchard Grubbing_ 
1970 
% 
60 
50 
60 
40 
45 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
£12  per  ) 
-acre 
60 
) 
) 
1971 
% 
40 
60 
70 
60 
60 
100 
1972 
% 
1973 
% 
Replaced by Farm  Capital 
Grant  Scheme 
40-30 
60-50 
70 
60 
60-50 
100 
33t _closing to 
applicants 
30  ) 
50  )  Closed to 
)  applican·:~ 
)  other  tha~ 
)  hill 
70 
)  farmers  o: 
60 
)  31.12.73 
) 
50 
) 
) 
100  ) 
In addition,  there are the grants made  under the Agricultural and 
Horticultural Co-operation Scheme  197lo  These are made  by the State on  the 
recommendation  of the Central Council for Agricultural and Horticultural 
Co-operation.  Since  1971,  there has  also been available t.o  the Council a - 37-
special fund to give assistance to marketing,  grants  from which are made  by 
the Council itself, as agent  of  the State.  The  main  expenditure  from this 
fund has  so far been the financing  of a  loan gurantee  scheme.  \fhere a 
co-operative undertaking a  marketing proposal has  had difficulty because  of 
lack of collateral security in obtaining adequate  accommodation at the bank, 
it can apply to the Agricultural Credit Corporation Limited  (ACC)  or the 
Agricultural Finance Federation  (A.FF)  for a  Government-backed  loan guarantee 
and the cost of  that loan guarantee is met  out  of ·funds  made  available to the 
Central Council.  The  bulk of the co-operatives  concerned have  so  far  been 
cereal marketing groups;  others have  included co-operatives  marketing  potatoes, 
livestock,  and horticultural produce.  The  scheme  began as an experiment; 
because  of its suc.cess,  it has  now  been established on  a  permanent basis. 
(Future plans  are indicated in Chapter 6  in Part B.) 
Grants which  operated from January 1,  1974 include:  the Farm  and 
Horticulture Development Scheme,  the  H~ticulture Grant  Capital Scheme,  and the 
Farm  Capital Grant Scheme.  The  first of these  schemes  is in implementation of 
Directive 72/159/EEC  of April 1972  on the Inodernisation of  agricultural 
holdings.  The  others are  made  under domestic  legislation, viz.,  the 
Agriculture Act  1970. 
As  regards the former,  the  ~finister  for  Agriculture said in the 
House  of  Commons  on  November  14,  1973: 
"The  Directive  • ".  requires  r.rember  States to introduce  schemes  for  the 
modernisation  of  farms  and horticultural businesses  on  lines laid down 
in the Directive in pursuance  of the Community's  policy for the 
improvement  of agricultural structure.  It provides for a  25  per cent. 
contribution from  FEOGA  towards  Government  expenditure under the scheme. 
A draft statutory instrument will shortly be  laid before Parliament for 
approval.  The  scheme  covered by the main part of the Directive will be 
called the Farm  and Horticulture Development Scheme.  It will be  open to 
far-mers  and  growers who  at present have  an income  per labour unit of less than - 38-
the national  rtvere.ge  income  of vorkers  in non-agricultural 
occupations,  e.nd  1-rho  can  subrJit  a  dcr~elo's;:rnent  J?lan  sho-:·;i:ag  -t!1at  '\Tit.hi:!..l 
six years their  j ncome 1dll reach this  level with the  help cf  the 
plan.  'i'he  present figure  is £2,300  a  year in England,  \'Tales  and 
Scotland;  and £2 1070  in Northern Ireland.  j\.pplicEnrts  11hose  pl::tns  are 
approved '.rill be  eligible for grants  on the capital investments. 
necessary for the  implementation  of their plans.  The  go1ieral  rate  of 
gra.nt  for agricultural investment 1vill  be  25  per cent,  but  field 
draiP  ... age will qualify for  60  per cent and  certain other investments 
such as  the  purchase  of  livestock,  plant  ancl  machinery,  fencing  Hnd 
certain land surface  im~rovecents and the  provision of facilities for 
fresh~·rater fish farming 1·rl.ll  qualify for  10 per  cent.  'rhe  rates  of 
gra.nt  for hor-ticulture ,.;rill  be  30  per cent for buildings  except 
additional production buildings,  and  20 per cent for r.10st  plant and 
equipment;  additional production buildings  and minor  equipment  such 
as  tractors lrill receive 10  per cent.  Investments  in poultry and  egg 
production will not qualify for assistance  and  invesmcnts  in pig 
production '\vill qualify only if -they  amount  to not  less thr  .. n  £4,600 
and not  more  than £18,500 and  the  farm unit is  capable  of  providing 
35  per cent  of  the  feed.  For  other investments  the  maximum  ,;ri 11  be 
£118,500 per  labour unit. 
"Farmers  and  growers  carrying  out  an approved  development  plan 
will also qualify for  a  grant towards  the  cost  of keeping  the  farm 
records  which must  be  submitted annually during the life of the  plan. 
Farmers  '\¥hose  pla.n  provides  that more  than half the  fr-,rm  income  '\·Jill 
be  derived from the breeding  or keeping  of cattle or sheep suitable 
for  tlle  production of  beef,  mutton  or  lamb  will. also  be  eligible for 
guidance  premil.Ulls  totalling about £16  per acre  subject to a  maximum 
of £4,150  ~er holding. 
"Under  the Directive,  Nember  St~,tes mn.y  also  "'~i thin specified 
limits  provide national aids  for capital investment  on holdings  not 
subject to  a  farm development  plan.  \'le  propose  for this  purpose  to 
seek Parliamentfl.ry approval for  .ne1v  Ii'a.rm  and Horticulture Cv..pi tal 
Grant  Schemes.  In general,  the  Farm Capital  Grant  Scheme will be 
similar t~ the existing scheme,  but there will be  some  new  features. 
As  under the Farm and Horticulture Development Scheme  there ,,rill  be 
no  grants for  investment in poultry and  egg  production and  gra.nts 
for  investment  in pig production w·ill  bcsubject to the  limitations 
.•••  already mentioned.  The  maximum  amount' of  investment eligible for 
grant  on all holdings will be  £18,500 for  each  labour unit. 'll1is  'dll 
supersede  the !)resent limit  of  £10,000 per farm unit.  It will 
be  related to total inv-estment attracting grant  over  a  period  of 
two  years.  The  grant for field drainage will be  a.  maximum  of 
55  -per  cent,  but to  meet  an E.E.C.  requirement that grants  should 
not  exceed  25  per cent  of  tota.l  investment,  it '"ill be  necessary 
to take into account all capital investment  on  the unit  of  a  ty-pe 
eligible  for grant under the Farm  Rnd  Horticulture Development 
Scheme· over the  preceding two  years.  The  amount  of grant  paye.ble 
for field drainage work will therefore  represent  25  per cent  of the 
cost  of all such investment,  less  any  grant already already paid 
on  that investment,  subject to a  maximum  of  55  per  cent  of the 
cost  of  the field drainage work. 
11The  Horticulture Capital Grant  Scheme will offer grants at 
five  percentage  points  lower  than for horticultural investment under 
the Farm and Horticulture Development  Scheme  except that those 
improvements  grant-aided under  the latter scheme  at 10 per cent 
will not  be  grant-aided under the Capital Grant  Scheme. - 39-
"Pending the adoption by the E.E.C.  of a  Less-Favoured 
Areas Directive,  the capital grants for investments in hill land 
will continue 1mchanged." 
The  Farm  and Horticulture Development  Scheme  is open to farmers  and 
growers  whose  income  pe:''  labour unit is below the level of the  average  income 
in non-agricultural industry.  This  is at present £2,300 in England,  Wales  and 
Scotland and £2,070 in Northern Ireland.  Applicants will be  required to submit 
a  development  plan designed to bring their income  up to the  comparable  level over 
a  period  of six years.  Approval  of a  plan will entitle the applicant to grants for 
capital investment  on a  wide  range  of items,  and for  record-keepingo  Grant 
will not  be  payable for  investment in poultry and  ~gg producv1on;  and 
investments  in pig production will qualify only if they  amowYli  to not less 
than £4,600 and not  more  than £18,500 and  the  farm unit is  capable  of 
providing  35  per cent. of tha feed.  1fhcre  the  plan provides  for at least 
50  per  cen~ of the  income  to be  derived from  the  bre~ding or  keeping  of 
cattle and sheep suiteble for meat  produc-tion,  the applicant will also 
receive guidance  premiums  of about £16. per acre  up to a  maximum  of £4,150. 
Government  expenditure  under this scheme  will. be assisted from  FEOGA  funds. 
The  national  scheme  to provide  capital grants  for horticulturalists 
,.,as  laid before  Parliament  on November  29,  1973  and  came  in·bo  operation 
on  January 1,  1974.  The  new  scheme,  the Horticulture Capital Grant 
Scheme,  succeeded the Horticulture  Improvement  Scheme  1970  and provided 
grants  for. those  growers  who  could not,  or did not wish to,  apply for grant 
under  the-Farm and Horticulture Development  Scl1eme.  In many  respects  the  new 
scheme  resembled the Horticulture Improvement  Scheme.  In particular, it 
retained the  same  conditions  of eligibility for grant,  but it differed in some 
respects,  reflecting the  requirements  of EEC  Directive 72/159  on ·farm 
modernisation and  the  objectives  of national policy for horticulture.  It 
.... 
provided for  a  25  per cent.  grant for  land improvements,  buildings  used for 
horticulture  other than production buildings,  and replacement  or improved 
production buildings with their associated works  and services.  A 15  per cent. 
grant is  no1v  available for plant and  equipment,except tractors and cultivators. - 40-
The  range  of  i-tems, on 1:bich grant is offere(l under  the Horticulture  Capi  t2vl 
Grant  Scheme  is  broadly similar to that· of ·the  Horticulture  Improvement  Scheme 
except that no  grant is ave,ilable  for additional  or  extended production 
buildings.  Grant will continue  to  be  available for their replacement and 
im:provcment.  This  is in accordance vith the  nationr  ... l  objective that the  scheme 
should encourace  the  modernisation of the  industry rather than the  further 
expansion of production,  which  could  involve  a  rj_sk  of recurring surpluses. 
Another  new  scheme  introduced at the  same  time  was  the  Farm Capital 
Grant  Scheme,  1-1hich 1-;as very similar to the  then existing Farm Capital  Grant 
Scheme,  which  '~Tas  closed to now  applicants  other than hill farmers  on 
December  31,  1973.  Grants  for buildings,  etc.  under the  ne1v  scheme,  ,.;ill 
be at the rate  of  20  per cent.,  but as  in the  Farm  and Horticulture Development 
-Scheme,  investment  in poultry a.nd  egg  production will not be  eligible for 
assistance and there will be  the  same  limitations  on grants  for  pig 
production.  '1
1he  grant for field dra.ino.ge will be  a  maximum  of  55  per cent., 
but to meet an EEC  requirement·it will be  calculated as  a  25  per cent.  grant 
in respect  of the  combined  cost  of the field drainage and  of all other 
capital investment  on the  holding of  a  type  eligible for assistance under the 
Farm and Horticulture  Development  Scheme  over the  preceding  tw·o  years;  it will 
not,  however,  be  less than  25  per cent.  of the  cost  of  the drainage work. 
It should be  noted that EEC  Directive  72/159  requires  a  limit to 
be  set on the total  investment "\vhich  may  be  grant-aided in any  one  business. 
The  aggregate  investment  under the three  new  capital grant  schemes 
implementing the Directive will be  limited to a  maximum  of  40,000 units  of 
acconnt  (currently about £18,500)  per  labour unit employed in any period 
of  tw·o  yca.rs  finishing with the date  on which  a  claim for grant is received. 
Details  of the  new  schemes  are  summarised in tabular form below: - 41-
FARM  AND  HORl'ICULTURE  DEVl~l.OPi'Th"'JT  3CHE!..\'E 
F~H  CAPI'l'AL  GHA't'-.'T  SCH:Ei·1E 
HOH'l'ICULTlm.E  C!iPI'rAL  GRANT  SCHEME 
~J.  tal Grant  a 
Item  F  H  D S 
(1)  (2) 
(a)  (b) 
Agricultural Horticultural 
Businesses  Businesses 
Rate  of  Rate  of 
Grant%  Grant% 
----
1.  Per~anent farm  buildings (exclud-
ing living  acco~~od~tion) silos, 
bulk dry stores.  25 
2.  Permanent  horticultural buildings 
(except  those shown  in 3(i)  and 
(ii) belo\·J)  30 
3.  {i) Provision of parmanent  build-
ings and  frames  designed for the 
production of horticultural 
produce  10 
(ii) Replacement,  improvement.  etc 
of permanent  buildings and  frames 
designed for the production of 
horticultural produce  30 
(iii) Perman~nt ·thermal insulation 
vapour sealing or gas sealing in 
permanent  horticultural buildings  30 
4.  Yards,  loading platforms or banks  25  30 
5.  Disposal of agricultural waste  25  30 
6.  P1~vision of gas or  e~ectricity 
for agricultural purposes  25  30 
?. field drainage  6o  60 
8.  Facilities for the supply 
of water  25  30 
9.  Farm  flood protection works, 
protection or improvement 
of river banks  25  25 
F  C G S  H  C G S 
(3)  (4) 
Rate  of  Rate  of 
Grant %  Grant % 
20 
25 
25 
25 
20  25 
20  25 
20  25 
Maximum  25 
55 
}ldnimum 
25 
20  25 
20  -. ___  _.-_ 
Item 
10  ..  Rands,  paths,  per-manent  ways,  ha.rd 
stnndings,  fords,  bridges, 
culverts,  railv:ay crossings, 
creeps,  piers,  jetties or slips 
11.  Sheep grids or cattle grids 
12. Pons,  dips~ st l~s, or other 
facilities (excludine in-
wintering) 
13.  Fences,  hedges,  walls or gateo 
14.  Shelter belts &  shelt~r 
hedges 
15.  Clearance of scrub 1  land levell-
ing or grading,  removal  of hedges 
tree roots,  bould~rs & ob-
structions,  bracken control 
16.  Claying,  marling & soil mixing 
17. \'lirework  for hop  gardens 
18.  Orchard grubbing 
19. Watercress beds 
20.  Plant or machinery for 
agricultural purposes 
21.  Plant or equipment  for prOduction 
or harvesting of horticultural 
produce 
2·2;.  Plant or .equipment  for· storage 
or prc1mration for market of 
horticultural produce 
23.  Plant or equipment,  including 
tractors and  ancillary equi-pment 
for the cultivation of-hort-
icultural crops and  produce 
24.  Purchase of livestock 
25.  Facilities for farming of 
freshwater  ~ish for food 
- 42-
25 
25 
25 
10 
10 
10 
10 
25 
25 
10 
10 
10 
FHDS 
30 
30 
30 
10 
10 
20 
20 
10 
26.  Any  work  incidental to  works 
carried out on items  1-25 
and  28 
as for  1 1as  for 
appropriate appropriate 
27.  Preparation of development 
pl·ans 
28.  Arterial Drainage {Scotlancl 
only) 
item  item 
25  25 
FOGS  HOGS 
20 
20 
20 
20 
as for 
app:ropriat 
item 
6o 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
15 
15 
as for 
appropriate 
item NOTE:  1. 
- 43-
Under  the  li'HDS  businesses whi.ch  have  an  income  at  or 
...  ' 
above  the  comparable  level may  qualify for  assistance 
if the  income  is at risk  of falling below  that levelQ 
Such businesses will qualify for  slightly lower rates 
of grant  than  those  shown  under  col. 2  above. 
2.  The  ~E.C  ..  directive  provides that no  more  than £18,500 
J. 
of investment  per labour unit·may be  grant-aided.  This 
limit will apply  to  the  aggregate  investment  under all 
I 
three  schemes. 
3.  All applications for  carryj.ng  out  proposals for capital 
grant  (including  those  provided for in developJlcnt  pla11s) 
will be  subject to  the  prior approval rule. 
Additional  Grants under  FHTIS 
Guidanc~ I'remiur.n  is payable  over  3  years  as follows: 
Year  1 - £6.40  per  acre  up  to  a  limit of £2,079  per holding. 
Year  2  - £5.60  per acre  up  to  a  limit of £1,386  per  holding~~ 
Year  -3  - £2.80  per acre  up to  a  limit  of £693  per holding. 
Keepi~ of Accounts 
Year  1  - £70,  Year  2  - £46,  Year  3  - £46,  Year  4  - £46, - 44-
i'hese  means  of  wn.king  moneys  avaiL:::,ble  to ac:ricul  turc  :c1ay  be 
compared  '~i th the  financing  of  the  nationalized industries  in Britain,  1 
which are  more  nearly like State agencies.  Until  1955,  most  of the 
nationalized industries in Dri tain borrm·;ed  long-term  on the L:ndoll capital 
ma  .. rket by  issuin::;; fixed interest stock ,.;i th the  bacldn~ and guarantee as 
to capital and interest of  the United Kingdom  'l'rea.sury.  These  stocks ·Kcre 
underwritten by the  Bank  of  .En[  laud and  v;'ere  managed  and  regarded  Ci-S 
gilt-edged securities,  in that they w·ere  formally  'issued'  by prospectus 
in stated amolmts.  Some  issues  '\vere  made  directly to the National Debt 
Cor.Jnissioncrs,  in 1-:hich  case  the  effect -v:as  to dir.1ir  ... ish the  amount  '"hich 
the  Commissioners  could  lend to  the Exchequer,  so that the Exchequer  held  to 
borrow· an equivalent  sum fer its  m-:n  pur'l_)oses  from  the market  rnd vas 
-therefore  in effect borro'\ving  to finance  the nationalized industry concerned. 
Host  issues ·were,  ho·wever,  r.m.de  to the  market,  in "'lhich  case  az;10U11ts  not 
subscribed by the public at the  time  of  issue were  taken into the  portfolio 
of  the  Issue Department  of  the  Bank  of  .i.~ngland  and  subsequently sold at 
r...arket  prices  through the Govcrrunent  broker as  opportunity offered.  In 
proportion as  unsold stock "1-tas  takeu  Ul)  by the  Issue Department,  the  Issue 
Department vras  obliged to reduce  its lending  to  the  -~xchequer  and the 
Exchequer  '\v~as  forced to borrow more  from  the  market by the  sa.le  of Treasury 
bills.  In effect,  the authorites were  obliged to increase the total of 
Treasury bills in order to finance  the  ne  .. tionalized industries until such 
time as  the  Issue Department  had  sold the  stock which it tooh:  up at the  time 
of  issue.  In so far as  the  rrreasury bills were  taken up by the  banking 
system,  they replaced the nationalized industries'  ban.lt  borrouings.  Thus, 
the  'funding'  of  these banlt advances  made  the  banks  more  rather than less 
liquid. 
1.  See· N.G.  \·lebb,  The  Economics  of Nationalized Industries,  London,  1973, 
PP•  137 ff. - 45-
In 1955,  however,  the authorities  experienced increasing 
difficulty in selling nationalized industries'  stocks  to the public  and 
a  succession of  such  issues  had to be  taken up almost entirely by the 
Issue  Department.  Not  only did the  Bn.nlt  of England.  become  alarmed lest 
the  Issue Department  might  become  "'cluttered up  vTi th a  lot of unsaleable 
stock",  but the  effect upon the  liquidity of the  ba.n}dng  system '\vas 
directly contrary to the  Government's  declared air.1s  of restricting credit 
and,  for that purpose,  keeping  the  liquidity of the banks  as  near to the 
conventional minimum  as  possible.  It uas  therefore decided to suspend 
issues  of na,tionalized industry stocks  a.nd  fino.nce  the industries from the 
Exchequer.  To  this  end,  the  Finance Act  1956  gave  power  for the  Treasury 
to make  advances  of  long-term capital to these  industries,  us  it had  done 
frotn  the  outset for the National Coal  Board and other public  corporations, 
and authorised the  Trea.sury to borrow for the  purpose  of  so doing.1 
Since  1956,  therefore, British nationalized industries have  not been 
permitted direct access to the  London  capital market,  although in recent 
years  a  number  of them  (e.g.  the Gas  and Electricity Councils;  also  some  of 
the  local f!.Uthorities)  have  been allowed to borrow  on  foreign capital 
markets  (see also  pp.  98-99  )  with the  backing and  guarantee  of the  Treasury. 
Under  the Finance Act  1956,  most  of  the  capital required came  from  long-term 
advances  made  by the  Treasury to these  industries.  These  funds  derived from 
the  Consolidated Fund  (now  the National  Loans  Fu..'>ld).  The  Exchequer  makes  the 
loa.ns  either fr-om  -the  proceeds  of its  m.;n  borrovrings  or from surplus  revenue 
which 1-roulcl  otherwise  be  used to redeem the National  Debt.  Interest is 
charged  on  these  loans  (except for Public Dividend Capital,  see  belm·T)  at 
rates based  on  those  paid by the Exchequer for borrowings  at  ~omparable 
periods  rounded upwards  to the nearest i  per  cent.  to  cover the costs  of 
administering the debt.  These  borrmvings  are subject to statutory  limit~ 
1. See  Committee  on  the \forking  of the  Nonetary System Report,  Cmr·  32.7 1 
1959.  uu.  29-10. - 46-
tl~rl1 these  may  be  revised from  time  to time. 
The  nationalized industries also have  -pm-1er  to  borro·w·  short-term 
from  the  be.nks.  Such  advances  are  likevlise  guaranteecl  by the  Govermr~ent, 
,.,.hich  enables  the  borrm.;ers  to  obtn.in  a  finer  ra-te  of  interest than mos-t 
connnercie,l  customers. 
On  occasion,  it has  f'..,lso  br~en possible  in Bri-ta.in to ,;rite  off 
a  proportion of  the capital debt  of  e  nationalized industry.  Thus,  Ullclcr 
the terms  of  the 1'ransport Act  1969,  the  ca.pi tal deficit euccount  of 
British Rail,  1-rhich  stood at £345  millions  '' 78.s  ,...,ritten  off  coL1pletely  u.nd 
the  book value  of British Eail's fixed assets  reduced by £709  millions. 
In 1965,  the  concept  of the Government's  providing equity fi11ance 
to nationalized industries v:as  in-troduced.  for the first time.  BOAC  v2.s  the 
first beneficiary for  an experimental  period  of six yeers,  extended in the 
financial year  191J/rl for  a  further period  of'  five yeaTs.  .rhis  provision 
1-.ras  kno\vn  n.s  Public Dividend Capital·,  on '\'Thich  a,  variable rate  of  return 
(like  a  dividend)  is paid.  It varied over the  expcrimentP.l  period from  ~-s 
lo1v  as  7!per  cen-t.  to as  high as  25  per cent.  per  aiulum. 
The  nationalizccl industries,  like  corruncrcial  concerns  in the pri  v~d,e 
sector, "  .. ill also finance  some  proportion of their investment  requirements 
from  retained earnings  and in the  form  of  a  provision for depreciation.  Some 
economists  have  argued that the  proportion should  i tsclf depend  on  cor.mwrcial 
considerations  such as  pricing and  investment  policies  and  should not  be 
predetermined.  But  when  the  Government  was  setting financial  targets for 
the nationalized industries  in 1961  the  proportion was  in fact  predetermined. 
For  example,  the Elec·trici  ty Boards'  target '\'las  set at 12.4 per  cent.  'l
1his 
was  divided approximately into depreciation 5t  per cent.,  interest 41  per  cent.., 
and balance  of  revenue  2t  per cent.  Given the  estimated capital investment 
programme  for  the  quinquennium,  this  objective  amoUL'"lted  to the  achievement  of 
a  self-financing ratio  of  51.2  per cent.  in 1962/63,  rising to 61.8  per cent. - 47-
in 1966/67, with an average  of  56.5  per cent.  over the  period as  a  whole. 
Achieved ratios 1vere  rather lm·rer.  Latterly,  the 1967 White  Paper retained 
the  use  of financial targets,  but recognised that they must  be  made  more 
flexible in order to reflect sound  investment  and  pricing policies. 
as a  proportion of the nationalized industries'  fixed investment 
programmes,  Government  loans are  of  major  though apparently declining importance. 
Thus,  for  1961/62,  the percentage was  71;  for  1966/67, it was  64;  and  for 
1970/71,  it-was 47.  At the  same  time,  although  the  percentage  of total funds 
provided in this way  has  declined,  the absolute amounts  required for  investment 
by the nationalized industries have  increased quite  considerably. 
But to return specifically to the financing  of agriculture,  ·the  provision 
of credit can also be assisted by providing a  supplementary guarantee.  The  only 
agency in the United Kingdom actually providing this service is the Agricultural 
Credit Corporation Limited  {also referred to at p.  64  and note);  with Britain's 
entry into the  Common  Narket,  resort to this technique  may  become  more  frequent 
and  important.  The  .ACC  '\"Tas  originally set up  in 1959  and  provided with 
financial backing by the National Farmers'  Union  ~rutual InstiTance  Company. 
Farmer borrowings  from the banks  totalling £5  million were  guaranteed in the 
first three years,  but the  NFU  Nutual then withdrew its support after a  run of 
bad debts. 
Eventually the  Government  agreed to support the  operations  of the 
Corporation,  the new  ~cheme commencing  in 1964 for horticulture and in 1965 
for agriculture.  This  was  to  operate  on  a  loss-sharing basis, 'vi  th the 
Corporation standing a  proportionate increase as its reserves were  built up. 
From  the beginning,  the  banl~s agreed to stand 5  per cent.  of any loss under 
guarantee and  the  residual loss was  shared acc_ording  to  an agreed schedule, 
which in recent years has  been as  follows: 
Period  Proportion of Expenditure  Incurred 
by Ministry  by ACC 
%  % 
Year  ending  31  Narch,  1972  84t  15t 
Year ending  31  Narch,  1973  81!  18{ 
Year ending  31  Narch,  1974  79  21 
Year ending 31  March,  1975  76t  231 
When  the  Gover~ent took the relevant powers  under the Agriculture and 
Horticulture Act  1964, it also made  provision for guaranteeing agricultural 
co-operatives and  arranged that in this context a  second organisation - the 
Agricu~tural Finance Federation Limited - should be  included in the scheme. 
In fact,  AFF  has  intervened much  less frequently than the ACC,  though under the 
later scheme  described at p.  50 it has  powers  to dooo. - 48-
·:rhe  role  of  l~CC is to  provide  a  specialised service  by  combining 
technical asscss1.1ent  of farm  programmes with guarantees  to the  banlts  for 
e.gricul  turc and horticul  turc  throughout  the United Kingdom  in order to 
a.::si.st  farmers  to obtain loans  from their  m.;n  bank  on the  basis  of  a 
guara,ntee  provided by the  ACC.  'l'he  object ""as  'to improve  the efficiency 
a.nd  profitability'  of  the  farm by helping to  provide  the  finance  for the 
purchase  of  farm buildings,  machinery and  equi:pment,  or livestoch:,  even 
working  capital,  and  the  service ,.,as  to  be  made  available  'to the  con:.pctent 
ancl  progressive  man  vho  is  prepB,red to seck and  follo¥r the  best management 
advice' •  In  addition,  such support was  expected to be  useful to  a  ne'v 
farmer,  for  mnalgama ti  on projects,  and the  takeover of  extra acreage.  '.:here 
assistance is given,  this  is based  on  'a development  programrue,  agreed between 
·{he  farmer,  his  adviser and  the Corporation's technical staff' •  'I'he  programme 
will outline  the appropriate  system of  farming,  specify the additional  money 
required,  r-nd  the  purposes  for which  i-t  should be  used.  rrhe  objective 1vill 
be  to  increase profits  sufficien-tly to justify the  borro·Hing  and to meet 
interest and  repayment  terms.  r1
1he  agreed  programme  must  be  followed  and, 
to that  end,  a  degree  of  supervision is  exercised,  based  on the keeping  of 
adequate  records  (including audited accounts)  and an aru.1ual  farm visit.  The 
sum  E:,ru.aranteed  would  usually incluclc  the  existing facili·ties,  the total then 
becoming  the  ne'"  limit,  and  a  repayment  scheJ.ule  over a  maximum  period  (normally 
10 years) vould be  agreed  bet,~·een the  farmer,  his banlt,  and  the  Corporation. 
This  is based  on  the ability of the business  to repay the  loan,  but although 
the  farmer is  expected to abide strictly by its terms it is  so~etimes alleged 
by critics of ACC  that the Corporation tends  to  be  too  lenient and does  not 
in fact  ex·ort sufficient pressure to reduce  outstanding borr'owings.  On  the 
other hand,  it is  claimed that  a  degree  of flexibility is essential to meet 
exceptional  circumstances  or to  enable capital to be  ploughed back for 
further development  subject to specific approval  of the  arrangei}lents  by the  ACC 
and  the bank. - 49-
The  ACC  guaran-tee is particularly useful 'vhere  the  security readily 
available to the bank does  not match the degree  of  development  required by 
an otherwise viable  enterprise.  Nevertheless,  at the time  of the Wilson 
Enquiry,  1  and  taking the country as a  w·hole,  the  ACC  guarantee did not  seem 
to  be  greatly used.  But  follo'\ving  s  series  of area r.1eetings  with bankers, 
the  ACC  then progressively improved its image  with branch bank managers, 
who  no,.,  had a  much  clearer understanding  of the facilities that '\'Tere  being 
offered by ACCo 
So  far as  charges are  concerned,  there is a  single  'initiation'  fee  of 
t  per cent.  of the value  of the guarantee to cover the  preliminary work  (this 
is very reasonable)  and the annual charge  (additional to the rate of interest 
payable to the bank) will normally be  a  minimum  rate of  2  per cent., '\>rhich 
can be varied between individuals deponding  on  the degree  of risk and the 
value  of  other securities held by the  bani~ in support  of the  borrowing. 
This  charge relates,  however,  to the value  of the guarantee at the beginning 
of  each guarantee year and the amount,  therefore,  reduces  as  repayments  are 
effected year by yearo  The  use  of  overdraft facilities  on  a  day-to-day basis 
remains  the cheapest source  of available credit and,  although the  addition· of 
around  2  per cent. to the cost of that borrowing may  appear  something  of a 
deterrent,  the  Btggregate  charge to the farm business still works  out in 
practice at considerably less than the rate required by outside  sources  such 
as hire purchase. 
Over  recent years,  new  guarantees  of  the order of £750,000  per annum  have 
been provided and the Corporation is steadily developing  the  scope  of its services 
to farmers,  growers  and co-operativeso  Of  farmers  and  growers with guarantees, 
1. Availability of Capital and Credit to United Kingdom  Agriculture,  H}~O, 1973. -50-
tenants  (70  per cent.  of the total) use  the facilities more  than 
owner-occupiers.  By  mid-1974,  total guaran·tees  provided by ACC  exceeded 
£9.5 million,  of which nearly £2.5  million was  still outstanding.  Of  these, 
90  per cent. would apply to  England and i{ales  and the remainder  to  Scotland. 
In April 1972,  the Central Council for Agricultural and Horticultural 
Co-operation and  the Government's Agricultural Departments  agreed that for an 
experimental  period of  one  year the Council  might  use £50,000 from its special 
fund  (see  Po  37)  to assist with the provision of guarantees in support  of 
borrowing to undertake worthwhile  developments  in  n~rketing by co-operatives. 
Any  co-operative wishing to start,  improve  or  extend its marketing  operation 
and which had difficulty in obtaining the full extent  of  the  required finance 
might apply to the Central  Com1cil  and ACC  for support in obtaining guarantee 
facilities.  It was  subsequently agreed as  from April 1,  1974  that the Central 
Council  might  support by a  payment  out  of its special marketing fund any 
guarantee  provided by the  ACC  (or AFF)  to a  co-operative,  federal  or  joint 
venture  engaged in marketing which  through an· insufficiency in collateral 
security  had difficulty in arranging an adequate  overdraft facility.  In 
other words,  in suitable cases,  the  Central Council will itself pay the 
ACC  charge.  An application from a  co-operative for this support is made  in the 
first instance to  the Central  Council; all the necessary information must  be 
provided to  allow  the  Council to examine  the eligibility, worthwhileness  and 
viability of  the applicant and the proposalo  The Central Council  immediately 
passes this information to  the ACC  so that both organisations  can pursue their 
enquiries  simultaneously and thus  reduce  the  t~me taken to approve  loan 
guarantee  support.  In fact,  the  ACC  will not give approval to  a  loan guarantee 
where  Council  support is involved,  unless the  Council itself recommends  support. 
The  information sought by the Council is as  follows:  Is the applicant 
a  bona fide  co-operative which "lvould  be  eligible for grant ai·d  from the Council? -51-
Is the  assistance  required to help finance  a  ma-rketing  develor)ment? 
It should be  pointed out that no  assistance will be  rriven for  guarantees 
sought for e.cti  vi  ties other than marketing,  nor rdll assistance  be 
considered to finance  existing operations.  Significant  expo~sion of 
existing operations  may  be  considered.  The  Central  Council w·ill  e.lso 
require the  balance sheets  and accounts  of the  co-opcrn.tive,  from \·rhich 
an  idea  of current '\'rorth  can be  determined;  a  revenue  forecast  for  the 
number  of years until the  proposal is implemented and  contributing fully 
to the profits  of  the co-operative;  a  cash flow forecast for  the  same 
period,  showing the  overdraft position at wonthly,  quarterly or periodic 
intervals  as  suitable;  and  confirmation  of  bank  lending  (subject to 
guarantee)  and.  proof  of adequate additional finance  to  implement  the 
proposa,l. 
The  Central Council will require the  co-operative to  enter into 
a  written contre.,ct  to ¥;hich the  three Ministers  of Agriculture are  a 
party.  'I'his  contract requires that the  co-operative  comply "lith a  list 
of  annexed conditions,  '\othich  arc  those  normally associated 'lvith grant aid, 
and  includes  a  limi  ta.tion  on the  use  of  the  money  raised by the guarantee 
to-the  pur~osc described in the  contract.  If the  co-o~erative agrees  to 
abide  by these  conditions,  the Central Council  pays  the  costs  of the 
ACC  in furnishing  the  loan guarantee. 
Another way  in which the State - or,  in this case,  the  moneta~ 
autha::ities  - can play a  role that is relevant in the  present context is 
by providing the  policy frame"\vork  within 1·lhich  capital and credit is made 
available to agriculture.  In the United Kingdom,  it is pertinent to  consider 
this matter for  t1·10  periods  the first before and the  second after the 
introduction of  Competition and  Credit Control. -52-
All the  deJ1osit  br,n~\.s  rvre  subject to a  <lct;rce  of  regulc,tion by 
the  rnone-~ary a.uthori-Lics  in the United Kingdom,  which  in this context  meel"ls 
primarily the  BP~nk of .!5uglanc1.  As  is '"ell lrJlown,  throughout  the 1960s  the 
United Kingdom vas  subject to recurrent crises in its balance  of  payments 
and  a  range  of  measures  was  employed  in e.n  attempt by mone·t.ary  means  to 
limit increases  in bank. advances  and thereby in the  supply of money  and the 
levels  of  expenditure  in the  econonw. 
In genere,l terms,  these measures  '\verc  three-fold in charac-ter: 
(1)  They  might  be  quantitative.  Under this head,  the  main weapon  employed 
during these years  1vi th a  view· to regulating the  increase in bank advances 
'\?as  the  imposition  of  a  ceiling  on  such advv,nces,  which ceiling related to the 
level during  a  base  period.  In effect,  there was  a  series of  'credit 
squeezes  1 •  Hore  generally,  an influence vas  exerted  over  the  monetary flo'\·Ts 
in the  economy by buying and selling Government  securities  (so-called  'open 
market  operations').  1'he  calling  of  1 special deposits'  '\-Thich  had to be 
plarod by the London clearing banks  and  the Scottish banks  1vi th the Banh:  of 
England  could also be  resorted to. 
{2)  A degree  of regula-tion could be  exercised by varying Bank  ra~l:,e  (the 
minit:mm  rate at which the  Banlt  of England was  prepared to lend to the 
discount houses  or to discount first-class bills of  exchange).  By  this. means, 
the Banll.  of England could  exert a  direct influence  on the rates at '\'Thich  the 
deposit  ba.nks  lent to  their  customers,  since until September  1971 Bank rate 
remained the  conventional basis to 1vhich rates  on  aovances  (and  on deposit 
ace ounts)  were  linls.ed.  As  from September  1971,  each of the deposit banks 
set its  O'\-m  Base  Rate  (which reflected movements  in market rates)  and to 
which  each  barJ~'s  lending rates were  related.  In October 1972,  the  Ba..."'lk  of 
~ngland introduced its  ~linimum Lending Rate  (in place  of Bank rate).  The 
new  rate  was  calculated by adding !  per  cc~t. to the  Treasury bill rate  and 
rounding the result up to the nearest t  per cent.  This  formula  was  temporarily 
suspended  on November  13,  1973,  when the rate was  raised from 11t per cent. -53-
to  13  por cent.  A  change  in Ninimum  Lending HatH  triggered off  by the  change 
in Treasury bill ten<ler  r<:te  again  occurred  on ,Je..uuary  4,  197'1.  (Novemon-ts 
minimum  leEdinc  ro..tcs  of the  clet~d.n(;  bauL:.s  (see  column for  'blue  chip' 
rate)  in l';ngland  ancl  \:~.les,  ,,·hich  w·erc  rnis0d ·}per cent.  ifl  Octobr~r 1969;1 
also  BarJt.  rate  rmcl,  latterly,  the  l•!..hd.mm1  L0ncJ.ing  ante  of the  nank  of 
EnflO..:ld  and  tlle  deposit bnnJ;_s 
1  Br.se  Rrtte.)  Actmd  r<Ltes  clmr,r;cd  -t.o 
r  ... gricul  tural boj:-rm·:ers  would  be at  lcc:.st  1  per  c0nt.  a.nd  po.ssi bly 1-j  to  2 
per  cent.  higher  for  the  ;;encr::1,l  run  of  loans  (over  1973/74,  the  mu.rgin 
may  h&.ve  been as  high as  2  to  2~- per cent).  Prior to  SepteJ11bcr  1971,  the 
minimum  lending  rates 1·:rcre  f'ixe.d  by c ollccti  ve  n.groc~r.wnt.  After that  dP::,e 
the  bc.nl-:s  becf.lme  rather more  competitive,  since a.lthoueh  R:.se  Hates  still 
tc:t.'ld  to kce:r_>  nore  or  less  in line,  there is competition '.Vi th regard  ·l:,o  i:lw 
marcim:  beyond  Dasc  lGr,tc.  IImvcver,  a.s  com;1arcd. vith other  .:~uro:;,1can  con:Y~.:r.ics, 
rates  charged  on bank advc:mces
2 
in the United Kincdom  have  tcn~clcd to be 
net and relatively lo1wr than ch8,rges  levied  clso~>rherc  (on the basis  of 
rate  of interest plus  other charges);3  despite  some  edgine  up  of rates  in 
recent. years,  this has  broadly speaking  remained true,  though in a 
number  of  instances  on the  Continent  of  Europe  rates  on  loans  to agriculture 
are  subsidised ancl,  for this purpose,  Continental  rates  on  loans  c:wai ln,blc to 
fzJrmors  may well be  lover. 4 
(3)  Credit controls  may  be  qualitative.  In this context,  the  Bank  of  LnFland 
issued directives,  vrhich  indicated tho  directions  in 1:hich  the  banl>;.s  could 
-\1 -
1.  The  'blue chip'  rate  ,~·a.s  n1ore  obviously a  m1n1mur.1  lending rate :prior to  the 
publication of the Banh:  of Bngland 
1 s  document  on  Corrr;)ctition a1d  Crcc1it  Control* 
After Septer.1ber  1971,  cartel arrangements  rela-t.ing t;  interest  ratc~--;~----­
ended and  the  situation "'·Ii th re[;ard to the  minitJa at ,,,hich the  severr.,.l  ba!Jks 
,.;ould  lend becar:!e  much  more  fluid,  as  was  in !X!.rt  reflected by the  (ln.recly 
teraporary)  differences that occurred from  time  to  ti1.1e  in Base  Rate  itself. 
~.  '£his  is not ah;ays  true  of  prime  cor.~mcrcia.l bills. 
3.  See  II rhe  Cost  of Bank  Fim~.nce - a  Cooparative Study",  NicllaDd  ~nE]::  P:,~iev, 
August  1971.  But  the  position can chanc:.;e.  Por  example,  r,t  er.cl-1972,  it "'.,rc:.s 
reported by Villic.ms  & Glyn's  Dank that  'from being the  cheapest  coulltry 
in .  .!..'urope  for  bank lor  .. ns  only 12  m<,mths  ago  Br  i. tain  is now  the  most 
expensive',  Fin~nci~l Times,  23/12/72. 
4.  A:1  addit:lon0.l  reason for t.ilis is tl1e  -l,:?~ct  ·tl:;.a-t.  -the  benl~s  on w·hich agriculture 
h:.rgely rcliQs  ere  t~wmeelves of 
1c1J>;ricultural 1  origi:a;  farl1lers  and tneir 
co-operatives therefore  te:ad to receive  special treat.r.:ent;  also,  in p:-.rt, 
farmers  are  subsidisecl  b;y- aon-e..r,ricul-~urel  lcnclc:o::-s.  ?urtherJ:lOre,  -'c.ltese 
institutions have  bee:..1  able to  rJai:rrtain  a  b.i;_:.hor  ratio  o±'  hmdin~ in  rel::~tio:1 
to ti1e  capita-l contributed by  t.J.1e  borro"\'rers  tllG.il  ,;roulcl  be  cO!"lsidereu 
conucrcinll:y'justified in the United Lincd.om. -54-
lend and the  degree  of restriction that might,  or might not,  &pply 
'\·!hen  lending to pa.rticular sectors.  So  far as  agriculture was  concerned, 
throughout much  of this  period the  industry '\vas  regarded as  a  sector 
enjoying  some  degree  of  priority {this was  explicitly recognised in 1966)! 
t .  1  f  .  t  2 
pa~ 1cularly in its ro  c  as  a  saver  o  1mpor s,  though there did seem 
to be  a  measure  of restriction,  especially of  farmers'  longer term borrowings, 
to '\vhich  a  specific reference had been  made  by the authorities. 
These  several  forms  of restriction continued until April  1970,  when 
it 't'ras  announced  by the  Chancellor  of  -the  Exchequer in his Budget Speech 
that  'a graduLl  and  moderate  increase,  of the  order  of  5%  over the  12  months 
to  l-~rch 1971,  in lending which has  hitherto been subject to ceiling 
restrictions "llOUld  be  consistent '\vi th the  main  ec anomie  objectives. •3 
This  appeared to  result in freer  lending,  even to wnat had been regarded 
as  a 
1priorl.1iy•  sector like agriculture.  1
1he  position '\-Tas  further relaxed 
in  l·iarch  1971,  vhen it '\-Ta.s  announced - again in a  Budget Speech  - that ~  t 
would  not be  inconsistent with current general  objectives if, for the 
present,  lending subject to restriction were  to grow at a  rate  of about  2~~~ 
a  quarter.•4  But tho  guidance  relating to the direction of  lending remained 
unchcnged. 
Follmling the ·publication of a  Bank  of England paper  on 
Comuetition and Credit Control,  a  somewhat  different system  of  regulation '\o;:-as 
introduced as  from  September 1971,  '"hen all existing ceilings  and guidance 
of the direction of  lending were  ,.;ri thdra,m.  Under  the  new  arrangements, 
1. After  exports,  priority was  given to  'productive  investment by 
manufacturing  industry and agriculture'  (Bank  of  En~land announcement 
1/11/66).  A Treasury Note  on  the  announcement  explain;d that what  was 
'productive  investment'  in agriculture deserving priority treatment ,.;ras 
priraar~ly for the  banh:s  to decide,  but replace  went  of  old  machinery,  purchase 
of ent1re ly ne,.,  equipment,  etc. ,  wa.s  uha  t  the  Treasury had in mind.  It was 
also explained that  'long-term  fi1~nce for the purchase  of  land may  continue 
to be  restricted by the  banks  _ 
2.  This  was  specifically referred to in a  Government  announcement  on 
November  18,  1967  a.nd,  again in a  B::-;nk  of :England Notice  of  Nay  23,  1968. 
It was  reaffirmed  on  November  25,  1969. 
3.  See Bnnk  of England  Not~ce 14/4/70. 
4.  See  Bank  of England Notice  30/3/71. -55-
the dcposi  t  banl\.s  (slightly differen-t arrangements  f;.uplicd  ·c.o  fin~ncc 
houses)  w·ere  required to  observe  day-to-day a  uniform minimum  reser¥e 
ratio of  12~ per cent.  of their  'eligible liabilities'  (basically sterling 
deposits  of  t1·10  years  or  less  from  outside the  ba.nldng  system,  plus  any 
foreign currency s1d tched into sterling).  Previously,  the  requirement for 
the clearing ba.nlr.s  in England  and  .{u.les  had been  a  minimum  liquid assets 
ra.tio  (in relation to deposits)  of  28  per  cent.  (of 1vhich  8  per cent.  h<:~d  to 
be held in cash),  though these  arrangements  did not  apply to the Scottish 
banks.  In addition,  when called upon to do  so,  the  banks  both north and 
south  of the border  could be  required to hold specinl  deposits  with the 
Bank  of }illgland.  'l
1he  'reserve assets',  '"·hich  comprised  the  12-}  per cent., 
included balances lTith the  Br- .. nk of  .S'ngland,  other than special deposits 
(for the  London clearing banks,  balances  'ldfh  the  Bank  of England 1-1ere 
required to  be  on avera.ge It per cent.  of  eligible  l~abili-~ies);  Treasury 
bills;  comuany tax reserve certificates;  money at call with the  London 
discount market,  eligible brokers  and  (if secured  on certain public  sector 
investments)  '~i th jobbers  on the stock exchange;  local authority bills eligible 
for rediscount at the  Bank  of England;  similar commercial bills  (up to  a  maximum  v~ 
2  per cent.  of  elig-ible liabilities); and the British Government  securitie.s ,.;ith  c.:: 
year or  less to final maturity.  It did not  include cash in till, which  may  be  of 
·the order  of another  5  per cent.  Maintenance  of this  minimum  reserve  asset ratio 
,.,as  intended  'to provide the  authorities with  a  known  firm base for the 
operation of monetary policy'. 
As  one  \Tould  expect,  there has  been  some  modification of  the  'l·mrl~ings 
of Competition and Credit Control since its introduction.  So  far as the  bar.J~ 
are concernedt  this has  taken. two  main  forms:  the  reintroduction of 
qualitative credit controls,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on the  other,  resort to 
a  new method  of restraining the  grm-rth  of  the  banls'  interest-bearing resources. 
Under the first head,  the authorities did not revert to direct control 
of the level of bank lending,  but they have  decided to exercise  a  selective -56-
influence  on  i-t..  Thus,  in August  1972,  the  banl:;.s  1wrc  e-sl;:,od  to  'r!wJ;:,o 
credit less readily available to property cowpanies  and for financial 
1  transactions  not  associated with the  maintenan~e and  expansion  of industry.' 
In September  1973,  the  request vras  made  in even stron_::rcr  terms,  becr  ... use  of  tho 
need to  ensure  the availability of  credit to  'finance  a  higher volume  of' 
exports  a.nd  for industrial investment and  for  other essential purposes'. 
In addition to further restraint  on  lending for property development  and 
financial transactions,  there '"as to be  'significant restraint  on  the provision 
2  of credit for persons (other than for house  purchase)'.  As  it happened, 
persont:-~  .. 1  demand  for  ba,nk  credit began to sla.clwn  of its  m-rn  e,ccorcl  about~ this 
3  time,  so that the last part  of  the  req_uest  pr·ovcd  in fact to be  u1mecossary. 
\•Then  controls  on  instalment  crecli  t  ·Here  rc-impos ed  in Dec ember  1973,  the  ba.Dl';:s 
were  asked not to provide  credit for  similar purposes  on  easier terms  than 
those  laid down  in the  official controls. 
However,  there was  nothing in·these restrictions that would affect 
directly the  araount  of bank credit made  available to ar;ricul  ture.  'fo  the 
extent that agricultura.l land may  haYe  been sold for development,  restrictions 
on  loans  to  property companies  might  be  relevant,  but planning permission 
'\vould  first be  required and  the amount  of  truly agricultural  land that would 
be  affected would  be  limited.  Noreover,  since September 1971,  the  banks 
have  only gradually felt themselves  to  be  under  an  increa.sing degree  of 
restraint and,  '\lhile this  could be  expected to affect agricultu;rc  quite as 
much  as  other  'essential'  purposes,  the  effects  cannot have  been very  marl~ed. 
It is  "perhaps  the  banks'  understanding  of  the  general climate  of  opinion 
that makes  them feel  less free  to  lend now  than they did a  year ago,  •••  "~ 
1. Letter sent to the  ban}~ing system by the  Governor  of the  Ba1lic  of  bn.gland 
on August 7,  1972. 
2.  Letter sent to the  main banking associations  by the  Governor  of the Bank 
of England  on September  11,  1973. 
3.  See  Nidland Bank Revie1.r,  }.iay  1974,  'Almua1  Honetary Survey- No.  25',  p.  9. 
4.  See  Hidland  Be,nl~ Revie1v,  lac. cit.,  p.  10. -57-
Hore  relevant mieh-t  have  been high rates  of  inter(~s-t,  1rhich Emst  have 
made  a  significant impact  on  the  costs  of farmers  liho  "'Tere  heavily 
borrowed. 
Another  measure  of general application vas  the  nm·r  arrangements 
announced  on December  17,  1973  1-dth  a  vie-vr  to  improving the authorities' 
control  over the  money  supply and  bank lending.  The  nmv  arrangements 
for credit control provided for non-interest-bearing special deposits 
to be  made  1d th the  Bank  of England in respect  of'  grm{th  of the intercst-
bea,ring resources  of  each bank and deposit-takinz finance  house  over and 
a-bcw e  a  specified rate.  These  arrangemm1ts  lmre  to  be  activated immediately. 
The  Bank  oi'  England.  may  now·  specify a  maximmn  rate  of  growth for 
the  interest-bearing  el  ie::ible  liabilities, to apply to  every bank and 
<leposi t-taking finance house.  Any institution 11hose  interest-bearing 
eligible liabilities grovr faster than this  must  place non-interest-bearing 
special deposits  1-li th the Bank  of England,  to an extent related to their 
excess  interest-bearing eligible  liabilities~  To  judrre  from the first 
activation of the .xheme,  this rate  of  call for special deposits ivill be 
progressive,  to  a  point at ivhich it quickly becomes  virtually prohibitive. 
As  a.lready indicated,  this  scheme  ·vas  activeted immediately,  the 
baru~ being told that their interest-bearing eligible liabilities should not 
grov by more  than 8  per cent.  over the first six months,  this being 
measured  by the  average for A:pril,  1-.fay  and June  197  4  over that for  October, 
November  and December  1973.  At  the  end  of April it was  announced that,  over 
the  second half of  1974,  interest-bearing eligible liabilities could  grow 
at the rate  of  1~ per cent.  of the base figure  per month,  recltoncd  on  a 
three-monthly moving  average.  The  rate  of special deposits  is  only 5  per  cent. 
for an excess  gr~rth of  1  per cent.,  but rises  sharply to 25  per cent.  for  an 
excess of betvreen  1  and  3  per  cent.,  and  50 per cent.  for any higher excess. 
By malcing  several releases  of special deposits  to ease the  liquidity situation, -58-
ui  thout  modifying  the  ne,,T  control,  tho  a.ut.hori tics he,ve  given the 
imprension that it is the  main w·eapon  on '\thich they are  now·  relying 
for their restriction of tho  grow·th  of baPJ( activities. 
In  I·~ay  1974,  the  Dvnl{.  of  Engln.nd  announcecl that it lTas  maintaining 
its strict oontrol  over  the  grmrth  of  bank deposits and  the  money  supply 
introduced in December  1973  1and thgt the  limits it was  setting on the 
grm~-th  of  in-terest-bearing clizible  lia.bili  ties at the  banks and deposit-taking 
finance  houses  for  the  second six-month period of the  new·  restraint "Tas  in 
effect an extension of  the  basis set for the first six-month period,  ~1ich 
was  to  end  in June  1974.2  Hm·wver,  the  scheme  was  now  applied  on  a  more 
flexible  monthly basis,  vhich  meant  th2.t non-interest-bearing special 
deposits  '\?ould  be  repaid,  1>:rhon  a  bank 1vhich had  incurred a  penalty carne 
back within the  limits. 
1.  One  1vay  in '\·ihich this  control might  be  evaded to some  extent '\tas  by the 
issue  of bills of exchange,  '\vhich are  'accepted'  by financial institutions 
and then sold in the d.iscount  market.  There  '\vas  said to have  been a 
significant·recont increase in acceptance business which had  enabled 
certain large  companies  to  escape  the  impact  of the  Bank of England's 
supplementary deposits  scheme.  See  The  Times  (London),  1/7/74. 
2.  In fact,  by  end-June  1974,  it was  found that the  majority of the  banks 
had kept 1vi thin the  interest-bearing deposit limit laid dmln.  Banl~ 
which failed to meet  the  requirement vrere  among  the  smaller groups  in 
the  industry;  several  of these had to pay the full  50  per cent.  :penalty 
on  excess  deposit  gro1-rth.  See  The  Times  (London)  and The  Financial 'i'imes, 
10/7/74. -59-
Cha.l)tcr  4:  '1'he  Structure:  8.n(~  Costs  oi !.:.n:ricu0.~ral  Crecl.i t. 
The  significance  of the  several types  of  credit insitutions  as 
sources  of  borro1v-ing  by the  a..gricul turv.l  industry is  indice.ted in Tables XI 
(for EnglR.nd  f1.nd.  'h~.les),  XII,  XIII,  and XIV  (for Scotland),  XV  and XVI 
(for Northern Ireland).  'l'hese  figures  arc  ba..serl.  on  the  s~mple survey 
relating to the years  1967/68,  1968/69,  and  1969/70,  the  results  of which 
were  published in Ava.i labil~  .. Y .of _C8:..t>i tal and  Credit to United Kingdom 
A~riculture, H}BO,  1973.  A  balance sheet figure  for  the United Kinedom as 
a  whole  is given  in ·rable XX.  'rhis  ,.,ras  l?reparecl  by  the United Kingdom 
Ninistry  of Agriculture,  and  partly based  on the  \·fils on Roport.  'rhe 
general  picture here  outlined is  confirmed by the  Farm  Jvianagement  Survey 
of Farm Assets  e.nd  Liabilities  (see  Tables  XXII  to XXXI). 
On  these bases,  it is clear that a  significa1rl quantum  of  short-term 
loans  comes  from the banks,  on the  one  ha.nd,  a.nd.  the  agricul  tur£d  merchants 
and dealers,  on the  other.  The  latter accommoclation is itself partly 
derived  from  bank sources.  (For  tenants,  merchants  and dealers is the  more 
important  source;  this  was  also the result in the \;Tilson Enquiry.)  .At 
medium- and  long-term,  loans  from  relatives is the  most  important  source 
(though here we  _have  only statistical evidence  and very little kno"\•tlcdge  of 
the  bases  on \vhich money is lent).  J:i'or  mvner-occupiers  and farmers  with 
mixed tenure,  the  A~I.!  is the next  importa.nt  source for medium- and  long-term 
loans  (SASC  in Scotland,  though  formerly rivalled there by the  insurance 
companies).1  On  the  evidence  of the Farm  }~nngement Survey,  bank loans  are also 
quite an important  source  of  medium- and  long-term credit,  though the  banks 
1.  targely.because  of yield considerations,_ the  insurance  companies  have 
virtually dropped  out  of  mortgage  lending,  though  a  certain quantum 
of  such  loans  is still outstanding. - 60-
would  not generally regard themeselvcs  as  willing  lenders  in the  latter 
category.  Hire  purche.se  finance  companies  and building societies  - in 
England and \•iales,  even  i.nsurance  companies  - are relati  vcly unimpor..:tant 
as  sources  of  loan capital. 
An  attempt 1vill  now  be  macle  to describe  the  sources  of funds  and 
the  methods  of granting  credit to agriculture under  the  several relevant 
headings.  In addition,  some  indication vill be  gi·~len  of  e.pproxima te  cos-ts. 
The  CleP.rin.rr  Banks  arc  the  most  important source  of institutional 
lending to agriculture in the United  Kingdom.  ThHs e  include,  in J:::ngland 
and Uales,  Barclays  Ba.nk  Ltd.,  Lloyds  Banh:  Ltd.,  Midland  Bank Ltd.,  Nationnl 
Westminster Bank Ltd.,  and,  on  a  much  smaller scale,  Williams  and Glyn's 
Bank Ltd.  aDd  Coutts  and  Comrxl.ny.  In  Scotla11<l,  there are three  clearing br..nh:s  -
The  Bank  of Scotland,  The  Clydesdale  Bank Ltd.,  and  'l
1he  Royal  BF"nk  of  Scotle,nd. 
(Th"  Clydesdale  Ba,nk  is a  \vholly-owned  subsidiary of'  the  Hidland Bank and  the 
other  banks  have  links with London  clearine; banks.)  The  four  main banks  in 
Northern  Ireland are  the· Ban.k  of  Irela11d,  Allied Irish Ba,rJ{.S  Ltd.,  the  Northern 
Bank Ltd.  (Midland  Banl'l::  group),  and the Ulster Bank  Ltd. (National v.'estminster 
Bank group). 
All these  ba~nks  have  developed  branch  systems  - the  clearing banlts, 
which  may also be  described as  deposit  ba,nks,  operate  just over  12,000 
branches  (including sub-branches)  in England and.  We.lcs,  some  1 (130  (including 
mobile  bra!.'lches)  in Scotland and  319  branches  in Ncrthern Ireland.  In·  .t~ngJ.and 
and Wales,  the  several banks  decentralise their control  of  operauons  to  some 
extent to  loca,l,  rcgi anal,  or  area offices,  although  bank managers  have  a  degree 
of  autonomy;  managers  of Scottish bank branches  also  seem to  operate  w·i th a 
measure  of autonomy.  Even 1-,•here  they are part  of an Irish banking  group,  the 
Belfast offices  of  the  Northern Ireland banks  would  be responsible for 
operations  throughout  the  province. - 61-
The  deposit  ba.nl'\:s  derive their resources  - a.s  their na.mc  impl  ..... (::::, 
from  deposits  received from the  public,  vhether  on current account,  on 
deposit  accoun-t  (at seven days  notice),  or against Cer-tificates  of De:9osit. 
On  current account,  no  interest is paid,  so that ·this  is a  relatively chea-p 
source  of  funds,  even when  allow·ing  for the cost  of  clearing customers 
cheques,  the  issue  of statements,  the  ust'!  of  computers  and highly paid 
staff.  Deposit  accOlmts  and Certificates  of  Deposits  do  of  course attract 
interest and latterly at quite high rates,  though the  rate  on  deposit accounts 
under  £10,000 has  since November  1973  been limited to 91  per cent.  in  order 
not  to  compete  too actively 1vi th the building societies'  need  of  funds 
to finance  house  -purchase. 
Banks  throughout the United Kingdom  consider applications for  a.dve.nccs 
in much  the  sa.me  "\-ray.  Usually,  they lend by -....ray  of  overdraft  (see  below)  ancl, 
especially where  applications  come  from  established farmers,  there lvill generally 
have  been a  continuing relationship vlith the  bank,  possibly for  a.  long period  of 
years.  'l'he  'connection'  may  go  back for several generations.  Insummary,  the 
banker when  eva.luating  an a-pplication  looks  e.t  a  whole  package  of  considerations, 
including the  man  himself and 1vhat  they l{nO'\v  about  him;  1vhcnever  possible and 
-....·hen  desirable the  banker will  'walk the  farm'  from time to time and  meet  the 
farmer  on his  home  ground,  in this 1vay  maintaining some  con  tact 1vi th the actual 
farming  operation;  again,  the banker will want  to knm·r  what  is the  purpose  of 
the  credit facilities  sought,  for how  long the farmer wants  the money,  and how 
much  he wants;  in this context,  too,  the  banker will  obviously be  concerned to 
establish whether the proposition is  lil~ely to be  sufficiently profitable to 
provide  the  means  of paying  off the  advance  over a  defined  period;  on the 
other hand,  it 1s  equally important to  ensure that the  farmer is seeking to 
borrow sufficient finance  to see  the  project through to a  successful  conclusion. 
Not  only will the  banker wish  to see  the farmer's  cash  flow  projections  and his 
1  audited accounts,  but he will also study the  previous behaviour  of the account 
1. For  a  more  u-p-to-date  picture the banker may  draw up with the  farmer  a  statemen-t 
of the farmer's  current assets  and liabilities. - 62-
in order to form  a  judg:nwnt.  of  the  farmer's  capaci·t.y  to  re-pay.  There  may 
well also  be  a  seasonal  pattern to be  accommodated.  More  generally,  and this is 
the  relevance  of  cash flov: analysis,  the  banker will be  concerned that the  fp  ... rmer 
has  e.cccss  to  nder~uate working capital nnd  himself generates  sufficient linuidi  ty 
to ensure that the farming  operation remains  viable and the  emergence  of a 
'ha.rd core'  is  e,voidod.  'l'o  this  end,  moreover,  he  is less interested in 
a  particular set  of figures  than in the  trend.  This  is  one  of the benefits that 
accrues  from a  continuing banker-customer relationship,  namely,  a  set of  records 
going bBck  over  a  period  of years.  Gn  the  basis  of an assessment  of  these 
severfl,l  sets  of  fieures  a  .. nd  a  projection of  cash f lm.rs,  the  banh.er vlill  a ttertipt 
to establish whether  the proposition is viable in the  sense that the  proposed 
operation 'vill generate sufficient profits fully to service the  accommodation 
that is  sought.  In  ··.d:.her  w·ords,  the additional  income  must  be  e-de(_!.late  to 
cover not  only the  regular  payment  of  interest but also  provide  a  margin  out 
of "'rhich  the  farmer  can reduce  the  extent  of his  indebtedness.  In~ddi  tion,  one 
hopos  that there vrill  be  something left for the  farmer  by v1ay  of profit, ,;rhich 
usuallyiliol!S  as  an addition to his net  C'.sset  position in the  form  of  additional 
buildings,  machinery,  or  stock.  At  the  sP,me  time  and  no  matter how  careful the 
banker is in vetting the proposition,  there  must  always  be  - and the banker 
knows  this  from  experience  - a  degree  of flexibility in the  repayment  programme. 
Bad  seasons,  disease,  and  a  host  of  unforeseen contingencies  a.re  liable to 
upset the  best laid schemes  and,  very frequently,  repayment  periods  have  to be 
extended,  sometimes  indefinitely, with borrovrings  'going solid'  a.nd  developing 
a.  hard core. 
Similarly,  vri th a.  customer  coming to  the bank for the first time.  In 
this case,  the  obvious  difficulty is the  relative dearth  of  information and the 
bank's  lack of  experience with that particular borrower.  Hence  the degree  of 
risk is greater.  But,  if the account is  coming  from another ba.nk,  the  very 
first question to  ask is why  does  the  customer wish to  leave  the  other bank and, - 63-
in partic·ulr  .. r,  is it u  hard core  loan?  For the rest,  -the  tnrL:\:cr  concentrn.·t.es 
on finding  ou-t  as  much  as  possible about·  'the men'  and  he  will certainly 
keep his  eB,rs  ·open for  .eel  evant  comment.  But,  for the  most  part,  in 
a~sessing 'the man',  the  banker must  depend  on his  01.;rn  judgement.  This  is  a 
time  v:hen  he  should visit the  ma.n's  farm,  meet his \vife  (if any),  and  exomine 
his  balance  sheet.s  and  bar...k  statements.  Another  source  of  information,  if the 
man  is an  established farmer,  is his  audited accotmts,  in addi-tion to 1:hich 
the  banker  can build up  a  farmer's  statement  of a.ssets  and liabili  tics.  He 
ca.n also ask for  a  cash  flow forecast,  v.rhen  -the  banker  must  assess  the  figures. 
Again,  he  is working partially in the  dark,  because  he  lacks  the  experience 
of  a  period  of years  and  an intimate  knowledge  of the  man,  though he  \·till  as  a 
matter  of  course  have  asked  to see  previous  baPJ\.  statements  ard thereby 
satisfy himself \-lith  regard to the  operation of  the  account  ;?rcviously held 
at the  other ba,nk. 
Even  more  difficult to consider is an application from  a  ne'\or  farmer. 
In this case,  the  banker 'v-ill  be  concerned first to  investigate lvhethcr  in 
fact there is  a  'farming connection'.  The  applican-t  may  be  the  son  of  a 
farmer.  Has  he  any practical experience  and  training?  \{ha.t  is the nature  of 
that tra.ining and  experience?  It is moreover difficult to  judge  the  character 
of a  man  who  is  just starting out  and it is important,  thcrefore,f'or the  banker 
(with the customer's  permission)  to attempt  to get worthwhile  opinions  about 
him  from  outside  persons  competent to  judge  both his  integrity and his  farming 
experience  (e.g.  a  previous  employer).  It is also pertinent to make  a  judgement 
(especially '"hen  lending to smallholders)  about  the  calibre and  comnetence  of 
the  farmer  1 s  ,.Tife  (if any),  since  a  lot will depend  on her.  If the applicant 
is  a  new  college graduate  of  limited pra.ctical  experience,  the  banker would 
hesitate to back him,  unless  the application is supported by the guarantee  of a 
wealthy friend  or relative.  Alternatively,  resort might be  made  to an ACC 
guarantee  (see below).  Again, it is the ·•connection'  that influences the 
decision. - 64-
Bank8rs  regr~rcl the  vir<.bilit:y  of  f:ny  pro-;:>osition  _placed  before 
them  as  of  prime  in1portance;  nevertheless,  a  proportion would  tRke 
security 1ilicrc this is available and  particularly when  lending to 
a  nc"'iv  custo1:1er.  For  ov:ncr-occupiors  and  fe..rms  ,,.ri-th  mixed tenure1 la.nd 
vas  the  most  cmnn10D.  form  of  securi-ty avFlile::ble.  Usually,  a  full  legal 
mortg2.ge  over  l8nd  \{as  employed  (a 'standard'  security in Scotland;;  in the 
past,  an  eguitc:.ble  mortga.ge  (w·ith the  deeds  lodged  under  a.  }1emora.ndurn  of 
]);;:Josi t)  might  be  resorted to,  but with the  end  of  stP.rrrp  duty there is  now 
no  advantage.  But  i·t.  is still not  uncommon  for  banl~ers  only to  require  the 
deposit  of  the!  deeds.  Frequently,  bankers  also  lend ageinst  a  second 
mor-tr~a.gc  (c.  g.  ,,rhere  the first mortgagee  is  the  Al•.C)  •  vthcr forms  of  s ccuri·cy 
that are  employed  (virtunlly throughout the United Kingdom)  include 
assignment  of  a  life insurance  -policy  ( especirilly  importo.nt  in parts  of 
Scotland),  third party guf!.rantecs2  ( cspccia,lly as  a  supplementary form  of 
3  securi-ty),  the  ACC  guara.ntee,  stocks .and  shares  (e.r~.  under  a  hemora.ndum  of 
Dcposit4),  and  (from  sme.ller  ril<~n)  the deuosit  of  National Savings 
CertificB.tos,  Premium Bonds,  even the  lodgment  of  a  building society pass  bocl\., 
(in Scotla.nd)  d.cposit  account  or  savings  account  pass  books,  or parcels  of 
whisky  (v1hich  may  hc,ve  been bour,ht  by  a  b::~.nk  customer as  an investment).  In 
.8ngla.nd  o,nd  \·Tales,  an  agriculturCJ.l  charge  over  livestock,  implements,  or  crops 
may  sometimes  b2  t::dwn  (e.g.  in the  case  of  the tenant)  under  the f.f.·ricultur::.l 
Credits Act  1928.  In  the c v.s e  of  farming  c om-pani P.S,  the  bank  mny  arrange  to 
1.  Por details  of the  special situation in Sco-tlnnd  (vtbich  has  its  Ovlil  legal 
systeJil),  see Ava:_ilPbili  t.y  of  Cc1UitR.l  F-J?-d  C_redi t  to United  Kinr~dom Agriculture, 
l?'!?·  119-122. 
2.  Father  (or raother)  for  son,;  uncle for nephew;  also  a  director's gua.rantec 
to  sv.;>port  a  loan to  a  farming  company. 
~.  Guarantees  provided by the Agricultural  Credit Corporation Limited in 
consideration of  a  fee.  See Ava.ila,bility _  _:)f  C~ital and  Credit to  Unit~<1_ 
Kingdcm  A.f~riculturc,  pp.  108-9;  for  help· to marl\.cting  co-operatives,  sec 
scheme  referred to at p.  109. 
4.  In Scotland,  n  letter of  pledge/hypothecation. - 65-
talce  a_  debenture  incorporating a  floating  ch?.rge,  '\·rith  the right- if 
necessary - to  :9ut  in a  receiver.  This  f.orm  of security \·rould  be  taken 
esl?ecially 1-1here  the  bank does  not hold a  mortgae;e  over  the  farm,  the 
ow·nership  of vrhich  may  still vest  in  o2.1e  of the directors,  when it is also 
usual  to take  a  director's  guarantee  (see  above).  Alternatively,  the bank 
may  take  a  collateral charge  over  the  deeds  of  the  property.  Sometimes,  too, 
where  a  director has  himself  made  a  loan to  a  farming  company,  a  bank may 
request  a  'letter of  postponement'  in favour  of the bank,  "'hereby the director 
ranks  after the  bank  r.Js  a  creditor  (in effect, direct  om'  loans  are  regarded as 
capital).  Finally,  it should be  noted that in certain cases  for both tene.nts 
and  owner-occupiers  the  bank may  have to depend  on  composite  security.  Vhere  the 
farmer  owns  a  good  acreage  of fertile  land and has  a  sizeable equity,  a  mortgage 
will be  sufficient, but  in many  cases  (e.g.  where  money  has  been borro"red  beyond 
the  security lodged  or there is an excessive  element  of  risk)  the primary 
security rna.y  require  support  by charging a  life policy or  requm;i.ing  a 
guarantee  from  a  third party,  even by taking an agricultural  cha.:t·ge.  Indeed, 
in the  case  of  a  tenant  or young  farmer,  these  may  well  constitute the  primary 
security itself. 
But bankers  by no  means  always  lend  on  a  secured basis to farmers  and  in 
many  bank branches  throughout the United Kingdom  (though perhaps  less  so in 
Northern Ireland)  unsecured  lending tends to  be  quite  a  significant proportion 
of the whole.  In addition,  just as  there will  often be  a  seasonal fluctuation 
in the total amount  lent  on  a  farm,  so will there  often be  a  seasonal 
fluctuation in ·the  proportion of it \vhich  is unsecured  •  For example,  moneys 
might  be  lent unsecured to buy the cattle in the  autumn to be  in1vintered  on  the 
farm,  with a  sharp rise in unsecured lending at that time  of year.  In areas 
devoted to sheep,  seasonal  accommodation to finance  buying will begin in August/ 
September;  just after the sale of the  lambs.  Not  infrequently,  these  accounts 
go  into credit after the seasonal  accommodation has  been repaid.  Again,  very - 66-
often tenant fa.rmers  borrou vholiy or in l_)Rrt  on an unsecured. basis 
(against the  net ,.,orth  of  the  farmer  as  sho,·m  in his  balf':.nce  sheet).  .N..<>.ny 
of these tenants  mr..y  be  sUJ.all  men  'vho  ha.ve  little formal  security to  offer. 
In addition,  where  there is  a  good  surplus  on the  bahtnce  sheet,  a  banker  may 
lend unsecured to finance  the  seasonal  r~quircments of an ara.ble  fa.rmer.  It is 
also quite  common  to lend unsecured to a  man  of  substance  (,.,rho  may not 
necessarily be  an  owner-occupier but  a  tenant farmer)  a.ga.inst  'evidence  of 
mer:,ns',  provided  only that he  has  a  viable proposition.  Alternatively,  a  loan 
may  be  only partially secured.  Thus,  the  sm.r  ... ll man  may  haYe  pledged  a  life 
policy to provide partial security,  supported by a  third-party guarantee.  1he 
large farmer  me..y  already have  mortgaged his  la.ncl  to the  bank,  though before  he 
is prepared to lend  part::.aJ.ly unsecured the  banker  would  require that the  farmer 
should have  at least as  big a  stake as  the  bank itself.  In this context, 
so-called  'current assets'  (stock and/or  growing  crops)  would  be  considered 
in relation to other balance  sheet figures,  as  providing  evidence  of future 
cash  flo1-r. 
In summary,  security is not alwa.ys  regard.ed as  essential;  even when it 
is a.vai lable,  the  bank ma.y  not  require it (e.g.  ,.:here  a  man  is ,.,ell  and 
favourably lmovm  to the  bank,  having maintained  a  good  account with it for  sorae 
years).  But sometimes  the  arnom1t  required  may  be  relevant  - a  banker  may  be 
prepared to  lend unsecured for up to a  certain amount,  but require security for 
mmounts  larger than this
1 
(that does  notalwa.ys  follow  because wealthy individuals 
on large estates  may at times  borrmv very large amounts  on an unsecured basis). 
Hore  generally relevant is the  term for which  money is required.  A  good 
proportion of the  unsecured  lending would  be  to provide  seasonal·finance, 
particularly where  the unsecured moneys  only bore  a  modest relationship to the 
t'Otal  finance  committed.  However,  '\dlere  money  '·Tas  required for a  longer term 
(e.g.  in order to buy  land)  it would  be  customary to take security. 
1.  The  branch manager's  lending limit is also  a  relevant consideration.  If withi~ 
his ·limit,  a  branch mana.ger  may well  be  prepared to  lend unsecured to  a  knovm. 
customer.  If,  however,  the  proposed borrowing  is above his  personal  lending 
limit,  an acce-ptable  proposition has  to be submitted to  a  regional,  local  or 
area office,  which  ll'lay  then require  tlnlodgment  of tangible security. - 67-
'l'he  most  common  way  in w·hich  baruts  lend mone.y  in the  United  Kin.~dom 
is by way  of  overdraft,  whereby a  lirni  t  is fixed  by the  banlt up to which the 
customer  can overdra'",  paying interest only  on the  amount  of the  clebi  t 
outstanding day  by day.  Advances  ma,de  in this  form are  in theory repayable 
on  demand  {and in fact  re-payable after due  and  reasonable  notice has  been given), 
but  in practice they run  on  sometimes  for quite  long  periods,  though alhTays 
subject to  review·,  usu:1lly atmually but also at shorter intervals  should this 
prove to be  necessary,  as ,.,hen  a  new  proposition is being considered  (e.g. 
seasonv.l borrowing to fina.nce  purchase  of store cattle),  or  when  the  account 
runs  into difficulties giving rise  (say)  to  excesses  beyond the  agreed limit. 
Although attitudes are  changing,  bankers  in the United Kingdom still 
retain a  strong preference for short-term lending  of a  self-liquidating 
character.  This  prefernce is firmly  rooted in past history - British bankers 
traditionally regard themselves  as  properly engaged in financing 'vorldng  ca"Pi tal, 
particularly the  'seed-time to harvest:•  kind,  1 bridging transactions',  and 
(~hin cautious  limits)  the  temporary financing  of  fixed capital developn1ent 
pending the raising of  long--term finance  through  other channels.  In addition., 
the  ba.nks  trade  lar~ely on  the basis  of  short-term deposits  (though to  some 
extent  this is less true than it was).  As  a  rule, British bacl~ers seek to 
avoid more  than the  minimum  of  formal  long-term commitments.  Nevertheless, 
there does  seem ~o be  a  good deal  of  lending  even by way  of  overdraft.  that 
might  reasonably be described as  medium-t.erm and this is particularly true  of 
farming  branches,  since farm projects not infrequently require  a  period of 
years  to mature  and  to produce  the  means  of  paying  off the  moneys  borrowed.  In 
addition,  there is the  incidence  from time  to time  of disease and/or bad 
weather,  which  may  considerably dlisrupt any agreed  programme  of  repayment. 
But there  is an alternative means  of  lending that is frequently 
employed  by the  baiU{s,  though in terms  both of number  of  accoun-ts  and volume  of - 68-
moneys  lent it would  account  for  n.  much  less  important  pPr-b  of the  business 
than thGt  done  on the  bP.sis  of  an  overdrn.ft.  ~'his  is  the  lo?..n  acccunt 
technique,  vrhethcr  the  ndv-ance  is in fact  ma,de  through  a  loan account  or 
se::pa.rated  off into a  No.  2  current account  (vhich is  sometimes  d.one).  Vhen 
an  adva.nce  is made  on  loa,n account,  n  specific amount  is placed to  the· debit 
of this  account,  ¥.rhich  amount  pending its disbursement  may  be  transferred to the 
credit of  the  current accotmt that  rnn.y  i t~:elf be  overdrawn.  Although 
technically repaya.ble  on  clemand  (excluding the special arrangements  that "rill 
be  described belovr), •there is an understanding  that,  subject to an annual 
revim·r  and  provided that the  account has  been  operated in a  satisfactory 
manner,  the  loan  ,~,ill  be  p,llm-red  to run  on for  a  period  of years.  'l'here will 
also be  an arrangement  '\·Thereby  the  outstanding debit balances 'ivill  be  reducccl 
periodically.  If the  borrow·er is  a.  dairy fa.rracr,  part  of the  monthly milk 
cheque  could  be  so applied.  A  pig fa,rmer  may  repay his  loan in a  simila.r v;ay, 
since  he will tend to market his  product regula.rly,  and  the  sa.me  vill apply 
with  eggs  and poultry.  An  arDble  farmer,  on  the  other hand,  1vould normally 
be  expected to effect his  reductions  annually.  Noreover,  the  arrangement  for 
a.  regular reduction is probably as  common  as  (if not  more  common  than)  the 
stipulation thr:.t  the  loan be  repaid  over  a  specified number  of years,  since, 
farmi;ne  being  what~ it is,  retention of  a  degree  of flexibility will be 
desirable,  even  'ivhen  lending is  done  by '-ray  of  loan account.  Obviously,  an 
agreed  Pvrrangement  regularly to reduce  the  indebtedness  amounts  to a  term  of 
years.  Equally,  if for  vrhatever  reason. repayments  are  less regular than agreed, 
this will in effect be  the  same  thing Rs  an  extension of the  term. 
The  pur-poses  for vhich  loan  account  is thought  to be  appropriate 
include most  obviously the  purchase  of capital  equipment1  (such as  tractors and 
combines,  beet harvesting machinery,  bulk milk tanks,  silos,  and  fn.rm  buildings 
like milk parlours  or grain storp.ge).  Occasionally,  the  purchase  of dairy 
cow·s  might  be  financed in this way.  Although during the  credit squeeze 
1.  Some  banks  have  a.lso  catered for the  financing  of  such  equipment  by providing 
a  leasing·service through  the agency  of  a  subsidiary. - 69-
of the  la,te  1960s,  banks  vrere  much  less  able  to  lend for the  purpose  of 
land  purchase,  they still in fact did so  - usually for  the  purpose  of 
1 
buying  contiguous  land in order to round  off the property,  possibly an 
adjoining farm which  could be  operated together with the  existing farm 
as  a  more  viable unit;  alternatively a  'bridging loan'  might  be arranged 
to provide finance  while the possibility of the  loan's  being  passed  on  to 
a  term lender was  being negotic'1 ted.  The  fir~l group  of  purposes  relates 
to the  imposition of discipline in order to  ensure ultimate  repayment  by 
insisting on  regular reductions,  whether that discipline is required 
because  of the  emergence  of  'hard core'  or not. 
Tl1e  terms  of these  loans  depend in part  on  the  purpose.  Thus, 
capital  expenditure  can take different forms  and '\vhile  two  to three years  may 
be  appropriate when  financing the  purchase  of  a  tractor,  five  to six years 
2 
may  be  necessary in the case  of a  combine.  Financing the  purchase  of 
dairy stock may  be  done  on  the  basis  of  a  term  of five years.  Even  buying 
in beef stores for fattening may  be  'done  on  ·this basis  (say)  for six months  -
hought  in spring and  sold off in the  autumn;  or they may  be  bought  in the 
auturllll  for inwintering and sale in the  spring.  Probably the  most  common 
terms  average  about five years,  though there is a  continuing progression 
out to seven  or  eight years  and,  indeed,  the most  common  single term 
quoted at.the time  of the Wilson Enquiry was  'up to ten years'  and  loans 
beyond ten years are not  unknown.  As  one  banker  put it,  'stretching the 
term helps to cover the  gap between bank lending and  medium-term lending'. 
In short,  by whatever  means,  many  bank managers  would prefer to find the 
finance  for their farmer  customers  rather than see  them  pay high rates to a 
hire-purchase fir1ance  company  or have  to depend  on their merchants. 
1.  In Northern  Ireland,  the  Government  launched  a  scheme  to finance  lon0'-term 
(e.g.  over  20 years)  the  purchase  of  con-tiguous  or  'marching'  land  t~ 
encourage  the  build-up of viable units. 
2 •  But noto that a  nwnbcr  of bank managers  '\·Tould  still prefer to provide  finc-tnce 
for -lihese  -purposes  (and also for drainage)  by lending by '\vay  of  overdraft. - 70-
Quite frequently and  even for  a relatively short-term loan,  the 
farmer himself will request that it be  put  on  loan account in order to 
force  him to apply the necessary degree  of  discipline to  ensure tnat,the  loan is 
paid off within a  reasonable  time.  More  commonly,  it is the banker who 
will suggest this arrangement and particularly when  the account  beg1ns  ~o 
'go solid'  and to develop  'hard core'.  In these  circumstances, the banl{er 
'has to exercise a  lot of patience and  some  degree  of pressure'. 
Admittedly,  hard  core is a  little difficult to define.  It may  be  due  -
and  often is due  - t.o  the bank's having financed  land purchase in the past 
and with rises  in costs  (including nmchinery,  improvements,  and  interest 
rates)  the farmer  has  been unable  both to meet  service  charges  on  the 
account  and  to  pay off the  loan.  In these  circmnstances,  the  bank is in effect 
providing permanent  or  semi-permanent  capital, which is not regarded 
as its main function and  the  bank  n~y therefore attempt to persuade the 
farmer  to transfer this type  of  indebtedness to a  term lender like the 
.Agricultural Nortgage Corporation.  Alternatively,  the  farmer  may  be 
under-capitalised and,  although it is really additional working capital 
that the  bank is providing,  it has nevertheless  become  built-in and is 
again in the nature  of a  semi-permanent provision of capital.  Thus,  a  dai~ 
farmer  may  run an  overdraft over a  period of years with,virtually no  more 
than a  monthly fluctuation and  no  effort made  to secure a  reduction.  At  the 
same  time,  he  may  gradually be  building up an improved stocking position or 
purchasing  other additional assets  and it is a  nice  point  of definition 
whether such a  loan represents  true  'hard core'  or not.  Indeed,  many  bank 
managers  1\"0uld  regard this as  good  farming  and  may  be willing to support 
it by permitting a  continuation of the  'hard core'.  More  obviously,  hard 
core  may  appear where  a  farmer is always  b~ing again before he  pays  off 
the last purchase  - 'trying to develop too quickly  •  Again,  the development - 71-
of a  solid core  may  be  due  to poor  farming  or past  losses  {or both). 
For  example,  a  farm~r may  have  had  two  or three  poor  seasons  and  find 
himself sinking into the mire,  unable to pull himself  out again.  This 
si  tua.tion could apply particularly to an arable farmer,  but also to stock 
raising,  or  even to dairying.  Death duties  could  occasion a  similar 
burden. 
In addition,  the several clearing banks  in England and Wales 
and in Scotland  (but not in Northern Ireland)  have  developed formal 
term lending  schemes.  Of  the present  schemes,  one  to finance  the 
'development  of  sound  productive  investment in agriculture'  goes  back 
to 1966.  The  others  were  introduced in 1971.  Not all were  launched 
specifically to assist agriculture.  The  big advantage to the farmer 
of the  formal  term loan is that under normal  circumstances  and within 
the agreed term  of years it cannot be  called in,  i~e., not unless the 
borrower defaults in paying his  instalments  by due  date,  or supplies 
false  information,  or fails to use  the  loan for the purposes  stated. 
These  loans,  which are· usually secured,  are.more  expensive than finance 
provided by way  of  overdraft 1 - the interest rate would generally be  at 
least one  or  two  nercentage  points  above  that which the  customer would 
pay for a  fluctuating  overdraft - but they are intended to provide  a 
facility that comes  somewhere  between proposals  suitable for  overdraft and 
proposals where hire purchase  or leasing arrangements  might  be  more 
appropriate.  It is understood that the demand  from  farmers  for these 
loans  was  not at first very lar2e  and some  banks  report that there is 
1. Sometimes  the rates are quoted as  Base Rate +  x  per cent.  and therefore 
vary with the level of Base  Rate,  but for longer-term loans  of more 
than modest  amount it is the  current practice to quote  a  rate  of 
interest linked not to Base Rate  but rather to inter-bank rate and to 
·look for a  margin  of  (say)  2  per cent.  above  that rate.  In other cases, 
the rate may  ~e fixed  or can be  negotiated on that basis,  though latterly-
although it still remains  open- it is not  perhaps  a· very real option. 
If pressed,  a  bank would still concede  a  fixed rate,  but in those 
circumstances  because  of the recent volatility of rates it would tend 
to quote  a  rate that was  sufficiently high to be unattractive to the 
customer. - 72-
still a  rclat.:Lvc  h< c lc  of'  interest by the  fa.rming  comnunity. 
1 
Even  ,.,h,2re 
some  increase in term lending to agriculture has  taken place,  the  total  of 
such  loo.ns  has  remained  a  very small l?roportion  of aggregate  advflnces  to 
farmers.  In  appro~riate circumstances,  too,  a  loan  account  (or  even an 
overdraft)  on  normal  banking  terms  and  conditions  might still be  preferred 
as  a  more  flexible  means  of  lending for  a  period  of years.  Alternatively, 
-part  of the facility might  he  put  on  a  term  loan,  in.  order to  provide  i...llc 
farmer  ,.;i th an assurance  that  even in the  event  of a  credit squeeze  the  money 
"\vould  continue to  be ava.ilable.  At  the  sa.me  time,  there  mit:ht  be  occasions 
'vhen the financing  progra.mme  '\vould  be  revised and  an  existing ·term  loan  be 
substi  tutE~d by  a,  nmv  a.rrn,ngemcnt  perhaps  cornprisin{;  both a  term loan  D nd  an 
overdraft. 
It wa.s  on  October 1,  1971  that the  London clearing banks  introduced 
Base  Ra.te  (the Scottish clearing banks  also  introduced it at ab0ut the  s~me 
time).  It  w~ts  to this  base that rates actually charGed  on  loans  ,.;ere  related. 
Previously, it had been Bank rate.  For the  novencnt  of  bank interest rates 
since  1961,  see  Ta.ble  XXXII.  For quotation of rates  on  bank advances,  the  tBU~~l 
formula  is Base  Rate  +  x  per  cent.  On  advances  to agriculture  (in early 1974, 
when  Base  Rate  ,.ms  13  per cent.),  the  minimum  rate charged by the English 
clcarin~ banks  to  first-class agricultural  borrm.;ers  ,.;as  generally Base  R2 te 
+ 1t per cent.  per  annum  (this rate might  also  a.J?ply  in addition to borro,.,•ers 
'lvho  over part  of the year maintained very good  credit bala.nces);  average  rates 
were  usually+ 2  per cent.  to 2}  per cent.  and,  effectively,  the  maximum  rates 
2 
chE'Jrgcd  "';ere  +3  ·to  4  per  cent.,  '-vi th +  4  per cent.  the  excertion rather than the 
1.  It is possible that the  position may  be  rather different in Scotland,  where it 
is reported that farmers  have  tended to make  increasinr, usc  of business  t.crr!1 
loans,  though because  of the difficulties involved  in proj ccting 'd  th any  de,s:rc- ~· 
of  accuracy future  profits in agriculture the business  term loan is  of  less 
interest to farmers  than it is to industrial and  commercinl  customers.  One 
interesting development  in Scotland is that since these  loRns  were  introduced 
(with terms  usually  ran~ing u-p  to reven years)  t· 1e  Scottish banks  necm  to  have 
been rather less-inclined than  they  were  i~ 4 ·:d  past to refer medium-term  (even 
longer-term)  propositions  to the  SASC. 
2.  Rates  are also said to vary somewhat  around.  the country,  being slirhtly hi,~her 
in the  south-west  of England  and  somewhat  lower  in the  east and north-east. 
Bank managers  have  a  lot of autonomy in determining the  rates  charged;  also in 
some  parts  of the  country competition may  be  more  intense  than  elsc1.,rhere. - 73-
Table  1XX:II 
Interest Rates  1962  to 1974 
Cloa:rine bank 
B!lnk rute  Clea:ri!1e  bank  'blue ch:i.p' 
P..-:1.se  Hate  rate 
1961  d  ~{. 
('f 
p  ,o 
2  Hover1ber  6  67 
1962 
8  Harch  st  6 
22  l'.:.:.rch  5  s.;. 
26  April  4-1- 5 
19G3 
3  .Tanuary  4  41  2 
1964 
27  February  5  5-} 
23  november  7  7·~ 
1965 
3  June  6  6-} 
1966 
14  July  7  71 
1967 
26  January  6t  7 
16  I.rarch  6  6-} 
4  l·rBy  st  6 
19  October  6  6-} 
9  November  6t  7 
20  November  a·  at 
1968 
21  J'.arch  7t  8 
19  September  7  7t 
1969 
27  Fe  brua~.Y  8  8t 
9  (1 October) 
1970 
5  Narch  7-}  st 
15  April  7  8 
1971 
1 Aprj.1  6  7 
2  Septctlber  5  6 
26  november  4t-*  5t* 
1972 
9  June  5+  6+ 
22  June  6 
30 June  6 
~  24  July  7:1: 
11inimUI!1 
Lending Rate 
13  October  7t 
27  October  7-l;-
1 December  7t 
8  December  8 
7t~  st§  13 December 
22  December  9 - 74-
To.ble  XXXII  cont. 
1973  stt  9-t,!  3  January 
19  ,Tanuary  8t 
lot-Y.-*  14  February  9-1** 
23  Na.rch  81  2 
4 April  9***  10*** 
13  April  8 
19  April  st 
11  Nay  8 
18  Nay  7-l 
9t44- 22  Hny  8~++ 
22  June  7-~ 
26  Jun·-:  ai~  9~~ 
20  July  9 
27  July  11-} 
2·Augu~t  10 
¢  11.0 
23  Aug1.1st  11  12 
19  Oct..:'uor  11{ 
13  November  13 
14  November  13  14 
1974 
4 January  12f 
1 February  12t 
5 April  12-.r 
11 April  12  12
1  13t 
13  Hay  12)f  13/i· 
24  illny  11-l 
20 September  llt 
UO'J'ES  ':'0  TABLE  x:x:XII 
*  Barclays  Bank  rate reduced as fror.l  15  October. 
+  Barclays funk  change  made  13  June. 
+  National Uestminster change  made  21 July and  Lloyda  25  July. 
rlilliams &  Glyn' s  BD.se  Rate rai.sed  only to  6~ but to 7  on 12  Septembe1·. 
~  National  ~{estminster change  made  12  December. 
f  The  move  was  led by Barclays with Hidland close behind.  Lloyds and 
1'1ii..liaras  &  Glyn' s  follo.-Ted  on 4  January 1973.  National :·!estminstei· 
(and Coutts)  did not raise their rate until 9  January 1973,  but then 
only to 8{ per cent.  They came  into line with the other banks  oh 
J·anuary  25. 
**  l.fidland.s  R'lrclays,  and Hilliams &  Glyn' s  raised rates on  15·  FebrU.9.ry 
1973. 
•**  1~1idland funk rate reduced  5  April 1973. 
++  Midland and  Lloyds rate change made  23  }ay 1973. 
~~  national '\'Jestrninster rate reduced.  15  June  1973. 
¢  Lloyds rate  raised  22 August  1973• 
/-/.  The  move  was  led by  JJloyds.  Barclays and national Westminster 
follm-red  on 23 11ay  1974  with Hidlo.nd and "dilliams and  Glyn' s 
C'!loAe  behjnrl  on  24.  HaY  J.q74. - 75-
rule.  Gnc  banlt mir:ht  occa,si onally hD.vc  gone  to +  5  per cent.,  but this 
,.,..ould  be  very unu.:-mal.  Also,  1-rhcrc  a,  rc lati  vcly high margin  ~.-:D. s  n PI:·li cd, 
it ,.rould  tend to :rela;tc  to  c_.  rather more  risky venture  and,  in those 
ii1stances,  there might v."ell  be  a  '~lit'  rate,  the  normal  rate being applied 
to the farmer's  main account and the higher rate to  a  particular venture. 
Formerly,  a  minimum rate belmv 1vhich  the rete charged  could not  go,  wa.s  also 
quoted for  each advance,  but this seems  to  be  no  longer the  case.  For the 
most  part,  rates  on the  loan account would tend in England and 1·la.lcs  to be 
t  to  1  per cent.  higher than the  equivalent rate  on  overdraft  and,  on terrn 
loans,  1  to 2  per cent.  higher.  One  ba~t charged a  flat rate  on  term loans, 
but in effect charges  current in early 19'/4  came  out  much  the  sr  .. me  as for the 
other banlts • 
1  In Scotland,  rates still seem to be slightly higher than in 
England  e.nd  \Vales  - tho  minimum  rate  charged 1vould  be  as  in England  and  \'Tales 
Base  Rate + 1t per cent.  and the  maximum  Base  Rate  + 4fper cent.  or 
thereabouts,  but the vast majority of farming  eodvances  would  now  be  charged 
within the  range  of Base Rate+ 2! to 3t per cent., with Base Rate+ 4  per  cent. 
a  much  more  common  rate than it would have  been t'vo  or three years  ago.  In 
Northern  Ireland,  whe  .. :·e  rates are related tot  hose  obtaining in England  and 
Wales,  interest rate arrangements  have  in the past been rather less flexible 
and the rates  charged were  slightly higher than in England  (say,  an additional 
1  )  2  2  per cent.  •  Since  September 1971,  when the policy of Competition and 
Credit Control ,·ras  introduced in the United Kingdom,  the  tendency has  been 
tmvards  parity, "'lhcn  calculs..ting the true  lending rate  to the  customer. 
So far as  comparisons with  other industries  are  concerned,  most  (if not 
all)  of  the British banks  actively seek the  borrmdng ace ounts  of  farmers 
1. Scottish banks  have  usually charged a.n  extra  ~- per cent.  on unsecured 
lending.  While this may  be  less  co~non than it used to be,  the practice 
is still prevalent.  Horc  generally,  the banks  are  nmv  inclined to relate 
rates  of interest to the  time factor  involved,  rather than to the  security 
position alone  and to charge  a  higher rate on  longer  term a.nd  hard core 
borrowings,  even to  'shacle it' when  dealing with the  temporary bridge. 
2.  Sec Availability of Capital and Credit to United  Kin~dom A~riculture, 
Pl?•  127-128. - 76-
anu pride themselves  on  treating the farmers  (if anything)  slightly 
better than other  custoMers.  Hence,  it is thought that on average 
farmers  may  be  granted advances  at  rates.approxin~tely t  per cent.  lo,ler 
than  (say)  industrial customers.  Likewise,  there appear to be  no  extra 
costs applying specifically to farmers  (other than the  conmission charged 
on  ACC  guarantees)  when  arranging security- solicitors'  fees  would be 
essentially similar;  there is now  no  stamp duty on  mortgages;  and,  in 
the  case  of agricultural valuations,  these  may  often in the  case  of 
farmers  be  done by bank staff, whereas  valuations  of industrial 
properties may  require  outside specialist treattnent and  therefore be 
rather more  expensive. 
The  ,Agricultural  Nortgage  Coruoration  (as  was  indicetcd in 
Chapter  1  at pp.  8  and  ll)  lends  mainly at medium- and  long-term. 
As  at March  31,  1974,  outstsnd.ing loans  1-1ere  £244.18 million,  the  sharp rise tlud 
had occurred in 1973  being due  to the increased price  of  land and the rising 
cost  of  inputs.  The  AMC  was  set up in Janua~ 1929  under  the Agricultural 
Credits Act  1928  to malce  loans  for agricultural purposes  (i)  on  the 
basis  of  ntortgages  of agricultural land  or  (ii) against rent  charges 
(under the  Improvement  of  Land  Acts  1864 and 1899).  It conunenced  business 
with a  capi~al originally of £650,000,  later increased to £750,000 
1  subscribed by all the  large  joint stock banks  in the country  and by the 
Bank  of England.  Reserves  in the amount  of £750,000 have  now  also been 
cap1talised,  raising the total share  capital to £1.5 million.  The 
maximum  dividend payable  on  the  A~~·s capital was  originally 5 per cent. 
non-cumulative,  later restricted to Jt  per cent.  Originally,  one  of the 
eight directors was  to be  nominated by the- Treasury;  this was  later 
1. Currently,  Barclays  Bank Limited,  Lloyds  Bank Limited,  Midland Bank Limited, 
National Westminster Bank Limited,  and Williams & Glyn's Bank Limited. 
(Note  that two  of these banks  - National \festminster and \villiams  &  Glyn' s 
--are the  result of recent amalgamations;  ~~rtins Bank has  also been 
absorbe~ by Barclays Bank.) - 77-
altered to  t";o  to. be  nominnted by the  Hinistcr of Agriculture and 
one  by the  Treasury.  It was  further laid dmin that the Corporation's 
Nemorand.um  and Articles  of Association could be altered only with  the 
~linister  1 s  consent. 
The  Corporation '\·las  given powers,  inter  a.l~-~'  to raise money 
on the  London  capital ma.rket  hy means  of debenture  issues to  be  re-lont to 
farmers  on  the  security of first mortgages  on agricultural  land and 
buildings.  Debentures  were  to  be  long-term and at fixed rates  of 
interest  (debentures  bearing variable interest rates are not generally 
issued in the United Kingdom).  It '\vas  for this renson also  (and because 
it was  expected to  be  of advantage  to the  farmer)  that it wns  decided 
by  the  Board that the Corporation's  lending should initially be at 
fixed rates.  In addition to authorising certain grants  towards  the  cost 
of running  the Corporation during its early years,  the  1928  Act  empowered 
the  Minister, with the approval  of the 'l'reasury,  to advance  loc=ms  to the 
Corporation free  of interest for  60  years  and  up to £750,000,  the  intention 
being to ensure  that  loans  would  be  made  to borro'i....-ers  on  favourable  terras •1 
Subsequent legislation increased this amount  in several  stages  e.fter 19442 
to £17 million  (as at 31  N  ..  "trch,  1974,  £12.68rnillion was  outstanding).  The 
Corporation also has  a  Na:rginal Fund,  w·hich  consists  of its paid-up  sha.:.~e 
capital, its reserves,  and  a  Guarantee  Fund.  The  Guarant.ee  Fund  cons:ists  of the 
Minister's interest-free advances  (as  above)3  and is the balancing part of  tl1e 
Marginal  Fund,  which  on  the  occasion of  each new  debenture  issue  must  be 
brought  up to  10 per cent.  of the first £50 million of the Corporation's 
outstanding debenture  borrowing  plus 7t  per cent.  of  outstanding debenture 
1.  Thus,  the interest-free loan could be  reinvested and the relevant  income 
so applied. 
2.  As  a  result of additional assistance given  (by way  of grant)  in 1944,  most 
of the  5  per cent.  a.nd  41  per cent.  loans  to then existing borrowers "'ere 
converted by arrangement to the  nm.;  3t  per cent.  rate. 
3.  The  terms  and  conditions  of these advances  are set out in agreements 
between the Minister  and the Coruoration and are  in· turn reflected in the 
Corporation's  Memorandum  and Articles  of Association.  They  are  referred 
to in the  prospectus  when  ·a.  debenture--issu-e-i.-s-ma~e-.-- 78-
borro1·ling  in excess  of £50 million.  The  Guarantee  Fund  is intended 
to  provide  a  larger capital base  as  'bacJs.ing'  for  any debentures  issueq 
to the public.  By  this means,  it was  hoped that the AHC  would  be  able 
to borrow·  and  consequ0ntly to  lend more  cheaply. 
The  Corporation did not  in fact  do  a  great deal  of business  in 
its early yenrs,  largely pecause it was  caught by the fall in interest 
rates in the  early 1930s  and the  money  it had borrowed against fixed rate 
debentures  eventually had to be  re-lent a.t  a  loss.  For the  purpose  of 
easing the Corporation's  problems~ Section 32  of the Agricultural 
Development  Act  1939  introduced a  subsidy,  which was  later extended.1 
The  arrangement vlas  that ea  .. ch year until 31  }'.f.arch,  1974 the Ninister 
might  grant up to £100,000 to the  Corporation in order to cover:  the 
loss  shown  (if any)  by the profit and  loss, ac_count;  the  sum  transferred to 
the Special Reserve  (a sinking fund  for the  purpose  of repaying,  if 
required,  the Government  Loans  to the  Guarantee Fund);  the year's 
2  proportion of the written-off costs  of  debentures;  bad debts written 
3  off;  and the cost  of  compounding  for  stamp duty.  The  grants  were  to 
become  repayable after  }~.rch 1974,  provided the }linistry and the Treasury 
were  of  the  opinion that the  Corporation could afford to pay.  Meanwhile, 
repa~nents were  only required if the Corporation's  reserves  (including 
the Special Reserve)  totalled £1.25  million or more  and the Corporation 
1.  By  Section II(ii)  of the Agricultural  (Hiscellaneous  Provisions)  Act 
1944 and Section I(b)  of the Agricultural  Mortgage  Corporation Act  1958. 
2.  Within the  terms  of the subsidy agreements,  there is a  write-off of the 
costs  of debenture  issues.  These  relate to the  annual  sums  required to 
write  off these  costs  over the  minimum  life of the stock  (the normal· 
accounting basis).  In addition,  there have  been special write-offs  over 
and  above  the  minimum  required.  In other words,  the  A~V writes  off the 
costs  of debenture  issues  as  quickly as  possible,  depending  on  how  much 
they can afford in any  ~ne year. 
,J. On  the majority of the  secured loan capital issued  (debenture stock and 
bonds)  and  on all that issued since July 1956,  the  A~~ compounds  the 
transfer stamp duty.  These  stocks  ca.n  therefore be dealt with in the 
market free  of transfer duty.  It is understood that the  A~£ thereby gets 
a  finer rate,  i.e., it can borrow more  cheaply. - 79-
decided to pay a  dividend.  (as it has  in some  years);  then an  amount 
equal to the  net dividend1  had to be  repaid,  the General  Reserve  being 
reduced by  a  like amount.  NCl  annual  gran-t  had  been taken since  1959. 
Allowing for the  repayment in connection with the  1974 dividend,  the total 
of past grants  now  outsta.nding  amounts  to £1.574 million.  '£he  agreement 
under which these grants were  made  expired  on  31  1-Iarch,  1974  and AH0  is 
not  seeking a  renewal  thereof.  Negotiations  are taking place  regarding the 
repayment  of  the balance  of·these grants. 
The  Corporation's business  remained at comparatively low  levels  -
below £5  million of  new  lP.nding annually - until the  1960s,  "rhen  as  a 
result of a  combination of factors  such as  the credit squeeze  and the 
increase  in land values  there was  a  sharp rise in the Corporation's 
business,  some  of it being diverted from the  ba1li~s.  The  amount  of  loans 
granted annually to repay the banks  increased from just under £250,000 in 
1959 to over £8  million in 1970.  Latterly, it fell to about half that, 
but  rose  again to  £13.5  million  by 197  4.  As  a  percentage  of  loans 
granted annually, it varied from  a  lo1v  of 8  per cent.  in 1959  to  a  high 
of  28  per cent.  in 1974.  Meanwhile,  loans  granted annually increased to 
£47.9 million in 1974,  of which £25.8  million or  54  per cent. 
(it was  57  per cent.  in 1970)  of the total was  granted for the purchase  of 
land. 
The  majority of the  funds  that the Corporation has  available for 
lending are raised by long-term debenture  issues  (for issues to date,  see 
Table XXXIII).  In addition,  since June  1969,  smaller sums  have  been raised 
(again see  Table XXXIII)  by issuing short-term  'bonds'  (though legally these 
are a  form  of debenture).  The  Corporation also has  an overdraft facility 
with the baruts  in order to provide additional funds  on a  temporary basis in 
1. I.e., net of  income  tax. - 80-
Table XXXIII 
THE  AGRICULTURAL  MORTGAGE  COF~PORATION LIMITED 
DEBENT~~ES AND  BONDS  ISS~~D 
MininniD 
Date of  Amount  Terms of Issue  All  Up  Value of  L-ending 
Issue  Cost to  Government  Rate 
AMC  Accretion  Required 
DEBENTURES 
May  1930  £8.5M  5%  1959/80 @ par  5.27 
Apr.  1932  £2.0M  4f%  1961/91 @ £95%  5.16 
Sept.  1948  £2.0M  3%  1966/69 @ par  3.53  (Redeemed  1969) 
Dec.  1949  £3.01'-1  ~}% 1965/67 @ £99%  4.18  (  "  1967) 
Oct.  1950  £3.5M  3f%  1975/78 @ par  3.94 
Sept.  1951  £3.25M  3f%  1961/63  @  par  4.25  "  1963) 
Aug.  1952  £5.0M  4f%  1977/82 @ £96.5%  5. 34 
July  1956  £5.0H  5%  1979/83 @  £97%  5.82 
Aug.  1958  £5.0M  5t%  1980/85 @ £98%  6.24 
Sept.  1960  £6.0M  6%  1982/87 @  £99%  6.64 
Nov.  1971  £10.0M  &t%  1975/77 @ £99.5%  7.09 
July  1963  £10.0M  5t%  1993/95 @ £98.5%  6.15 
July  1964  £12.0H  6i%  1992/94 @ par  6. 74 
Oct.  1965  £12.0M  6i%  1985/90 @ par  7.19 
Sept.  1966  £17.0M  7t%  1981/84 @ £99.25%  8.52 
May  1968  £20.0M  7t%  1991/93 @ par  8. 354  .546  7.808 
Apr.  1969  £20.0M  91%  1983/86 @ £99.5%  10.304  .617  9.687 
Mar.  1970  £25.0H  9t%  1980/85 @ £98.5%  10.337  .675  9.662 
Mar.  1971  £20.0r1  9f%  1981/83 @ £98.25%  10.597  .620  9.977 
Sept.  1971  £10.0M  9%  1979/82 @ par  9.930  .630  9.300 
Nov.  1972  £12.0M  9i%  1985/87 @ £99.5%  10.670  10.670 
June  1973  £12.0M  lot% 1992/95 @ £98.5%  11.070  11.070 
Hay  1974  £20.0N  14{7b  1984  @  £99.57~  15.420  1.080  14.340 
OTHER  BORROWINGS  SECURED  BY  DEBENTURES 
June  1973  £10.0M  June  1982 @ 100 
(Var.  2%  above 
syndicated base rate) 
Feb.  1974  £10.0M  Jan.  1983 @  100 
(var.  2%  above 
syndicated base rate) 
BONDS 
June  1969  £l.OM  10%  June  1970 @ 99  15/16 :n.4s  .52  10.83 
(Redeemed  1970) 
Jan.  1970  £2.0M  9%  F'eb.  1971 @ 99  15/16 10.46  .63  9.83 
(Redeerned  1971) 
Jan.  1970  £2.CM  9t% Jan.  1972 @ par  9.89  • 35  9.54 
(Redeemed  1972) 
Feb.  1971  £2.0M  7~-% Feb.  1972 @ 99  15/16  8.38  • 35  8.03 
(Redeemed  1972) 
Jan  •.  1972  £1.0M  5·i%  F2b.  1973 @  100  5.75  • 35  5.4 
(Re:deemed  1973) 
/cont ••• - 81-
Table XXXIII  cont. 
Date of 
Issue 
Amount  Tenns  of Issue  All  Up  Value of 
Cost  to  Government 
Minim  tun 
Lending 
Rate 
Required  Mr..C  Accretion 
BONDS 
Jan.  1972  £l.OM  7i%  Jan.l977 @ 100  7.54  • 35  7.19 
Feb.  1972  £l.OM  5i%  Feb.l974@ 99  15/16  6.24  • 35 (Redeemed  1974)5.89 
Feb.  1972  £l.OM  6i%  Feb.l976 @ 99i  7.22  .35  6.87 
Oct.  1972  £2.5M  9i%  Oct.l977 @ 100  9.59  9.59 
Feb.  1974  £l.ON  lL'rfJS  Feb.  19'{5  @  100  15.53  .35  15.18 
Nnr.  1974  £5.0H  14·bo  }w.r.  1979 G 100  15.52  .96  14.48 
Note: 
All  figures  from  1968  onwards  are definitive,  being based on  contemporary 
calculations still in the files. 
The  all-up cost figures for preceding years  are  approximations being based 
on current data- i.e.,  present rates of taxation and net administrative costs. 
between issues  of debentures.  The  overdraft facility is normally negotiated 
annually on  a  syndicated basis with the  Clearing  Baru~ers'  Commntee  and the 
Bank of England,  the limits for  1971  and  1972  being £25  million.  For 1973,  it 
was  raised to  £30  million, l'Thich  remained the amount available in 1974.  To  the 
extent that this is utilised,  interest at Base Rate +  1  per cent.  is charged. 
Latterly,  too,  the ANC  has arranged to take  up term loans  from  the clearing 
banks  in the amount  of £10 million on  each  of  two  occasions to mature  in 9  years. 
The  rate charged has  been 2  per cent.  above  Base  Rate.  A commitment  fee  is also 
charged  on the  unused balance  of the facility.  These  loans are  secured by 
placines of  debentures to bring them within the  ambit  of AHC 1 s  }larginal Fund. 
The  volun1e  and frequency  of  debenture borrowing is controlled by the 
Bank  of England,  which until recently has preferred that the Corporation 
should not  go  to the  market  more  frequently than about  once  a  year anel  ~.~uat  any 
increase in the size  of the  issues  should be  progressive.  However,  in 1971,  the 
AMC  was  permitted to issue £20 million of debentures  in }~rch and a  further £10 
million in Septembero  It is understood that subject to market  conditions the 
BaUlt  of  England sees  no  reason in principle why  AHC  issues  should not  be  Ir.adc 
biennially in future. - 82-
1'he  several holdings  of  these debentures  (by category)  are 
given  for the  last four  issues in Ta.ble  XXXIV  (Holdings  of Debenture 
Stock).  Formerly,  there was  a  great deal of  support from  the Savings 
Banks,  including some  massive  investments  by the National Debt 
Commissioners  o~ their behalf.  This  support waned at the time  of the 
last issue,  but was  replaced in part by stronger support from the 
insurance  offices.  This  is probably due  to their preference for 
somewhat  longer issues, 'vhereas  the  savings  banks  have  a  predilection 
for  the shorter  ones. 
The  Corporation's  stock ranks  as  near gilt-edged on  the stock 
market.  The  interest rates that apply  (again see  Table XXXIII)  are, 
therefore,  less than those  on  coznmercial  fixed interest stock,  but have 
been a  little above  those  on  Gover1ment  issues.  This  favourable  rating 
could be  explained by the Corporation's lmovm  association with the 
Government.  Although there has  never been a  Government  guarantee whether 
of  theJCorporation or its debentures,  it appears to have  been assumed  by 
investors in the past that,  in the  event  of a  financial crisis, the 
Government  would be  bound to come  to the aid of the Corporation - as  in 
fact happened in 1939,  when  as  mentioned  above  a  Government  grant became 
necessary to enable  AMC  to meet its debenture interest commitments. 
But the  position is not now  as  favourable  as  was  formerly the  case. 
For  many  years,  the  AJv.C  was  able to borrow at rates  only about t  per cent. 
above  the rates  on  gilt-edged.  When  gilts became  free  of capital gains 
tax  (in April  1969),  ,.,hich  .ANC  stocks  are not,  the differential widened. 
to t  per cent.  Indeed,  in 1970,  A~~ had to pay 1  per cent.  over the gilt 
rate.  This  was  a  consequence  of  the difficulties then  experienced by the 
Mcrsey Docks  and Harbour Board,  since  - although the latter has  no 
connection with agriculture - these  events  did cause  investors to look more 
closely at underlying realities and the  stocks  of  the Board were  unfortunately - 83-
Ta.b 1 e  XXXIV 
THE AGRICULTURAL Iv10RTGAGE  CORPOHATION LIMITED 
HOLDINGS OF Ll\ST FOUR DEBEN1URE  STOCK 
ISSUES  AT  THE  FULLY  PAID  STAGE 
Holder 
Holdings over £1 0, 000 :-
(a)  Trustee Savings Banks 
9~%  Stock 
1981/83 
% 
50 
(b)  Nationalllibt Commissioners  18 
(c)  Pension Funds  1 
(d)  Insurance Offices  9 
(e)  Local and County Councils  1 
(f)  Others (over £10, 000)  10 
Holdings under £10, 000 :- 11 
100 
==== 
9% Stock 
1979/82 
% 
"72 
3 
3 
3 
11 
8 
100 
==== 
~%Stock 
1985/87 
% 
62 
14 
1 
2 
2 
8 
11 
'100 
----
10~%  Stock 
1992/95 
% 
24 
10 
4 
17 
3 
28 
14 
100 
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for the Al-.C  dealt with in the  same  market as  were  ANC  stocks.  ~rhe 
effect was  that the raising of  A}lC  funds  had.  become  more. CX'J?ensive  and 
that it therefore had to charge its borrow·ers  higher ra·tes.  1 
Under  the  1928  Act, it was  stated that the  Corporation would 
provide  loans  on  terms  favourable to borrowers,  though what this was  to 
mean  was  nmvhere  defined.  Lending  rates arc in fact  governed mainly by 
the  interest that has  to be  paid on  the  coupon  plus  the cost  of debenture 
issues  {the total cost per cent.  is  shown  in Table XXXIII  - 'all up cost 
to ANC'),  less  income  received from accretions  to the Government 
Guarantee  Fund.  Actual rates  charged by the ANC,  together with 
related  yields,  are  given in the Graph  - Gross  Redemption Yields  on 
Gilts  {p.  85).  In general,  policy seems  to be to charge  about t  per 
cent.  higher than the cost  of the debenture  issues,  though at times  of 
rising interest rates the margin may  widen  a  little and '\'Then  rates are 
falling it may  shrink.  But,  in any event,  the margin does  little more 
than cover administrative  expenses. 
Loans  may  be  made  to  mvners  of agricul  ture.l property in England 
and Wales  (including companies)  or to an applicant '\rhose  intention it is 
2  to  purchase  a  property.  They may  be  made  only against first mortgages 
on agricultural iand and buildings  (i.a, the freehold)  and are restricted 
in value to two-thirds  of the Corporation's valuation of  land and buildings. 
No  collateral security that may  be  offered will enable  the  Corporation to 
increase the  amount  of the  loan beyond the maximum.  In particular,  the 
Corporation cannot take into account the value  of stock or crops.  But the 
offer of a  loan may  be  conditionalon a  guarantor  (or guarantors)  joining in 
the mortgage  deed.  The  taking of security is the Corporation's  prime 
safeguard,  in addition to which at a  time  of rising land prices its margin 
1.  The  differential given for the  November  1972  issue  of £12  mil~ion was 
0.10 per cent. 
2.  Hence,  a  tenant farmer  can  only be  assisted if he will become  the  OWller 
of the farm following the taking up  of a  loan. 1
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of security effectively widens.  The  Corporation is also concerned with the 
borrower's ability to service the  loan and  makes  a  thorough investigP.tion of 
the  a-pplication,  "\vhich  must  be  supported by  information rela.ting to  financial 
status and farming  exper5ence.  In addition,  the  A~~ will need to be  satisfied 
that there will be  adequat~ working  capital available  to farm the  property in an 
economic  manner  and to provide  for the  purchase  of  such stock as  may  be. 
necessary.  It will require  evidence  of  the farmer's  ability in the  form  of the 
last three years  balance  sheets and/or forward  budgets  and cash flow analyses. 
'fuere  new  land is to be  fa.rmed,  for"\vard  budgets  for the next  two years  operations 
are asked for. 
As  interest rates have  climbed higher,  Al-C 's concern 'vi th the  borro:wer  1 s 
ability to service .his  loan has  increased.  Current  requirements are that 
applicants  must  shmv  a  minimum  net margin of  income  from all sources  of  the 
greater of  £2,800 per annum  or  5  per cent.  of the AMC  loa.n  required,  before tax 
and after meeting A}C  and all other loan charges  and  outgoings.  Further, it is 
necessary for  applicants with outside  income  to  show  that at least  three-q~~rters 
of the  cost  of servicing the  Al'I..C  loan required  can be  m~t from farm  income.  AEC 
monitors  the  sources  of applicants'  incomes  and  currently two-thirds of  loans 
sanctioned are to applicants 'vi  th no  income  other than  farm  income  from which to 
service their borro,.Jings. 
It costs  nothing to apply for  a  loan and  no  deposits in respect  of  fees 
are required.  In all cases  where  an.acceptable  applica:lion is submitted,  the 
Corporation will immediately arrange  a  valuation,  but if - following  the 
valuation - the Corporation is unable  to offer a  loan,  no  charge will be  mede. 
However,  if a  loan offer is  made  but not accepted,  a  fee  amounting  to  t  per  cent. 
of  1  per cent.  of the amount  of  the  loan offer will be  payable by the applicant 
towards  the Corporation's  expenses.  Also,  when  an  offer' is  accepted,  the 
applicant must  pay a  loan  fee  of  lt_per cent.  of the  amount  of  the  loan  (in 
normal  ca.ses,  the  fee  is deducted from the  loan completion moneys,  but it 
becomes  payabl~ in cash if the applicant withdraws  after accepting the  offer;  if 
the valuation permits,  the fee  may  be  added to the  loan at the  mortgage  rate 
of  interest). 
The  type  of property on ,.mich the Corporation will lend lvould  normally 
be  an agricultural unit with an  income  potential sufficient to  enable  the 
borrower to meet his  loan commitments  and to provide  a  reasonable  livelihood. 
In sui  ta.ble  cases,  the  Corporation is  prepared to offer a  loan on  ba-re  lancl 
or  on  specialised units  (e.g.,  pigs  or poultry).  There  is  no  minimum  siz·e 
of acreage;  it is the  income  potential of  the  lana 1vself which is the most 
important fa.ctor  to be  taken into account.  In fact,  most  loans are made 
in terms  of  number  'in the  size  groups  of  50  - 100 acres,  100 - 150 - 87-
acres,  and 150-300 acres.  Those  made  to fina.ncc  small  farms  (of up 
to 30 acres)  are nevertheless significant and,  as  one  '\•rould  expect,  those 
made  on  the basis  of  large  farms  (1,000 acres  and  over)  are  small in 
1  number.  tf the value  of the property is mainly in the house and/or the 
buildings,  the Corporation will not usually regard this as appropriate 
security.  The  basic test is whether the  land arid  buildings  add up to a 
viable  farming  enterprise.  Indeed,  the A}C  will on  occasion lend  on 
bare  land,  even '\vhere  the fields are scattered,  provided it cons-~i  tutes 
a  viable unit and the valuer i3  ~atisfied .that it will find a  ready 
market  in case  of need.  AP~ valuers are also authorised to take into 
account  to the  extent that they consider reasonable  - non-agricultural 
factors  such as  amenity ve:lue,  non-farm buildings,  gravel rights,  etc., though 
the  valuation  may  not  always  be  the  equivalent  of the  current market 
price.  But  there is the possibility at a  later stage  of  obtaining an 
additional loan from the  AMC  on  the basis  of the  same  security,  provided 
the current valuation of the  mortgaged property maintains  the necessary 
margin for the  loan.  The  Corporation will also consider the release  of 
a  part  of  the mortgaged property,  provided the  remaining property can 
still be  regarded as  suitable security and  subject to any necessary 
adjustment  of the  loan. 
When  a  loanhas been granted,  the proceeds  may  be  used for any of 
a  number  of purposes.  Most  obviously,  it may  be  used for purchase  of a 
farm,  but it may  also be  used to repay loans  borrowed from  other sources 
(e.g.,  a  bank),  or for capital improvements,  such as the reconstruction 
or provision of new  cottages  or farm buildir1gs,  electricity or water 
supplies,  drainage,  farm roads,  and so  on.  It nmy  even  be  used to provide 
working  capital.  (See  Diagram at p. 88) 
1.  Though it should be  remembered that a  large farming  unit may  in fact 
only mortgage  a  small proportion of its land. - 88-
ANALYSIS OF PURPOSES FOR  LOANS COMPLETED DURING THE 
YEAR  ENDED 31st MARCH 1971:_ 
Repayment of other loans 
f:13·f.•rn (28%) 
Capital 
Improvements 
f4·4m 
(9%) 
Working 
capital etc. 
£4·0m (8%) 
a  Purchases of Additional land 
£14·0m (29%) 
b  Purchases by sitting tenants 
£2·9m (6%) 
a 
Farm/agricultural land purchases 
£25·8m (54%) 
--
\  \ 
\  \ 
\  \ 
\  ', 
\  \ 
\  \ 
\  d 
' 
-
' 
...._  ...._ 
' ' ' 
--
' ' 
-
c  Existing farmers buying new farms 
£3·1m (7%) 
d  Farmer's sons, etc. setting up 
£1·0m (2%) 
e  Newcomers to farming 
£4·8m (10%) -89-
For these  purposes,  the  A}~ offers two basic  typos  of  loan: 
( i}  Long-term repayment  loans which  a.re  av<:d lable for period£  o:r  from 
1  10 to 40 je£>.rs  and include  provision for  repayment  of  capital during the 
·life of the  loan. 
Repayment  may  be  effected by one  or  other of  three different 
methods:  (a)  by aru1.ui ty - eq_ual  half-yearly payrnents  comprising interest 
and  an  instalment  of capital  so  calcula.ted that at the  end  of the period, 
the whole  of the  loan will have  been repaid;  (b)  by endo,nnent  assurance 
('~vith  or without profits,  or linked to unit trusts with guaranteed values)  -
equal half-yearly pa.yments  comprising interest only,  plus  endowment 
assurance  policy premlums;  (c)  by the  equal  capital ncthod  - equal 
half-yearly instalments  of capital plus  interest at the  mortgage  rate  on 
the reducing balance. 
It should be  noted,  too,  that in the  event  of death,  the  loe.n  may 
run on,  provided the  new  legal  ow~r continues  to  observe all the 
covenants in the mortgage  deed.  Also,  the proceeds  of  any assigned 
assurance policies will normally be required for  reduction or  repayment  of 
the loan. 
(ii) Eight to 10-year  'straight'  loans.  In this  case,  the maximum  loc.n 
will be  for not  more  than one half of the valuation of the  property  (as 
compared with two-thirds for  long-term repayment  loans).  No  repayments 
of capital will be  required during the life of the  loan,  the whole  of  the 
capital being repayable in full at the  end  of the agreed term.  Meanwhile, 
only interest at the mortgage  rate is payable at fixed half-yearly dates. 
Obviously,  some  provision must  be  made  for repayment,  or there must  be  some 
expectation that moneys  will become  available  out  of which repayment  can be 
effected  (e.g.,  an inheritance).  It should be noted,  too, that- subject 
to the availability of funds  - the A}C  will  always  be  willing to consider 
applications  for~  loans to finance  the  repayment  of capital. 
1. Strictly speruting,  loans  may  not  exceed  60 years,  but at present they are 
normally for not  more  than 40 years •.  If the  loan is for capital improve-
ments,  however,  the  loan p_eriod  may  be  as  short as  5 years. - 90-
In June  1972,  borrov:-crs  ':ho  1vould  normally have  opted for  a 
long-term loan  (10 to 10 years)  ~~re permitted to elect to  tak~ half 
their total loan on  a  'straight'  basis.  In other words,  only half the 
capital  borrowed had to be  repaid during  the  term of the  loan.  The 
remainder vas  to be  paid back in a  lump  sum  at the  end  of  the  loan.  The 
repayment half  of iihc  loan is dealt with in terms  of any  of the standard 
Al-i;  loan repaymen-t  methods  (e.g.,  by half-yearly repayments  of capital 
on  a  sinking fund basis,  or through  a,  'minimum  cover'  endowment  policy). 
In addition to mortge.ge  loans,  'improvement  loans'  may  be  made 
under the  ImprJ~ement of Land  Ac~~ 1864  and  1899.  In these  cases,  the 
security consists  of  a  rent charge  placed by the }linister of Agriculture 
on the  land improved.  It iR  not  necessary for the  deeds  of the  relevant 
property to be  handed  over.  The  security rests  on the rental vallue  of 
the  property as  increased after the  improvements  have  been effected,  but 
the rent charge takes priority over all existing charges  irrespective  of 
the date  of their creation,  except for Tithe  Redemption Annuities,  existing 
improvement  loan charges,  and the  like.  Hcwevcr,  the procedures  relating 
to  an application for  improvements  arc  so  lengthy  and  cumbersome  that 
landowners  prefer to finance  thar improvements  by other means  and,  in fact, 
the  A~C has  received no  improvement  loan applications  since  1966. 
On  the general run of Al-.C  loans  (and until recently on all loans), 
the rate  of interest was  fixed throughout the period of  the  loan.  In the 
case  of further advances  against the  property,  the  rate  of interest that 
would  apply would  be that ruling  on the date  the further  loan was  completed. 
Once  determined,  this  rate cannot be  increased whatever the circumstances; 
nor  once  fixed  can it be  reduced.1  Amounts  and datus  of  payment are also 
fixed at the  commencement  of  each loan,  but the  A}~ is always  willing to 
consider variations  on  the application of the borrower.  l·feanwhile,  the 
1. Except  on  the  occasion described at n.2,  p.77  • - 91-
borrower gets  complete  security of'  tenure  aau  tht)  lou.n  cD  .. nnot  be 
called in,  provided -the  borrm;er maintains  prompt  payn1cnts,  keeps  the 
property in good  order and cultivation,  and  observes  the  other terms 
of the  mortgage  contract. 
The  legal charge that is taken  on  mortgage  loans  contains  a 
clause 1-1hich  precludes  repayment  of the  loan  other,-rise  than as  set 
out in the deed.  This  is intended not  only to give the borrm.;er 
security of tenure but also to give the  Corporation the protection 
which is necessary,  having regard to its long-term  commitments  to 
its debenture stockholders.  Notwithstanding the  exis-tence  of this 
clause,  however,  the directors  w~ll accept non-contractual  repayments 
of loans,  in approved cases,  on  terms  to be  arranged at the time such 
repayment  is sought.  One  reason why  earlier repayment  of the  loan may 
be  sought is the relatively high  rat~ of interest  (say,  14 per cent. 
per annum}  which have at times been.applied to what  is for the  most 
part long-term borrowing;  alternatively,  a  farmer  rr~y inherit moneys 
that make  it possible forlim to pay off  outstanding  indebtedness.  At 
the  same  time,  the A}£  is  only prepared to consider earlier repayment 
on  terms  that will in part  compensate it for the loss  of its investment 
and,  in this context,  it is the Corporatiotis  practice to charge  a  fee 
not  exceeding. the actuarial value  of  any loss  occasioned to the ANC  by 
such repayment.  In certain circumstances,this fee  might  be substantial. 
Hmvever,  fixed rates give  rise to problems.  Farmers  who  borrow 
from the  A}~ for a  term of years  commit  themsel~es at least for the  medium 
term;  many  of  them have  in fact  committed themselves  for  a  long period of 
years.  It is all very well, if one  happens  to have  borrowed at  (say) 
3! per cent.  (  which applied in the mid-1940s)  or  even 4! to 5  per cent. 
(as  in the mid-1950s),  but 1vhen  the rate rises to 13  or 14 per cent.  (as 
it did in 1973/74)  there may  be  a  case for the borrower not  committing - 92-
himself for too  long a  period  of y0ars.  'fhis  may vell be  true  even 
under inflationary conditions,  "'Th1ch  with rises in the price  of land nnd  -
albeit with some  lag - in the  end-prices  of agricultural products  ma.y 
greatly reduce the burdens  of borrowing. 
Even if the A}U  agrees to prepayment,  there  n1~y be  heavy costs 
to be  met.  If,  on  the  other hand,  & variable rate  of interest is  a~plied 1 
there would certainly be  occasions  ,~Then rates lvould  rise  (to accord with 
existing levels  of money  market rates),  but this would  be  offset by periods 
when  rates were  falling and when  they were at relatively lower levels.  In 
any  event,  at times  of high  rates  and in cases  of hardship,  the  term of 
the  'pay-out period'  could be  extend.ed,  in much  the  same  way  as  Building 
Societies  a.re  prepared to  extend their terms  against the mortgage  of a 
house,  though there  may  be  practical limitations to the  extent to which 
this would  be  possible. 
Considerations  such as  these may  well have  been behind the scheme 
for variable rate loans  introduced by  the  .ANC  in February 1972.  In addition 
to its  lonr~-term repayment  loans  ( 10 to  40 -years)  and its 8  to 10-year 
'straight'  loans  (see  above),  both being  on the basis  of a  fixed rate of 
interest,  the ANC  \vas  now  prepared to  offer borrowers  the  opportunity of 
taking part  of whichever type  of  loan they select  on  the  basis  of  a  variable 
interest rate,  the remaining part to be  taken on  a  fixed interest rate basis. 
Initially, up  ~o half the  loan granted by the  AMC  might  be  taken out  on  a 
variable interest rate basis.  Subsequently  (in June  1972), it "tas 
announced that the borrower,  if he  so  wished,  could take the whole  part  of 
a  loan at the variable rate,  or at a  fixed rate,  or  on  the basis partly of 
a  fixed rate and partly a  variable rate.  This  new  facility was  open  to all 
new  applicants for an  A~C loan and  to  existing borrowers with respect to any 
further  loan they might  require.  It was  not  considered possible to convert 
existing loa,ns  to the new  basis,  because  money  lent by the AJ.I!  to existing - 93-
borrouers was  in fact raised by the  A1,~  on  fixed.  interest terms. 
Horeover,  especially where  moneys  had been  lent. at low  rates,  the AHC 
had contractual obligations to existing borro'\>Ters  to continue that 
accommodation  on the favourable terms  originn.lly agreed. 
The  new  variable rate loans 1vere  to bear initially the rate  of 
interest ruling  on  AHC  loans  on  the date  the  loan was  actually completed. 
For completed loans,  this rate would  t.hen be  reviewed lli  th effect from 
1  June  and  1  December  in every year in the  light of the  current cost 
to the MK1  of the funds  from 'tvhich  the  loans  are made.  This  rate of 
interest 't·TOuld  then apply for the  succeeding six months,  and interest '\'Tould 
start_accruing at the  new  rate.  Hence,  when  added  -Lo  repayments,  the 
variation in interest rates would  from  time  to  time result in a 
fluctuating liability, which would have  to be  met  as it became  due. 
In common  with all other A}~ loans,  borrow·ers 11ere  accorded  complete 
security of tenure  on their variable rate  loans  and the  loan could not be 
disturbed or  called in by the  .ANC  provided the borrO'tier  mainta.ined  prompt 
payment  and  observed the  other terms  of the  contract.  Somewhat  to the 
surprise  of the  A~C, the amount  of borrowing at variable rates  of interest 
has  been relatively limited. 
In fact,  the uptake  of variable rate loam stabilised fairly quickly 
at arow1d  one-third by volume  of  loan completions  and ha.s  since then 
remained fairly constant.  ~fuvements in the variable rate  of interest are 
out in Ta.ble XXXIVA. 
lVhether  interest rates are fixed  or variable,  they must  be  relatgd 
to the terms  of AlC  borrowing.  Previously,  the bulk of AMC  borrowing was 
not  only for a  fixed term  of years  but it tended to be  long-term,  as  did - 94-
Tablc:XXXIVA  ------
AGH.ICUL'J.lUR.AL  NOR'l,GAGE  COH.PORl\.TION 
Varinble  Ra,te  of ·Interest 
for  nmv  as  revim·Ted  for 
lo?.ns  existing  lo~ 
Feb  1972  7 
1  June  1972  7 
1  Aug  1972  et 
13  Oct  1972  9 
1  Dec  1972  9 
12  Jan  1973  9t 
19  Feb  1973  lOt 
19  Apr  1973  12 
1  June  1973  11~  11{-
15  Aug  1973  12-} 
1  Dec  197}  15  15 
1  June  1974  15 
1  Dec  1974  15t  151 - 95-
much  of thn  1  cnd:i.n~,  t.hou[.h  lftt-LcrJ.y  lc)o,ns  h::td  tendetl to become  shorter.  1 
Ho\H~ver,  once  policy  r.10vcc~  in the!  di:rec ~jon of  a.  varircble  n~tc of  intcrc!st 
even  on  a  propor-tion  of LHJ  loans,  it '·ms  necessary also to Gear 
borrovi...1gs  n:orc  closely t0  re. Lo  f]  uc·l;u~,-U.orcs  in ·the  morwy  .... ,lll  capi  t,o,l 
me,rlwts.  In effect, this  mcrms  borro-..ring  for  shorter pc:;..·5.ods  c.nd,  to  t!li::; 
end  in June  1969,  the  ALG  began  issu:i_ng  short-tcr1a bonds;  they have  als_o 
increased their overdraft limit ,.,.ith  the  clearing  bEJ.nlr;:s  and.  used this at 
least :pa.r·Uy  o.s  the basis  of varie.ble  rate  lem1ing;  and  they arranged 
term  lor,ns  from the cleuriug banll::s  at varia.blc rutcs  of interest,  usin,<j 
some  of this  term loan money  to fund  a.  proportion of  -their Ynriable  rate 
lending.  It is clear,  too,  tha-t  bect·mse  some  lending is at fixed rates 
and  s orne  at Wl-riable  rates it means  !we  ping virtually t'l·lO  sets  of  books, 
in order not to  r.d.x  unlH;os. 
Even vhon  lcndinr,  n:t  fixed rates,  there '''ere  problems.  In this 
context,  it is  d~sirable to distinguish between  {a)  new  funds  raised at 
fixed rates  r"s  a  result  of  lle'\-1  issues  of debentures,  vhether  long  or 
short-dated;  and  {b)  sources  of funds  for  current  lending '\>lhich  still 
relate to earlier borrowings  at fixed rates  of interest.  These  latter 
inclucle  (i) 
1 reflux  1  due  to  progres:i  ve  repayment  of  moneys  borro1-red  on 
mortgage;  and  (ii)  prepayments  in advance  of  due  da.t.es. 
Clearly,  if a  loan is repaid before  the  r.1aturi ty of  the debenture 
on "'hich the  lending is ba.s&d,  the  money  must  be  re-employed  in  s orne  way. 
It could  be  used to  buy the Corporation  1 s  mm debentures  for  cancellation 
or be  invested  in gilt-edged stocks,  but quite  often a  better return would 
be  obtained by re-lending it on mortgage  to farmers.  ¥.'hen  re-lent at  a  fixed 
rate, if lending rates  he,d  risen since the  money  'vas  first- lent,  the  A}C 
would  make  a  fortuitous  profit,  whereas  if the  lending rate had fallen,  it 
would  make  an  equally fortuitous  loss.  In other words,  there are two  forces 
acting in opposition:  when  interest rCt.tes  arc hir,h,  reflux r.10ney  can be 
1. Since  1943,  there has  been  a  st&ady fall in the average  life  of  .fH~ 
loans  (only slightly  i:aterru~t.cd in the  early 1950s  ancl  in 1960/61) 
from  44.80~ars to 23.66 years in 1972.  During the  10 years  1948  to 
1958,  the fall 'lva.s  relatively slip,ht,  but  <:'vftcr  1960 it accelerated 
considerably alld  the greater part of this fall  came  after 1965,  when  the 
incidence  of higher interest  ro~es was  also greatest.  This  shortening 
of the average  term  of  loans  granted  '\vEl s  partially due  to  the  rc  la  -ti  ·rc 
prosperity of  the  industry,  p2 rticularly in the  early 1960s  and  pa.rtially 
to the  introduction of  en(lovmcnt  nssurance,  vh::!re  20  to  25  years  is for  the 
majority the  most  practical term,  but high  rates  of interest might  fllso 
have  been  DD  additional factor. - 96-
re-lent at a  profit,  hut  cx;jring debentures  must  ustw  .. lly be  re-f'uncl~1d at 
a  loss  (i.e., ncu  <J.cbeni·.ures- or  'bo:nd.s'  -will be  more  expensive). 
When  interest rates  &re  low,  the  converse is true.  If the Corporation's 
business  took the  form  of  en  evPn  and predictable flm.;r,  it might  be 
possible  to  reach a  position of  equilibrium,  with the Corporation's 
profits and  losses balancing  each  other,  though the  irwidence  of 
Coryoration tax would  dcl<w  its achievcwcmt.  But  because  latterly the 
Corporation's  business  has  increased rapidly at a  time  of high interest 
rates,  it could become  particularly vulnercble to a  fall in rates.1 
The  other  source  of returning  fur1ds,  though the  Cor-poration has 
a  degree  of  control  over this,  is the  prcprt.yment  of fixcd-rv,te  advances. 
This  is  in addition to the normal  pa.ttern of  reflux.  Noreover,  if there 
has  been a  fall in rates,  this  could 'vell  lead to fa.rmers  seeldng 
premature  redemption  of  loans that they had taken out ,.,i th the 
Corporation at high  fixed rates  of interest.  In that event,  the 
Corporation may  be  left with large  sums  of dear money  which  could  only 
be  re-lent at what  might  have  become  relatively cheap rates.  At the 
same  time,  it is possible to regulate  prepayment  of  advances  to  some 
extent by  charging those  who  repay their  loans  prematurely redemption fees 
more  closely·related to  the  cost to the Corporation.  These  could be 
calculated either  on the basis  of the  outstanding period of the  loan or 
on  the  basis  of the  outstanding period  of the debenture  by which the  loan 
was  financed.  On  either basis,  however,  there would  almost certainly be 
a  clear deterrent to  repayment  and the AI-r:  does  not  in fact t:ry to  levy 
the full fee. 
However,  as  we  have  seen,  the  AlvlC  has  latterly moved  in the 
._direction of variable rate  lending.  This  is a  shift in policy ·!:,hat  is 
1.  It is possible to protect  oneself in this  type  of situation by adjusting 
the  term of  one 1 s  borrowing,  a  technique  kno1m  to actuaries as 
'immunisation'.  For  example,  if there is a  persistent fall in rates, 
the  losses  involved in loan reflux can be  offset,  where  recently issued 
short-dated debentures  mature  and can be  refinanced more  cheanly.  On 
the  other hand,  if rates  stay high,  the  continuing profit rnadeLfrom 
loan reflux will help to meet  the high cost  of  refinancing the  debent.ures. - 97-
greatly to be  encouraged.  At  the  se.iJW  time,  t.he  AHC  still offers  a  fixed 
ra  to  option ai!d,  indeed,  a.  nJixture  of  the  -t1-ro,  s inc  0  s orne  farJ;.wrs  -pre .fer 
these  other a.rro.ngements  and  the  .\I-;.C  fc:.vours  a  flexible  policy and  is 
conccrnc<l  to  meet  es  •,.;ide:  r_  r2:;,::r1:e:  of  cler.-.r_n.Cl.s  [:..S  })Ossiblc. 
The  use  mr1de  by borro-vrcrs  in 1973/74 of the  range  of  choice  ava.ila.blc 
is illus-trated hy the  follow·ing table: 
·r  cl b 1 e  xxxrvn 
Loan  comnletions:  Year  to  31  K1rc_l!_1  19'74 
Perc_onta..ge  of Lcl)clin_rr  for yer.r  ~-~on.n •r_ypcs 
Loa.n  l'ype 
Annuity 
Endowment 
Equal  Capital  Instalments 
5~'~ 
1 straight' 
8-10 year  'straight' 
Type  of  Interest Rate 
Fixe1l Rate  Vu.riable  Rate 
24 
30 
l 
3 
7 
65 
% 
10 
15 
1 
3 
6 
35 
The  moneys  accruinr;  from  rd'lux  and  prepayments  ,,rill free  a 
proportion  of  previously com1ni tted money  for  re-lending at varicJble  rates, 
though this  may  in the  r-hort-run result in losses.  But if a  policy of 
variable  rate  lending is to  be  encouraged,  as  long-dated debentures  mature 
they must  be  replaced by  short-dated borrO\ving to 1-.rhich  variable  rate 
lendina can be  more  directly related.  'l'o  s orne  extent,  the Corporation can 
hasten ·these  developments  by buying in its  m,rn  debentures  for  cancellation 
and  re-borroving at shorter term.  Nore  generally,  as  debentures  n;ature,  it 
can shift the  emphasis  over to  short-term borro'\\·ing.  It has  done  this to 
some  exten·li  already by issuing short-term  'bonds'  with  maturities  of  up 
to five years  and  arranging term loan facilities  from the  clc~ring banks. 
nut five years  may  itself be  too  long,  especially ,.;hen rates are high,  and it 
would  seem more  scmi!ble  to borrmv  (as  indeed the  Corporation has  done)  for no 
longer than  one  to two  years  (also  on  overdraft),  unless  rates fall markedly, 
when  the  opportunity might  be  taken to  expand the Corporation's borrowing and 
to  extend the  term  (subject alvays  to the authorities giving their  permission). 
However,  1-1hat  may  be  desirable  cmd  '\-That  may  be  possible could be  t"ro 
different things  and there are  limits set by the  capa.city  of  the  me,rl<;:et.  The 
annual  demand  for borro,ved  money  by  Al~;c  is of  the  order  of £20 to £30 million. 
Of  this,  the  bulk will have  to  be  raised by the  issue  of debentures  and  much 
of  the  remainder by  'bonds'.  The  AH:;  is currently allo,·Ted  to  issue  £5  million 
of  ne,·r  bonds  c·ach year,  provided the total  of  bon<ls  in issue does  not  exceed 
£25  million,  of "\<Thich  not  more  than £5  Inillion  ma;y  be  'yearlings 
1
•  Hence,  if 
there is to be  a  further shift in policy from  lone-term borrO"'.ring  and  fixed 
rate  lending to short-term borro,dng  and  variable rate  lending,  the  move 
would  require  the  full support  of the  monetary authorities.  It is  thought 
tha.t AHJ  vrould  have  little difficulty in securing an  expa;nded  bond  issue 
capa.city. - 98-
Nevertheless,  it may  also be  necessary to look -to  other sources. 
One  possibility is that the  AHC  might  attempt the  private  placing  of 
stock '"i  th major  institutional investors,  such as  insurance  companies. 
Although this would  save  on  issue  expenses,  this  might vell be  absorbed 
in the higher  coupon  e,tta.ching  to an unquoted stock;  furthermore,  the 
insurance  companies  rrlc1,Y  no-t  ,,~ish  to taltc  up  short-dated securities and, 
in any event,  such placements  arc  not  likely to add greatly to the  total 
amounts  raised by debenture  and  bond  issues,  since the  funds  ernanating 
from  private placements  would in all likelihood be  offset by a  reduction 
in the  amounts  forthcoming  froo  -the  institutions ,.,rhcn  subscribing to public 
issues.  Alternatively,  the  A}~ may  itself seek to attract short-term 
deposits  (say,  up to  one  or  two. years)  and,  despite its absence  of branches, 
it is not a 1 together out  of the qucsti  on  - a  number  of  siilall  banlts  in the 
City now  raise money  in this way,  though not infrequently they are 
subsidiaries  of much  larger organisations,  1-1hich  in the  past may  from  time 
to time  have  been instrumental in referring money  to them.  In the  case  of 
AMC,  a  major difficulty might  be  that the Corporation's  main  shareholders 
are  comprised  of  the  lB-rge  banks,  which  may  or may  not welcome  this kind  of 
cempetition.  On  the  other hand,  there is  some  tnerit in concentrating 
long-term lending for  farm purchase  in the hands  of  a  specialist institution, 
thereby avoiding an intensification of  the  hard core  lending  by the banks 
(and,  indeed,  one  hopes  some  diminution of it) and,  if the  A~~ is to have 
adequate  resources,  a  greater proportion  of  which is  short-term in 
character,  there  may  be  a  case for attracting funds  by way  of  deposits, 
though necessarily in individually large  amounts. 
Another  possible  source  of  funds,  llhich has  in fact been 
considered by the AHC,  is borro1.;ing  a.broad  - either in the Euro-currency 
or Euro-bond  marl\:ets,  though in this  context the  AHC  would itself have  to - 99-
bca.r  t.he  exchanc;c  risl\..  ~incc it does  no  business  rLbroe.cl,  there  is 
no  '~ay in v:rhich  it ca.n  hedge.  .Also,  the  .A.HC  is regarded as  beint; in 
the  private sector,  and it is  only public  sector borrowing abroad, 
which  is guaranteed by the British Government.  If the  AhC  vere  in the 
public  sector and  therefore able to  obtain a  Treasury guarantee,  there 
lrould  be  a  case  for borrowing  (say)  in European money  and capital 
markets;  indeed,  there  have  been  occasions ,.,hen  they might  have 
obtained money  more  cheaply in this way.  It must  also be  remembered  that, 
to the  extent that the Greater London  Council and  other  local authorities 
do  borro1v  in these markets,  the pressure  on the  London  market  is thereby 
reduced and,  indirectly,  the  Al·r.:!  ,;rill benefit.  In addition,  :if  local 
authori  tics borro1v  less  in London  than formerly,  this tends to create 
a  relative shortage  of gilt or near-gilt paper and AH::  paper  (which is 
in this latter category)  is therefore likely to  make  its issues with a 
smaller differential in relation to gilts. 
But,in any event,  the Euro-markets  Femain a  possible additional 
source  of  funds  and it has  recently been suggested by a  number  of 
baruters  operating in London that the building societies in the United 
Kingdom  (which are as it happens  very marginal  lenders ,.,hen  it comes  to 
agriculture)  might  supplement their resources  by  seeking huro-loans, 
though so far nothing has  come  of these  proposals  and there would in any 
case have  been technical difficulties.1 
As  has  been indicated already  (p.8),  much  smaller  sums  were  lent 
by the Scottish Agricultural Securities  Corl>Oration Limited in Scotland. 
(For details of business,  see  pp.  11-12.)  In all essentials,  its 
organisation and techniques  are essentially similar to those  of the  A}~. 
The  SASC  'ras  incorporated in 1933.  All  the Scottish joint stock ballits  are 
1.  See  The  Times  (London),  9/3/74 and  22/4/74. - 100-
equal  shareholders  in the Corporation.  There  is  a  'l'rea.sury nominee  on 
the  Board.  Its capital is  £125,000  and  reserves  total £400,000 and it 
ha.s  a  loan from the  Secretary of State for Scotland vihich  ·Has  £710,000 
at 31  }arch,  1974. 
The  bulk of the resources,  -v.rhich  it is the  primary purpose  of  th~ 
Corpora,tion to  lend  out  on  first securities  'on agricultural  or farminz 
estates,  properties  or  lands  in Scotland,  including  land.  used for 
horticulture,  for  poultry farming,  and for any purpose  of husbandry',  is 
raised by the  issue  of debentures,  debenture  stock,  or  other like 
securities,  1'\vhether  terminal',  perpetual  or  otherwise'.  Their first 
debenture  issu.e  "~as  a  public  issue,  but subsequent  issues have  been 
placed  (through Nullens  & Co.,  the Government  broker)  -about 10 per  cent. 
goes  to the  public  and  the rest to  insurance  companies,  the.trustee 
savings  banks,  etc.  As  at 31  ¥arch,  1974  debenture  stocks a;;gregating 
£10  million had  been  issued  (see  Table XXXV). 
Table  XXXV 
SCOTTISH  AGRICULTUHAL  SECURITIE~ C9R~QRATION 
Loan capital 
(Secured by Trust Deed over certain oft  he Corporation's Assets) 
as at 31 l\1arch 197 4-
3!-% Debenture St0ck 1963/93 
3!-% D~bcnturc  ~tock 1979/84 
6% Debenture Stock 19iS/81 
Sl% Debenture Stock 1986/88 
7% Debenture Stock 1980/33 
1t% Debenture Stock 1990/92 
101% Debenture Stock 1989/91 
£ 
500,000 
1,000,000 
1,000,000 
1,500,000 
2,000,000 
2,000,000 
2,000,000 
£10,000,000 
These D.!benture Stocks are  rcd~cmable at par not later than the last year quot~u m  ""'Sfte.cl: 
of each stock. 
The  interest rete  charged  on  loans  and advances,  which remains 
fixed for the period  of  the  loan, will be  varied from  time  to time to 
accord with the varying  costs  of raising money.  The  SASC  has  not so far 
experimented with a  variable rate.  ''lhen  considering a  loan,  the  SASC - 101-
a,t-taches  considerable  importance  to  the profitability of  the  enterprise 
.it is being asked to finance,  since  only profits will generate the 
means  of  repayment.  It is obliged by its constitution to take  security, 
but this  is not the  prime  consideration. 
Legal  arrangements  for  taking security in Scotland are different 
from  England and Wales,  but recently  legisl~tion (see 1-Ii.lson,  op.  cit., 
pp.  119-122)  introduced a  'standard'  security for Scotland.  In all 
essentials, this is similar to a  mortgage  in England and  \~ales. 
The  Corporation is also willing to accept as  supplementary 
security,  certain types  of  endmnnen·t  policies 
1  (a non-profits  policy 
for the full amount  of the  loan;  a  with-profits policy of  such a  sum  as  would, 
if the  Company's  current rate of annual  or intermediate bonuses  wore 
maintained, be  a.dequate  to  repay the  loan in full at the  end  of  the 
desired term;  or equity linked policies  for a  guaranteed maturity value 
of  100 per cent.  of the  loan) ,  The  Corporation is willing to convert 
existing  loans  to an endol:ment  assurance  basis,  subject to the rate  of 
interes·t  on  the  loan being increased to the current rate.  By  this method, 
interest is payable  gross  to the Corporation each half-year on  the full 
amount  of the  loan and the  proceeds  of the  policy are used to repay the 
capital advance.  In certain cases,  the Corporation's  offer of  a  loan 
may  be  conditional  on  a  guarantor or guarantors  joining in the Loan 
Agreement  or  on  such other conditions  as  the particular case requires. 
The  property is required to  be  one  that can be  regarded as  a  complete 
agricultural unit capable  of  providing a  reasonable  livelihood for the 
occupier.  The  Corporation cam1ot  accept Registered Crofts as  security. 
Every advance is repayable within a  period not  exceeding 60 years. 
In practice,  loans  for·over  30  years  are very rare.  Nore  usually,  they are 
£rom  15  to 25  years. 
In a(J.dition,  loans  a.nd  advances  may  be  made  under and in 
accordance with the  IrnnrovemPnt  of  Land Acts  1864 and  1899  'for effecting 
1. Endowment  loans are about  one  in tw·o. - 102-
Table  XY:XVA  -------
The  Scottjsh  AgricnltHrnl  Secnritks  Corporation  Limited 
Intcl'est rates 
Original Rate'~~~~  (3} ~-~repayment) 
Volunt>Jry reduction tc 4 t% 
Statutory reduction tn 3-}% 
Increase ~gain lO 41% 
,  "  4i% 
,  ,  ,  5!% 
Decrease to  41 °1-
4}% 
5% 
6'1(> 
7!% 
6}~~ 
6% 
5!% 
6% 
6!% 
Dc~~ensc  ~fall 
?!%loans to 
Increase to 
Ik::rea5c to 
" 
" 
,, 
De~;ease  t'o 
Increase to 
., 
, 
Dc.;easc 't'o 
l1lC;~ase  t~ 
.. 
,,  II 
"  ,, 
1933 
~ . 6.42  Mreting 
19~4Act 
15.  6.51  Meeting 
12.11.51 
14.  4.52 
14.  6.54 
8.11.54 
8.  8.55 
20.  2.56 
18.10.57 
7.  4.53 
16.  7.58 
11.  5.59 
13.  6.60 
15.  8.60 
14.11.60 
15.  8.61 
14.  5.62 
15.10.62 
21.  1.63 
24.  2.64 
22.  5.64 
25.  1.65 
27.  5.65 
31.  8.66 
4.  5.67 
8.12.67 
13.  2.69 
29.  5.69 
17.12.70 
16.  9.'11 
16.12.71 
17.  3.72 
7.J 1.71 
,,,  e;..").) 
" 
" 
" 
" 
"  , 
., 
,, 
, 
, 
, 
II 
\c..! .)3  .. 
.).\.).)4  " 
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or  payinr, for  improvemen-ts  for agricultural purposes  to  estates, 
properties  or  lands  in Scot] e..nd',  the  moneys  borrmvcd  being secured 
by a  charge  1 on  the  inheritance  of the  lands  on,  or  in connection 1vi th 
Which  SUCh  improvements  are  effected  I  •  rrhe  fl.,ffiOUlltS  inVOlVed  haVe  been 
small and,  since  1969,  have  been dGclining. 
On  the basis  of  the 'V'ilson Enquiry and  other  evidence,  merch2ni:.s 
and dealers  provided virtually as  much  credit as  the  ba.nks,  though  much 
of the  merchan·ts1  and dealers  1  crcdi  t  is its  elf derived f'rom  ba.nk  overdrafts  .. 
(For the statistical data,  see  Chapter 2.) 
So  far as  the agricultural merchants  are  concerned,  it is 
thought that  on  average  they are probably ovordra'tvn  for  a·t  least t'tvo 
months  in ea.ch  year and,  iLJeed,  it may  be hi[jher  than that.  Some  m::.y 
even be  permanently overdrenvn.  Noreover,  with the  inflationary increase 
in prices that has  occurred,  the volume  of business  has  greatly increased 
in financial  terms.  Hence  the  need  for  a  greater quantum  of  finance, 
with bankers  providing up to one-third of merchants'  requirements,  often 
on  an unsecured basis.  On  the  other hand,  so· far as  the grain merchant 
is  concerned,  these  same  influences  probably make  him rather less 
dependent  on  his  banl~ers,  since there '\vill  generally be  a.  positive  cash 
flow  on  grain transactions.  For  example,  the merchant 1dll  take  in grain 
from the farmer  and sell it either to the miller  or the maltster.  In 
1  the,ory,  the  merchant  should  pay the farmer within 28  days,  but in 
practice  it  -ma.y  be  longer;  the  small merchants  probably pay more 
promptly in order to maintain good relations with the farmer.  Nevertheless, 
merchants  generally are likely to have  a  positive  cash  flow,  only 
partly offset by credit associated with the  supply of fertilizers,  and in 
effect the farmer is on  balance giving credit to the grain merchant. 
It is  proposed to consider first the  role  of the  agricultural 
- ruerchants..  These  comprise  both  'private enterprise'  firms  {some  of  them 
subsidiaries  of national manufacturers  or international grain traders)  and 
1.  The  terms  of  trade 'vith the  end-user provide for  payment  to the  merchRnts 
in 14 days. - 104-
co-operative  enterprises  engaged  in the marketing  of  cereals  and the 
supply  of  feeds,  fertil  i.zers,  seeds  and agro-chemicals,  the majority 
of these firms  and  co-operatives  (about  1,300 in total)  being members  of 
the British Association  of Grain,  Seed,  Feed and Agricultural Nerchants 
Limited  (BASAN).  On  the  one  hand,  the  country's grain and agricultural 
merchants  provide  the main  link in the marketing  of United Kingdom  cereal 
and  pulse  crops  (arranging the  cleals,  building up  stoc!-\:s,  and usually 
providing the transport;  this is especially true for grain);  on  the 
other - and it is with this that w·e  shall be  mainly concerned - they 
supply the basic materials for  farm  production - feeds  for  stock and 
poultry  (which they themselves  may  have  compounded);  seeds,  fertilizers, 
and crop protection chemicals  for arable  crops  to increase yields  and 
improve  quality. 
It is important to differentiate between what  may  be  described 
as  'conventional'  credit, "\vhich  almost all farmers  enjoy,  and medium-term 
credffi,  whether this be arranged or  tal~c the form  of  overdue  accounts, 
While  the position appears  to vary from  one  merchant  to another and, 
indeed,  from  one  part of the  country to another,  it is nevertheless 
possible to generalise  to  some  extent. 
By  '·conventional'  credit is meant  an arrangement vrhereby  i terns 
~e supplied by the merchant to the farmer,  subject to payment  in cash 
within a  specified period.  Usually,  payment is required by a  date  in the 
month  follmving the month  of delivery  (say,  the  15th or the  30th/31st). 
In these  circumstances,  the  farmer will enjoy credit for  a  month  to 6 
weeks.  When  the sale  is  made, a  'credit charge'  or discount is  added 
and this will be  deducted  from the total selling price,  when  payment is 
made  within the  spocified time,  or  on  normal  trading terms.  Formerly, 
so many  £s  per ton were  added to the selling price,  but it is now 
increasingly usual  for· merchants  to add a  pcrcentage1 mainly due  to the 
rapid rise-in the  prices  of inputs.  (The  merchants'  profit margin is - 105-
likewise  no1·1  being calculated as  a  percentage  and  no  longer as  £x 
per ton.)  Credit  charges  n~y be  as  much  as  10 per cont.  and,  if 
payment  is not  made  on  due  date,  there  may  be  an additional penalty of 
1  per cent.  for  every month  the  credit is  outstanding.  But  the  pressure 
is to reduce  the  amount  of credit granted and  s01:;.e  mcrch&.nts 
are  seeking cash with the  order in return for the full discount  or  even 
a  little extra.  Moreover,  for  a  time,  the  increased profitability of 
fa:rming  made  it much  eas-ier for farmers  to pay more  readily.  'Jlhis  is 
still true for cereal farmers,  but not for dairy farmers,  and  those 
concerned 1vi th the fattening  of stock  (beef and pigs),  ,.,here  the 
increase  in~1e cost  of  inputs  has  been frightening.  Actfu~lly,  the 
amount  of credit being made  available by merchants  has  probably gone 
up  over the  past  18  months  to 2  years,  though merchants  nrc trying -to 
make  it available for  shorter terms.  And  there is  some  evidence to 
suggest that these terms  have  been getting shorter. 
Conventional  predit merges  into medium-term credit,  when 
accounts  become  overdue.  Under  current circumstances,  farmers  '\vould 
lose their discount,  if they did not  pay  UlJ  vi  thin the  '!_)eriod  specified. 
Nerchants are less  accommodating than they used to  be  and,  if anything, 
nre  no\·T  inclined to  impose  a  penalty in addition.  Formerly,  a  rather 
close relationship was  common  between merchant and farmer.  Not  only 
was  it usual for the  merchant to provide credit in the first instance, 
but it was  also part  of his function at a  later stage to sell the 
farmer's  grain.  Even at the time  of the 'fils  on Enquiry  (1971),  it had 
become  very much  less true than it 'l·ras  and  the  process c:f  change 
accelerated greatly over the next  2  years  or so.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
merchant  has  preferred to view  each transaction separately and to  judge 
it simply  on its own  merits  (i.e., he  no  longer thinks  in terms  of 
'tied'  transactions  - e.g.  the  supply of fertilizers at relatively lo,., - 106-
prices  in consideration of  the farmer selling his grain through the 
same  merchant.);  on  the  other,  farmers  a.re  no1v  looking for the best 
possible deal in each  instance  - they shop around more  and  by  this 
action arc forcing merchants  in the  saoe direction.  Both arc becoming 
more  businesslike in their relationships.  fl.ncl  this has  been 
associated \vith a  tendency for  a  number  of  merchants  to become  more 
specialised,  reducing the  range  of  lines that they carry (e.g.  concentrating 
on fertilizer or seed,  hut  no  longer combining both). 
Of  total credit made  available  by agricultural merchants,  it is 
thought that three-fifths might  be  described as  'conventional'  credit and 
t1vo-fifths  be  in the  form  of  overdue  ace aunts,  though this 1vill tend to vary 
a  good deal at different times  of  the year.  Despite  the amounts  of credit 
given,  it should be  noted that bad  <.lebts  tend to be  f_evT. 
Another  source  of  credit is that me.de  available both to the  egg 
indmtry e_nd  to the broiler indus-try by sup-pliers  of pullets  or  of feed. 
Sometimes,  ,.,hen  the  farmer  buys  his  -poultry stock from  the breeder,  the 
latter is  paid by  the  merchant,  l{ho  is repaid' by the  farmer  (say)  in 
four  equal  instalments.1  Alternatively,  tho  feeding-s-tuffs  merchant  or 
manufacturer  may  supply 18-week pullets,  which are  paid for  over  a  period 
o:(  4-8  \·reeks  in eight  payments  graduated to  the  egg  income.  It is also 
co1mnon  practice in the  feed  industry to  provide  credit  on the  feeding 
stuffs  required to take  a  complete  crop  of  broilers through fromintroduction 
to slaughter.  A cownon  period for this  type  of credit is about nine weeks. 
Not  infrequently,  there has  been  a  high degree  of risk in lending in this way 
to such enterprises.  Likewise,  with pigs:  some  firms  contract the  pigs 
out,  themselves  retaining  o\.,rnership  of  the  pigs;  fattening and sale is then 
on  a  formal  profit-sharing basis,  subject to an agreed system of contract. 
(Profits  may  be  shared  on  a  50:50 basis;  likewise  losses.)  Alternatively, 
1.  Note  - there is no  egg  income  in the first three months;  then a  steep 
rise,  followed  by a  gradual fall. - 107-
under a  so~v- credit scheme,  the  merchant.  may  provide  the  breeding  stock 
and the  farmer  repays  as  the litters  come  along - the first litter 
,.,ould arrive three  or four  months  after the  purchase  of the gilt.s  (it 
is virtually a  hire  purchase transaction). 
Again,  the  scheme  may  operate  as  a  co-operative  vcn  ture  bet\veen 
the merchant,  who  provides  the stock  (weaners),  the  feed  and  the business 
expertise,  a.nd  the  farmer  vho  provides  the  accommodation  encl  the 
stoclunanship.  In return the  farmer  is  paid an agreed fixed amount  per 
batch no  matter whether  the  merch~nt makes  a  profit  on  the  batch  or not. 
1'he  amount  is agreed before any pigs are  placed in  the  acco~nmodation '\vhich 
enables participating farmers  to assess  the  profitability of the  livestock 
enterprise before  they commit  themselves  to ta.lting  the stock. 
Fertilizers represent  a  some1vhat  special case.  1'hc  problem.  is 
that the  demand  is highly seasonal,  but for  production  costs  to  be  l~ept 
down  manufacturers 'lill wish to maintain  output at a  relatively steady 
level throughout the year.  Since fertilizers  can  only be  applied at the 
·time  of sowing,  or - on grassland - usually in the  spring,  there is a 
storage  problem.  Hence,  the manufacturer  and  the  merchant are  encouraged  to 
find means  '\-Thereby  the farmer  ca.n  be  persuaded to purchase his fertilizer 
in advance  of his needs  and  furthermore  to store it on  his farm. 
Effectively, the finish  of the fertilizer year is the  end  of  ~hy.  Some 
manufacturers deal  only through merchants;  others  deal direct with the 
1  farmer  as lvell. 
In former  days,  the manufacturers  and merchants  delivered fertilizer 
to the farmer  predominantly in the  spring and ii was  paid for the following 
winter after the  crop had been brought in and sold.  But  the pattern  tod~y 
1. ln E.'ngla.nd  s.nd  \vales,  the  tendency is for fertilizers  to  be  distributed 
through merchants  (it is thought -that'about 70 per ·cent.  of  the total 
would  be  sold to fc.,rmers  by merchants),  whereas  in Scotland  (largely 
because  of the  operations  of Scottish Agricultural  Industries)  direct. 
sales are  more  common  (possibly 60  per cent.  of  the total). - 108-
is very different.  The  msnufa.ctur<:rs  c:dm  to su:Jply  (say)  45  pt~r  cent. 
of their annual  deliveries  of fertilizers  betv.reen June  ~1.nd  Scvtember. 
There  tends  -Lo  be  a  secondary peak in clomu.nd  in the  autumn  occasioned by 
the  s ow·ing  of winter cereals.  In  ortl.er  to  encourage  an  even off-take  of 
fertilizers throughout  the year,  the manufacturers  offer early payment  ancl 
early storage  incentives  (see  belOI·r).  In other l·rords,  if the  farmer 
takes  delivery early,  he  gets his fertilizer more  cheaply; if he  pays 
promptly for it, he  gets it even  chea:pcr.  In  n-ddi tion,  although it 1vas 
reduced  in June  1972,  there 1ms  until Nay  31,  197  4,  a  fertilizer 
subsidy and,  u.ncler  these  circumstances,  the net  cost to the farmer was 
the price charged by the  merchant  or manufacturer  less  the  r...mount  of 
the subsidy. 
The  pattern foll01-1ed  by the  several manufacturers  ~s very similar. 
They generally operate to a  base  price,  which  is the cash price for 
immediate  usage  and  payment  (i.e.,  February to :Nay,  during the  spring 
sm;ring  period).  Prices  in other months  reflect incentives for  storage1 
and  payment,  or  pre-payment 1vithout storage,  these  incentives being at 
their maxipm.m  in June  of the  previous  year  and  reducine progressively 
until they become  nil in February.  1'o  make  it easier for the farmer  to 
calculate his  costs,  suppliers will quote  two  figures,  the  secor~ being 
the net cost .to the  farmer.  In  some  ce,ses,  if the  farmer  pays within the 
month,  the  supplier 1vill deduct the "\vhole  of the  'credit charge',  "\vhich 
amounts  to about It per cent.  The  maximum  storage  and  payment  incentives 
applicable within the fertilizer year are for June  and,  for the  season 
1971/72,  amounted to an allowance  of approximately 111  per cent.  (for 
1972/73,  with the  lower  level  of interest rates that had  obtained,  this 
was  reduced to approximately Sf  per cent.).  For  the  1973/74 season,  the 
maximum  storage and  payment  incentives  amounted  to an allm-rance  of  9  per cent. 
1.  The  aericulturr  .. l  merchant  often himself stores fertilizer,  ,.,..hich  he 
purchases  or takes  delivery of at the start of  the  season for delivery 
to the  farmer  in the  spring.  The  merchant  likewise  receives  a  storage 
incentive  on  such fertilizer. - 109-
If the  farmer  toJ;.cs  delivery  of  the  fcrt.j lizer  <'-n'l  stores it, bnJv 
defers  payment,  he will be  [~rv.n·tcd  n.  s-Lurv ge  allo,·:<.illCC  only  •  1-k~c1.m;h:..lc, 
a  deferred  invoice arrRngcmcnt  is  cmnloyccl  - the  invoice  becomes  effective 
as  a  cash invoice  (say)  on  1  February rmd  the  Recount 'lvill  be  due  for 
settler,wnt  (sn.y)  on  28  I·iarch.  The  credit charged '\dll be  deducted if 
the  customer  pctys  promptly.  'l'he  details  may  vary  somewhat  from  one 
manufac·turer to ano-ther,  but  the principle is the  same.  Also,  where  the 
manufacturer delivers to a  merchant,  he  '\·lill  apply similar arrangements. 
The  merchants  in. their turn ".rill  deal  in much  the  same  vay 'lvi th 
farmers.  Again,  the  attempt ¥till  be  mad0  to  ensure that the  fertilizer 
is stored  on  the  farm  and  the merchants will offer incentives  for early 
payment.  Probably,  about  50  per  cent.  of  farmers  1x::.y  cash and  get their 
full  allo'\vances.  Even if they borr01-r  from  the  bn.nk  to do  so  (o.s  many  of 
them  often do),  it is vrell  '\ororth,.,.hile  - as  a  result of getting better 
terms  from the fertilizer manufacturer  or the merchant,  v1hich  more  than 
offset the  low·er  interest they ma.y  be  pG.ying  on  a  bank loan.  Lat·terly, 
too,  with the high prices arable farmers  have  obtained for their grain 
(e.g.  in 1972  and 1973),  there has  been heavy investment ih both machinery 
and fertilizers  and,  indeed,  there  seems  to have  been  some  fo:nvard  buying 
1 
of fertilizers  in ~nticipation of further  price rises. 
Occasj;onally,  arrangements are  specially negotiated ,,.hether 
by the  merchant  or the manufacturer.  Two  cases will serve to illustrate 
the possibilities:  (1)  a  young  man,  uho  is working  hard and  trying to build 
up his position for  the  future;  in such  circumstances,  the supplier may 
make  credit available  and,  subject to regular  repayraent,  only  make  a 
modest  interest charge;  this  may  he  an appropriate  procedure  where  a  farmer 
has  a  regular milk cheque  from  a  herd that he  is building up;  in effect,  the 
l. In addition,  there has  been a  very considerable rise in tho  price  of 
fertilizers  since the  end  of  1973  due  to the  sharp  increase  in the  cost 
of  i toms  lH~e arrunonia,  phospha-tic  rock and  pote.sh.  Al  thou2h  the 
,.rholesale  ~1rice charged by the  rr.<:mufn.cture'r  to  the  mercha.n·L  hos  been 
controlled by the  }>rices  ConunissioH,  the  margins  added by merchants 
have  tended to increase  and  some  merchants  have  charged l1ighcr  prices 
than others  (margins  m>ty  nm.r  ranze  from  £2.50  per ton to £5.00 per  ton). 
This  has  been  clue  to the  mercho...nt.s'  attempts  to secure  a  reasonable 
return  on  the  cavital they  employ  in this  part  of  their business.  'l'hcre 
has  also benn the  incrcnsc  in credit charges  referrEd to  in the text. - 110-
has  made  a.  su1>stn.ntial  lm~o;  in,,, p:::J•ticular yco.r,  after hnving been  r:  'cr:.sh  na~1' 
sup-f1lier  might  be  prc):lred  ·Lo  ca,rry the  clcbt  for  a.  yer:.r,  subject to  pe.yJGcnt  of 
interest; after the  debt  hr,<l  been  cli~dle,rgcd,  they ,v·oulcl  co back to  c::1.sh. 
Al  torrw:civc~ly,  viH'rl'  farmers  have  a  cnsc  :for  more  exteml0d  Cl'edi  t  against  e:1. 
purchase  of fertilizers,  r..n  arrangement  nd.ght  be  mn.dc  by the  JllfJ.nufacturer 
(possibly  throu.r.~h  a  retail  inc subsidj ary)  ,.,ith  a.  bank '"hereby fertilizer sn los  ou 
crcdi  t  arc>  funded.  by the  benk instead of  by  the  mrmufacturer  (or its subsi<linry). 
The  mai.n  f'unct,ion  of  an  ~c:ricul-~ural machinery dealer is to be  a 
distributor for  f.'l[~.nufacturers  of agricnlturv.l  equipment.  This  includes holding 
stoch:s  of  nc,;  equipment,  s~~rvicing and  repairing  equipment  in use,  a.nd  providing 
spares.  In a..cldition,  as  n.  rcsul  t  of  tro.cl.e-ins  or outright purchases, 
agricultural  w~:chincry  dcrl~'rs "1ill also be  concerned with  sccond.-h2.nd  items. 
In this  con  text, it is  important.  to  mal-;:.e  the  dis  tinction bet1.;cen  the 
supply of  (1)  trc:.ctors  c'.nd  combines,  potato and sugar beet harvesters,  '\l'hich 
tenu to  be  hn·go  c-.nd  cxpensi  V(~  i terns,.  for '\<:rhich  it is usual  ei-ther to pay  cash 
or to buy  on  the  basis  of hire  purchase  (though  in fact the finance  company  may 
mal\.e  t.he  moneys  ave,ilE:ble  in the  form  of  a  loan);  in some  cases,  leasing l!laY  be 
the technique  employed;  ancl  (2)  general  implements  (such as  ploughs)  and  spare 
pr,,rts,  w·herc  i-L  is  common  for the dealer to  supply the  items  on credit.  For 
both  grou:_)s,  llhcre  cash is paid,  q_ui te frequently the ultimate  source '\>rill  in 
fe.ct  be  a  bank .loan,  ~..rhich  is likely to be  less  costly than either hire purchase 
or dealer credit. 
In the  case  of  an  ordinary cash tr2.nsaction  (for special  out-of-sen.son 
discounts,  see  below),  the farmer will  almost  certainly be eble  to  claim discount 
if he  pays  'vi  thin seven days,  though  some  dealers  may  allow up  to  14 days.  1 
The  dealer ,.;ill  himself have  received  a  trade  discount from the manufacturer. 
The  range  of this  discount varies  according to the  number  of products  sold and 
types  of  products.  Hm-rover,  it '"ould not fall below  15  per cent.  and  is 
unlikely to  exceed  (say)  30 per cent.  Indeed, 
1.  In some  cases dealers '"ere  insisting  (1974)  on  cash with delivery. - Ill-
on tractors and  con;bi ncs  and  other  ex  pens i vc  cquipm:;;:nt  (e.g. ,  oy(;r  -~:, 00J 
in retai  1  vc.lue),  it is unlikely to  exceed  20  per cent.;  on t:t'actorfl,  the: 
average  vTould  probably be  about  l&-~  per cent.  Normally,  this  is in  i'F.l ct 
the  dealer  1 s  margin (from which he  must  provide for his  overheads  and  s·ti  11 
leave sufficient over  for  profit);  part of it is  passccl  on  to the  fa.rnwr  in 
re-turn for  -prompt  pa.yment.  The  O.l!lOunt  pa.ssed  on will vr.ry  from area  to  Droa,, 
cccording to the c  om~)oti  tion that the dealer is  forced to meet,  but it 
would  normally be  in the  region  of  10 to 12! per cent.;  in exceptional 
cases, it may  be  increased to  15  per cent.  For  tra.c·tors,  u-p  to  10  per  cen·L 
1 
appeared to be  common  but  some  dealers  only offered 5  per cent. 
On  general  items,  the  discount  given to the  customer  may  be  of  the 
order  of  5  per cent.,  though  SO:l1e  dealers give  less  (e.g.,  2t  per cent.). 
Usually,  a  farmer  pays  wifuin  the  month,  especially the big acreage  farmers, 
who  run their enterprises  in a  very businesslike way.  In other cases,  it is 
largely a  matter  of  the  salesman calling round to get  the  money. 
Al  ternati  vcly,  the  farmer  may  pay w·hen  he  c orncs  to market.  Credi  i  arra.ngcmcn ts 
have  in the  past been flexible.  Latterly,  there has  been much  tightening 
up as  a  result  of earlier invoicing and  more  aggressive  recovery  prosrun~es. 
Where  credit is  ~llowed, it is usually  on the  ba,sis  of  2  to  3  months,  in 
order to get. the business  and provided the  farmer is  prepared to  pay the 
related charges.  At  the  end  of  3  months,  the dealer will usually put 
pressure  on  t"he  farmer  to  pay his account.  At  the  time  of the ifilson 
Enquiry,  dealers  reported that the  average  period  of  time  for '"hich credit 
was  granted was  at the very least about  6  ,.,eeks  (sometimes  do,vn  to  5  weeks, 
but up to 7! ·Heeks  in the  summer;  it ma.y  also vary with the  area).  One  of 
the  large dealers  following·the  introduction of  n  computerised sales  ledger 
had  reduced it from  an average  of about  9  nine  'veeks  to below  8  '"eeks .and  by 197-:. 
to  6  weeks.  (This  was  an average based  on  a  range  of transactionsfrancash-i.e., 
within the  month after invoicing- to  credit granted for  4  to  5  months). 
On  the whol_e,  bad debts  were  minimal. 
1. 1Vith the production shortages  that have  occurred in 1973/74,  the 
initiative has  to  some  extent  passed bf!.ck  to the dealer,  who  has  been 
able to reduce  the  discounts  offered. - 112-
The  traditional '\<my  of  collecting Recounts  in the  industry  haL 
been to make  -the salesman responsible  for  ensuring that his  customers 
pay up.  In many  cases,  commission is not  paid until the account is settled. 
Special  out-of-seG.son discotmts  i·rill also normally be  allowed  and 
thes~ likewise  originate with the manufacturer;  they apply to  such  items 
as  combine  h?.rvesters,  potato harvesters,  and  sugar beet harvesters.  It 
will be  a:pparent  that the  manufacturer  ha.s  a  financing  problem,  since  over 
much  of the year he will be  ma}:ing  combines  a.nd  similar equipment  in 
advance  of  the seasonal  demand.  Hence,in order to  encourage  out-of-season 
purchases,  he idll offer  a  cash discount to the  machinery dealer;  this 
depends  upon the  existing  level  of  bank charges  (including interest)  and also the 
tirue  of year  - there is  a  progressively reducing discount as  the  peak 
seasonal  demand  is  gradually approached.  If,  therefore,  a  farmer  orders  and 
pays  for  a  machine  in the  out-of-season period,  because  of  competitive 
pressure,  part - if not all - of the  out-of-season discount will be  passed  on. 
But if the  farmer  puts  off buying the  combine  until nearer the  sea.sonal  peak, 
he  '\-lill  get proportione,tcly less discount.  Horeover,  if a.  dealer himself buys 
a  machine  in the  out-of-season period,  but does  not  in fact sell it until the 
following  season,  he will retain the  '\•thole  of the  out-of-season discount for 
himself.  Such discounts  may  go  up to about  5  per cent.  of  the  price  of 
the  equipment  concerned;  they will diminish by  1  per cent.  per  month  over 
the  following  months  until they become  nil..  But,  even allowing for that 
part  of the  trn.de  dis count that is passed  on  Csee  above),  total discount 
(including  out-of-season discotmt)  on  a  combine  1-rould  not  exceed 12t per cent. 
(Some  dealers would  reckon to give  away no  more  than  7-}  per cent.)  In 
addition, it shotild be  remembered that as  part of the  price  of  the  new 
combine  is  the  trcvde-in value  of the  old  co11.bine,  the dealer would  be  left 
financing the value  of ithe  secondhand machine  taken  in part  exchange. 
It should be  noted that in the  case  of hop  picking machinery,  and 
fruit and vegetable  picking machinery generally,  items  are  sometimes  sold 
direct by the manufacturer to the user;  likew·ise with  farm buildings 
(including silos). ·-
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This  attempts  to  outline  the general  position,  but  in a  very 
competiti  vc  trade terms  may  be  negotiable.  'l'his  is  encouraged  by ·lhe 
system of paying  salesmen partly by  commission.  What  the  salesman can 
allow by llay  of discomrt  is laid down  for him  by head  o::.'fice  (i.e.,  by 
the  owner  of the firm  or by its directors),  but he  sometimes  has  a  degree 
of discretion and what  he lvill allo"r by "\vay  of  additional discount  '~ill 
depend  on  ho1v  good  a  salesman he  is  and  on  how  badly he 1orants  the business. 
But the more  he  'gives  away'  to get the business  the less he  himself will 
receive.  lloreover,  fa.rmers  are  q_ui te adept at playing  one  dealer off 
against another and,  in fact,  they never  expect to pay the full list price 
for  a  piece  of machinery or  equipment. 
\ihere  a  farmer has  an existing machine,  "\vhich  he  desire to replace, 
he  may  trade it in and will attempt  to get as  high a  -figure  as  he can; 
indeed,  l~,rt  of what  is  allowed is  often quite fictitious.  It is understood 
that it is rare to do  a  deal  \-There  there is both a  trade-in and  a  discount, 
but the trade-in value  is invariably inflated.to some  extent in lieu of the 
discom1t that a  farmer  could claim if he  purchased a  new  machine  without  a 
trade-in and sold his  old machinery secondhand. 
As  a  result of trade-ins and  outright purchases,  dealers find 
themselves  carrying large  amounts  of  secondhand  equipment.  It is  a  major 
proble1n to dispose  of it and,  meanwhile,  it absorbs  a  substantial amount  of 
c&pital.  In addition,  it has  to be  put into good  order before  sale and, 
although there is  no  discount  on  secondhand  machine~, the  dealer often 
offers  a  good warranty with it.  ~ruch  of this machinery is sold secondhand 
within the United Kingdom,  but a  proportion  (about  10 per  cent.)goes  for 
export. 
J.luch  of ,;ho.t  has  been written about  merchants  and dealers  would also 
apply to  co-operative~ operating as  trading societies,  while  the  credit 
offered by marketing societies  (e.g.,  those  operating in the  meat  trade  or - 114-
marketing  eggs  ancl  poultry)  is  somevhat  analogous  to that provided by 
auctioneers. 
Although any co-operative  may  admit  anyone it liltes  as  a  member, 
the  members  of'  the  trading and  marketirg co-operatives are for the  most 
part farmers/producers  (in the  case  of a  co-operative marketing meat, 
butchers  might also be  members)  and it is they who  provide the capital. 
They are required to buy shares,  but for the co-operative societies1  these 
holdings  are restricted to a  maximum  of £1,000  per person.  In fact,  average 
sha~ldings arc well  below this figure.  On  the  other hand,  any moneys 
beyond the  maximum  that a  member  \vishes  to  invest in his  society 'lvill  be 
placed  on  loan account,  though  - as  one w·ould  expect from the  low  average 
figures  -members'  loans  contribute very much  less  capital than shares. 
Societies also place significant amounts  to reserves, -which  can be 
substantial,  particularly in the  case  of  the  largest societies. 
Dividends  are  paid  on  share capital2  (it is normally referred to as 
'interest'  on share capital)  and  interest is paid  on  members'  loans.  Some 
societies also  pay a  bonus  (or  'dividend')  related to the amount  of business 
put through the  society  (purchases  in the  case  of  a  trading society and with 
marketing societies,  for meat,  there  may  be  a  stock bonus  paid per cattle 
•t3  UDl.  to farmers  and  a  bonus  is paid to butcher members  per £100  of 
purchases;  for  eggs,  a  bonus  is paid  on  'sendings', i.e.,  on the value  of 
eggs  supplied by the  producer).  But,  in the  case  of a number  of the trading 
societies,  there has  been a  move  towards  reduction of  bonuses  distributed to 
those  who  trade '"i th the  co-operative in favour  of higher interest to 
those  providing  the finance. 
1.  It does  not apply to co-operative  companies. 
2.  It occasione.lly happens  that for  a  particular trading period a  society 
does  not in fact  pay a  dividend  or  'interest'  on its shares. 
3.  One  beef animal = 5  pigs  =  8  sheep. - 115-
The  annual net  loss  of share  capital  (due  to  outgoin;:;  members 
holding wore  than incomin3  ones)  is more  than  cocpcnsatcd for,  in a  year 
when  :profits  have  been  reasonably good.,  by t.hc  retention  ,  ~.;i th members 
1 
consent,  of amounts  due  to them a.s  interest or bonus.  It is not unusual 
for  75  per cent.  of the  amounts  due  for distribution to be  retained in 
this way.  1?'cre  it not  for this  source  of  new  share capital,  combinetl vi th 
the allocations to  reserves  already mentioned,  cc-operativen  would  have  had 
little opport.uni  ty of  obtaining the  finance  required for  expa.nsi on.  (Even 
"rhere capita.l grants  are available  from  the  Government,  it is normally a 
condition that an equivalent amow1t  of  ne1-1  finance  must  be  provided by  the 
co-operative itself.)  Obviously the  success  of  this  policy is very 
dependent  on profits  continuing  to be  made,  in order that the  co-operc>.ti  ve 
may  directly,  in the  case  of reserves,  or indircctly,in the  case  of its interest 
and  bonus  distribution  ,  be  able to plough  them  bach:.  \·then  marl~et rates  of 
interest are high,  there will be  an  impact  on  profits to the  extent that 
societies depend  on  borrowed funds  (subject to a  limit,  this also applies 
to  payment  of  'interest'  on  shares,  the  rates  on  which  have  to  be  relatively 
t •t•  )  .1  compe  1  1ve  •  Marketing  co-operatives are  more  easily able  than supply 
co-operatives to  relate members'  capital to trade by means  of a  levy  ir.rposed 
on  each unit  of  produce handled,  but in  gener~l the  finance  obtained in this 
way  is used as  'lvorlHng  capital rather than to  pay for  nev:  developments. 
Recently, it has  become  more  common  for a  co-operative to invite its members 
to subscribe formally to a  loan,  tied to a  particular ne,.;  investment,  sometimes 
(but  by no  means  always)  at relatively low  rates  of  interest,  subject  (say) 
to six mont.hs  notice  of  repayment  on  either side  (i.e., notice  of  repa;ymcnt 
ruay  be  given either by the  co-operative  or  by the  member). 
For the rest and as  a  means  of  supplementing their working  capital, 
co-operatives  may  make  use  of an overdraft facility with their  ba.nlt~:;rs. 
Some  only  overdraw their account  from time  to time;  at other times  of 
year,  they mn.y  keep substantial balances,  though these '\vould  only be 
maintained at levels  sufficient to  avoid  payment  of  bank charges,  any surnlus 
1.  The  Registrar's limit  on  'interest' on  shares  for  society rules  is usually 
7t  per cent.  or  2  per cent.  above  Bank  of  !~ngland 1>-.iinimum  Lending  Rr:te 
(formerly Bank rate),  whichever is the higher. - 116-
funds  being invested a-t  short-term (e.g., vi  th a  local  P..uthori ty). 
On  occasion,  a  farmer  might wlsh  to 'td  thdra"""  his capital.  Host 
obviously,  this  could happen  when  a  farmer retires;  or his heirs  might  '\>,·ish 
to withdra'"" his  share  ca.pital after death,  in order to  pay estate duty. 
Co-operative  societies vary in their attitudes to  such applications  to w-ithdraw. 
(Co-operative  .::ompanies  have  a  difficult problem,  viz., that their shares 
can  only be  transferred,  not  cancelled)~  At  one  extreme,  because  certain 
societies  have  found  themselves  very short  of  capital,  permission to '\vi thdraw 
share capital' has  only been gra.nted to  a  limited extent  (e.g.-,  in cases  of  death 
of  member  or  'financial distress'  or  'hardship')  and  abv-ays  at the discretim1 
of  the directors.  In fact,  several societies have  put  a  moratorium  on  repayment 
of  shares  and permission '\<las  only granted in really urgent cases.  In generel .terms~ 
the attempt was  made  to  ensure  thn.t  no  more  was  paid  out  in redemption  of  shares 
than wa.s  invested by  ,.my  of  retained profits.  Even ''hen a  farmer died,  the 
attempt  w-as  made  to effect a  transfer of his  shares  to his beneficiary. 
There  was  no restriction on  repayment  of  moneys  on  loan account.  Other 
societies have  alw·ays  kept themselves  in a  position to repay members'  ca.pitu.l. 
Nevertheless,  it should  be  added that this has  only been possible  because  of  a 
good  level  of  profits  (in substantial part,  reflecting good  management)  and 
this  has  bred  confidence  in the  society.  Co-operatives  in this situation 
argue  that there ls greater re-investment  of dividends  and interest,  because 
there are no  restrictions  on 'dthdrawals.  On  the  other hand,  where  profit 
levels are  less ·good,  it is ·maintained,  repayment  of  capital  (e.g.,  ~vhen 
farmers  retire)  is  much  more  likely to represent a  problem,  because there are 
less retained earnings to offset it.  It was  also thought to be  a  matter  of 
loyalty;  in some  areas,  members  1v-ere  more loyal to their co-operative than 
others,  but this· like,vise  may  in part be  a  function  of  confidence.  A profi  t~ble 
co~operative makes  possible  a  higher  level  of retained earnings, while atthe same 
time  maintaining such a  degree  of  confidence that members  are  less inclined to 
wi  thdra.1-r  their capital from what  they come  to regard as  a  good  investment. - 117-
Nevertheless,  even the  most  prof'i  table societies  eould  from  time  to  tin1e 
usefully employ additional capital.  Horking  ca.pi tal can be  supplelfiel1tf'fl 
by borrO"iiing  from the  banks  by "\vay  of  overdraft,  but  mcdiultl-tcrm  invcs-tra:::nts, 
if they cannot be undertaken from  ow11  resources,  may  be  more  difficult 
to finance,  despite the  prospect  of  a  favourable  return.  Indeed,  if the 
la·tter were  not anticipated,  there llould  be  no  point  in unclcrtaldng the 
investment at all. 
As  has  been:indicatcd,  trading societies  offer a  range  of facilities 
very similar to those  provided by the  ogricult~ral merchants  and agricultural 
machinery dealers  - in the  case  of the  co-operatives,  sometimes  under  one 
roof.  The  main  purpose  of  these  co-operatives is to sell the farmers  their 
inputs  and to buy from  them their outputs.  In this business, it ,.;as 
maintained,  'there is high security and  lmr risli'.  For  example,  the 
co-operative would  supply to members  seeds  and fertilizers,  fuels,  feeds, 
and animal health proJucts;  they '\-lould  also supply agricultural machinery 
(including tractors and  combines),  spare parts,  and sundries  such as 
ironmongery.  Necessarily,  they also become  involved in trade-ins and  sales 
of secondhand machinery,  though because  of the  capital required in carrying 
such stocks  some  of the  smaller societies  leave this type  of business  to 
the machinery dealers themselves.  It is also noticeable that farmers  -
,.;hether dealing with a  co-operative  or not  - are  only interested in making 
a  purcha.s·e  if prices  (allo1-Ting for discounts)  are  competitive.  They  are 
not interested in the  possible payment  of  a  bouus  by the  co-operative. 
As  with the merchants  and dealers,  for the  co-operatives  likewise,  the 
essence  of their financing  problem is  t.hat  (on the  merchanting side)  their 
suppliers  give.  them credit (it used to be  4  '\'TCeks,  though this is chetnging 
because  of the·pressure  on  the  suppliers'  capital)  and their  f~rmer/custom~rs 
are  accustomed to get six "\·leeks 1  credit.  There  is thus  a  gap  of about t"ro weeks  to 
finance.  A;-ain  a.s  a  remlt of inflation a.nd  the  general rise in prices,  the 
amount  of  finance  required to carry stocks  has  r.lso  increased.  Budgeting 
and the  me.intenance  of  cash  flmv  have  become  increa.singly difficult problems. 
A  number  of  co-operat{ves,  in their cr.p2.ci ty as  mer chanting 
organisations,  buy the  Elember/farnK•rs'  grain from  them and  process it - 118-
themselves  into feeding  stuffs  (very often t.hey  have their  mm mill). 
They also make  concentrates  a.....J.d  add vi  -t.amins.  Trading  co-operatives 
also set up  groups  for the  purpose  of marketing grain.  In these  cases, it 
must  be  good  grain and  up to the  standard accepted in the trade.  When 
the grain is harvested,  it is pooled and  llk'Lrketing  is  placed in the hands 
of the co-operative.  The  farmer  may  indicate when  he wishes  to sell and 
the  co-operative docs  the rest.  For this  service,  they charge  a 
commission  of  (say)  50  pence  per ton.  Alternatively,  the co-operative 
itself may  decide whether  to sell earlier or later attempting to get the 
best deal.  The  proceeds  of all grain sold in a  particular month  and  of 
a  particular type  arc then averaged  out  and distributed to the  members  of 
the  group concerned.  And  there are  other variations  (such as  payments  to 
farmers  in advance  of  selling grain and  pending ultimate receipt  of  the 
proceeds;  this is often done  w·i th the assistance  of bank finance). 
Forage  may  likewise be  bought by a  co-operative  from its farmer/ 
members  and sold to other farmers  th~t have  need  of it. 
In the appropriate areas,  surplus  calves are bought  from dairy 
farmers.  First,  they  are put through the hands  of a  rearcr  (this  may  take 
one  to 12 weeks),  after which they are sent  on to a  feeding unit for 
preparation for market. 
The  supply of fertilizer,  which is another important part of the 
business,  is  ~ubject to the  same  sorts  of arrangements  described under 
~furchants and Dealers.  Manufacturers will very often use the facilities  of 
a  co-operative as  a  store,  paying the co-operative an allmvance  to  cover 
handling and  s ·~orage.  In due  course,  the fertilizer will be  sold by the 
co-ope~a-tive to the farmer,  when  the  co-operative would  reimburse  the 
manufacturer.  The  usual  out-of-season discounts  apply. 
Credit arrangements  for the supply of requisites to  farmers  are very 
much  the  same  as  those that apply in the  case  of  agricultural merchants.  The 
basic terms  are  payment  by the  end  of the  month following the  month  of - 119-
deli  very.  In general,  this averages  out at six -vwoks'  cred.i t.  'fo 
encourage  prompt  payment  of bills, the societies  add  a  credi·t  charge 
{usually 5  per cent.)  to their invoices.  Nost  co-opcrati  ves  nmv  have 
fairly adequate  credit control arrangements  and their experience  1-ri th 
bad debts  has  really been very goud. 
If a  farmer  does  not  pay his  account within six w·eeks,  the:: 
society will want  to know  the  reason why.  If he has  not paid up "\vithin 
a  further month,  he will be visited,  possibly with a  view to discussing 
his  cash flow  problem with hXn,though in this case  a  penalty rate of 
interest may  well be  charged and  the transaction may  be  forn~lized on  the 
basis  of a  bill of  exchange.
1  Alternatively,  a  penalty rate  of interest  of 
lt per cent.  per month  may  be  charged  on  the  overdue  account.  The  ultimate 
sanction would  be  to cease  trading with him altogether.  But this would 
clearly be  a  last resort,  because usually there will be  an  inti~~tc and 
continuing relationship between the  farmer  and his  co-operative.  At the 
same·time,  the  co-operatives  like all agricultural merchants,  are  now 
tightening up  on  the amount  and period  of credit they are  prepared to permit. 
'vi  th macbinery,  the farmer usually pays  cash (i.e.,  cash within 
seven days).  for tractors and  the bigger machines,  though the  money  may  in 
fact  come  from the bank.  All  other machinery sales  and services  are subject 
to normal  credit arrangements. 
So  much  for the  trading societies.  The  marketing  co-operatives  do 
not provide  credit to producers,  but they do  to some  extent accommodate  the 
credit needs  of the wholesalers  and retailers  of the  products  they help to 
market.  This is true,  for  example,  of both meat  and  eggs  and poultry. 
In the  case  of meat,  farmers  might  be  paid in  (say)  eight days  a.nd 
those to whom  the  co-operative sells would probably be  required to pay in 
1.  See 1iilson,  op.  cit., pp.  187-8. - 120-
(say)  12  days.  Certain of the  larger customers  may  get credit for up to 
18  dn,ys  and,  for  the big supermarket groups,  it may  be  as  much  as  five 
"reeks.  No  dJ. arge  is ma,de  for this  credit,  though the  co-operatives  attempt 
to reduce it to a  mini~1um by.instituting tight credit controls.  Usually, 
the business  consists in buying  from  a  large  nrunber  of farmers  and selling 
to a  small  number  of buyers,  which  tends  to mean  that the  buyers  have 
something  of an advantage. 
Crcdi  t  is also  extended to '\Tholesalers  and retailers by the 
co-operatives  concerned with the  marketing  of  eggs  and poultry.  In the  case 
of  one  of  the big egg  co-operatives,  every attempt was  made  to  ensure that 
the  large retailers and the co-operative  retail societies 6·1hich  are also 
their customers)  pay their bills promptly.  Indeed,  a  large part  of their 
sales  (especially the smaller  ones)  is for  cash.  Meanwhile,  the  producers 
are paid on  a  1veekly basis.  ·vlhere  credit is given to the  purchasers, it 
usually ranges  from  14 d.ays  to three  or four weeks.  Nevertheless,  they 
endeavour to maintain quite a  strict control and, .if the buyer fails to pay 
on the appointed day,  he  gets  no  more  eggs.  But the situation is kept 
under  constant review and bad debts  tend to be  fe1·r.  In another case,  the 
attempt is made  to limit the period of credit to  21  days  (producers  tend 
to be  paid witl1in 19  days),  though the multiple stores are inclined to 
expect  more  extended arrangements.  In any event,  there is a  time  gap to be 
financed and,  where  necessary,  this is done  on the basis  of a  bank overdraft. 
Three  of the  largest marketing co-operatives and a  private producer 
have  combined their marketing efforts in Goldenlay Ltd.  to undertake 
'consortium selling',  eggs  being supplied by the  farms  under  contract and 
sold at negotiated prices  on  a  free  market basis,  the  farmers  receiving a 
price  (after deductions  for expenses,  etc.) related to that negotiated with 
the purchasers. 
The  egg marketing  co-operatives  may  also negotiate  terms  on behalf 
of  egg· producers  for the purchase  of feed;  by ordering a  large total tonnage, - 121-
rebates arc  obtained and the cost of feed to the  individual producer 
is reduced.  Similarly,  with chicks  - by  ordering these  in large numbers 
on  behe~lf of their members,  they  can  ~:gain obtain a  rebate  and quote  a 
lower price  per 1,000 chicks. 
Hence,  the  larger co-operatives  in particular provide  a  range  of 
services very similar to those  offered either by merchants  and dealers, 
or by auctioneers  and feeding stuff  firm~.  The  chief problem that they 
have  to face  in varying degrees  is ensuring a  sufficient availability of 
capital either to carry stocks  or as  a  basis  for  extending credit,  though 
this will clearly affect the trading societies  more  than those that are 
engaged in marketing  only.  In part, this  is  due  to structural changes  in 
agriculture itself and,  in particular,  to the  increasing scale  of  farm 
investments  - with larger farms,  there has  tended to be  a  greater economy 
in the use  of  labour and a  transfer of resources  resulting in greater use 
of machinery,  with the. necessity for the  suppliers to carry larger stocks. 
Transport fleets also tie up  a  lot of  c~pital, though  some  societies have 
sought to  overcome  this difficulty by resorting to leasing arrangements. - 122-
.Although  on  ihc b2..sis. of the Vilson  j~nquiry,  svndic~tes ap;?earecl 
to  be  an unimportant  source  of agricultural  fine..nce,  it is  lmOi-."n  that a 
number  of  m~chincry syndice.tes  exist,  though these are  largely dependent 
on  bank finance.  These  syndicates ere partnerships  formed  for the 
limited purpose  of  jointly Oiv-ning  or  operating  one  or  more  pieces  of 
a.gricultural  machinery  (including installations such as  grain driers) •1 
They  are set up  in accordance with rules that cover questions  of use 
and  maintenance,  i·:hich  rules  have  been approved by local Syndicate  Credit 
C  .  2  ompan1es,  ,.,hich  nmv  exist in 42  English and  10 \Ielsh  cou..11ties,  and are 
united under  a  Federation of  Syndicate  Credit Companies. 3  'i\ri thin the 
fr~,:mew·orh:.  of these  rules,  members  of these  syndice.tes  ca.n  borrmv four-fifths 
4  of the  tot~l cost  of the  machine  on relatively favourable  terms,  to  be  paid 
back  over  5 years,  or  - ,~·here  fixed machinery  or buildings arc  involved -
over  a  longer period  (e.g.  up to 7  years).  Secondhand machinery as  well  as 
new  may  now  be  included in the  scheme.  If difficulty should arise,  the 
County Syndicate Credit Company  undertakes  to assist the  bank to  obtain 
recovery  of  moneys  lent,  but in no  sense  is this  a  guarantee.  Indeed, 
whilst taking account  of the fact that the  County COinmittee  has  approved 
the  syndicateis  request the bank reserves the  right to reject an application 
if it is not  sa~isficd with the  proposal.  In addition,  the  bank reserves  the 
right to reject applications  for  the  purchase  of highly specialised equipment 
1.  Also,  sometimes,  buildings,  such as  grain stores. 
2.  County Syndicate Credit  Companies  ce"n  be  iClentified with the National Farmers' 
Union  county structure.  'l'hey  are companies,  limited by guarantee  and without 
share  capite..+;  they have  a,  Board  of Dircctor·s  composed  of prominent  fn.rmers  in 
-~the county and a  Secretary  (in many  counties  the  secretary of  the  county NFU 
Branch).  The  compQnies'  standard objects,  taken  from their }icmorandum  of 
Association,  are to  promote,  encourage  and develop n1achinery  syndication. 
3.  As  implied,  this is a  central body to which  each  county company  supplies  a 
representative.  The  Federation is responsible for  co-ordinating the  activities 
of  the  companies  and  machinery syndicates  generally and  enables  represe~tations 
to  be  made  on  any matter affecting the  conunon  interests  of  members. 
4.  It is understood that the  rate being applied in 1974 is Base  Hate  +  2  per cent. 
per annum. - 123-
-rrherc  no  alterna-tive usc  is possible.  At  the  encl.  of  1970,  there ·were 
agreements  in operation permitting total.outs-tanding indebtedness  of 
£1  million.  'rhis  overa:l limit has  nm.r  been  removed  and there is at 
present  ( 197  4)  no  ceiling.  Presumably,  hO'iiever,  a,n  eye vi  11  be  l~ept  on 
the  arnonnt  of  overall borrm·ring  and  banks  reserve  the  right to review 
arrangements  at any time  in the  light  of  chanr,es  in the  domestic  economy. 
It is understood that there have  been no  bad debts.  At  least tvro  of the 
large clearing banks  in Ene;lancl  and '\vales  are  nmr  involved in this type 
of  lending. 
In Scotlo..nd,  much  the same  system exists  but the arrnnzements  arc 
centralised under Agrifinance  (Scotland)  Ltd.  estn.blishcd and  managed  by the 
Scottish Agriru 1 tural Organisation Society.  This  company deals '"i  th 
production co-operatives  as  well as with machinery syndicates  and is 
empm:ered to  extend help to trading co--operatives.  The  Board  of Directors 
is composed  of  representatives  from the  Scottish Agriculh.lral  Organ1sation 
Society and  the Scottish National Farmers'  Union.  Although this  company has 
continued to trade,  little business  has  been done  over the  past year  or  so 
(1974),  because  of  the high level  of interest rates. - 124-
.Although the  purchase  of  lives-tock is sometimes  financed by the  banks  or by 
the hire  purchase  finance  companies  (l.:he-ther  by  means  of  a  hire purchase 
transC'.ction or by way  of  lean),  an appreciable proportion of the  fi:nance  a 
farmer  needs  to purchase  livestock comes  from the  v:uct.ionoer,  "'vho  may  also 
fiilance butchers  to  a.  considerable  extent and thereby cor:tes  into the cycle 
of  sale/production/sale at least twice  (by financing the initial acquisition 
and,  in effect, also the  demand for the  final  pro<.luct).  This  is particularly 
true  of auction marts.  Some  a.uctioneers  also have ancillary interests thai; 
are  merchanting in character;  in addition,  they may auction second-hand 
machinery  (e.g.,  when selling a  farm),  though here they are  acting as  agent 
bet"'veen vendor  and  purchaser.  Indeed,  w·ith  auctioneers,  there is 
a  very great diversity of  experience in the  several parts  of the United 
Kingdom,  not only bet1veen different arcf!,s  but also between different  firHlS 
in the  same  area,  due  to differences  in the size and  composition of the 
business  done  by agricultural auctioneers;  in some  cases,  there are also 
differences  of practice.  For  example,  there is Great variation in the 
relative importance  of  the  livestock marketing  side  of an agricultural 
firm's  business in relation to  other aspects  such as  land agency,  valuation, 
compensations,  property sales,  and  so  on.  Again,  some  fir1~1s  are  more 
partic.ularly agricultural than others,  ~>?hich  1nay  have  important urban 
departments.  And,  if one  adds  to this the wide  geocraphical variations, 
which  influence ·the  character r...nd  type  of  local farming  a.rraneor:lents,  and 
also differences  in regional  and  local practices,  the degree  of diversity 
is increased even further.  Hence,  it is exceedingly difficult to generalise. 
Ho,.;ever,  _so  far  Cl.s  auctioneers'  credit is concerned - and that is our major 
preoccupation in the present context - there is  evidence to sugeest that it 
is required by many  farraerq at some  stage  or other  (especially by those 
concerned with livestock).  Necessarily, it tends  to vary in r.,mount  over 
the course  of the year,  depending  on the  season and  sometimes  on  other factors 
(such as  the availability of credit from  other sources).  Not  ~hat auctioneers 
"\vould  extend credit to all their customers  ancl  raost  - if not all - auctioneers 
attempt to  limit the  amount  of credit they grant.  For the  most  part,  they 
only accom:nodate  farmers  that they know well a.nd  who  also have  a  reputation 
as  good farmers.  In many  cases,  an auctioneering firm will hcve  lmm·m  a 
farmer '-s  faL1ily  over several generations  o  There  is also the credit extended 
to the  Lleat  trade,  i.e., to 1-rholesale  and retail butchers,  though this tends 
to  be  'conventional'  short-term credito 
To  a  large  extent,·auctioneGrs appear to provide  from their own  resources 
such credit as  they grant.  'l'he  mg,j ori  ty of  them  seem not to depend to any 
considerable  extent  on  bacl~ overdraft,  though  many  of  them maintain such  a 
facility at their banl:crs.  For -th-e rest,  because  of the tremendous  turn-
over in their account,  they would be  charged an appropriate turnover fee, 
which would  recompense  the  banl">- for the  ac.lvivity  of the accom.lt.  It is 
possible  thc:.,t  the auctioneers in Scotland use  bank overdrafts  more  than do 
their coUJ.s.terparts  in England and  ~.I ales  .. 
In the context  of  s·Lore  cattle,  some  auctioneers 1:1ould  in the general "'ay  of 
business  give credit to both farmers  and dealers.  \ihere  farmers  purchase 
cattle to stock a  farm,  these will usually be  brought back to the auctioneer 
at the  end  of the  grazing  season  (or,  in the  case  of  invlintering  of cattle, 
in the  spring)  either as  stores1  or  n.s  fato  The  auctioneer may  also help to 
1  Some  farmers  only talte  the cattle on to  a  cer·tain stage,  when· they sell them 
off to somebody else. - 125-
finn.uce  the  purchase  of dairy heifers - 'and  freshly calved cattle - ei  t.he~ 
in order to provide  th9 initial herd  of a  dairy farmer to to  supply hiw with 
replacements.  Por  example,  f:.  farmer  may  buy a  number  of  cows,  '\vi th the 
auctioneer providing the  finance for  a  prop6rtion,  in the  expectation that 
some  cows  '\vill  come  back when  they are dry to be  sold again in the market, 
the remainder being paid for  from the proceeds  of the milk produced. 
In the case  of  sheep,  farmers  may  buy  lambs  for  'feeding throua;h'  either in 
July to ge-t  them fat by  Christmas  or in September/November  'to come  out fat 
in the spring'.  Credit,  which is also required for breeding  01ves  1.mtil they 
lamb,  is given  on the  same  basis  r:.nd  probably ::10rc  regularly than in the  case 
of cattle.  Sheep credit is considerable in some  places  on  the borders  of 
Sco-tlc.:nd  ancl  Enr;land.  There  are big sheep centres also in Radnorshire  and 
in Shropshire. 
On  the whole,  credit is not granted against pigs  - 'only to those that take 
it'  (and then only for a  short period).  Pigs are vulnerable to disease and 
auctioneers  expect the  farmers  themselves  to accept the risk.  'Auctioneers 
only help people  into trouble  by giving them credit on  pigs'o  In any  event, 
subject to an appropriate agreement,  the biG feeding  stuff fir1:.1s  are  often 
prepcred to help  (e.g.,  by providing elite stock- sows  capable  of producing 
the quality required in the finished article and also good  proaeny averages, 
'\vhich  progeny is also likely to be  free  of disease  - or by providing feeding 
pigs;  they  n~y also provide the feed itself on credit,  being repaid as  the 
pigs are  sold - say- each  moilth  to the factory). 
The  provision of credit appears  to take  four different forms:  (a)  short-term 
'conventional'  credit;  (b)  a  'running'  credit based  on  a  current account; 
(c)  a  direct loan;  and  (d)  in certain cases  speci~'.,l  agreements  relating 
either to feeding  or breeding stock. 
So  far as  'conventional'  credi·t is concerned,  only a  proportion of farmers 
are affected,  since the majority pay on the  day;  perhaps  up to  20 per cent. 
require  a  week  to pay and about the  same  number  take  bet'\veen  one  and two 
lrceli:s.  Only a  minority takes over two  weeks.  No  specific  charee is made 
in ma.ny  of these cases,  the auctioneer being  recompensed  only by his 
commission.  The  auctioneer also  expects the farmers to continue to put 
their business  through him.  1Convcr1tional 1  credit is meant to be  the basis 
of a  continuing relationship. 
'Rulli.J.ing'  credit based on  a  current account is probably also still fairly 
common,  particularly in areas that raise or run a  lot of stock,  since the 
farmer will necessarily again have  a  continuing relationship with his 
auctioneer.  In this case,  the  farmer  may  be  buyine a  particular class of 
stock (cattle,  sheep,  or pigs).  He  will not in fact pay for it at the time, 
but at a  later stage;  1vhen  he  is ready to sell, he '\vill bring the stock back 
in again to the auctioneer.  \fuen  the  sale has  tah·.en  place,  the cashier will 
offset the money  from the sale against 11hat  is owing,  paying the farmer  any 
balance.  And  this type  of transaction will be  repeated over and  over again. 
It is often regarded as  a  service provided either for men  they have  lrno1m  for
1  years  or sometimes  for younger farmers,  who  may  have  need  of working capital; 
1  Usually,  this 1-rould  only be  done  whore  a  family was  well-knmm and often 
only when  supported by a  father's  guaranteeo - 126-
the  e,uc-tioneer  mc8XLVhilc  hopes  t.o  tie his  cus-tomer  ·f,o  him anU.  looks  for\var(L 
to  retniuia~ this  b~3iltcss  over  ~  lon~ period of  yc~rs iu the future.  In 
-the  meantime,  as  a  result  of regular purch[\SOS  a,nd  sp,les,  he  oJlso  attracts 
regular  cor~11~1ission.  i·l"cedless  -to  say,  the  <tuctiouoer \·roulcl  1\.ecp  n.n  eye  on 
the working  of  such  accomr~s to  ensure that  a  man  diu not.  go  beyond his 
USUc'l.l  r::tnge  of  debits. 
The  stocJr involved w·ill vary -v:-ith  different pn,rts  of  t.he  country.  For 
example,  the  farmer  r.1ay  buy  C£'~ ttle at;  -the  1 back-end  1  (i.e., in the  autumr1) 
for the  purpose  of  imvin-tering  them  (yard  o:c  box  f'eeclinc,),  selling them  oi'f 
as  fat  stocl~. in the  sprine.  Or  he  might  buy cattle in -the  spring to put  out 
to grass  over the  smmaer,  sellinG  them off in the  a.utmim.  Or  he  may  buy 
breeding  sheep  f'ror.1  the  autv.nu1.  om·mrds,  the  relov2.nt  r-vmou.-:-1ts  beinG  debited 
to his  account;  then as  he  brings the fat  lambs  in for  sale,  he  obtains the 
money with ,.,hich  to pay. off his  indebtedness.  He  w·ou.lrl  bring in his  breeding 
e"es  a-t  the back-end and settle -the  balance.  But  on the ,.,hole  this is not  a 
large  part of auctioneers'  total business. 
Even  more  rarely,  nn auctioneer may  make  a  direct  loan to assist  iT.!.  the 
financing  of  farmins  O:!?era.tions.  For  ex2.L1ple,  -the  far1;;cr  m2-y  hn.ve  cormnitted 
part  of his  workin~ capital to the  purchase  ol buildings  or  equipment  and 
hence  be  short  of "1-lOrh:ing  capital for other purposes;  the  remainder  may  be 
tied up in stocl\. that vill  evcntu~tlly be  co:;1ing  bc:.ck  to the  rn  ..  '"trl·wt.  On  loa~ts, 
the  farmer would  pay a  rate  of  interest.  The  rate charced at the time  of  the 
ililson Enquiry  (1971)  "'J~\s  usually Bank rate  (it uould  110"\·1  be  Be.se  Rc.1.te)  +  1 
to  2  per cent.  (sometimes  less  than "\·rha,t  the  banl\.s  would  charge  an auctioneer 
on his  overdraft;  some  auctioneers  charged the  same  ra,te  a.s  the  br:,nl;:s  charged 
them).  On  other  occasions,  they might quote  a  rate  of  10 per cent.  on  a 
reducing basis  (i.e.,  on  a  reducing  amom1t  us  the  loan vas  paid off),  or a 
flat rate of  5  per cent.,  i..e.,  5  per cent.  on the initial aL1ount  horrm·Ted 
and  over the vrhole  period of tho  loan,  though the  fariL1er  may  be  ma.rlteting 
(say)  pigs  regularly and have  the  loan paic1.  off by  J0he  E~greed date  (usually 
after nine  months  to  a  year).  It should be  added that there is normally an 
unders-tanding that the  farmer will bring his  stock back to the  same  auctioneer. 
Vhere  the rate charged is relatively low,  the auctioneer reckons  to 1:1ake  his 
profit out  of  commission.  In a  similar '\-lay,  an auctioneer  lll.:'1Y  help a  farmer 
to put in a  dairy herd,- regular repayments  to derive  from  the  monthly milk 
cheque.  Again,  these  types  of business  tend to be  a  small proportion of the 
total and they are mostly  underteJ~en to help young farmers. 
Indeed,  auctioneers tend to limit the total amount  of  lending they will 
undertake under this heading and,  in this context,  one  or tw·o  auctioneers 
reported that they had  operated subsidiary finance  companies,  to "\-Thich  they 
would tend to refer this type  of  business,  ·the  finance  being provided  on the 
basis  of hire purchase. 
As  has  been indicated already,  the auctioneer when he  gives credit is usually 
accommodating  a  farmer that he  knows vell personally and 1vi th whose  family 
his  firm may  have  had  a  connection for several generationso  In addition, 
he  is in a  position t,o  keep an  eye  on his farmer/customer's affairs, ·since 
for recular customers  the auctioneer will usu&lly be  responsible for the 
annual  stocktaking valuation.  In the  case  of  a  fe.rmer  nmv  to the area, 
auctioneers  may  be  pre~  pared to give  them credit also; it i;::;  again a  question 
of  judging the  man  and his record;  establishing '"hat his background is; 
aslting him to declare his financial  experience  and to  lodge hin  accounts. 
In addition,  the auctioneer lrill koep un  eye  on' his farming activities  1 in 
order to build up  a  flmd  of  experience with him'. -t27-
Br:t, thcrc  a,re'til:rcs  r,iire:l a  1oi:rn iioes 1'Irorri.:. jl^ fi'r:r;.ie-r'lli:.';r flifo,l'i.lic cr.'r:ij-Jo
for up to 12 ri:onths, but he nray finisir up orr:Lng JJ1 1500 j.lor sevcn yei.:lts.
I1 al case iihe'bhis;, the auctiorir,.er  has'0o titirstc'bhe Litlii alot.g alril jrope.
The fe',,rtner co.rrtiriuc-.:s to pay his i:r-i:erest but Ltit].ies no llrorEress in  rc:]raying:
the princj.pal.  If  -bhe auctioir.cer put presstlrc on him, ths farnicr rrould
go banJ.rrupt. In cn,ses lilie  'ohese, 'bhe atrc-Lioileer  ru'ould i:oulally iro1cl some
securi'by. IJovever, bad clebts do not seerl -bo bc ap:prcciable ancl orle
auctioneer estin:ated tiiem as no lilor€ than Li pcr cen'br per atJ.ttuji of the
amounts he lent.
Finally, in this  context, there &re the breediirrg ancl fcoc1in61, agreet.'letr'us!
s;o::ie'biring like this  j.s also unt].eri;.:riten b1''i;hc i;'i',lJ (see belorr)" Thc fee<l-i:lii
agreernept is'r.he s-ir:rpl-er. It  i-s agreeiL b]'a,.n er,uct:ioneer t'o suppl;'r', farnter
wi-bh stocir to be fcd. and rnain'i;air-red. orr h,is fi'.rin in consid.eration of Ira,y-
ments for feeding being r,acie by'bhe auctionecrbo tire fnrner, riiro is  given
an option of purchasit:g 'bhe st,ocli in clues'bion if  he so ilesires at "an agreed-
prj.ce a,nri wirile the s'lioci; still::er;:ains on hj.s farn.  Uir-i;il that tj.r:ler the
stock remai:rs thc p,bsolu'be  *ancl exclrrsive proirer-by of 'blie auctioileorr
lieaixdrile, the auctioneer charp;es interest on tJ.re value of 'bhe s'boch until
such tir;re as'uhe farner exercises iris op-;iolr., or'r,lie s'oocll is  sold.. Ln
1971 I a rate of 10 per cen'bo r.r&s not unconr;1o.n (say, 1 per cent. morc tha,n
L'as beiugg cirargccl by tire bir,nl;s). Ia e:ffec'1, -i;he farner g;e'l;s tire iiiffereirce
betlleen the cost of the stock ar:tl the selling price, rtiuus exponses i'"nci
interest.  There are e, nunber of conclitioits - tiie stocli nust not be retiioved
fron the farn in question; it  tarr-st be supplieC. rriih goocl and. sufficien.-b
foocl and va'oer, and. -  in the case of sic.l<rrcss - rrii;h shj-lled. aclvice,
a,ttenclance  and. neclicinei a,nd alL necessary  L'lcesures rtus'u bel,alien'oo protec'b
it  from injury,  claliioger or Loss of airy i'.in.r}. 'firere is provision for
inspecting 'tlre stoclc at any tinie ancl for the ending of the agreetleut af-t,er
clue and proper notic e by either of the parti es to the other .  S ird Larly t
r'rith the breecling agreernent, r'drich is  s1-i54ir'o1y iiiore cornpl.icatecL, sj-nce it
rel,at,es not merely to the feed.ing and. naint-,a.ining of stoch, but tothe
supply of stock for breeding purposes. He:r.cs, one of 'bire concLitioirs is-birat
the nrrales should- be pu'b to the fernale stocli a'b 'r,he propr;a season. Alsot
nhen calcu}ating payments for heep payable by the auctioneer to the farner,
the progeny of the ori.ginal stocli is not to be 'oaken into acc ount r the neeiily
rate having been fixed. and. d.etermiired on the u:r.d.ers'uanding  that each dan ancl
its  progeny shall be reckoned. as onc hear,d. onLy. Again, an option to purchase
is  incluiled. in the o,greenent. This time it  relates both to the stock and its
progeny. fn these va)'s, too, the auctioneer may nake a contribution to the
financing of the proeess pf agricultural procluct,iotr.
One of the largest me&'u vhoLesalers  Fl,iC Ltd.1  itself  provid.es cred.it to
farners ttroug[ fatstock firuince sc]remes operated. by a subsid.ieryr Fl'iC (i'ieat)
Ltd .  The Latter nalres lurlp sum cash aclvanc es f or tb.e purchas e or f atter:ing
of stoch, providing  a.n &ssurecl narhet Hhen the stocil is  finishecl.  ?he finance
is provirled. by rvay of an aclvance; it  is not hire purcbase. The stoch belongs
0rigin"ally set u.p in 1954 as The Fatstoctc I'lariteting Corporation and
gging public in 1962, It  is  over one-third. owr:.erl by the l'ilrl Development
irust Lta. anil over 50 per cent. oirned. by inclividua,l share]rold.ers  (nany of
thenr fari:iers), ldth an erephasis on snall to ned.iur;r-sizecl hol*ings (elO'bo
5 ,000 shares ) .  f ustitutiorrs anA uonrinee eompanies also have snall
hoLclings. It  opera'bes a, J-arge nunber of er,battoirs aud pacliing stations
throughout the Uniteil Kingclomo- 128-
to  thn  f::t.rmer  until it is  solcl to the  Fr-.C.  \Ihon  a,n  ?.pplication is  mad~, the 
fC!,rmer  couplo-Ges  a  S be...tement  of  Rc~sour·ces and  an applicn,t:ion for tho  advance 
required,  \'lhich also  asl~s  foJ.  names  of'  banl\.crs  aud  a  traclo  referee.  In most 
cases,  F~~ would also ask to  see  the  farmer's  accow1ts.  No  security is 
required and  up to  75  per cei.lt.  of the value  of the  stock may  be  advanced 
atr.,insi;  store  CD.ttle,  60  per cent.  of the  cost  of  ewes  or store  lambs,  £10 
(in 1971)  per bacon  or  heavy hog  pig,  and  £5  (1971)  per pork pic;.  There  is 
a  'service charce'  to  cover  the  cost to  FlAC  of  providina the finance.  This 
relatE~s to the  size  of  the  advance  a.nd  the  period for which it is outs·tanding. 
It is quoted as  so  much  per head  of  stocl~ per month, 1  so that the  producer 
can vJOrk  out his  ovn costs and  es·t.ablish '·rhether there is in fact  a  margin 
o:r  profit before he  ent.ers  into ·tho  transaction.  There  is also  a  sinall 
ad111inistrative  charge  to  cover the  cost  of  hu,:t.lclling  applications;  this is 
only payable when  an advance  is granted.  Since it is difficult for producers 
to forecast  accura·Gely many  months  ahead the date  on '\vhich  stock will be 
properly finished,  the  PHC  fatstock finance  schemes  provide for flexibility 
in the  perio(~ for "lvhich  the  money is ad.vanced  and the  service  charge is 
adjusted to cover early or late repayments.  The  conditions  Ullder  -vrhich  all 
schemes  operate are  -that  finished  s·bock  must  be  sold through  FNC  {if this 
condition is not  observed,  PhG  ril1:\)t  not assist that farmer  again)  and re-
payment '\·:ill  nornm.lly  be  nE~-de  from the  sale  of finished stock  .. 
There  are also  one  or  two  schemes  where  mono:y  is  mE~,de  available to  a  feed 
merchant,  1-1ho  hiwself  supplies the units and  puts  8,  number  of  pigs  into 
each.  The  l~l·lC  makes  a  service  charee  per pig and  pays  the merchant the 
difference  bet,ween that and the  market price when  the  pj~gs are sold. 
Total turnover  of the  FNC  Group,  in 1972/73,  was  £238.8  million. 
hore  generally,  auctioneers  have  been trying to check the increase in the 
D,mount  of credit being accorded,  prompted partly by the high rates  of interest 
being  charged by the  banlcs.  They have  both restricted the  amount  originally 
all01ved  ancl  also taken positive  steps to  ensure  prompter payment  of  moneys 
outste,nd ing. 
A  certain amount  of credit may  also be  given by auctioneers to dealers,  1-rho 
are  involved in moving  stock from  one  part of the  country to another.  They 
tend to  get rather less credit than farmers  and usually it is  on~ weekly or 
fortnightly basis..  For the most  part,  dealers  pay cash and they may  be 
treated generously with regard to  'allmm.nces  1  {e.g.,  in some  cases,  they may 
receive discounts  for  prompt  payment)o 
But  the main  re~~1n1ng f~mction of  an  auct~oneer in providing credit or 
finance  relates to the  meat  trade.  Fat cat-tle,  lambs,  (in certain districts) 
veal calves,  and  (sometimes)  pies2  are  sold through auctioneers to wholesale 
and reta.il butchers,  to processors,  and to chain stores.  So far as butchers 
1 
2 
But whatever the beast,  in 1971,  the charges wor]{ed  out at approximately 
13  per cent.  per  a:rmum,  payable  on the  aL1ount  outstanding.  It used to 
va~  with Balli{  rate,  but it now  relates to the joint stock ballits 1  Base Rate. 
Most  bacon pigs are sold direct to factorieso - 129-
are  concerned,  the Buctioneer alms to provide  no  more  than~ week's  credit. 
\fnolesalers  seem to  need.  crcdi  t  L1ore  re,r,ulnrly ·!:,hun  re-t.ailers,  -thougb.  ·Lha 
latter usually talte  a  '\'Teek  -tc  pay,  occa.s·io::JL..lly  long  or.  Credit to "rhole-
salers may  be  for  one  week or two  (occasionally,  even threo).  Sor.Je  of  tho 
big firms  - processors and cha.in  si:,oros  1  - mrl.y  take  up to three uceks;  this 
is said -to  be  due  to their dGsire  to maintain their mvn  liquidity at adequate 
levels,  but it is more  1)roba.bly  occasioned by the  complications  of their 
accounting processes.  Ho  interest is  ch[·,rt;od  on this crcdi  t, w·hich  mieht be 
described as  'conventi01ml 1 ;  the auctioneer reckons  ·to  cover his costs and 
to make  a  profit out  of his  conmlission  on sales. 
Occasionally,  auctioneers  tend to have  ruore  difficulty in getting their 
accOU!lts  settled 1-Tit.h  retail U.:Lld  '\·rholesalo  butchers  than 1rith farmers.  If 
q,  custo1:1er  is having difficulty in paying his accormt  on the  due  date,  the 
auctioneer lrill attempt to reduce  the  amount  of crodi  t  accorded '\·Teeit  by 
1>1eek  (he  'tries to eet  them  owing  less  1 );  no  interest is cha.rged at this 
stage,  but if a  customer gets behind in his  payments,  the auctioneer may 
allow him to buy  (say)  for four ·vcoks  on the  old basis;  after tha.t,  the 
customer will be  charged  10 par cent..  per  annum.  on  out  s-tandings.  Usually, 
there are no  formal  agreements.  Exceptionally,  the details  of  a  transaction 
may  be  set out in a  letter  • 
.Althouch all auctioneers are  concerned with the buying  and selling of  farms 
'\'Then  these  come  on to tho  market,  they do  not provide  finance. 
1i!hen  a  fe.rm 
is sold, it is expec·ted that the parties will complete  on tho  due  date 
and that the  purchaser will pay up.  It is a  ma.tter  for the  farmer  to 
arrange the finance  necessary for  a  purchase and,  if he  has  to borrow·,  i·t 
is expected that he  "\·rill  usually go  to tho  AHC  (SASC  in Scotland)  or to  a 
bank.  Occasionally,  the vendor will lend part of  the  purchase price  agains·~ 
a  mortgage. 
All the  emphasis  so far has  been on the provision of credit by the auctioneer, 
but in a  very real sense he also himself receives credit to  some  degree. 
The  auctioneer "\V'ill  pa.y  a  farmer for  stock sold probably the  day after the 
S3.le, 2  but unless the  farmer  pays  his  cheque  in inunediately the auctioneer 
will himself be  enjoying credit as  a  result of the  1float'.  This  is 
probably less  import~Ii-t; as  a  source  of finance  for auctioneers  nm·r  tha.t the 
banks  are requesting farmers  to  lodge their cheques  more  promptly with their 
baruters.  In any  event,  any delay by the  farmer  in presenting his  cheque 
would serve merely to offset total credit being advanced by the auctioneer. 
1 
2 
These  usually buy  on contract,  but their prices are based  on auction lilarket 
prices,  which are used as  the  'regulator'. 
Some  auctioneers  in fact pay for the stock on  the  day  of the sale  and  prompt 
payment  is regarded as  one  of the  most  important  advantages  of the auction 
system.  Cheques  not collected by farmers  on sale days  are  posted that night. 
Even  when paid in,  they will still take four  days  to clear. - 130-
At the  time  of the \'fils  on Bng_uiry  ( 1971),  hire purchase  accounted for  o_nly 
about  1  por cent.  of'  total borro\·:ings  by a,gricnl  ture  or  s omeiihing  bot'\,rcen 
£15  million and  £20  r;-:.illion.  Although apparently unimportant,  at the  margin 
the  amounts  raised in this ·'\'ray  can in particular cases  be quite significanto 
Hire  purcha.se  finet,nc e  is provided by the finance  houses  (some  of which '\>Tere 
recognised as  banks after the  introduction of nmr  arrangements  by the  Bank 
of Engla,nd in Septer;~ber 1971).  In fact,  they not  only offer hire purchase 
facilities  1,  but also  do  a  larce  (and  probe,bly increasing)  amount  of 
business  by '\vay  of  loan,  as  '~Tell  a,s  offerine contract hire arra.nt.;cments  and 
leasing  (though  sometimes  these  other activities are carried out by sub-
sidiary companies).  l;uch  of this business 11ill be  concerned '\vith financing 
the acquisition of  plant ancl  rnachinery  (especially tractors and  corllbines, 
but also balers,  ploughs,  end other items).  In addition,  some  finance 
houses  also finance  the acquisition of  livestock,· grain storaee facilities, 
fnrm buildings  (or  extensions  or  improvements  thereto),  even broiler houses. 
Quite  a  lot of the business  comes  in through agriculture.!  machinery dealers 
tha-t  have  links  often with a  particular finance  house;  the  latter houses  tend 
to be  somcvhat  selective ,,ri th regeJrcl to the dealers  from whom  they will accept 
business  r..nd,  in ceneral,  they '\·rill  only negotiate a  financing arrangement 
2  through  a  dealer they already know.  'rhe  farmer  makes  contact with a  dealer 
1 
2 
Hire purchase night be  defined as an agreement lmder which a  person agrees 
to  tal~e  possession of  goods  for  a  fixed term during which he  pays  to the 
owner by instalr;jents  a  sum  equal to the cash price,  plus  chu,rees.  At the 
end  of the term the hirer has  an option to acquire title and to retain the 
goods  in return for the  payment  of  a  nominal  sur~1  (c.  g. ,£2)  ~~ 
In the case  of  e.  n<nT  dealer,  a  banl~ manager  may  recormnend  him ·to  the 
company in the first instance,  but they '\vould also themselves  gather 
relevant information as  a  basis for assessment before  adcling the  name  of 
the dealer to their approved list. - 131-
and,  if ·t.he  fa.rmer  requires  non.-baD.k  finance,  very often the den.ler "\·Till 
recommend  a  fa.rmer  to  a  fina:r~:~e  company.  In consideration of these 
introductions,  the dealer may  receive  a  commission,  'tvhich  can amount  to  one-
tenth of 1...-hatever  tho  finance  house  charges  the  custor:wr.  If it :is  o,  matter 
of financing  a  purchase  of  livestocl:,  the introduction may  be  effected by n.n 
auctioneer;  it is understood tha.t  they  clo  no-f;,  receive  a  commission.  Some 
business is n.lso  referred to the  finnnce  houses  by accountants,  advisers,  and 
consultants.  On  the  o-'c.her  hand,  if the farmer  goes  to the finance  house 
direct and  no  coinr!lission is payable to the  supplier,  the farmer  may  be  cha.rgecl 
a  ne·~ rate  (i.e., net  of  cOirunission). 
llhen a  finance  house  is considering a  financing proposition, it 'dll have 
rega.rd for  a  number  of factors  r-.,nd  the  emphasis  may  VE'.,ry  somewlw.t  from  one 
finance  house  to another.  It is probably now  true ·that the rJB.jori-!iy  of 
finance  houses are primarily concerned with the  creditworthiness  of the 
farmer1  and  (-vith certain exceptions)  are very much  less concerned 'vith the 
right in the  event  of default to repossess  the  eq:uipment.  For t.his  reason, 
many  fi:na.nce  houses  nov appear to be  offering in a  number  of  cases  loan 
facilities rather than hire purchase.  Only a  fe1·r  of these  companies  would 
still resort mainly to hire purchase  on the  grounds  -that  1 a  hire purchase 
contract still affords  a  good  security interest',  though it is  common  to 
employ hire  purchase when assisting to finance  ·t.ho  acquisition of an  i tern 
like a  tractor or  a  combine.  Loans  tend to be  resorted to "\'Then  the  farmer is 
financing  improvements  to buildings,  purchasing portable buildings,  or live-
stocko  (For ·the  last, hire purchase is sometimes used).  Where  the  amounts 
involved are in excess  of  (say)  £3,000, it is common  for security to be  sough-t 
1  Information as  to the credi  t1-rorthiness  of  an individual is usually obtained 
from  (i)  (possibly)  the  custo1ner1 s  bankers,  Jlihough  for  competitive  re~.sons 
this is lil;:ely to be  done  only rarely;  (ii) the 1TD..tional  Credit Register 
(1·rhich  lToulcl  confirm any current indebtedness  of the customer "\vi th the 
major  finance  houses  and  r~lso any adverse  credit experience);  or  (iii) 
a  scrutiny of the customer's  latest eud.ited accounts,  though not usually 
"\vhcn  the business has been introduced by a  supplier of uericultural 
machinery and the  sum  is less  thctn  (say)  £1  ,OOO~ - 132-
(e.g.,  a  charr,e  on  land or property).  If the resale value  of the eoods  if3 
likely to be very little, the  company would  use  a  credit sale  (see belml). 
Other .companies  tend to  finar..ce  the  purchase  of tractors  on  the basis  of a 
loan,  but the  finance  for combines,  or for a  combine  and tractor toeether, 
is usually in the  form  of hire purchase. 
Some  companies  have  a  rule that, 1vhere  tho  item is  over £2,000,  i-'G  will be 
1  financed by way  of hire purchase.  To  finance  aznounts  below·  this,  a  number 
of houses  would  offer a  PersonEtJl  or Purpose  Loe,n.  Hm1ever,  when  accommodating 
a  limited company  (and more  particularly uhen financing  movable  plant),  they 
would always  do  it on the  be.-sis  of hire purchase.  Loans  also have  the 
advantage that where  more  than one  supplier is involved the  making  of  a 
loan to the farmer  enables  him to settle directly with  the several suppliers, 
builders,  or installers, which is a  much  more  convenient arrangement.  In 
addition,  preference for the Personal  or Purpose  Lonn  seems  to have  been due 
in part to  some  dissatisfaction with hire  purcha,se  arrangemen·fjs.  Hire  purchase 
tends to be  regarded as  a  le~al fiction and  some  companies  have had difficulties 
in the courts,  '\-Then  they have  sought their remedies  and wished to repossess. 
In addition,  courts tend sometimes  to make  unrealistic  orders;  defaulters 
may  handle  the truth somewhat  roughly and  County  Court Registrars and Jud.ges 
seem  to think that the  company  has  been acting usuriously.  There may  indeed 
1  One  reason why  this is preferred is that the Hire  Purche.se  Act  1965,  uhich 
applies up to that figure,  requires  a  hire purchase agreemGnt  to be  signed,-
either on  the finance  company's  premises  or the  premises  of the dealer 
supplying the goods.  If the agreement is signed on the hirer's premises, 
then a  'pause'  documen-t  has  to be used,  eivin~ the hirer a  statutory 
period of three days  to w·i thdraw from the transaction if he  so w·ishos. 
As  the farmer  cenerally prefers to conclude  t.he  deal  on the  spot and to 
sign papers at his  own  farm,  a  finance  company  ma.y  choose  to handle the 
transaction o,s  a  l.oan where  the  cost of the  goods  plus ·the  finance 
c.ompany' s  charges aro  belm>1  £2,000 and foreeo  any security interest for 
the  sake  of  lack of  involvement in the  documents  and procedures  of regulated 
hire purchase. - 133-
be  months  of delay and no  rea  1  remedy at the  end  of it.  And,  '\'There  re-
possession proves  possible,  ·lihe  value  of the  repossessed goocls  may  be  only a 
fraction of the  amount  of the  loan.  Also,  ''hen a  piece  of  equipme11t  has  been 
repossessed  (e.g.,  a  combine harvester),  there  rc11k1.ins  the problem of its 
disposal.  In all the circumstances,  an unsecured personal  loan often seems 
to be the most realistic basis  on '\vhich to  lend,  Jlihough  some  companies  may 
seelc security for  such a  loan.  At the  same  time,  this may  not be  easy to 
obtain.  The  farmer  1 s  land is likely to be  mortgaged already  ( vlhether to the 
ANC  and/or the bank),  thoueh  a  seconcl morteage is possible.  Alternatively, 
share certificates migh·b  be  pledged under  a  memorandum  of deposit.  In the 
case  of  a  company,  they could take  a  director's guarantee  or a  debent,ure  over 
assets,  even a  bill of sale  (in the case  of an individual1 ),  though because 
borro'\vers  dislike the publicity this ,,rould be very much  a  last resort.  2 
An alternative to the  loan that is used by  some  companies  is the credit sale3 
- in some  respects this is similar to an unsecured  loan and is resorted to 
as  a  means  of expediting the settlement of an application by the farmer  for 
a  J:.d.nistry grant  (in those  cases ·where  these apply}.  Grant is not paid until 
ownership passes,  i.e., until the last instalment  has been paid and the 
option to purchase  has been exercised,  whereas with  a  credit sale 
m·mership is immediately vested in the  farmer,  lrho  has full control over the 
goods  in question.  There  are also advantages  for the finance house.  If the 
1 
2 
3 
Since certain of  the finance  houses  have  no1-r  become  banks  (see above),  it 
is possible for en incLividual farmer,  by resorting to the form  of  charge 
under the  A~ricultural Credits Act  1928 to mortgage certain of his assets 
to what  is now  an approved baru( free  from the  requirements  of the Bills of 
Sale Act. 
'l'here  is also  a  problem \'Then  a  farmer '\'lishes  to sell or  exchange  some  of 
his chattels.  Hence,  there is a  need to revimf the bill of sale every 
few  months  and to revise the  lis·~ that iden·tifies  every  i tern covered by 
it, an_arrangement that is based  on  a  gentleman's  agreement when the first 
bill of sale is dralm up. 
It is said that for the  larger finance  houses,  which are  now  recognised as 
banlts,  this is almost  a  thing of the past. - 134-
f'Rrmcr  fails to  :pc:..y  his  instn.lr·1ents  on  tlue  date,  the 1rhole  bcl.la.ncc  outstaudii::.g 
becor•les  repayable  and the finance  house  can  sue  for this, whereas  under  a 
hire purchase agreement  thP- finance  house  cc:vn  only sue for ·tho  outstandinc 
d/ 
,..  .  1  arrears  an  or Ior posscss1on. 
For the most  part,  the  finance  houses  (soi>"lc  of 1rhich have  becoml~  banl~s)  seem 
now  to be  adopting criteria not greatly different from  t.he  ban.1\.s.  They arc 
now  rather less  cone erned 1·rith the  security being offered ·than 11i th the 
evaluation of  a  risl\..  l'o  this  end,  the  company providing the finance 1·rill 
want  to  ensure that the  farmer  is likely ·to  use the machine  (or other item) 
profi-tahly,  thereby justifying its purchase  and creating the  conditions that 
w·ill  make  it possible for the  farmer to repay.  In addition,  and as  a  means 
of establishing his  credi  t"\';crthiaess,  the  company 1·roulcl.  1vish to see  ·the 
farmer's  br.J.ance  sheets for the  last two  or three years;  -'c,hey  may  also 1.rish 
to discuss the pattern -of  his  ce.sh  flow,  because they 1-rould  not rrillingly 
wish to  lend to  a  farmer  'with a  real liquidity problem'.  If they did not 
knmv  the  far1:10r  already,  he  '\vould  be visited in order to assess his  farm and 
farming  methods. 2  Resort  might  also be  macle  to the  credi·jj  inforl~1a-t,ion 
services,  but,  in the final analysis,  it is always  a  question of the  man 
to '\vhom  one  is  lending.  This  is true  even when  one  is dealing vi·bh  a 
3  company.  At  the  same  time,  most  of these finance  companies  are quite 
aggressive  in seeking new  business and norumlly they "\'Tould  try to find a  1vay 
of accepting the business if at all possiblee 
1 
2 
3 
Actually,  the  arJount  of the arrears claim under  a  hire purchase  agreement 
depends  on vhether the  ac;ree:u1ent  falls llithin the  scope  of the Hire  Purche?.$0 
!£! 1965  or no-t.  If it does,  the  c luim is more  restricted than if it is  --
outside ·the  Act.  It is probably more  accurat.e  to  sr.,y  that the  O'\mer  is 
entitled to his arrears  plus  damages,  but the total of the tlro  '\·Till  very 
~arely equal tho  outstanding balance  of the hire purchase price. 
But,  in many  cases,  the  assessor '\Jould  have little  (or no)  specialist 
farming  lmolrledgc;  his expertise woulcl  be  primarily financial. 
Sametimes,  in the  case  of'  a  company,  it. will be  given a  line of credit, 
subject to a  l~mit. - 135-
During the period of the credit squeeze  (ceilings were  applied -to  fine,nce 
houses  between 1966  and 1971),  sori1e  col1lpanies  1·mre  obliged to apply quotas 
to the  amounts  of finance  they n1:1.de  available.  Latterly  (post-1971), 
after a  period of freedom,  restrictio:as have  applied to funds  attracted by 
'ray of 'leposi  ts or borrmd_ngs  (see above),  though -this was  thought to be 
no  less  severe  ·lihan  the  e<:t.rlier  squeezes.  During  those. squeezes,  finance 
houses  have  tended to select the better risks,  though it is raaintained 
that -l:,he  vast rnaj ori  ty of application would in any case have  been elieible. 
For the rest, there is a  tenclency to look after old customers, 1rith 1vhom 
they. have  already had a  satisfactory credit experience,  in preference  sorae-
timE:s  to new  customers.  Some  customers  1 shop arolu1d  1  the various  fillc"tnce 
companies,  seeking the  lOllest rates available;  w·hen  credit is tight,  some  of 
the finance  houses  tend to look some1-1hat  less favourahly  on this type  of. 
customer. 
On  the whole,  the  lending  experience  of the finance houses  - especially over 
more  recent years  - has been quite favourable.  If the  companies are tolerably 
successful in  evaluC~,ting their risks,  1 delinquency ratios'  or default experience 
tends  to renmin within statistically determined limits.  In part,  this  tn~y 
be  due  to the fact that farmers  appear to become  much  more  disciplined 
borrmvers  when dealing with a  finance house  (as  compared,  for  example,  with 
a  dealer).  The  finance house  is rather more  remote  and the transaction is 
more  impersonal  (the dealer's relationship tends  to be  much  more  intimate; 
'he  meets  the farmer  on his  farm and sits in the kitchen').  From the outset, 
the finance  house is concerned to apply financial discipline;  it "\vill  also 
eenerally require payments to be  made  by way  of  a  banker's  order and the 
farmer  is ready to accer-t  -t.his  condition.  This reflects in the default ratios, 
1·1hich  are  calculatecl on the basis  of the percentaee  of  accotu1ts  that are  30  days - 136-
in arrears ni;  the  r.10nth-end.  ':Che  nationa.l  avcrnge  of arl"cnrs at -'vho  -Gi1.1e 
of the ;·Tilson Enquiry  (1971)  va,s  un.clerstood· ·bo  be  about  2.5  to 2.6 l'er  cen·b. 
and,  for  n  nmnber  of companies,  the  experience '\vas  even 111ore  favourable. 
In addition,  arrears e,re  of·ben  recovered and the  loss ratios "'vould  therefore 
be  even  lo·ver. 
Whether  moneys  are  ma.cle  availaole by 1·ray  of  loan or  on the basis  of hire 
purchase,  much  the  same  terms will apply.  For  example,  the customer will 
normally be  required to make  a  deposit.  In effect,  this gives  the  borro1·Ter 
an equity in the  item purchased.  In 19''"(1,  the deposit  required  seemed to 
vary from  20 to 25  per cent.  on ne11  equipmen-t  (the bullt of the business 
would relate to tractors and combines),  but during the  period of rela,tive 
freedom  (1973/74)  deposits fell to from  10 to 20 per cent.  Higher deposits 
would be  required  on  secondhand  .  _,  1  equJ.pmenli  and in the  case  of  loans to 
finance  buildings  - possibly up to  33j- per 
2  - and there  certa,in  cent.  ·vere 
types  of  equipment  (e.g.,  chicken batteries or 1t1ilking parlours,  which 
depreciate very rapidly) vhere  some  companies  sough·t.  a  deposit of  40 :per 
cent.  On  the  other hand,  because  of the  strenrrlih  of  competition,  certain 
companies  might accept  a  deposit as  small as  5  to 10 per cent.  (e.g.,  on a 
combine),  but this would  depend  on the credit standing of the  customer. 
Similarly,  with th_e  pay-out period.  For ne1v  equipment,  vThether  the  money 
had been made  availcble in the  fori'l'l  of  a  loan or by vray  of hire purchase,  the 
maxi:r.imm  period 1vould be three years,  but for  secondhand  equipment it "'·rould  usually 
be  t"'vO  years.  Loans  to finance  ·the  purchase  of  livestock might also be  for 
1 
2 
In practice,  ·the  far1aer  is usually tradin2 in a  ma.chine,  the value  of which 
i§  more  than adeq_u.n.te?  as  deposit.  In fact,  because  of the high value  of 
used tractors,  sometimes  the  farmer 1V"ill  only apply some  part of his part-
exchange  n.llo1-rance  to the deposit against the  new  machine. 
Depending  on the ago  of the  equipment  and the amount  involved. - 137-
the shorter period.  In the  ce.sc  of  cm.ibines  - 2-nd  other  expo:1.sive  plan·(,  1 
where ·r..z<1ote1ts  of £6,000 to £'7 ,000 rnight  be  involved,  the i'ina.nce house  may 
be  prepared to go  out to four  or  even five years. 
UepayDents  are normally made  on a  monthly basis,  but they InD.y  be  made 
quarterly  (in both cases against  a  banl.tcr' s  order to ensure  prompt  payment). 
On  the  larger transactions,  particularly with periods in excess  of three 
years,  ·(:,here  is no"'lr  greater emphasis  (19'14)  on 1-rha·h  is termed per annwn rate 
.transactions.  This  is where  the capital sum  involved is repaid by equal 
monthly  ins-GnlmelY~s  over the period of the  loan,  but  in-'c,erest 1vhich is an 
agreed ficure  over and above  the  Finance  House  Base  R?vte  is calculated on 
the  reducing balance  and is paid separately quarterly in arrear~  Indeed, 
although it is not usual,  paymo~1ts may  sometimes  be  made  on a  'seasonal' basis  (c.;;., 
for  combine harvesters).  Over  a  3-year pay-out period,  a  laree payment  me.y 
be  made  after t.he  harvest  (e.g.,  in Noveu1ber),  \ri-th minimal  payments  in 
bct'lvcen.  But finance  companies  do  not  lil\.e  such arrangements,  because they 
interrupt their cash flo1-v  and they would  only do it for  a  very credi  t11or·thy 
custoner. 
On  occasion,  too,  loQns  are  made  for  longer terms  than three years,  possibly 
up to five yee.,rs  with monthly repayments.  Some  of these may  be  'farm 
productivity loans'!  where  each individual transa.ction is  lool~ed at  on its 
merits  and the terms which arc negotiable are arranged accordingly.  Al  terno,t-
ively,  a  finance  house  may  land to a  limited liability company in this w-ay, 
but usually this 1-rould  be  on the basis  of  a  reducing balance,  interest being 
charged quarterly. 
1  1.'hl. s  might  inc  1  ude  mi lldne. machinery. - 138-
Loc:.-ns  - e,nd.  ::;or~lctim8s hire purchase  - to finance  the  purchase  of li  vestocl\. 
represen-ts  a  rather special field and not all finance  houses  favour  going 
into it.  Others  seert1  to favour  these transactions,  especinlly '\•rhen  asked to 
finn.nce  the  pu_L'cl?-ase  of  do~iry cm.rs,  because they can depend  on regular monthly 
repayments  after the receipt of the milk cheque.  :Tsually,  they '\·Till  require 
the  loan to be  paid off fairly rapidly  (say in 9 to  12  months).  It is 
understood that such  loe~ns are  a  relatively small part of total business. 
It is usual to req_uire  the  fa,rmer  to go to  ?.,  livestock dee,ler with a  good 
reputation and to buy accredited stock.  (Sometimes,  loo,ns  are  only made 
against pcdi[;reecl c:,nina.ls).  But finance  companies  arc not too  concerned 
about foot  0nd  mouth disease,  regarding its incidence  as  a  con~ercial risk. 
In any event,  there lrould be  compensation ancl  their experience  of recovering 
their money  aGainst  such  loans  has  been very goocl.  1  It- is not usual to talte 
security r,nd  they therefore lend only to good credit risks. 
Loans  may  also be  made  ar;ainst store cattle - up to a  period of 10 months. 
Noneys  ma,y  be  borro,red for the purpose  of fattening  up  stores  over the winter, 
the cattle being yarded and fed the barley crop;  or the  cot1pany  may  lend to 
finance  summer  grazing,- -the  farmer buying yearlings to sell the follo"ring 
autw:m.  In -these  cases,  the  company is norulc'"Llly  reimbursed by  one  payment 
cd;  the  end  of'  the period of the  loan;  alternatively,  they may  receive an interim 
payment  (say)  after seven months  and the balance at the  end of  10 months. 
Again,  the  farmer  may  borrow· to finance  'forward stores', the  moneys  to be  paid 
bach:  in (say)  three bi-monthly instalments.  ~lv"ery effort is made  to tailor 
the  scheme  to suit individual needs  and clearly one  cennot  expect the farmer 
to repay rmtil he has  the  means  to do  so. 
1  Some  compa.nies  operate an umbrella  insurance policy so that if an individual 
animal dies before  -the  loan is paid off  ("vhether  from  a  non-notifiable disease 
or  an accident),  '\That  the farmer still had to pay  on that animal is deducted 
from the total e.mount  outstanding.  Hormally,  the calving risk, which is 
not hiGh,  is excluded. - 139-
Lil~e'l..,.ise,  finance  companies  may  lend to finance  "the  purchase  of  brecclin:; 
sheep.  Such  lou:ns  1'10uld  aGain norr:-.i3.lly  be for 10 uonths,  vith half the 
loan being  repaid after  (say)  eieht r.1onths  v.ncl  the  o-ther half of the  loan 
t1·ro  months  later (i.e., not until  -~he 1rool clip aucl.  the  la1abs  have  come 
along)o  Very little tends  to be  lent against store laubs.  If finc.nce  is 
made  a.vailr~ble, it "ould be for  a  period of  six months,  vdth re:paynont  of 
the  end  of six mon·t.hs.  Pigs  r.1ay  be financed  on  a  sir,1ilar br:.sis,  thouch in 
some  quarters they are not regarded as  a  very good subject for  such  a  trans-
a.c·bion.  In all these  cases,  the  loan is liquicla-ted  on  a  deferred 1m:yraents 
b  .  1  asJ.s. 
In no  circumstances would  a  company be  in·bercsted in U.CJJd.nG  c.  lo~n for less 
than £:i 50.  But  loans  may  be  for  P-S  much  as  £4,000 to £8,000,  1-rhen  -bhe 
company 1rould  offer a  negotiated rate. 
In the case  of  one  compa.ny  covered by  our  survey,  assistance "\·ras  given in 
financing  a  rather special-type  of  lives·bocl-: - day-old chicks  u1::'0il  they 
became  lay pulle-'c.s  (this vas  done  for the  chich. rearer);  the  process  1-ra.s 
then taken  on to the  egg producer,  :-tho  required fin&.nce  for his  lay birds. 
It ,..,.as  usual to require a  25  per cento  deposit,  with the balance  over  a 
maximum.  of  10 months,  conu:1encing  tuo  months  v,fter the delivery of the birds. 
Obviously,  there "\vould  be  some  delay,  since the birds have  to provide  the 
eggs  before the farmer  can begin to repay.  .All  poultry transactions  hv,d  to 
be  indemnified by the  supplier of the  chicl'~s  (because he  had a  co::1tinuing 
relationship vTith  -bhe  poultry farmer) o 
1  .Auctioneers  lil:euise  some-c.~mes  provide hire  purch2..s c  fi:::1unce  r;._gainst  li  ·vcs-bocl:, 
but usually throuch a  subsi(Liary finn.:.1c e  company,  ·bhou~h thero a.ro  not  r.w.ny 
of these.  The  avc;.ilabili  ty o1  these i'e.cilities is racant.  Jvo  provide  v.,  service 
to the  fe.rnacr,  -::.houGh  the auctioneer also 11opcs  -C.ha:li  ti1e  s·t.ock vill come 
b<1cl:  ·to. him for auctioning and thv,t he 1-1ill  ge,in a  second cor..1mission  from them. - 140-
Lon:::;er-terr:1  loans  P-re  clso  mn,d.o  t.o  fi.:au,nc e  the  put-tinE:  up  of  ne'>T  fr,rm bni  l(li:ar· s 
(such as barus and cattle stalls), the  rebuilding or  extension of farm 
buildings,  or their improvemmtt.1  'i'his  lTould also  cover  other fixed equip-
ment,  such as  grain storr:.ge,  silos,  and.  fuel tanl:s.  Normally,  the  loans 
lrould  be  for three to four years;  the  company would certainly wish to get its 
money back '"i  thin five years.  But,  sometimes  loans  arc  made  for  longer 
periods,  if the  collaterc:tl  security is available.  They '"ould also require 
collateral for  loans  of  over  (say)£3,000-£4,000.  Rates  are  subject to 
negotiation and interest vrould  be  che.,rged  on a  reducinz balanc o.  A::;a.in,  this 
tends  to be  a  very small  p2..rt  of total business. 
In the  past  (e.z., in the  early 1960s),  noLle  finc- ... :.1ce  houses  lent to finance 
the acquisition of broiler houses,  but they burnt their finsers  - profit 
forecasts  were  over-optimistic,  there Vlas  the risk of  fm·rlpest,  bu·b  above all 
the production of broilers was  a  nevr  industry into which  too  many  sma.ll 
people  ca1:1e  flooding,  many  of wh01a  llere very quickly forcbd  ou·t  of business. 
As  a  result,  the  finance  companies  became  very '\vary  of financing broiler 
houses.  Nevertheless,  some  le:ading is still done  in this area  -~o  le.rge 
concerns  that can hendle the  size and  cos·&  of  operations.  Usually,  such  lo3.ns 
are totally unsecured,  thoueh  occasionally securi·ty may  be  t,aken  on ·the 
basis  of freehold  l~~d to  support an advance  to buy  enviroJunontal houses. 
Cages  and feeding  systems  are financed  on the basis  of credit sales.  Terms 
are negotiable;  it depends  on the  customer.  It is not  a  large section of 
total lending. 
Other areas in which a  finance  house  may  help include  loans  to assist a 
farmer  ·t,o  hold his grain for the purpose  of selling it at a  more  advantt-:_geot::.s. 
1  It 1vould not be appropriate ·to  use hire purchase,  because the building may 
,.,ell be affixed to  a  freehold and not be  mov[l.ble. - 141-
price later in the  season;  such a  loan would  be  L~de 
'  I  agalns·li  the VD.lue  of  the 
grain.  It lessens  the strain on  -the  farmer's  own  resources.  Formally,  tho 
loan is unsecured and is based on trust in and the crcdi  t1vorthiness  of the 
customero  It should be  remembered,  too,  that the  farmer  could sell his 
gra.in earlier,  \·Then  the  loan '\'rould  become  irmnediately repayable.  Also,  in 
the agricultural \l.rea,  a  finance  house  may  make  a  'stocking loan•1  (also 
lmm·Tn  as  a  'floor plan') to assist an agricultural machinery dealer to 
cerry stoclr.  and himself to ob·tain his discounts  from the manufacturer.  This 
is usually charged at relatively lm·r  rates and is done  as  a  service. 
2  Some-
what  similar assistance  rday  be  given by vtay  of  'clm:wnstration :Cin::..r .!0 1 •  In 
this case,  a  dealer may  take  a  new  trr.tctor into stock frot1 the  mr  .. ,nufacturer 
and use it for demonstration purposes  on  a  farmer's  land.  The  finance  house 
would advance  the trade price, 1-rhich  is repayable  in t1vo  instalments - the 
first after (say)  three months  and the  second after six months.  Age-in,  in 
order to enable  a  farmer to obtain the benefit of  a  reduced price for  a 
combine  by placing an  orcler. at the  end  of  a  season and  many  months  before 
delivery,  the  farmer  may  be  offered a  joint facility,  \vhereby the initial 
finance  is provided by means  of  a  'purpose  loan'  a~d subsequently a  hire 
purchase  aereement is ~ntered into when  the  combine  is delivered.  The  loan 
is liquidated. by transferring the  outstanding balance to the hire purchase 
agr·eemento  Either the farmer will have  commenced  monthly repayments,  say, 
one  month  after the  original loan is made,  or he  may  defer the first  rcp~~uent 
for three months,  or until the delivery of the  combine  has  been.  effected. 
However,  immediately the hire purchase  agreement is entered into,  rep~yments 
would  commence  on either a  monthly or a  quarterly bo,sis. 
1 
2 
Sometimes,  this is done  on the basis  of an overdraft through  a  sister 
company;  on  other occasions bills of  exchange  are resorted too 
Ho""Yrever,  it is not  pure altruism.  The  rate charged is not unrewarding and 
the finance  company ,.;rill also hope  to attract through the dealer  even more 
profitable creclit instalment business  (whether done  by way  of hire purchase 
or  loan)" - 142-
It is usue1l  TIO'i'l  for  the  rates  charp;edcnthese  several types  of nccomrnodation 
-Go  bc  stn.t.ed as  x  per cent.  above  the  Finance House  Base Rate  as  determined 
from  time to time.  1  In n1gny  cases,  the  minimura  ad<lition to Base Rate would 
be  4  per cent.  It should be  noted that Bo,se  H.ate  has  been as  high as  16 
per cent.  As  a  general rule,  rates appear to be differentiated on the basis 
either of the  cost  of the  rnn.chine  or the amonnt  financed,  and  on ,.Thether 
the iteu is new  or  secondheJ;1d.  \·!here  tha rate charccd relates to the  cost 
of the  rnachine,  it is argued that the  salesr.mn h:nmvs  automatically what  the 
rate will be  and there  can be  no  arc;ument;  i·b  is the cost of the machine 
that is relevant,  not ·the  nr.lou.:tJ.t  financed,  and it does  not matter hmi  Jauch 
the  :r'2.rmer  puts  dmn1  on deposit.  In cases where  a  company offers  seasonal 
repayr.1ent  plcnls  (e.g.,  a  large  pa.yment  on  a  combine  after the harvest, with 
minimal  payments  over the rest of the year),  a  'factor'  might  be  applied 
to the rate of interest, in order to convert the situation to the  equivalent 
of  one  where  interest and  repoJyments  of principal are  evenly spaced over the 
"Yrhole  term of the  loe..n. 
In revim-ring the fe>cilities  being offered to agricul·l:.ure,  certain of the 
finance  houses  arc  now  seeking security in ·the  form  of  a  charge under the 
A[!jc~~~vr2-l  Creel~  t.s  Act  1928.  1
1his applies particularly to  loe..ns  concerned 
with  improvements  and  extensionsto farm buildings,  the  supply of fixed equipment, 
1  By  September  1  1970,  it 1ras  felt that movements  in Bank rate no  longer 
reflected adequately flucJ0uations  in the  cost of  money in the markets 
and the Finance Houses  Association therefore decided  in future to quote 
a  Base  Hate  and  changes  in it are announced  from  t,ime  to time.  It is 
understood that the Rate is calculated on the basis  of the  inter-bam~ 
three  months  r:waey  rate  over a  period of  eich-t weeits,  rounded up to the 
nearest half  poi:i.J.t.  (half per cent.)  and it is therefore  supposed to 
reflect the  cost  of  borrowed  money to the  financP.  houses  ,.,hich use it 
in their businens.  If there is  a  tendency for the cost of  money to 
increase significantly over an eight-week period1  EG.se  Rate vill be 
increased;  conversely,  if m2.rl~et  rc-,tes  for  inter-ban...l{.  money are tending 
to fall.  On  this basis,  day-to-day fluctuations,  llilless  they are very 
mn>rl;::ed,  will becor.1e  absorbed in the  r:mving  average. - 143-
such  ~s crain stor&Jo,  silos,  etc.  The  Act  mcl:as  it ~ossiblc for  ~ farmer 
to mortg2.ge  certain of his assets to an approved bank free  from the require-
ments  of the Bills  of  Sale  ~ct.  'Assets'  for this purpose  means  crops  or 
horticultural produce  (erm·dng  or severed),  livestock,  machinery and  other 
plant.  This  enables these finance houses  to  obtain  some  measure  o:f  security 
in a  transaction of  substance ·where  the  purpose  of the  loan in itself does 
not provide  security. 
Other finance houses  have  been reviewing ·lihe  possibility of  providing longer 
·term  C2~pi  tfl  .. l  to young  farmers  and investors -vrishing  t.o  get into agriculture 
or land.  The  clifficulty  he~s  been that the  return from  lend at bet;reen 1 
per cent.  e-nd  2  per cent.  leaves  a  very larze deficiency ,.,hen  comp1:1red  -vrith 
the  cost  of  long-term  borrm·dn~ r  .. t  15  to 20 per cent.  ~J.lhe  borrmrer is faced 
vit.h a  very severe  cash flovr  problem and because  of this finance houses  have 
been  loolring at the possibili·liy of passing  on to him the benefit of  lo"\ver 
in·terest rates in exchange ;for a  share  of  any future  e.ppreci~tion in his 
investment. 
Hean~d.1ile, all the  i'L1ance  houses  have  had  occo.sion carefully to consider 
their sources  of  funds  and this matter will become  even more  urgent. if they 
are in any 1-ray  to lengthen out their lending.  Some  houses have  attracted 
significant &mounts  of  deposits from the  general public,  lli  th the probable 
advantage  of ·relative stability at times '·rhen  interest rates are tending to 
rise.  Indeed,  some  of the  large.  finance  houses  E,re  now  recognised as  be.,nl\.s. 
It seems  unlikely,  hovever,  that the  finr~.nce houses  can expect to rely on 
small deposits for a  substantial part of their resources,  if only because 
they could never match the clearing  banl~.s  in providing the  range  of services 
they offer to their deposi·C.ors.  And,  indeecl,  most  of the  i'inn,ncc  houses 
.have  tended to rely r:1ainly  on -t.he  open mor:cy  marlcet  as  a  source  of funds, 
and.,  in particular,  on  the  inter-bank and  company funds  rr.arkets.  At the - 144-
sai:IO  tiuc,  this ucans  they hgvc  h:-1.<.1  ·bo  becone ·increasincly sensitive to hi0"b 
and fluctuating  in--'c,erest  rates  (hence  the  move  to rates  relf"\,ted  ·bo  a  B~.se 
Rate,  itself linked to movements  in raoney  lllarket  rates)  o  This  is also 
short-term money  and the question being asl:ed is whether  t.hey  shou~.cl aot 
make  a  positive effort to attract loneer  term money to match their lending, 
"rhich for the  mos-t  po..rt  is also at term.  An  al-ternative source is resort 
to  a  bank overdraft,  vhich all the  finr:.nce  houses  use  to  some  extent,  but 
this  like"YTise  is short-term finance,  though  likely to be  less volatile than 
money  marh:et  fm1ds.  Term  loans  fror.1  the  banJ.ts  are another possibility, 
but they are  lih:cly to attract hit;her rates than the rate  on  overdrafts.  As 
it happens,  a  :m.uilber  of the larger finance  houses  hvNe  substantial institu·t-
ional ba,cJdng  (being partly m·rned  either by insurance  conpn.:..1ies  or partly or 
wholly  mn1ed  by the big clearing  banl~s themselves)  and,  in this context,  it 
is nov being  suggested tha.t  a  further possibility is that longer term finance 
may  be  provided quite appropriately by certain of the interested insurance 
companies,  even more  generally by the insurance  companies  as  a  group. 
Contract Hire is a  system operated principally by the  den.ler ·who  rents  (say) 
a  tractor to  a  farmer..  Contract hire applies in particular to trac·bors, 
which tend to be used more  or less continuously;  it does  not apply to 
combines,  since these are used only once  a  year.  \·There  it applies,  an 
agreement will be  entered into betvTeen the parties, whereby  a  farmer hires 
a  machine  from the dealer at an agreed rental and for  a  specified period. 
The  amount  of  Jc,he  rental is based primarily on the difference betveen the 
retail price and the residual va,lue  of the  equipr.1ent at the  enu  of the 
hiring period,  plus the cost of the finance  involved.  Usually,  too,  there - 145-
1vi 11  be  ... tt  +,..  .  ~  1 
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is i1icluded,  the  farmer vi11 have  tho  r..dva.ntagc  over -the  rclcvan·t period 
(1·ihich  may  be  12  or 24  r.10n-r.ns)  that his  u;.::..chine  \'rill  he  fully  ma.int::~,ined
2 
and he  can therefore budget ahead,  hJlOidne 1·rhat  his  expcr.J.scs  vill be  so far 
as that piece  of  equipment is concerned.  (It should be  noted that tlilder  a 
hire purchase  P{::reer;wnt,  a  loan arranzei:lent,  vr  o..  ler.sing  contra,ct,  the 
farmer  is responsible for Lk"1intenance.  l~xpcrie:.1co \'li-t,h  farmer  1:m.intena:nce 
has,  however,  been quite  s~.:tisfr,c-tory,  if only because  the  fv.1•r,1er  callllO..Ijj 
afford to  ner;lec·~ his Iac,chinery  over  the  rela-tively lone period for \{hich 
he  operates it). 
'{hero  :fir~.anc e  co!npo,nies  e:n.snge  in -this business,  they \·rill  buy the machine 
from  a  dealer ru1d  hire it to the  farner;  at the  end  of the  1  to  2  years,  the 
clealer lTill  buy  ..rc.ho  equi}?;.'ilent  ba,cl:  fror:1  the finance  cor.1prvny  ~t en agreed 
figure.  The  charges  Dade  by -the  finance  compc,ny  p,re  said  ·~o  be  much  the 
same  as '\vould  apply under  ~u1 ordinary hire  purcha.se  ar;roeLJ.ent. 
The  difficulty arises \·rhen  it becomes  necessar-y to sell the  og_uipn~ent at -the 
end  oi the hire.  If the  dez,ler himself has  arrn.n~ed the :1ire,  he  mr...y  have 
come  to at:  arranc~n:;:at \vlth  ·jjhe  supplier to  tul~e tho  nachine  bach:  a,t  the  e:.1<.1  of 
the  period ol hire a.t  a  price that was  n{:reed  a.t  the outset.  1lhere  a  fina}:lCe 
house is involved,  it \vill heve  arranged 1vith the dealer from "t·rhom  it boucht. 
the  I:J.achine  to buy  i-t.  bach: at the  end  oi the hire c:t  an aereed price.  Tho 
1 
2 
lt
1or  exa.myle,  a  tractor might  cost  {~1 ,000.  .l\.sstu:1e  Jc.lw.t  it is w·orth £500  Pvt 
the  eXJ.d  o:f.'  a  tl·io-year  period.  (thfl.t  is its residual vclue).  The  basis for 
computing the rent is the difference between the  t1ro  ficv..rcs  (i.e., the 
arrtouat  of depreciation over  two yccrs),  plus  th0  cost  of 1:1ai:ntenance  (this 
varies  a  lot from  d.e~.ler to dealer;  also 1vi th ·tho  type  of tractor and the 
h.ind  of  coturtry in which it is to be used).  I:i.1  addition,  there is the 
cost of the  finn,nce  and the margin  of profit for the hirer. 
In the  event  of  a  serious  breakdo1m,  -the  i..IGem  lTould  be  replaced vith  (say) 
~,no-ther tractor  o - 146-
dealer ,.,j_ :t.l  -&hen.  he  ... ve  io sell the  ma.chL1.o  secondhand  o:L'Lher  on tho  home  Dar:-:et. 
or  r~brou.d  (c.[; o,  -tho  Con-tino:tl-b  of .i.'urop:-J).  In these ci  rcw:-ts·lianccs,  the 
de~:;.. lex·  ·ui 11  hope  'to got the  mc.chino  ba.ck  from  r-v  farmer  11ho  has  not 1-rorh:.ed 
i-t  too hard'. 
specirvl  cl.npr·  .. rt.':w;J.-t.)  o):  the  busi1~o3s  r:1ay  be  dollG  through  a  subsidiP  ... ry company. 
~Chore  p,re  ,~.lso  o:::J.e  or  t·vo  speci£J.lis·t.s  in this field.  'l'he  amount  of business 
clone  - and their interest in it - seerns  to  vc..-..ry  quite a  good  deal as  bet"\·Teen 
Jucte;iag  by tho  replies  by ·0he  sr.  .. nple  of  1o.ri.:-:crs  n.pproached in the \f:i.lson 
ED.f!_uiry,  only  3  pel'  ce:.1tQ  resort.  eel  to  leasil!g  arrancez~wnt.s.  The  bulll.  of  -these 
occu.rrocl  L1  crop:pil:.g  [·,ncl  da,iryi1:..;~,  vi  th  some  in·torcs  t  i:iJ.  mixed 
r>  • 
xar1~1J.n.e. 
Por  tho  uo:T~  pn.r·~,  -~he  types  of  equipmen-t  tlw.-t  nrc  ·bhe  subject of leas  in-c 
arr<\ll[;Ciilonts  nrc  those  ,.,i-th  a  hich capit[\.,1  cos-t  liL.e  tractors  n:nd  combine 
h~rvesters,  hut,  r:10bilo  machinery ge:nernlly \70Uld  ~lualifyo  Sor.1e  cmapa.nies 
will lec,sc  silos  o..D<l  oven vJncillary  equipment  ~ncl lover-:pricetl items  such 
v.s •  plou~)ls,  harrmrs,  drills,  sprayers,  and dairy equi  pt:wnt,  but t.hi  s  is 1 es  s 
counon. 
Occr.,sio~1n.lly,  fi:-1ai1ce  houses  recci  ve  applica-tions for tho  leasing of  second-
hand  cor;1bines.  In t:;enoral,  the criterion is  '\vhe-~her the  equipment  can be 
Lcasinz is nmr  coui:i1.~:  -to  be  regD.r<~.ecl as  a  feasible  proposition for  some  forms 
of  livestocl'~,  particularly dairy covrs.  In this context,  these  anir.1.'1-ls  heve 
a,n  obvious  adva1rta.[Ze  in that the dairy CO\l  is a  prod1.Jcer  of monthly revenue 
and payments  u:1der  tho  lease  can be  related to the  incmne  produced. durine -the 
lact_ati  on I>eriod  of  the  c 0"\·T.  Houever,  the  maj ori  t.y  of  leasing arrangements 
cone ern D<1chinery. of  one  1-.:.ind  or another. - 147-
'.fhe  i tern  (be it a  machine  or an anim[;.l)  ;Till be  prtrchased by  -~he  finance 
company  from the  fc--rL1er' s·  O'W!l  su:pplier  n,nd  leased to the farner for an 
agreed period  ( S['..y,  three to five years).  The  first rental is  payf~ble  i:a 
advence  and the  remainder usuu.lly monthly,  sorl1etimes  quarterly.  It is usual 
also to quote  ·the  rental per £1 ,000.  7ho  finonce  company  air.1s  -'c,o  obtain the 
sn.ne  rn.te  of return as  on <1l·t.ernative  11n.ys  of  provicling finance.  'rhe  full 
ar.lOUJlt  that is p0..yr..,ble  in rent is en allo1-.rable  expense  a~2.ins-t the farmer's 
taxable  income,  but he  can only benefi-t  from this if he  in fact pays tax. 
J.Ioreover,  the hit,her the  rr"-te  of tax -the  fermer  pays,  the  more  he  1-Ti 11 
benefit.  For ·this  reason,  leasing tends to be  more  advantageous  to the big 
e.nd  veal""tihy  farr:1er  than ·t.o  the  smaller farmers.  'J:he  finance house  (as 
O";mer)  benefi-ts from  any free  deprecip/c,ion facilities avcdlable,  bu-t,  in t.he 
final an,'l.lysis  these tax allo-v:ances  are in effect passed  on t,o  the far8er in 
the  for~ of  reduced rentals. 
The  period of ·the  lense is usually three years,  bu·t for  combines it may  be 
as  long as four  or five years and the total of all  rent~ls payable under  the 
lease vrill reflect the capital cos·t  of the  item,  less the taxation advantages 
ecdnecl  by the  finance  house,  plus  an interest element.  At  the  end of the 
primc.ry period of -the -lease,  where  machinery is involved,  the  farmer 1·rill have 
the  option of  contrinuing to rent ·the  machine  for  a  further period,  in return 
for a  srr,all nornnal rental  {r..  'continuation rental', vhich may  amount  to !  per 
cent.  of tho_cost price  of ·the  machine,  payable  arulue,lly·in e.dvance)o  'l
1he 
1  farmer  may  continue  on this basis for  a  further  two years.  AlJverna:ti  vely, 
at the  end  of  -the  lease,  the  machine  may  be  sold secondhand and the net proceeds 
2  from the  sale 1Till be  credited to the  farmer  either as  a  refund of re1rlials 
or as  the initial rental  on  e,  further lease. 
1 
2 
The  life of  a  combine  is seven or eight years,  but  on average  a  farli.1cr  1voulcl 
not keep it for more  than five years. 
The  IJ..nance  house 1·rould not usually credit the whole  of the net proceeds  of the 
sale,  but probably abou·t  90 per cer..t.  This  may  be  done  to  ensure that the tax 
authorities 1vill in-terpret the transaction as  a  eenuine  lensing arrangement and 
not in effect  as  a  hire purchase transaction. - 148-
obto,in the use  (say)  of  eg_uipr.1cnt  by c O!iJni t-ting in the first instance  (say) 
1/36 of the  cost price  of  u  piece  of  expensive  equipHent.  Thereafter, 
rentals are  pr~id each month  ancl  can be  set off against profits as these  nrc 
earned.  It is a  system of financing  tha,.~ti  is therefore  of great assistance 
to n  farmer lTi th a  liquidity problem.  Alternatively,  so it is areued,  the 
fe.rx:wr  need not  reduce the  e,LJom1.t  of lWrh:ing  capital e,vailable by expending 
a  large  amount  on  purc~'"l.sinc  a  machine,  or put  tine dm·rn  a  sizeable  deposi-t, 
on an  expensive  piece  of  equipmen-t.  .1\:ny  cash resources  the  farmer  may  have 
available,  or such bnnk overdraft facilities as  may  remain unused,  could 
then be  enployed,  for  ex8-mple,  in buyin[!.  livestock u.nd  opera  tine more 
intensively,  or in ii:Jp:roving  the  land and buildinr;s,  or both.  In addition, 
if the farmer has  liquid resources available,  he  is able to  obtain sizeable 
cliscount.s  from his  suppliers  (  1rhether they be  merchants  or dealers).  It 
could also be  argued that leasing encourages  earlier and more  regular re-
plncer:Ient  of  out1-rorn  or  obsolete m2-chinery,  ,.;ith a  reduction in maintenance 
costs,  i·rhich  of  course still have  -t,o  be  met  by the farmer  under  a  leasing 
c:trl"anser.lcn-t.  Fur-thermore,  machinery  can be  installed llhen it is J;equired; 
it is not necessc.ry first to accumulate  ·&he  cash whe-ther for an outright 
purchn,se  or a  deposit.  An  additional point that is  sometimes  made  is that 
'continued inflation should make  rentals easier to pay and outright purchase 
more  difficult  1 ,  but inflation ahvays  tends to favour the debtor,  however he 
rnay  raise his money. 
The  basic  argument  in favour  of leasing is the  extent to which it can assist 
a  farmer '"i  th a  liquidi·liy probleme  By resorting to leas  in~,  ·t,he  fa.rmer 
pro_vides  himself ,.,ith ,.;orking capital aclcli tions,l to 1;hat is available  (say) 
froci his  bfull~.  He  also pays as he  goes  and. cloes  no-~ have  ·co  find a  lump 
sum  to finance  a particular ca,pi tal investmen-t e  Again,  if leasing is  regard.ecl 
as  jus·t another form  of financing,  it is a  question of vhat is most appropriate - 149-
i11  particulur circwastauces;  it. is llil1Tisc  ·0o  resort -too  hef'..vil~-- to  baiii.·~ 
over(traft (it  n.l~·rays  pays  -~o  keep  some  margin availet,blc,  if Oilly to cover 
contingencies);  i21  addition,  both the cost and the ave,ilo.bili  ty of  CJ,  banl: 
overdraft  llk'=LY  vary from  time to time,  'H'hereas  leasing rates  E  ... re fixed  from 
the  outset and the period of the  lease "Till be  sui·Lably geared to the 1v-or!.\.ing 
life of the  equipraent,  so that it beco1:1es  a.  self-liquidating commitment; 
again,  resorting to merchD.nt  credit,  ,.,hich  may  be  ·the  alternative,  tends  to 
be  expensive  - but  so,  too,  are ·the  severr..l  forms  of assistance  from  a 
•  finance house.  Basic['l.lly, it corues  back to cash flow·  and,  in some  circum-
stances,  a  resort to leasing  r1ay  have  sor.w  advantar;es  in this contexto  Also, 
altb.ouch  more  expensive  thc.n  bar.U:'\:  finv,nce,  leasin.~  (£!.nd  oJvher  forms  of 
financial assistance)  can usefully contribute to the solution of  a  farmer's 
financial problP-ms  by providing additional sources  of finance.  The  baru~s 
provide the basic financial services.  Finance houses  (and others)  offer 
addi-'tiional assistc,ilce that,  o.t  the margin,  may  moJ:e  all the difference bet,ween 
under"'vaking  a  profitable enterprise or having to a.banclon it altogether. 
At  the  sarae  time,  it nms·b  be  remembered that it is al\.rays  difficult to  mal~e 
comparisons,  especially on -t,he  basis  of siraplificd cssumptions.  For  exanple, 
some  leasing contrac·bs  P  ... llo1v for residual value to be built into the  lease 
1-rhen  calculating  interes-~;  others  p~ss the residual value back to the 
farmers.  In some  cases,  payments are monthly,  in o-'vhers  qua,rterly both for 
leasing  and hire purchase contracts.  It also  depenc1.s  on levels  of interest 
rates and charees;  in addition,  there is the  incidence  of  income tax to 
consider.  Indeed,  the necessary calculations are often so complicated ·(,hat 
the  farmer is well advised to consult with his acconntant before  cOliuaitting 
hin~elf to  an~~hingo - 150-
since  only efficient une  of  eq_uipwent  gcnerntcs profit' •
1 
This  may  '\·Tell 
be true,  but.  -there  is  n.  sense in "\Jhich  the  mrnorshi~-;> of  equipr:wnt  may  be 
sa.id to be  of vulue  ·bo  o..  fal'JJ1er.  "in1en  he  is borrOi;rinG,  potentio..l  lenclers 
,vill tend to  lis·t-.,  his assets  D.s  a  me2.ns  of  es·ba.hlishing his decree  of 
crec1itvorthiness. 
1.L'llis  is  li}cely ·to  be  J?8.rticula.rly important for  a 
tenant fo.rmer.  On  the  other h<>,nd,  becc~use of tax considerations,  leas  ill[; 
will tencl to be  more  advcntaBoous  ·to  the  bic~er and lrealthier ft!,rr:1el"s,  '\vho 
would  in f.>.-ny  case be  reearcled as  creclitvor-bhy.  i'his  e.lso  sa:bisfies another 
of ·the  conditions  of  leasinG  comp2,:::'d.cs  - ·they ·tend  Jlio  be  more  selective in 
lee,sinc;  thn.n in hire ptu·chase  fin.c:1.ncc  and,  if it is the "\Jeal·bhier  farn;;  ... ·s 
who  usc it rJost,  the  leasing  coLl:pc.~·lies  1-rill have  no vorries  on this  score. 
On  the  side  of the  supplier of  leasinG se:rvicos,  too,  it is said by  some 
companies  tha:t the  r.,clministrative  costs are hir;h,  bv:t  the  au-'c.hor  ~-rould be 
surprised if they '\·Tere  sienifica.ntly different from  al-ternn:~ives  lil\.e hire 
purch.ase  or  con-trcct hire. 
The  l1i.lk  1-~rketing Board provides  credit to milk producers  through their 
2 
bulk vat  loan scheme.  In this case,  the  source  of credit is provided by bank 
lending through the Board's  normal  overdraft facilities. 
Under this Scheme,  loans are  made  to milk producers  up to  100 per cent.  of 
tho initial purchase price  of their farm vats,  repayment to be  made  over  a  period 
of three years  by deduction from the  monthly milk cheque  in equal  instalments 
covering both  capital and interest.  The  rate  of  interest·charged is 1  per cent. 
over bank  Ease  P-ate  and is not varied after the  loan  has  been  made.  This  rate 
is then applied to ·the  reducing balance  of  the  loan. 
1.  S:e,  for  example,  Accountancy Ar;e,  18  September,  1970o 
2.  The  incentive to the producer to install a  bullt vat is the  labour he  saves 
through not having to handle  churns  (labour that can be utilised more 
·productively to run ad.ditional  cows).  There  are also  premiums  paid for bulk 
milk and these are  on a  scale with higher  premiums  for  smaller tanks  to 
provide the  maximum  incentive to smaller producers  1to go bulk'.  The  smallest 
producers  receive in adcli tion a  'fixed rate'  premium per  month  '\-Thich  varies with 
the  size  of their vat. - 151-
The  amounts  outstanding as  loans  tmder  -this  head as at year  ending 
31  l-.iarch  h._q,ve  grown  from £1.423  million in 1968,  £2.443  million in 1971, 
£3.537 million in 1972  to £4.602  million· in 1973.  The  amount  outstanding at 
l~rch 1974  was  £5.104 million. 
'fith effect from  1  October  1974,  an alternative  scheme  has  been 
available to producers  converting  from  churn to bulk collection whereby vats 
may  be rented from the  Board.  For the first three years  of  lease,  the  monthly 
rented payments  remain constant and are based  on  the  initial cost of  the  vat.; 
thereafter a  nominal  rental  of  £1  per month  is charged. 
The  scheme  is  partially financed by  a  FEOGA  grant  of £850,000 "\vhich  is 
available to the  Board  over  a  five year period cornmencing  in June  1974.  The 
terms  of the grant  stipulate that the Board must  own  the vats;otherwise 
assistance  from  FEOGA  would  not  be  available. 
The  Board is presently committed to  a  Bulk Development  Programme  in w·hich 
it hoped to achieve  100  per cent.  bulk collection of  milk from  farms  in England 
and \{ales  by 1978.  By  July i974,  76  per cento  of  the  milk sold off farms  in 
England  and ''lales was  collected in bulk but this. embraced  only  50  per cent.  of 
milk producing farmso 
Note  - Tables A and B in Appendix  C have  been prepared in order,  on the  one 
hand,  to summarise  chronologically the total amount  of credit granted by 
the  banks  (short  and  medium  term)  and  deriving from the  AMC  and  SASC  (long term) 
and,  on  the  other,  to list the rates  of  interest that have  been chargedfrom 
time to time  by the banks,  the ANC  and the  S.ASC  over the  past  10 years. - 152-
I:a  this chapter,  \?O  'd  11  c-.t-bCJilpt  to discuss  soiT.!C  of ·the  external 
variables that may  have  influenced the  a"\Eri.lcbility  of  credi·b to acricul  ture. 
'.rhis vrill  be  n;l::.tcJ:Jpted  under  t·uo  hea.cls:  ( i) eencral  ec anomie  policy,  where 
the  discussion 'dll i:aclude  references  ·to  budgetn,ry and fiscal policy1  (the 
relevant  in[:'redien-bs  of credit policy have  alreacl.y been outlined at pp.  51-58); 
and  (ii) reGional policy,  '\Ihere  atte:;.1tion '\>lill  be given to the facilities 
provided by specialis-t inst,i  tutions  in. this field  (to  a  certain ex·t,ent  grants 
might also be  considered relevarr--b  under  -~his  head,  e.g.  ·to  the extent that tl1ey 
assist hill farraing'  \·Thich  is  I rcciono,lised  I  :i.n  Scotland and  \Io.les  0  Grants  ,  ..  ~ere 
discussed  i:a  Che.pter  3). 
So  far  ~.s  burlgetary and fisca,l  policy is concerned - and these  emphases 
,;ere  freq_uently reflected also in monetary and credit policy - '\'Te  can begin "7i-th 
the projection into the  post-'\·mr years  of the  cheap money  policies  of the  1930s 
and the period of \lorld \Tar  lie  Under· these circumstances,  ·the  post-1var 
ern.  of full  employment  predic·l:iably  p:r.·otluced  ini'le,tiona.ry pressures.  Then,  ~-ft.er 
1951,  there \·ras  a  return to  -the  'new  orthodoxy'  ('uith the revival  of an p,ctive 
Banl~ ra:lic  policy and  more  res·bricted credit).  This  o.lso  creP  .. ted problems, 
pn.rtly because  of  structural changes  in -t.he  British economy - several of the 
staple industries \vere  no,.,  seen to be greatly antiquated - and in the direction 
of world trade,  1-rith related changes  in the role  of sterling;  and partly 
because  of  r:aodifications to  do1~1estic institutions and their place in the  money 
and capital markets  (the  relative decline in the  importance  of the clearinc banks 
whic.h  1vere  subject to restrictions and the  r.1Ushrooming  of  :finance house  businP.ss 
and  secondary barildng,  1orhich  for  a  long time  1-Tas  largely unregula  t'ed).  In 
addition,  the authorities did not  ah.rc.ys  seem -'vo  appreciate the intimate nexus 
1.  For the earlier period,  the discussion is bused  on J.S.G. \Tilson:  111-lonetary 
Policy in the  1960s"  in  l·ionet~.try Policy an(l the Dcvelonment  of Lonev  L:::.r}~.ets, 
London,  1966  <:'.nd,  from  196'(  /68  omvartis,  the  11Anr.m.al  r·lcnetary Surveys"  in ·the 
hi.dland Ban.1:  l1l~vieiv.  11A  Calendar  of  EconoL'1ic  Events"  fro41  1968  om;ards  has 
been  extrv,ctcG.  from  J.~conoc-Jic  'l'rends  and.  is  i -acluc1ed  in Appendix B. _153_
betveen ntorreterry poliey ancl fiseal ac'oion.
Ii  is 'biie autirorts belief trrai, tue <lefini'bion of r.lolc,'bz:r'-s'polic.y
rnigh'o be ext,errd.ed. to iacluC.e a:ry act,ion conceraecl to influcnce'bhe volutte
and. charact,er of the flows of f,roney a,r:.<l money substi'butes throughoub tbe
econorny. fn fact' this would. embrace nuch of fiscal policy also and. tne
d.istinction betn'een noret,ary policy ancl fisce,l policy is r,racie prirnarily to
emphasise the importance of providing a,n appropria'be fiscal  errviroruaenii,
vhereby the irrrpact of nouetary measure$ is reirrforcecl by consistent ancl
porerful fiscal action.  fnad.d.ition, the direct external effects of monetary
policy (o, clistinct from fiscaiL poli5r) are unlikely to be very obvious.
Fronn the point of viev botie of external ancl internal consid.eta''o|ons, it  is
the state of the d.or:restic econorry tba,t,roatters nos'b. Ind.eed., this is  liire1-w
to be especially true, rshere'uhe countrX' concerneci rras still  responsible
as tbe United. I(ingcLom was in the earlier post-r.rar yea.rs - for one of the
norld.ts more iruportant currellcies. ft  is the vier.r of the author that if  the
authorities  tahe aclecluate  care to ensure that the rl.omestic  econorqr is healthy,
there'rrilL be litt1e  need. to woruy greatly about the external si'buation. For
t^bis re&son, it  is aBproprid,te to concen'brate mainl.y on the d,omestic situation,
though it  is fulJ.y appreciated that in the I openr British econorry the internal
aud. exterru,L impacts of policy are in fact intimately inter-Telated and., ind.eecJ.,
insepaiable.
Throughout the post-var poriod., there vas nuch evirl.euce of rstop got
both on ttrd fisca} ancl. the nonetary fronts.  Periods of restriction and a'bternp'bs
at d.eflation tnncied to be followed by period.s of relative freedom, tbough the
trend. throughout  'bbe post-var period. was nithout d.oubt inflationary -  solretincs nore
so than at otherst it  was largely a ruatter of d.egree. Thus, there vas a period.
of- monetary freed.om iu the late 1950s end. a nunber of nev lerxling techniclues
werE introd.u"ud.1 fhere was also the periocl after the sharp f stopr of July 1961
L. See Hilson, .9pgc+.r pp. 86-87.- 154-
ard. frotn end-I962 up to e[rly 1964, r.'lr-'n grovth was favoured, though at
approxiraately 6 per cont. PoI .lDDurrt at s Level that was uulikely to be
sustained.. By Juaa L964, Lt not earlier, it  ves clear that the increase
in irrports was getting out of band. In 0ctober, there vas au election and
a new Socielist  Governnaut  carne into office.  Ii  faced the nocessity gratiu4lly
to restore the balance of lnynents to equilibriun enat it  alrtenpteal '1ro acbieve
this by bud6etary d.iscipline, deflatiou, and a series of cledit ceililgs  over
bank le[iling (beginning end-1964). It  sougbt to leinforce those golicies by
tentatively uoving iu ttre direction of o long-tern progralme  basecl .on the
ba,Ianced.grorrbhoftboecorroryvithinthefraraeworlrofonotion&Ipolicyfor
prices ard. inconos relatetl to proituctivity.  It  is a I'orog a'nd tlisappointing
Itory,  uot the prices anil inccmes BoLicy faile<I la'rgely because of its
non-acceptance by a sufficientty broait spectrua of the public '
Urartoubtetllys one of tbe nain rlifficulties  tas that on every occasion
thattbeeconon|rbegantoboon,tberecaneopointtbergtboauthoritiosfelt
conrpelled - because of the state of the exterrel bo'latrce - to go slow an'l -bhe
1
boon ra,s killett before it  c oulil get out of br!d.  It  ha's been suggesto'I that
policy poiil too little  atten{ion to tbe epeeil .of the cyclical upsving euil thst
ths b-asic renoqy for the rstopt lay la coatrol of t'hs rgo!'  It  bas long been
recognizerl by cortain econonistg thot tbe cseils of tecesgion ars to be founil i!.
tbe. ?teceilitrg  boom &nal it  canlot be alelied that dtha  rapitl state of axpansion there
is likely to bo an eerlier g!(l more suililea rstopr - for tbe obvious reason tbat
there is less tirm to rnake the recessary ailJustnanis ("€.rby  transferring labour -
or capitel - fron sectors of relaiive plenty to those vbere f,actors are scarcs)
antlr with a less flexible econon[zr tbe probability that energing bottlenecks vi]l
slon d.onu tbe rate of growth in econonlc activity becones so nucb greoter.  It
l.  ily tr"ran5 Brechling e,nd J.l{. 'ilolf e, "The iind. of S'bop-Gott r Llovcls. B.?r4r-.&eIi-9jllr
Jtnuary 1965r PP. 23 ff.-  TDD -
rriust be:}eely c,dr:riitecl., 'boor th.att, trocrrils \.rere rrot infreq.rrently  exa.cerbn.'bet'.
by the proxinrity of an election and. the des:Lre to go 'bo 'bire country o;r the
basis of  ecouomie expansion. \'Iloatever panty won at the polls  theu hacl 'bo
face reali'by ancl the rs'bopt almost inevitably'fo1lor.retl.  Dut'ing periocls of
expansion, agriculture st,oocl to gain r,ri'r;,h the rest  of the economy; d.urin6;
period.s of cl.efLntion, vhile  it.  reniairred. a priority  sector (o"  an import saver),
there can be li'btle  d.oubt -i;hat a.gricul-bure, rrioo, had some d.iff5.culty in
ohtaining access to g11 the funcls required..
The first  full  Socialis-b bud.get was in April  1965, 0rr the who1e, it
received. a favourable jud.gleurerrt: based. on i'bs contribu-bion  -bo restoring
tbalancer in the economy. The nost j.nurecl-iate  problem r.ras the r.reah balarrce of
payments culnina.ting irr a deficit  of &745 riiillioir  for  Lg64. Ihe objective ii.r
1965 rsas to go rnost of the r.ray tove"rds closing tire gap ...  and. to cornplete'bhe
process in  1966t.  But ins'bead. of preserving solve,rcy (""  in the past decad.e)
ronly by period.ic bouts of cleflation r,rhieh invned.iately  red.ucecl imports, but also
sappecl 'ohe confid.ence of 'nanagement  a,ud. labour at  home and. we&liened. our
industrial  poi/er  there vas now to be a change of d.irect,iou.
For one thiirg,  the CbanceLlor of the rixchequer had. beg.r::e his  conprehens.itu
revierr of the tax structure and. pronised. that  tbis  would. contj-nue oyer a perio<i.
of years.  Tax ref orm had been in  the air  f or a nunrber of years &nd it  '.ras badly
-needecl. It  onlf  requirecl the advent of a governnent vith  sufficient  political
courage to  ensure that  already existing proposals be actively  considered. ond at
least some of thero implemented.. This is  not the place to discuss in  detail  the
several ingreclients of tax reforn tirat r,rere put in  hand. and., in  particular,  the
precise effects of the capital  gains and corporation taxes.  lihat is  importcunt
is  that reform and experineat hatt been attempted..
Iress can be said. about the ,Socialist Goverr:tre.utrs attempts at
introduciug an Econor,ric Plan.  These \rere scarcely better thaa those favoured bf
their  preaecerro"r.l  'rfhat clid the Chencellor propose to  d.o in the short run?
1.  tiee HiLson, pp. 9B-99.- 156-
First,  -there  '\vas  the  a-ttempt to shift the  emphasis  in tax arrangements 
such that oversea.s  investment was  no  lon~~er e,s  highly favoured ns  formerly. 
Second,  certain changes  were  made  in exchange  co::1trol,  \vi th the  intention 
of  increasing foreign  excha.r:ge  revenues  in various vmys.  'rhird,  arra.nger:Ie:i!.-0s 
,.;rere  propos eel  -tha·b  1-rould  reinforce  the official reserves by channelling into 
thom  some  of the proceeds  of the  large accumuln.tion  of  por-~folio assets in 
private hands  when  -these  \'Tere  sold.  Pourth,  by cutting 1·rhat  ·Here  regardGd 
as  expe~.1dable defence  projects,  real resources  (and especially skilled manpover) 
1rere  to  be  made  G..vailable  for  -the  manufacture  of  exports.  Pinally,  and  in  s1:~pport 
of the hoped-for £100 million a  year reduction in the net  outflow of capital,  the 
budge-t 1·ras  calcul[~ted by  a  :1ice  blend of  ~  ... ddi  tional direct and indirect to..xes 
'-to· decrease  the  pressure  on  our  resources  throuch  lm  .. ?er  public  expenditure 
and higher taxation by £250 million'.  But,  in the last analysis,  success vould 
still depend  on the  creation of  'a ne\·T  ava.reness  among  manufacturers  of vrhat 
needs  to be  done'  i!.lld  the vic·t,ory  over inertia vp.s  lih:.ely to be  less easy to 1dn. 
Yet despite all the Government's  efforts,  progress  towards  a  more  balanced 
economy  remained painfully slm.:  and,  in July 1965,  further steps were  taken to 
cut back on  dor:1estic  demand.  The  emphasis 1vas  nmv  on heavy cuts  in public  r~nd 
priva-te  expenditure at home  "\•Ti th a  vie"\-T  to strengthening the balance  of  p~.ynents. 
'l'hus,  there 1vas· to  be  a  slm,.dmm in G()l'rernment  and  local authority buildine 
progremmes.  So  far as  housing,  schools  and hospitals 1.;ere  concerned,  there ·uas 
to be  no  further  ex:p::u1sion  beyond what  "\·Tas  a.lreP  ... dy  included in the  prograLlDe. 
Various  social improvements  that had been planned were  postponed,  such as the 
income  gU£  .. rantee  scheme  and the  scheme  to provide specially fa-. curable interest 
rates for housebuyers.  Cuts  in defence  expenditure were  confirmed.  The  rr~xiuum 
period for repaying hire  purchase  debts  '\'Tas  reduced from three years to  30  months. 
On  the  external front,  there '\'Tas  a  tightening of exchange  controls  e.nd  new 
measures to  recluce  the  finance  available for  it'!lports.  This  was  reinforced by a - 157-
must  have  the  hi~hest priority Etnd  the  gro1rth  of  imports  mus-L  be  restrained. 
In e..ddi tion,  measures 1vere  agreed 1vi th the banks  to  cheP~pen export crcdi  t  a1~C. 
to make it more  plentiful.  ]'or exaw:plc,  1-1hen  thr:J  ECGD  :facility 1<T8,s  a va.i ln.bl e, 
short-term finance  for  exports lras  to be  r.;ranted at Banlt rate inste".d of  1  per 
cent.  above. 
In brief,  the  objective remained the  sar..te  -to cut a"ay excess  domestic 
dema.ncl,  particularly in the  construction industries,  and to re-deploy the 
labour  saved such tha.t the  export industries  could  expand further  ancl  faster. 
£he  Government  was  still attempting to avoid  a  1 s·top'  and  the  emphr,sis  \v&-s 
rather  on  'disinflation'  rather than deflation. 
This continued to  be  the basis  of the Socialist Government's  budgcta.ry 
policy until tm,rarcls  the  end  of their period of  office.  'l'hus,  by 1963,  after 
minimal  rates  of  economic  grmvth ;n 1966  and.  1967 and the devaluation of  sterlin~~ 
to $2.40 in November  1967,  carne  the  most  severe budget  since 1"/orld  Vn.r  II, 
'\-tith  a  vie~; to curbing the  der.and  on domestic  resources.  The  budget,  ,.rhich vas 
presented  on Harch 19,  1968,  was  preceded by the rieid ceiling placed  on banl: 
advances  and the hire purchase restrictions in Hovcmber  and, in January 1968, by 
cut-bacl:s  in planned Govern.ment  expenditure.  In introducing his budget,  the 
Chane ell  or insisted the.  t  the country  1 must  have  a  stiff Budget  follm-red  by "tlro 
years  of hard s·log  1  and his proposals,  which  included the introduction of  a 
firm prices and  incomes  policy,  1-rere  1 seyere  1 •  He  suggested that the  econo;ny 
could be  expected to  grow at a  rate  of at least 3  per cent.  per annum in the 
18-month period from the  second half  of  1967  to  the first half of 1969,  despite 
a cut-back in the  expected level of  private consumption of about  2  per cent.  per 
annum  as  a.  result of the budget proposals;  if export  performance -,-rere  good,  a 
rate of 4  per cent.  was  'within the  ranee  of possibilities'. 
Despite high hopes  of  ittprovement based  on the anticipated combined 
effects  of  the devz..luation  of  sterling,  the most  severe  budget  since the lhn·,  end - 158-
o,  srwc essi  on  of  other measures,  the  :follolli!J.g fiscal yon.r  (to  J~ pri  1  1969) 
,.,as  !:lOst  c1isft.ppointin~.  The  current account deficit for the  calendar year 
1968 1·1as  the largest ever recorded  ~u1d further  external support for  sterling 
vas  required..  Some  pro~:ress ·t,ovards  surplus ·was  achieved,  but it was  uneven 
and slower than had been n.nticipe:ted.  In particular,  exports  expanded well,  assisted 
by  n.  fairly rapid rise in "tvorld  ·l.;rade,  but  irJports  rema.ined  obstinately at a 
hic;h  level.  Other favourable  developraents  ·uere  a  subst2..ntial  measure  of 
economic  growth '·ri th the  level  of  employment  being well maintained f'.,nd  ( to1vards 
the  e11.d  of  1968)  a  war1r:ed  upturn in industrial investment.  But  the  externa..t 
situation ::remained the  paramow"l-0  c 011sidern. tion  and for -this reason it vas 
necessary to  maintE~  .. in interest rates at exceptionally hi[;h  levels,  progressively 
-to  tighte:a credit controls,  and  in these and  other vays  to re-inforce  the  severe 
restraints  inposed at the  -bilne  of  devaluation and again in the  1968 budget. 
As  a  result of the  1968  budget,  pressures  on liquidity built up tmrards 
tho  end  of  the financial year  1968/69.  Import  deposits, hi&~er purcha,se  tax and 
excise  duty  paYL"1ents,  the  special charge  on  investment  incomes,  fllld  increased 
ra-tes  of  corporation tax and  selective  employment tax ell contributed to  a  sho,rp 
rise in G6vernment  revenue.  The  main purpose  of ·the  1969 budget,  in the ,.,ords 
of  the  Ci1nucellor,  was  to  c o~.1tinue  the balance  of  payments  i.IUprover.lent,  but to 
do  so in  v..  WD,y  'compatible with the  maintcnencc  of  economic  c;rmvth  a.nd  the 
requirements  of  social justice  1 •  The  squeeze  on c onslli11ption 1·ras  to be  co::.r~inuea. 
and  ·l:ihe  various proposals were  estimated to brin.g  an overall surplus  on the 
Exchequer  accom1ts  of  more  than  .:£800  r.1illion for the current financial year. 
The  ou-tcoue  for  1968/69 '"as  a  surplus  of  £337  million,  r,llm-;ring net  repaymml.JG  oi' 
.£237  Htillion  of Government  debt  in addition to a  reduction of  £50 million in ·bhe 
stcrliag capital  of  the Exchange  ~qualisa-tion Account. 
By fiscal year 1969/70,  the  clevaluation of sterling in november  196'/ 
and the  exceptiollally severe 1.:1onctary  ancl  fiscal restraints  ir.1posed  subsequently 
to  restore the  external situation at las-t  be[;an to bear fruit.  rl'he  princi113.l - 159-
objective  oi'  policy re:r:1aiue<l  the  improvcn~ent i:a Britain's  exterl\8,1  situati  o~:. 
To  this end,  the various fiscal  o..r..d  L10n.etr;ry  r0s·traints  O.t:l  don!estic  dernand  \:c:rE} 
maintained and the  economy  gre'\-T  only slo·vly.  As  had been  intended.,  the  ll'..a,in 
element  of  expa1:sion w·as  provided by  exports,  vh.ich  rose by 9  per cent.  in 
volw11e  ago,inst an increase  of  only It per  ce:ri:i.  in imports.  Consur!lers' 
expendi  turc in real  -terms  1-ras  only about t  per  c·ent.  higher in 1969  thail in 
1968  r..nd  public  expe;:Hliture fell by more  thail 2  per cent.  Priva·be  fixed 
investment,  hovrever,  rose by  4  per cent.  a,ncl  sor.1e  stool~. building occurred. 
'I'he  ou-tcome  1·ras  that industrial productio:n rose  only hesitantly a.IJd  the  increase 
in gross  doE1estic  produc-t  barely exceeded  2  per  ce:at.  a.3'ainst  over  3  per  cen-t. 
in 1968.  U:acmploynent  re1.12.ined  broadly at the  same  level as  in 1968;  the  avcrLge 
proportion uucr.1ployed  in the  U:uited Kingd01n  1·m.s  2.4 per cento,  the  sane as  i:Ll 
the  previous year. 
Early in 1969/70,  the  Government  h2.d  given  some  exacting W.!.cler-taldn.zs 
to the Irrt.err!ationnl  Nonetary Fund  in connection with  f.,n  application for  a 
standby credit for  $1,.000  raillion required to reschedule  overseas  debt  repa;~nw::.:ts. 
Thus,  the  overall balance cit  pay1.1ents  surplus vas  to be  set at £300 million for  the 
financiE:.l year  1969/70;  'dor.;estic  credi·~ expansion'  '\lo..s  to be  limited to £4..00 
r.1illion iu ·hhe  same  period.  'l
1his 1vas  lar[.ely o.chi eved,  but monetary conditions 
1rere  unusually stringent and interest ra·tes  F  ... t  times  reached exceptionally hir;h 
levels;  liquidity pressures  on the private sector,  incluclinr;  the banks, 
intensified.  A~riculture,  like  every-thine  else,  '\vas  affected.  Costs  of borrovin3 
were high and  raany  farmers  experienced cash flmr problems. 
D~spi  te the  craergenc e  of  a  surplus  on the balc:.nc e  of  payments  durii"-&  the 
second half  of 1969,  the various restraints vere  lfl.rEely  m~dntainecl in orcler to 
consolidate the  iraprovement.  Nevertheless,  there 1-12,s  some  evidence  of  rel;;vX8. tio:;J. 
Al~ough ·t.he  import  deposits scheme  was  renewed  in December  1969 for  a  further yen.:r 
the rate '\·Tus  then reduced from  50 to  40  per cent.,  and  a~ain to  30  per  cent.  LS 
from  J.hy  1,  1970.  'fhe  process  of  'gentle relaxation'  1-ms  continued in the ht.dJet 
introduced on .April  14,  1970.  'l'he  Chancellor felt it  1 right -to  t:;ive  a  I:iOclera·lie - 160-
stimulus  -to  the  eco:noqy,  but to spread ·this  0e-t:.vcen  Donetary ancl  fiscal 
measures'.  B2.!1.k  rate v.ras  -r.educed  by a  fur·ther  ~- per cent.  to 7  per cent  .•  E>.nd 
a  gradual rise in controlled bank  lendinr;  up to  5  por  cent.  in the year to l·;l:-.rch 
1971 1·ras  envisaged,  though special deposits ·uere  increased.  Fiscal reliefs 
amounting in tot~l to nee.rly  /~180 million in 19'/0tll o..nd  £220 million in a  full 
year 1·rcre  ari.llOUllcecl  so  as  to  s;,eecl  t.he  prospective  re!:be  of  grow·th  of the  Hco:1or:ry 
fran  3  ·to  3~ per cen·t.  be-t,.vccn  the first halves  of  1970  and  19~{1.  The  Chc..llcellor 
emphasis  eel  ·that he ·vas  not maldng  any general  relf!,XH.tioi.l  of credit;  he 1>ras 
sceptical of the  view· that cowpany  liquicl.i-ty ""as  'e~cessively lo·w',  but  in the 
in·berests  of  investment he  '\vas  anxious  ·i:,o  avoid  'an excessive  stri::.1gency  of 
res-'Graint'.  He  1mrned that  1 incomes  cannot for  long continue  t.o  rise at their 
present rate  1  '\vi"'vlwut  endangering  s·tabili  ty.  Some  months  before the  endins;: 
of the Goverment's  statutory control of  incomes  at the  beginnin::;  of  1970,  it 
"\va.s  becor::ing  evident that  sot~e  'lvE-[e  se·~tlement.s ·\'rere  exceeding the ceiliur, 
for  aDl1w~l increases  of  3t· per cent.  {.Tar;c  and  sala.~y earnings  per  employee  i:a 
the  second half  of  1969 were  about  8  per cent. hisher -than in the  correspo:1dinr, 
period a  year  earlier.  On  the  other hand,  productivity probably rose at a 
slovrer rate in 1969.  -A  1rhi  te Paper  on Frod.uctivity Prices  and Incomes  Policy after 
1969  (Crand.  4237),  published in December  1969, sugcested a  'norm'  of  2~ to 4t per 
cent.,  but subsequent vage  claims and settler.aents were  substantially in excess 
o:f  this range.  'l'his  development  represented a  w.ajor threat to the  continued 
success  of  the lrhole  post-devaluation strategy f'or  r.1anagement  of ·hhe  econor:.1y  e.nd 
was  larGely responsible for the  'cautious'  budget •. 
Because  e,  strong balance  of  paynents  position had beenachieved by 1969, 
the  external situation ceased to be  the  dominant consideration in the  applice..tio:u 
of d.9mestic  policies.  Indeed,  by  19'{0,  the total imrr,rd currency flow '\Tas  about 
£1;300  tnillion  com:x~recl vith a.bout  £750 nillion in 1969.  l:ost  of this  in<provenen·c 
1ras  <iue  to investment  e,ud  other capital movements; nevertheless,  the  surplus  on 
the current account  of the  balance  of  pe:.:·rments  a.lso  increcsed by  some  &200  r:1illion, 
though  r;lainly  becf~use of a rnarl:ed  improveuent  in  the  ·terms  of  tro,de  in the Uni·ted - 161-
I~ingdom'  s  fc.vour.  'l
1he substnntinl curro~:cy i:aflo1;rs,  ":.;rhich  lrcro  especi0,lly 
pronounced late in 1970 and  in the  ca,rly mon·ths  of.  •j 971,  \vere  not  en-tirel~r 
vclcome.  '£hey  ~-rere  the  counterp::;:,rt.  of  t1assi  ve  outflm·rs  of  sho1~·t-term :funds 
from  ·t.he  U1;.i ted States,  a.ttrac·bed by hir.;her  levels  of  int,erest rates in the 
United Kingdom and  else1vhcre,  anil  follm-rin~; successive reductions in other 
centres  Banl{  rate  ~·ras  even-tually lmrered by a  full point  on April 1,  19'71, 
hc.,vint;  been held at 7  per cent. for  over  a  year.  A  particularly 1-relco:I10 
outcome  of  -'uhe  balance  of  paymen-ts  si  tli<-1.-'c.i on "as ·the  rcpC~,yment,  by end-Larch 
19'"{1,  of  e.ll  outstanding short-terrJ v.,nd  rlwdi ru.:.-·C,erm  deb-t  \•rhi ;h had previously 
been incurred. in support  of  sterling,  except for  £683  raillion still owing  ·t,o 
the  International  Honetary J.i'und. 
The  main ca,uses  of disquiet in -'c,hc  fiscal year 19'70/71 '"ere  -~o  be 
found not in external developments  but in the  slm·T  growth  of the domestic 
economy,  on the  one  band,  and the acceleratinr; ra/te  of  11age  end  price infl"  .. tio:n 
on the  other.  In real teriJlS,  output  rose by less than 2  per  cen-~.  in 1910, 
that is even  more  slm-;ly -than in 1969,  but by contras-h vi-'c,h  -the  previous year 
the main  expansionary impetus  came  from  co:..1stt.'11ers 1  expcndi  ture ra-ther then 
expor-~s and investment.  \lith  outpu·t gro1dng at ·a  slow·er rate than produc-tive 
potential,  unemployment  rose steadily throughout the year e,nd  in harch  1971  B.I\iOtU1:he~~­
to 3.3 per cent.  of ·the  labour force as  com:pa1~ed 'vith 2.7 per cen·t.  12  r.10:aths 
previously. 
The  reason lThy,  in these conditions,  more  expansionary policies "l·rere  not 
pursued vras  to be  found  in the disturbing and  n.ccclera:ting rate  of  incree-so 
in prices and  inco~es, at a  pace without parallel for  many years.·  In the first 
three quarters  of  1970 mte,il prices rose  by  over  5  per cent.  e,nd  by a  further 
5  per cent.  over the  follOi·Tine  six months,  ,.;hen vmge  rates  and earnings \·Tore 
rising even tlore  steeply"  By  1-~.rch 1971,  t.lte  index of basic '·rage  rates  ~ias  1~~ - 162-
per  ccr1.t.  hi~;her than a  ~'lear  before, reto,il prices  9  per  cen-t.,  ['j1J<l  ·vholesr.lc 
prices  2  per cent.  No  spec:i.i'ic  a:rru,ngGDents  dcsi[ned to c on·~rol increases  ir1 
prices  and  incoues  had been  in·broduced siuce stgtutory restre.ints  lapsed at 
tho  end  of 1969;  indeed,  the  new  Conscrvi-l,-bive  Goverr  .. mcn·b  which toolt office in 
mid-19'"{0  set its fc.ce  againE:-t  the  re-introduction of an  incomes  policy as  such, 
though it exerted pressure  on  e1:1ployers  in bo-bh  -the  pu.blic  and private  sec-tor~ 
to resist  bJE~tlli."ltly inflationary wage  cl8.-irns. 
\•lith  contaim'Jent  ancl  thea reduction of  cos·b  inflation taking first 
priority in oi'fic ial policy,  the  fe"'r  mee,sures  of  rela.xa-liion ·Here  modest  ancl 
mainly d.irectecl  tm·mrds  easing the  pressures  on  coEl}Xu::.y  liCJ.uiO.i ty,  in order 
to sustain the  level  of  investw:mt.  '.i
1he  offici['vl  leD<ling  guidelines  ·were 
relaxed 1n J.hrch  1970 to  perL1i t  an increase for  the  clearing banks  over the 
next  12  months  of  about.  5  per cent.;  the  e,ct.ual  increase ,.;as  somew'l1.a:0  smP~ller. 
Ho1vever,  fur·ther calls for special deposits were  mB,de  on them  in April and 
again in October.  During the year,  the  irnport  deposits  schezae  1-ras  phased  ou-~ 
and car:w  to  an  end in December  1970,  thouch  repfl,y!~en-t  of  sums  deposited before then 
remained  ~ubject to  a  6  r,lOnths'  delay.  In October  1970, it lTa,s  e,nnounced that 
the  level of  income  tax and corpora-tion tax v.rould  be  rc(1uced for  the financial 
year  1971/'"72  and,  vrhen the  nevr  bucleet vas  introduced in March  1971,  it we,s 
designed to  raise the rate of erowth of the  ecoc.omy to  about  3  per cent.  that 
is the  assumed  :rate  of  grow'c.h  of productive potential,  though this figure  va~ 
not  expected  -~o  be  achieved tuJ.til  -the first half of the  folloving year.  Once 
again,  the fiscal changes lrere  to  a  co~siderable clegree  directed to improvi:.1g 
.Jiihe  li<J.uidity of  the  corporate sector aad in indicc.ting that a  slightly faster 
rate  of  growth  of  barJt lendh1e "\·TOUld  be  permi  t-~ed the  Chancellor expressed  t:1.e 
ho:pe  t.h2,t  additional credit Yould be  channelled 1:1<:!-i:nly  to companies.  So  the 
year 19'{0/71  endecl  1-Ti th the prospect  of  a  some1.rhnt  faster rate of  gro"rth 
developing.  But in ii:tportant  respects the  outlooh:  remained uncertain,  if :1o.:L. 
disquietinr;,  notably as  regards  moveLlents  in costs  and  prices and the levels  of 
unemployment and  investment. - 163-
T1e f iscal year L97I/72 sav the iritro<iuction of Coilpe'bi'bio::r ai:-cL
L:rcdit Con1rol (see pp. 54-58), vhich involved. a conplete re-shaping of tire
uretbod.s of cred.it con-brol ancL tire irrbrod.uetion of a broatlly based rcserve
asset rcquirenienb:for the ban}ring S}'st,ern as a r.r}role' €is 1'Q11 aS,uhe
aband.orring of  rceiling;t controls on barrli lend.ing and a subsl,ailbial ruod.ifiea'fio:r
of open rnarhet policy in  respect of gil-b-eclgecl securi'bies.  iljx-bernally r 'oire
situa.bion tras cLominated. by the aeasures talten by bhe Uuitecl iitates in  r\u,3us-b
L7TL, includ.ing the suspelsion of dollar  eonvertibility  anc1 'uhe ensuing
lrrcertaintlt in  irrterua{,iona} monetary arrang:enen-bs, cuhniuat,ing in  'ohe
'.,,iaslringiiol ag'reement of Decsmber L}TL.  i\t  the s&nre tiner  Sritainrs  ba.lance
of paymen-bs relrgiled stroug.  It  r"ras the state ot' the clonestic econor6' 'bhai; rra.s
tlisappoiriting,  vi'bh ru..eriiployinent risin.q andi hopes of a recoveqf of proi.".:.c'b'io::'
corrtinr:a,I1y <leferrecl. Ttre bud.get of I';a,rch L97L ha.d- been li''u'iile roore thau
neutra| bu-t ilardr rate was reduc.ed. frorn 7 to  6 per cent. on i'rpril. I'  Hxpa:.:.sioaal'J''
nea,sures vere tahen in July,  includ.iag the vithcrarral of 'bernts control  on
inst,akrerrt cred.it transactions.  lionet ary conrJ.itions  becs:!,nne Progressively
ea.sier <iuring the year as restrictions  on bank lend.ing lrere first  ea,sed. arrd-
then removecl and' Banlc rato was roweretl again to  5 per cent'  oil september 2'
fn the same mouth, the clearing banhs abanclonect tbeir  collective  interes'b rate
agreements and. shorbly af'berrrarcls  all  of then red.ueed 'bheir Base ilates for
aclvauces by * per,cent.  'Ihe general trend. of narke'b rates of interest  vas
firrnly  d.ovrnvards throughout the early parU of the periotl, alihough there rqas
Iatterly  sone upturn.  This rras a period. when nueb new investnent was rmileri;ai'lea
in agricul,ture, greatly encouragetl by ttre increased. availability  of crecLit.
It  is  probable, hor,rever, that  much of this  new investment  r,'e"y have beeu rurclertal:en
nitbout cluE consid.eration of tbe related. int,eres'b costs anc1, a,s these again bega:r
to riser  nany forners rrrust bave had. misgiviugs.
In his  Lg72 Buclp;et statenenb, 'ohe Chancellor estiflated. tha-b tire grorri;h
in gross d.orirestic procluct in the second. half  ctf lgTL was Pround 5 per cent'  a'i;
an annua,r ra,oe, but acceptecl. that  sorne sloving clonu vas lLl'.ery by the first  irr':li'-164-
of 1973. lle concluded that a further stir,mlus to clenaul was necessary  autl
introducerl neasures designetl to iucrease output in the first  half of f977 by-
2 per cent., go ag to obtein an onnual rats of growth of 5 pe! cent.  The neasures
iucluded. furLher incentives to invesfuient through t a:r aLlorre"nces and grants, a:ri
vitloly spreed incone tax leliqf  ltkeLy to encourage spending. It  batt alreadlr
beeu alnounced that repaynent of tbe outstaDding post-war cratlits, a&ou.nti[g to
630 nillionrwould begiir in A?ri I  anil be spread over about 6 nontb.s. the net
effect of tbeso nsasures vae expected to be an incrsaae rn ue  Drchequer  t s borroviDg
requirenent of about C2r000 nillion  in tbe su*ent financial year.
hessuro on the llniteil KinE4iloarr  s balance of payrlents agoin becano
evident La 1.972i the current occount  rva,s rlow lnore or less in balance es conpereir
vith a surplus of just over 611000 ailllon  in 197L. Thsre vas aLgo a subsi;antial
outfLov of capltal follorcing the oven greater inflow of the prewious year.
i'leaunhile, the exponsion of the ilonestio sconoqy gotherecl strengtb antl iu the
12 nonths to April 19?3 unenlrloynent  felI  svon nore sriftly  then it  bail riset in
tho previous 12 nouths.  Through6gl tbig perioil, the ochi eveneir't I aurl thea
the nniutenarce, of a bigh rate of ocouonlc grcirtib rerna{ rgil *,ha over-riding
objective of officlal  policy.  It  *ag ibfu,pbjectlve tbat explainoct  two
d.evelopurcnts  of perticular algnificance. Iben pterling caae under heavy presoure
iu ilune ]1972 t 1*e ettenir[ to na,i.nta,i! the parity osteblisheil 6 nonths prsviously
untlerr the Snithsonien  Agreenent wag saortlivetli the ileoisioa r&s guickly takea
to altorv. the pou.nd to float antl no loasures to i:estrain tbe econory vera
introilucoil. Thus was see!.. &n early irpleraebtatioa of tha lntention, os
e:qrresse<l by the Cbaacellor in bis 1972 Bu<tget speech, that econonic grorrbh
r-qhoultt not be frustrateil by attenpts to oaintai!, e;a rmrealigtic o<cha.ge rate.
llho othe:r irportant decigion was to counter grorring inflationary pressures by tbe
introcluction of staiutory coatrols over lricss aDd. incones - atterryts to reach
voluntarTr o6regnent bewing feiil.eil - :cetbe! than by resortitrg to itefletionary
lleasu:res. Thie egain reflEctetl the determinatioa not to jeolarilise .the
groytb of the econor.qr, rea,ffirneal by tbe ChoncelLor in his l9Z3 &rclget  speecb.
&a follovs!  |tr'e rmst lrot finit ourgelves conp6lled to bri4g grqrth to a, halt irl
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ord.e! to tteol r.itb difficulties vhich ou€iht ln be .taci:Ied in othcr r'Iays, r'rhether
thoso difficulties ere concerneal with i:rflation or rdth tJre oonsequences of
irflati on for tbe bala.rc e of paynentsr.
Because of ihe growbh.  obj ective, tha authorities vere Lihesise
relucta,nt to in;rose constreints on nonetary expansion nhich deveJ.oped stronglly
as the ec onorpr reacted to official, stiroulus anrl the roosr availobiJ.ity of
creillt, ond s,s inflation gathered pa,ce. fn the seco:rit half of I9?2p hovever,
tbe r&te of growth of tbe nonoy sulply begon to receive increasing atteati on,
anil actioa to contaiu it  gave a siroug ugrarcl twisi; to interest rot6s, vhich
eatly in 1973 reacheil high tevels.
the Uliteel Kingilon, together with Dennarh a.nal ths Bepublic of lrclantl,
becarne a full  nenber of the Burogean Ecorromic  Cdmruoity oa Jaaua,ry l,  1973
and tbe f,ive-yoar transitiou perioil begaa. 'I'he first  re<Luctlon, of 2O por cent.,
ln.tariffs  on trailo anrl inilustrial products bstneen Britaiu anil tbo Coarnunity
took ploco on I April.  0n I Febnrery, the Unite<t Kingrtoa adoptetl the Conroon
lgriculturel Sollcyl having previously acceBteil tha,t sterliag should. be regardecl
as haying been ilevalued by 9.2 per.cslt. to fecilitate operation of, the po3.icy.
A$ e neeting beld ia Porig in October 1972 beocts of state a,lil 6overnnent of the
Comiou lbrlcet countgies, incluiting applicant oenberd, reaffirne<t thdr
iteteruination I irieversibly. to aohieve the ecoaonic and noneta,ry ua:iout, vith
a i'iew to its  conpletion not lEter tha,n Decenber 3I, 1980. They al,so agree&
tbat fixerl but ailjustable p,ritiee botvss:r tb,eir curencies constltut eit aJo
essenti&l baeis f,or acbl.eveneat of the urion aril oxplesgoil their ileterni.neti os
to set u? within the Cer.rnmnfly  necba,nisms for the rlefence antl rutuel support of
curienci.es. Vrtr this !.n niuitr it  ras ilecideil to set up e Europea,n ltonotary
0i-operati on Furrd. a.niL tbir  begau opoiations 6n April 6, Lyl3. Iaitlal\r,  the
Fund hsaf oallr limiteil fuucticns, nq 
'ne1Jr the adninistratioa of existing short-tern
creilit liues botv€aa nenbers s[a +,he co-orclinatiou of ceotrol balir co-oporation
D€ceEsar"Jr for the j oint float of euneaciec.- 166-
)r:ri.r:g I9'(3, 1;be officia,I policy of i', t d"i:,sb for grovthr ruos coi'Linued.,
rlespite incroasing criLicj.s.: of its  approprialieness urder cba,llging  cond.itions.
Iir 19?21 'ohe sL::,cii in the ecoirorl'I:s'd' ena,bled n, subs'LgntiaL ratc of expansio:r
to bo geucra;ted. 'vri.thoub urrd ue signs of s'traid.  Bu'b by 1973 'tJreso had. bcconc
inoreasirrgly  evj-dent.  Lab our shortoges, part,icuJ.arJ-y in sone t,rades, began 't:o
be relortcd, as C.id lengtbening of dclivery deies.  The growth iu the voLune
of ir,rporbs e,cceiero'lerl  a;ci 'blie 'bratle gap witlened. 'rlhiie iihe evitlelce l-efi;
room for rlispubo about vhe ther the econottly ho,d aci;ually becoine Ioverheated.t,
it  nevertheless posed rrith incroasing entphasis tire clucs'bion as to ^whether the
rate of e:rpansi o;r c ouLtl be i:r.i;rtn ineti at a iine vhen rescrves of capaciiy r'rere
being used. np;. also vl.re'Uher it  should not be <lecelerated tove,rds a rate nhich
tire loirg-ru:r 6::or'rth of prociuctive copecity couLct suste,in.
Hovever, the ueed for restraint 'rros uo{l occepiied by the Coveriitent,
ru:til  l.ate in the year.  0f those vho supporterl the Governnelrit  I s vielr, sone
vere inf}uencecl by tho bclief  thatl  in  the absence of the coustroint  iDposed
by a fixecl excirange rate, it  r'roukl be possible to breah through into a period
of grovth l*lich soulal be sus+,ained. at a higher LoveL than had beeu achi-evecl i
the past.  A vi<ler segnent of opinion vas Less optitoistiic, but cloined thatt
on pr:ovious cocasioris rrhen 'tJ:e econor{r hacl shor,r-o oigns of overheatinS, 'r;he
brahes harl been appl,ieil too soon a,nd too in<li scririririately. Although tl:e
balance of pe"1'r'rents rras clearly deteriorcting, the floating  exchange ra"ue
relieveil tbo irsnediade pressure upon expansi on ald the case for  postponing
restrictive  neasures vas strengthepetl bJr ths ten<Iency of investment +o Lcg
behj.nrl tho 6ror'r$h of output -  eJ:td to a rather unusue,l extent.  It  r''as aLso'
arguerl tlur,'b the expansi oa va,s poter.t iaLly self-correcting and. this r'tas supBorted'
by sigls  suggesting an easing of the gror'.th of consuraer expentliture. lTev consui:tcr
creilit  e:rientlei! fell  betwebr the third  anil fourih quarters end. banli lenclitrg to
the lersoDal secruo! stoPpe<l risir:g atter the s relor.  The volume of consulrcrs  I
expc:idlure in the fourth quarter nas virtua!.Ly  r:acba,q;eil as conpared with tha-167-
previous three raonths, aI'bhough. the volume of r:etail sales contiuued. to
expand. at, nnrch the sanne rate.  Although the d.evelopnen'b of suptrrly shorbag;es
probably playect a significant part, the grorrth of consuner d.emand. r^ur,y olso
have been urxler res'braiu.t because of the squeeze on real persona,l  d.isposable
income due to rising impor"b pri.ces; also to Sta6.;e II  of 'ohe incones policy
and. to the effect of raarginal incorne tax.  /rlthough ljtage II  end.ed. in Uctober
L9T3r i'b vas possible to hope th^at S'bege III  r'roulcl secure'ohe acguiescellce,  e't/eu.
if  it'  Laclced. the agreement,,  of. the tracle rrnions ancl that sone of the inflatiorle,{rr
corsequerces of nrraintaining tbe expansion could. ttrereby be contained..
It  was not un-bil Novernber L973, lrben the prospect, va,s furtber- clourlecL
by the inpend.ing tenergy crisj.sr tirat the ChanceLLor pubLicly aciuronledgeci i;he
need. to raod.erate the grorrth of d.eraand., but in the rrid.d.le of the year a series
of measures of monetary restraint hatl, been initiated..  These were partly d.esipecL
to counter further clepreciation of sterLing, uncler prossure of the uplrar<l treud.
of interest rates overseas, particuJ.arly in the Uuited. States, rvhil.e clomestic
rates vere rcoviug d.or.ruward.s; but they also reflected. increasiug concern at the
rapid. grovth of the noney supply, parbicularly  as broe,d.ly d.efined. (i.O).l Thi"
continued. at the high re.te of L9fZ, rvhich was itbelf  exceptional  conpa,retl vith
pl'evious yea,rs. fhe basis for the mqnetary expansion vas tbe Governrlen'b.ts
comuritnent to the expansion of tbe ecollonyr &s reflect,ed. in its  fiscal policy.
This all.oried tbe current and capital ocpeircliture of the public sector - vhicb,
includ.es the nationalised. ind.usiri.es as rreJ.l as central and. loca1 goverment
to exceed, its  revenue to an even !-arger exteut than in  ]t9'.,2, resulting in a very
substantial  d.onestic borrolring requirement. Alihough a Lerge part of tbis was
1.-'The n&rrolt dAfinition (1.i1) cousists of private sector current accouirt baiances
vith the banl;s plu.s notes and. eoia in circuLa{iion. The broad. clefinition (i'j3) '  incluries in ad.elitiou private sec'bor d.eposit accounts, private sector tloit-sberlil:
dleposits ancl public sector cleposits. Tlre ciifference between the tr,ro is  bhus
largeLy in ternrs of interest-bearing  deposi-bs.
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met by the sale o-I Gover:rrneirti stoeii 'bo tlie rrou-brairlt priver,'be sector,  a'
substantial  bsrtance remainect to be talien up in the first  place by the banks,
rr'hoso assets ancL deposits increasecl accordingry.  (By the beginning of L9''(4,
tSis had. vir-i;ua1ly all  been tahen ar{€ry' frorn the bai:Jis by calls for increased.
speciaS. d.eposits, pc,rt of which r,'ere later released.  The banlts met this
situabion in the meentirne by expan.d.ing their calL noaey and. nrnn:ing clovn their
excess hot.diirgs of reserve assets.) To avoid. this crea'bion of crdd'itr it  r'rouLcl
have bedn necessaxy to have incLuced. the res'b of the private sector to absorb
even nore Governricnt s'Uock. If  this coulcl have been achievecl it  rsoulil probably
have causecl a,n even slarper rise in int,eres'b rates, vhich vouLd. have operau'bed'
agairrst t5e policy of e:<pansiou of iihe econonry at large; aBd in particular
against gre hoped-for grorvtb of investrnent in supporb of it  as tbe year
progressed.. /rltho.ugh the ca,se for raod.erating the expansion. wes steaclily gaining
srorengtb,  .bhe Gwernnen  b t s rurwiLlingness to aceopt it  involvett their ttEuing a
blincl eye to the scale on vbich cred,iti rras being created..
Ifhile fiscal poJ,icy proviclect the basis for the abnormal ntone'bary expansioit.
11re grea.ger part of it  tootri the form of .ad:nances by the connerciaL banits. In
tlis  eontex'b, the ro_ad. had. been opeuecl by the remorru,lr &s part of the
Competition and gred.it ControL ar.rangenents introduced. in Septeurber 1971, of
d.irect restraint on bank arlvances. But the banksr ability  to Drove along itt
while nainbainin$ their reserve ratios above tbe required ninirnrmr v8,s inbially
fuelled. by the reserve assets rrith nhich tlre fina^ncing of tbe pub1ic sectorrs
d.eficit 1a4 effectively suppliecl tben.  llevertheless, the dlegree to vhich
coi:rpetit,ion between banks barl intensified since LITL seems to ha,ve al.Loved the
expansion of the none)' supply, as neasured. by l.B, to have gone further tban would.
otberrrise have been the cos€e
i.trbile the increase in banl< advances \ras the r,rajor 1nrt, though n6t the
basic c&use ,  at the nonetary expe,nsion, it  necessariLy arose not only because ttre
banhs \rere in a position 'bo supp.Ly but aLso. because thers rrero custonels to
clenand. them. yet flre increase r.las r*ithout ctoubt abnornrally large in relation to- 169-
the.private sectorf s rreect to  borrorv for  invcs-brirclit,  inclucl.iir.g.stoeltbrriiri.irr:t.
Part of this  reflects  tire s:rbs'bantial fall  in  r:.er'r capital  issues, since if
this  had not occurrecl par-b of the ?rivate  scetorts accuraula.tion of banli
d.eposits would. have been d.ravn into  ne,r.r issues a:rcl extinguished as the proceecls
\'rere used. t,o rep&y bank atlvances. llie  d.isinclj.rm.-bion to  fund bErrrli borror,ring
in'bhis liay itself  refleeted. a grorviug; lacli of confid.ence iu the poss-.'.iri1i'b1'
of r,raintaining'ohe expaLlsion of the econoroy in  tire face of rr, cietei:iora't:lii5,
balance of payacnts and. the incipient  d.irficulties  that  beca.ne appare::i
la,ter in  the year in'flre fieId. of tlre supply of eiler6y both at horne aurl abroad.
Also, this  J.aclt of confiderlce- erthanced.'bhe  liquidity  preferonces of thr; puiilic.
rtt the sddme tinre r until  noflioal interest  rat,es niovecl sharply uprora.rd.s in  -i:he
secoacl baLf of  Lg'(3, the inflationa,ry clinate  dininished. the apparent risi-, of
borroving at  short-term to invest irr existing assets, particularly  properby,
rqhose prices lrere expected. to apprecjate.  l'he biggest expa,nsion 6f  !61u-i...
aclvances was indeed. to the financia,l aad property sectors.  Iet  in  the infla,-
tionary  clirnaiie that prevailed., it  is  usliliely  tha'b even very severe r.es-brjctio:.ls
on'banlt lend.ing to this  sector would. have achieved. nore than a d.iversj-arl (,f the
fund.s uhich the banks vere in a position to  lead. to other sectors, where they
might effectively  bave been enployed for  sin:ilar  pur.po$es.
Hiiherto,  the noney supply has been d.iscussed.  und.er its  broa.d.er
definition  (tA).  But a particular  feature of the f iscal year L9T3/74 vas
the clivergeat behaviour of the narrorrer neasure (l.A), r'drose rate of p;rowth oil
the monthly neasure reaehed. a peak iu  'bhe r.riddLe of  L973 a:rd. cleclinbd alniost
continuously -bhereafter. This relatively  slov growth in  this  nagrritud.e 1o cloubt
reflected the sbarp rises in  interest  rates during the second half  gf  LgTj,
rih.icb increased. the relative  attractiveuess  of  interest-bea,ring as'against
cuffent' accotnts, nhiie the compe'Litive bicld.ing for  d.eposi'bs, vhich aclcted. to the
gror'r0h of I'j3, rnad.e rlepositors more avare of o.opori;uuities  for  economisiag in  the
size of the balances they need.ecl to hokl agains'b eurrent transactions.
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J...g:dns-b  the  bG..c!tr;rou:nd  of ·the  I!lOncte.ry  cxp<:!.r..E  .  .iion,  a  nur.r.ber  of 
measures  ·were  ta~en by the  :;i..Uthorities  in the  scco:acl half  o:.f  19'/3,  "'.vhich 
resulted in interest rates reaching uuprecedented.ly hiuh levels.  In the  firs·~ 
half  of  1973,  the  ease  of fiscal policy vras  r:1e."Lchcd  by that of  monetary policy. 
'l'he  r.J.inilllW:l  lending rate  of  the  Banl;.  of ~ngland dropped  d.ovnnvards  from  9  to  ~(;;.· 
per  cent..,  but there "\-las  a  gro'rTing  expectation of  some  increase  in rates later 
in the ycta·,  for various reasons.  One  '\·tas  the  Governll~ant  1 s  oxcepti onally 
large  need to borrm.;  because  of  the  easy budge·t;  another ,.;as  the  fee line, 
in some  quarters at least,  t.hat  signs  of  overheating "'ore  developing in the 
economy ar.d 'mulc.l  need ·to  be  checked.  In July 1973,  the Banlt  of Eneland 
cilled for  a  furthe:r  1  per cent.  of special deposits  from  the  ba:nlcs,  raising 
them from  3  to  4  per cent.  of  eligible liabilit.ieso  This  il1l.r:lediately touched 
off  a  sharp rise in interes-t.  r&tes  - an effect ,.;hich hacl  seemingly been  ill:bcnfLcd 
by the authorities wi-th  the  object of  offsetting the relative upvrard  mover1:cnt 
of interest rates abroad.  In the  course  of  two  \·Teeh:s  the Ba.:nk  of gn&la.nfl1 s 
r.Jinimuu  lending  ra-te  .jtlf.:J?ecl  by 4  per cent.- iron  7~- to llf per cent.  ;J.'he  bar  .. ~:.s 
1-iere  somevl'ln.t  reluct.aut to raise their Base  Hates to  Juhjg extent,  even tho-ugh  ·t,he 
fa..ilure  to do  so '\-Tould  leave  scope for Ulldesira,ble  a.rbi-~rr:.ge transactions. 
Early in August,  Base Rates  were  generally raised from  8  to  10 per cent.  fl,nd 
later in the  month to  11  per cent. 
The  minimwn  lending rate fell by t  to 11t per cent.  in Octoberl973,  but in 
November the Banlt  of England temporarily suspended the formula for  calculatin.g 
it by reference  to the  average  1
1reasury bill tender rate  and  raised it 
adtlinistratively to 13  per cent.  (The  follo-vri:ng  v1eek  the te:ader rate cacc  i:1to 
line and  the  f'o~ 1mula 'vas  reinstated.)  At the  sg.me  time,  calls for  special 
deposits  of  2  per cent.  of eligible liabilities vere  a1mounced.  (These would 
have  raised the level  of  special deposits to  6  per cent.  but  two  t  per cent.  calls 
1-1ere  later  rescil~ded.)  This  tir.1e  the  banl~ promptly followed  - ''lith  some 
official guidance  - ruising their Base  Rates  from  11  to  13  per cent. - 171-
DurinG  ·Ll1i s  period,  when  Jlilw  n.utlwri  t.ies  ,.;ere acti  voly secldng to 
lever interest rates  upwards  and control the  grmrth  of the  1noney  supply, 
their efforts were  impeded by the  'arbitrase'  operations  referred to above. 
As  cowpetitive bidding for deposits  developed,  ra~es in the  1lrllolesale' 
sterline money  markets  becaEle  highly volatile.  Ba.nk  B<:J,sc  Hates  were  ch~:..r.,ged 
relatively infrequently and at times it becp,r,le  pro:fi  ta,ble  for  lf.:-rge  custor:.ers 
to borrm.;r  from the  banl~s  tmcler  agreed overdraft  arra.nf<ements  and deposit 
the funds  else"\·rhere  in the financial  markets at a  higher rate.  'l'his  becaD.e 
knmm as  'active'  or  'hard v,rbitrago',  as dis-tinct from the  'pa,ssive'  or 
1 soft n.rbi  trage  1·rhich arose  when  sor1e  borrovers  (notably loco..l  authori·tic;;) 
S\oTit,ched  bot,.;recn bank overdrafts  and  short,-terr.l borrovTi:ng  throur,h the  r.larl·,:et 
in accordance  1·Ti th relr..,tive  rates c£  interest.  'l'he  swelling  of  N3  v,s  a  result 
of hard arbitrage was  probably reduced as  the  rel[l_.t.ive  intereBt rate 
differentials 1·rere  reversed,  but it seems  lihely that  some  customers  continued 
to hold  some  oi their funds  in '"holesal9  cleposi ts,  perhaps  as  a  pro  caution 
against the possibility tha.  t  some  resi;:cic-t,ions  r11ight  be  pla.c ed  o~ bank  lejlclinc; 
and their existence  la,ter  seemed to  ease the  liquidity problm:1s  arising :i:'rom 
the  three-day veeli. in January and February 19'"14. 
The  November  1973  measures,  which  were  expected at the time,  seem to have 
been touched off by the armpuncement  of  a  record overseas  trade deficit for 
October,  with the  prospects  of further deterioration.because  of the oil 
situation.  But  the  Chancellor stated that, \vhile  the  imn1ecliate  purpose  '\vfl,s  ·to 
protect  sterlir~, the  longer term objective vas to sustain a  balanced  expansion 
of the  economy.  'l
1he  previous  gro·uth rate  of  5  per cent.  or more  per a!'...nm:1,  1-!hich 
had been possible ,.,hile  surplus capacity \'Tas  being brought into operatio::-1,  eould 
no  loager be  maintained,  and the  'toueh credit squeeze',  as  he  called it, vas 
introduced to moderate  grow·-t.h  to  a  rate \vhich  could then be  expected to be  o,bout 
3}  per cent.  per aunwno  The  measures  were also  intended to help modera-'lie  -bhe - 172-
[lT0';-7-bh  ol the 1-:1cnay  supply,  1,·~1ich  rc,s  being  feel  by  a  co:;:..ti:.nw<.~  rr~picl 
grm-rth  of  ban.i~  lending. 
JJy  this time,  it had bccorr:e  clear that .lliho  full ,,·eight  of  restrEdn-~ 
¥ms  bcinc- i1:1posed  upo:n  nc.Y.-letary  policy "rhile fiscal policy continued -to  be 
hichly expansionary.  H01·revo:r  in the  follmdng  month  (December  1973),  the 
Chancellor RD.IJOU!1cecl  cuts  of £1,200 lilillion in public  expenditure  and 
res-trictions  on  instalment credit.  (He  also  introduced the  new  scheme  for 
pe:cw  .. lising  exc ess:i.  ve  grout.h  of  the interest-bearing deposits  of  -~he  banl:s; 
sec  pp.57-58)o 
By this -Gi1.1e,  Stage  III  of  t.ho  incoL-:~es  policy was  rur.:.ning  into 
difficulties  uxxl.  the Gove:rm:1cnt  1 s  decision to resist the  claim by 'the  miners 'union 
for  increases  ou·tside  the  lir;}i ts led to  the three-day working week,  which  continued 
until the claim was  settled by the  new  minority Socialist Government  in }~rch.  But 
the  scale of the fiscal action taken in December  1973,  reinforced by the moderating 
effect of  the  rise in the. prices  of  oil and other  imports  on  the  growth of real wages 
and  domestic  demand,  was  such that monetary policy could become  more  relaxed in face 
of the  liquidity problems  expected  to  arise  during the thrce-d.ay \ree}\.  and  the 
subseq_ucnt  rec  oYery  .-·  ~lith sterling holding up \tell and United States interest 
rates trendiaG  dowm.,.ards,  dor.wstic  i:x~eres-b rates "'\'Tere  clearly high  enough  by 
international  c~r.1pariso:ns  and the  r~u-~horities w·ere  able  to  concentrate  on tho 
domestic  sit,uation,  mal~.ing  some  releases  of  special deposits  to  ensure that ba:alc 
crecli  t  "''tas  avT.,ilable to those  needing it because  of the cmerr:;ency,  although in 
the  event  lig_uidity problems  failed to materialise  on the scale expected. 
11inimmn  le:acling  rate twice fell by  ~;  p0r cent.,  though bank Base Rates  rem.ai.Lle& 
unchanged. 
\'lith the  chan.:5e  of Government,  the  ne"'r  ChrJncellor  introduced a  budget 
1ih±ch  sor11e'l;hat  tightened the  reirrs  on domestic  domrw.1d;  he  said that,  in his 
ju<.lt;enwnt,  it should be  'broadly neut.r11l  on  de1::and,  1vi th  -~he  bias, if any,  o  .. 1 
the side  of  caut,ion' o  It was  also to be  concerned with a  'deliberate and 
carefully co:-.:.sidcred  redis·~ribution of fiscal  burdens  so  as to help those  less - 173-
able to bear them'.  He  proposed to  i1rbroclucc  a  second  budget,  ln.tcr in  t,i.H~ 
year.  The  Chancellor announced ·that the cost  of food  fJUbsiclics  '\vas  to be 
incree"sed by £500 million.  In addition,  the .Sxclwquer 1ms  to provide  an 
extra £200 million to local au-thorites  ·bo encourage  them to pur.chase  completecl, 
bu-t  unsold,  houses.  The  standard weelcly r::v-tes  of pension uere  increased  a.:r.1.cl 
supplement~try pensions  and  short-term benefits 1-.rere  e,lso  raisedo  i.,;;mploye::::-s 1 
flat rate national insurance  contributions were  incre~~sed, 1-.rhile  those  of 
employees fell slightly.  Some  increases in graduated insurance contributions 
1vere  made.  Neanvhile,  in order to contain public  expencLit.ure,  prices  chn.rr.ed 
by many  naJlii onalised industries ·were  increased sharply,  further  -cuts  made 
in defence  spending,  and the  costs  of  some  other  programmes  (including  Concorde, 
}.!a.plin,  and EEC  commi tnmnts) "'ere  reconsidcreCl.o  'l'ax  increases  cnmounced vere 
expected to raise an additional £1,400 million in 1974/75. 
Speaking  about  monetary policy,  the Chancellor  s::...ia.  that the aim rras 
to  re.duce  both the rate of grm·rth  of the  money  supply a:1d  the  general  level  of 
interest rates.  He  realised  ther~ 1·1as  'no short cut  1  to  this  objective,  for 
several reasons,  notably in.flatione.ry expecvations,  which particularly affect 
long rates.  Another was  that tho public  sector borrow·ing requirement,  thoush 
expected to be  decidedly smaller in 1974/75  tlw,n  in the previous year vould 
remain sizeable.  He  also noted the  influence  of rates in other countries;  by 
this time United States rates were  rising again.  }~ven so,  his  expressed 
intentions,  together w·ith  some  easing  of the reserve position of the banks, 
quickly brought  miniraum  lending rate  clmm  by two  further i  per cent  o  steps to 
"  12 per cent.  and  lc.ter to  ll4 per cent.  '\lith  short money  rates  following  the 
same  trend,  the banlrs  reduced their Base Hates  - which had stayed at 13 per  cc::.'--t• sincE: 
November  1973  to  12t per cen·l:,.  and subsequently to 12  per conto  Despi-'lie  soue 
funding  sales by the authorities,  gil·t-edged yields also fell, first c?,t  the  s!·~ori 
end but later also at the  long  end. - 174-
In discussing regional policy insofar as it affects agr:Lcultu.re, 
necessarily -.;·7e  must  concentra·i,e  on institutions that provide  loans  and./or 
grants  in particular areas  lilte  Scotland and Northern Ireland,  since there is 
no  regional policy as  such.  In this context,  therefore,  we  shall concentrate 
onfucilities provided by the Hit;hlands  n.nd  Islands Development  Beard and the 
Crofters  Corlli'1lission  in Scotland, and  the  D.AJ~I  loans  (formerly NAN!  loans) 
provided by the Dopartme:1t  o1  Agricu.l"~ure in I-;orthern Ireland. 
In addition to its  sever~l other activities  (e.g.,  in the fields  of 
tou1·is1i1,  fishing and transport),  the  Hie;hlencls  and Islands Development Board, 
1-rhich 1·las  set.  up  rmder the HiP·hlands  and lslr  .. nds  Dcveloprr..ent  {Scotland)  Act  1965, 
also  offers  financi~l assis·tance for  pro.j ects which vill improve  the a.gricul·t,ura.l 
econor.1y  1>1ithin its area of  operation  (the  seven  coun·ties  of Shetland,  Orlmey, 
Caithness,  Sutherland,  Ross-shire,  Inverness-shire,  ancl  Argyll).  In  some  cases, 
erants  Dk1.Y  be  offered;  but the  most  cor.znon  form  of assistance provided is by 1vay 
of  loa.ns  at reasonable rates  of interest;  the  conditions attaching to  such  lor.,ns 
may  be tailored to meet  the special circunstances  of a  particular project. 
1i'he 
object is  •to  establish a  secure  and profi  to,ble agricultural  community in the 
area;  schemes will therefore  only be  supported  "\·here  they shmv  a  good chance  of 
becoming  self-supporting  and profitable.  The  finance  supplied by the Beard is 
intended to  allm·r such projects to  get started on an  economic  basis 
The  Board vill considertpplications to finance-
(1)  farms  1 for  any development  vrhich 1-rill  intensify production or  improve 
viability'.  Examples  of'  the  t,ypes  of project  tha·~ may  be assisted include  an 
increase  of stock nurnbers  in order to utilise a  farm's  resources  more  fully; 
this may be  combined with a  land improvement  or building  programme;  assistance 
may  be  given to  chan£~e the pattern of  production with a  view to building up  a 
~ore profitable  perforn~nce  (such as establi±dng soft fruit plantations,  or 
setting up e  ..  livestock enterprise  on 1·Tha-t.  was  a  predominantly cereal producing farm) 
in addition,  the  Board has  a  special  scheme  :for the reclamation and re-stocking - 175-
(2) }ntenni  ve  u:·d  iis  for :pig  brecd:i.DF:  and f'attmd.ne.;  }_:)QUl+,ry  production; 
horticulture,  or  similar  c:;.rt;erprises  (any of vrhich  may  be  ancillary to an 
existinz farming  cnt,erprisc,  or,  al·berna.ti  vely,  be  set up  o.s  independent,  u:ni-Ls) o 
(3)  ll1c'\rke-tiing  ::.;ch;.en-:Gn  or 1)ro9essinr;· uuits  - thcne  m<:1.y  be  subDi-ttod by  co-opere:d.i  ves 
or by private enterprises,  so  long as they nre  'likely ·to  stnhilise r:;;:,r:wts  or 
improve prices'. 
(4)  services to  agriculJGure  1vhere  i-t  can be  shmrn that these P"re  lacki.nz  and 
would benefit the agricult.ural  cor~1lnunit,y  of  the  t!-rca' o  .. t~ssist,ancc  may be  give,_,, 
for  cx~u:1plo,  to help in setting uu  co.._1trn.c-Gor  businesses,  co-operative 
grain-drying or  m.~.chiaery syndicntcs,  o:r:  o.ny  sit1ilar vc:ntures. 
The  B0ard  1 s  fina.nc e  is provided in the  form of grant-in-aiel from 
the Scottish Development  liepartment.  For the financial  year ended  31  lia,rch,  1973, 
a  total grant-in-aid of £3,835,000·,·ras  received.  In additio-:1,  the Board  ret~i:ns 
payments  received for  loan and debenture  interest plus  capi·cal  repay'1IleTi:.s.  In  the 
year  ended  31  1\.;arch,  1973,  this  r  .. mom1tod.  to £054,503.  Losses  are  incurred.  fron: 
time ·to  ti11e  on Board  investments 1vnen  projects fa.il  or  cease  trr.Cl_ing.  In -this 
context the  noa.rd reported -
1 As  tho age1icy  charged with the  task of developing  one  of the  mos-t, 
difficu~  t  areas  in Britain,  1·re  accept  ·thr;b  losses w·i 11  be hi[)l \ihen 
set  ar;ains·~ the  standc,rcls  2,ccopta.ble  ·to  coi;J.mercinl  le~tding sources. 
The  Board is  cletcrr:lined  JGo  r.ti:nit:Jise  -LllGsc  losses,  btr~ -ve  must  tal;:e 
reasonable  risks in  becki-:..1~  sc~1emcs  a::1d  projects which might  o-thc:r,rise 
not get off ·the  ground.  It lk'ts  to be  remembered  - inc1eed  eL1phasised  -
that these  projec·Ls  are d  .. so  br  .. cl:;:ed  by private  cci_)i-tal,  includi:.l:~ 
investment by br,n1-:.s  ancl  other financ ia.l  organisations.  'l'ake:a  ov0rall, 
pri  va·l;e  investraent  matches  that  of  the Board vir-tually pound lor 
pom:td. •1 
Again,  on the matter of risk,  the Board has  sn.ic1 
••• if development is to  ta~::e  place  in the Highlands,  a  greater than 
nornal  degree  of risk taking is essent,iG,l.  1•iosJ\i  businesses  in ·t.he  rurio'.1. 
are  small,  mnny  are in rer.10te  areas  diste..n·t  froli1  r.1arl:ets  c.nd all r..re 
exposed to pressures  and  circur.1stances  :not  usually found  in t,h8  more 
prosperous  par-ts  of the  cou:rbry. e2 
1. Hiuhln.nds  rn~d.  Isla:1ds  Develo;p::10nt  Bcarcl -_5th ILenort,  1970,  para.  52,  p.  17 
2o  Ibid.,  8th Ucport,  1973,  para.  71,  Po  33o - 176-
So  far as  agriculture is concerned,  it is relevant first to 
indicate the  size  of the  problem.  Something  lil.,-e  63  por cent.  o.£'  the ·Lota.l 
rough grazing in Scotland comes  w·ithin the  ambit  of the  Highlands  and  Islt.wds, 
with about  17  per cent.  of total grassland acreage  and  19  per cent.  of the 
acreage  under  oats.  The  Highlands  and  Islands  support about  one-third of 
the total sheep  populevtion  of  Scotle,nd and approximately 20  per  cent.  of  the 
beef cattle.  (About  t"\';ro-thirds  of the gross agricultural output  of the 
1  Highlands  and  Islands  comes  from cattle and  sheep.) 
Grants  and  loans  to  approved projects  of all types  from  1965  to  1973 
are smnmarised in diagram at p.  177,  from '\vhich it will be  seen that the  e..mO'I.mt 
of assistance  t;iven  to aericulture is relatively sm!tll.  It should also be 
emphasised that Exchequer  support is often crucial to the survival  of this type 
of  farming,  though the  proportion of this  support to total net farm  income 
diminished between 1970/71 and  19"12/73  as  risinc market prices  provided a 
greater share  of  cash receipts  (fromlll per cent.  on hill farms  to  36  per cent. 
2  and from 89  per cent.  on  upland rearing farms  to  38  per cent.). 
A budget is estimated annually for  the  follo,ving  financial year 
(ending  31  Narch)  and is based  on  the projected demand  for finance  on the 
evidence  of trends  during the current year.  Latterly,  there had been a  marked 
increase in applications.  For  example,  total approvals  from  1 April  1972  to 
31  Harch,  1973  amounted to £406,060 and  covered 71  projects,  the majority 
relating to the  'upland'  farms  in the  counties  of Argyll,  Caithness  and  Orlmey, 
where  re-seeding  or reclamation programmes,  or - in some  cases  - better grass 
conservation systems  enabled higher stock numbers  to  be  carried  The  Board 
estir~tes that  up to  90  per  cento  of funds  advanced to agriculture will be  for 
farm  developments  in the field of  land improvement  and  increased beef  cows. 
These  farm development programmes  are  operated tmder a  special section 
of the Highlands  and Islands Develop111ent  (Scotland)  Act  1965,  which  enables the 
Board to give  'financial assistance to any person carrying  on  or proposing to 
1. See Appendix VII,  Highlands  and  Islands Dpvelopment  Board Annual  Report,  1970., 
It is understood that the figures are still approximately the  same. 
2. See R.J.  Isaacs  and  R.  Anderson,  Farm  Incomes  in the North  of Scotland 197_1/72, 
North of Scotland College  of Agriculture, Aberdeen,  Financial Ileport No.  70,  anrl 
R.J.  Isaacs,  "Farm Incomes  in the  North  of Scotland;  1970/71 to 1972/73" in 
Farm  H.tnagement  Reviev,  June  1974  and  especially P•  16. - 177-
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opinion of  -the  Bo~.rd 'dll contribute  -~o  the  sociul or  econorJi:c  dovolop&-:lent 
of the  Hirbla:;.lcls  2.,nd  Islands'.  On  loe.ns,  the  Board '\:-as  (in 1974)  charging 
a  rate  of interest  o:L  10 per cent.  per  annwn.  In certa.in circm:1stances, 
capi·t.n.l  rep~1yr.wnt for  one  or tvo years '\voulcl  be  clesin>.ble  -to  ensure that 
e,  proj 0ct ccts firr.1ly  on to its i' ect,  the :3on.rd  has  pmmr to mal'-e  such  n, 
conccssi011.,  which  includes also the '\Taiving  or deferment  of  interest and/or 
capital ropaymcn·ts  over this period. 
1t1.1en  the  Board provides  discrotim1e.ry credit facilit,ies for agriculture, 
they us11ally  opere.te  very closely vith the  bo.:riL.:s.  FJ."equently,  the  banlt is 
o..lso  i·.1vol  vecl  in c ollaboruti:u,c;  ..,.,i th t.;.le  Do~rd in filw.:ncing  ae;rced  clcvclopr.w:c.:t 
procram1.ws.  l'he  B·:,E;,rc.l's  fin~-~-:_~cic:.l  assistailcc is  in·tended. to  supple;uent  b2..n1: 
f~cilitics, 11ot  to  suppln.n·t  them.  ID.deed,  ve1·y  often a  bunk vill rnak.c  it e., 
condition of their  mn.1  lending that tho  13o~.rd 1-Till  be  u..pproached for any 
o.dditim1c..l  fina!lce  that  n'l€t·Y  be  required  OV(~r and  above  the  r.10neys  lent by the 
bc:,Iu>::..  Por  exanple,  \·Thile  the  banl'i:s  provide  orc1inu.ry 1rorldng capi·tnl  requirci:lo:x~s 
~1s  a  m  .. dter of  course,  they may  and  do  sugr,est that the Board '\dll be approached 
for  allY ad:litional  finance  required for  itei.r.s  of:.'  capitnl expenditure.  In terms 
of the security that is  offered,  the Board tends  ·l:,o  lend at greater risk than 
the banks  (though the Board is enjoined to  obtain the  best security ·bha t  rennins 
available).  The  Board  '-rill also take  security over  B,  croft - a  form  of cover 
"\-T.hich  the  barJ'Ls  are unable  to accept as  security.  Indeed,  the  di.fficul  ty in 
obtaini21g  a  uatertight security over a  croft is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the 
1 
G-overnment  give specie! terms  to crofters. 
As  alrea  .. cly  indica  ted,  the  Boe  .. rd  m~ty offer assistance to agriculture, 
either by 'my of  loaas  or  gru..nts.  :::ince  1965  to  Decet1ber  1973,  a  ·total  of 
""  1.  Crofters,  being tenants,  cannot give  a  heritable security,  but in terr:1s  of  the 
Crofters  (~; ro·C,la.J.ld)  Act  1955  the Secretary of St['..te  can accept  payment  of  the 
vc.lue  oi  iz:1provcuents  on  tlw  croft of  a  doc eased cro:fter up to the a1:1ount  of 
the crofter's  li<.'  .. hility to  th~ Scc1
1 e·!Jc..ry  of State.  He  cn.n  also have  trnr'.sfcrred 
to him  a  cro1ter' s  rish-t  -lio  compenso,.Jc.ion  for  improver.1cnts  made  to  the croft. 
1'his  form  of  security can also  be  tal,.cn by the Board  (Section S  of the J-.ct) 
but  postponed t.o  the Secretary of Jtate 1·1ho  '\orould  st.ill have  the first call. -179-
if  p55 r4C5 r'fl s u,pi)r'ovc{. es Loi1,;itr  o.r,lai ;lLLirr465 a,J {lr'].n'f,s (21.}C .l;':oi ec "l:j 1-
all).  lhe Bocrrl cau provid.e loan p.ssisionce ',;bero gre,nts t'ure of:fcr:crJ'  Ly
othcr ptrbLic bodies, but it  vill.:rot  norrrie,J.ly offor 6rents ilr such circutlstu,".rc cs.
fn cvery case, tho t:ra;:irnrn amouirt of public I:ioircy vhicir con bo s'perrt ou a
project is  70 per ccnt. of '!hs total  sos115r so tire cpptice,:rb  rcus i; firrtl a'L Lc:-st
3O pcr curt.  of the cost fror:i pr!-vate sources.  ilovever, 'Loi;i.ng agricu li;r'rr,r,I
1:rojects rrs o whole, l;ore tha;r irr,If tirc rlovelopl:e:rt costs a.ro ftriseai fro;n
pr.i.va'oe s otl-TC os r
Loaris are avaiirr,ble for  builcli;:.93s, plan'c a;:tcL t:aciri:.:.er;r  ii.ni['Tro:i:']i.il:i..ti
ca,p:l1;al  (rr.i,rj.cir includes 'bhe-costs of pureh.',riiir" s'i,oc-;). -[n'feres'b j-s 'i:i..;,i,.irIo
ai'rt..ru{r,11y o;r t}rc balence ou'i;s'Uand.iirl;.  iicpa;nnir;it is  rr'r:,ti.o o\ier c, perioil.r t1? 'bo
J.0 yeiu.s in the case of p1a,:rt arid. iuochir:ery nnd. lrortrting; ce;itc,,l ond. up 'i,o 20
years for buil.iLings, though the B,:arc1 (o" has clrei.iiy bcen i.rel:rti.onecl) cc,i1.
cl.ef er capital repaynents and. vaive in'borcst for up to tr,ro \p€Ja.rs. Bef ore
o:fferir:.g €r }oau, the Boo,rd. r:rust be sa'bisjliecl ttrat  (")  thc d-eve.Lopne;;.'i:  vi:LJ-
be econon:ice',L1y viable a"nd. thab i'b r.riIl prod.uce sullficien'L i:rconts'bo se:rricc
'bhe loan and. coirtitrue to opera'le profita,bly therea:fter; (b) od,.cquate secu:rity
can be of f ered.i au,l (c ) tbe itevelopnent rrill  coirtribute to 'bho econorry cf  'uite
&f e&r
i{here tlre Boar,t is  satisfiocl that a project is.,nocess&ty forbhe
sa'Uisfactory  de.veLopment  of the a.rca ancl \lrat  it  vilI  eveffbual.ly become viahle,
but is unlitrel.y to becorie estebLished. o*'bhe brusis of nort;iil a,ssiste,;.rce alo;re,
tbey rnay off er a 
, specia.L grant to holp tirb d.o.relopment  over i bs initial  s-bari'"ses,
This glant caiurot, be r:ad-e i;r respect of costs rrhich a,ro:,;grant-tlid.ec1  b1- o'birer
public bod.ies such o,s tire Dcpartmen'o of Ag;ri.cuLture  end. !'isheries in Scotlond
or the Crof''uers Conuiissiorl,
Ilach applicatiou is  considerecl .on its  techrrical  aucl financ ial  merit,s .
The Bcard. also attenrpte to assess the itesira$il"i'by of the projecb fron the pc$-ut
of vier'r of the d,evelopmsnt of  iiho a,rea, concertred,.  But it  nust not be presuraed.
thatl  beeauso ?, schcrle is  eligiblo,  it  trill.  necessarily bs assisted..
.''..-
I  i  !' :.  illr .
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'l'he  discovery of  oil iu the  l:·Jorth  8cf~ has,  of course,  rllor1i:L'iecl 
the  econondc  situu.tim.1 in this region  a:ncl  oil-rcl<::.:ted  develo:pw:~r:-GG  have 
also had  ir:.direct effects  on  existing inctustries  (such as  'poechill[.{'  of 
labour ar:.d  greater labour turnover).  I::a  the  absence  of  oil-related  develOj?•:;!;;~:~rr,, 
it is thought  -!:,J:w.,t  the  reg-ion llould have  r.m.de  satisfactory progress,  though 
there \?ould.  have  been little indication of  a  decrease  in the  economic 
differences betw·ean region and  cou11-try. 
1 As  it is, oil developrilent  ho..s  broug:,ht  rapid  a11.d  spectaculgr 
eco;:!omic  progress to  -lihe  region.  U.:.J.e!l1ploy•~·;Gnt  levels  cm:d;i:1ue  -to 
fall,  ancl  reeio:.i.al  \·lr,,:~·e  levels i·:ill  probably rise uore  -th::1D.  :l:!atio:,.:-....1 
levels  in 197  '~.  The  iLD~locli.c:~c  eco::.lOil·:ic  pro  blor::s  ,.ri_ 11  be  associ£~-0e:::l 
lrit.h  c,cco!~JDodn:ting  ·C,hc- oil indus-i:,l'Y  (e.~-~·  in  providi:a~: houses  c:~i~·<l 
other  infrnstruc·C,ure)  a:::.ld  e::.J.coura.c.:-illg  -'::,hose  e~dstir:.g  i1d.us"t:.ries  -tl.·.r.~·t. 
could  prosper  eve:;.1.  in the  presence  of  oil iadustries.  11 
Brief reference  should  rJlso  be  L1c,de  to the  Crofters  Cot·:r:Iission,  vhich 
,.,as  estr:,blished under the tert1s  of ihe  Croiters_{Jcot1,e".:J~-~-1c"t  1955.  In gener[l,l, 
the functions  of the  Commission ore to  reorGanise,  dE~velop,  and.  ret;u.lz.:t;P-
croftin.z in the craftinG  cou.:rrties  of  Scotland; 2  to promote  the interest of 
..... 
croft,ers there;  and  to  l~eep under  review hll r/at,-ters  relatinG to crofting.  _) 
The  Act also  e1:1povrers  the Secretary of 8-t.a.te,  after consultation with ·t;hc 
Comr.aissio.r.!.  and vi  ·th _the  approval  o:f  the  'l'reG,sury,  ·to  lau11ch  sc~1.9r.1<3S  for 
providing  grant~ and  loans  to crofters  :i'or  the  purpose  of  Eddins  an<.l  developing 
agricultural produc·!ii on  on their crofts,  and  any  such  scher11e  may  provi(l.e  for the 
administration of  such erants and  loans  ·throuch the  agency  of the  Comn:issio:n.. 
In this context, it is perhaps  ndvisable to  define  sowe  of the  cli:i:'fcrences 
between crofters  and farmers,  ,.rhich account for the special arranzements i;lli:.t 
have  been nade  for crofters.  ;) ome  70 per cent.  of crofters live  on  islc,nc1s  ~-l~d, 
in the  grea-'l.i  majority of cases,  they ai'e  lTorldng  the  l)Oorer  lend.  AccordiEely, 
1.  Hi0:hlands  and  lsl0..-:.tds  Devclo-onen:t  Bc::~rcl  - 8tb. ne-port,  19'73,  :po.ra.  31,  p.  22. 
2.  These  arc Zctland,  Orkney,  Cc,ithncss,  Sutherland,  Ross  o,nd  Cromarty, 
Inverness-shire and Argyll. 
3. 'rhcre are  so:ne  18,320 re;;istercd crofts  in.  the crafting cou:-1tics,  thoush  as 
a  result of  ams.,lgax:tat.ions  these are  operated as  just under  15,500  ,vorLin~; 
units. - 181-
their prod.uc·l:,io:.l  is  lm-r  i 11  relation to  effort  a:::d  -their costs  ::t.re  hi~~h. 
Unlike  far11~ors,  crofters have  r1  legal oblieati  on "to  equip  their holdinc;s. 
Only in a  fev  ca~cs - and  this is exceptionc,l  - does  the  lc>  .. ndlord equip the 
holdings  - e .r;.  crof-ts  on  lr.-11d.  settlement esta.tes  o·H:n.ed  by the Sccretr.try 
of  S·ta:te  for  Scotln.nd..  A-t,  the  same  time,  -the  crofter he.s  no  proper title t.o 
the buildinc;s  he  puts  up  on  the crof-t  (only a  ri.s;ht  to  conpensc;,tion  on the 
renm1cia:lii on  of  ::1is  tc:u:.Ecy)  E..D.d  he  can:;::. at tl1oroforc  off  or  bui  LLi.l!gS  f.:,S 
security in orclel"'  to raise capital.  It is for this reason thaJli  the  Governnt"lnt 
has felt  obliged to provide  some  &ecree  of  ~ssistance  .. 
'!'he  fi~.1ancial a.ssis-ta.nce  availr.,ble  to croft,crs  -td~es  tl1e  form  of 
special assistance unuer the  Crof.tin:::;  Coun-ties  A::;ricultuTal  G:cf1..3J.ts  (Sco-'lilc.,uc1) 
Scheme  and the  Crofters,  etc., 1.Ji vostock Purchase Loans  Scher.w  aY1d  also genOl'r..l 
support to  farmers  in the  fo:~·r:1  of cnttle  £!,l1cl  sheep subsidies  t-tllcl  other p1·icc 
guarantees  in -Ghe  form  of deficieucy payments  schcr.1es. 
1i'hus,  tm.cler  the firs-t  scheme  6:Cants  cr:,n  be  mo  .. de for the  croppinG  oi 
ran,rgin::;.l  l;;,ncl,  for  laEd  improve::wn-'c,  (reclar!;ation  of'  rou,:::h  or hill lc:.ncl; 
ir.1pro-.·cmcD.t,  of heath land and  rou~;h  r;ra::~in~:  by surface  treat:r:1ent;  hill, tile, 
and  artcric.'11  drainace;  bracl\.e:n  cut·U.:n~~;  a:ad  .s·round  cler,rance),  o.r:d  for. other 
irJprovor;w:t:l'tis  (such as  the  construction or  inproveJilent  of pit and.  cle  .. mp  siloo; 
fielA shelter for  cattle or  sheep;  fencing;  the provision of cattle grids; 
fixecl  equj_p1:1ent  for the handl:L:n8'  or  trcatmen·h  of  sheep  or cattle;  the  pln.n-~ing 
of shelter bel-ts;  the provisioa of  electr:tcr.l  e<:uipmen·b  for  agricultuxel :?U:;.:posos; 
the  provision or  improvement  of  roads,  bridses  or boat slips;  and 1-m.ter  su}lpl:i.es). 
in1ere  appropriate,  grants "t·ri 11 also be  a vailablc ·to  Coru,1on  Grv,zing  Cornni t·boos 
under-Gal:ing  i::lproYen~ent  ,.;orl~s  on  corunon  &;razings.  During  1973,  the  Cor.unission 
handle(1  over  5,000 individual  claims for  zra:J.t  aid under  scher.10s  for 1-rhich  -~hey 
have  acl~1inistra-Givc responsibili-ty,  aLlOUJ.lting  to  over £550,000. 
In edclitio:;:1 to .a  1dde  ran{;e  of grants,  lo~:as are  rr.ade  in certain 
circU1:1stances  to fiP  .. ance  purchases  o.f'  livostocl~
1 
and  (as 
1.  In 1973,  J0he  rf!/Ge  of  in-'c,ercs-t.  fluc-~un.ted bet1-recn  9-i·  nnd  14:}  per  cent. - 182-
erection or  ir:1prov-er:1en-t  of  d1relling houses  and  o-ther builclines  on  -tihe  crofts. 
Por  ·t.his  la-tter purpose,  grants  may  be  ei  ven of not  wore  than half the cost of 
labour and rai-ltcri<:',ls  subject to  a  maxitmLl grant.  'The  f•lE:.xirilum  grant for  e.  :·~31-i 
house  or the  replacor~en-b of un  exis-C,i:ng  house is £2,300.  •r•he  grnnt for 
i  raproviHg  a  house  mr~y not  exc e eel  £'750  a::1<1  the  gra,nt for erecting,  replaciD.£ 
or  it:lp):-oving  fan:1  buildings  may  not  exceed £1,000o  In£t1dition,  loans  Ll?uY  be 
offerec1.  '.rho  al>10UJ.lt  and  duration of any loan is fixed at the discretion o:f  the 
Secretary of  ~)tate who  tal:es  in·~o  accoUJ:-rt,  ar~10ngst other things,  the resources 
of the a.pplico.nt,  the  suitD.bili-by of the  house  or building to the croft 
concer:aed.  ~Ui.o_  their compensa-t.io;1  value.  Loans  ere repayable by hal:~-yearly 
inst&.lnmnts  of  an.  ..  '1uity including interest at  3-6  per cent.  :re r  an..nwn  for houses 
and  9}  per cent.  per  annura for  fa.rLl  steadinz builciings-.  The  maxil!mL1  tot.al  loa.~ 
assistance for a  house to  any applicant is £3,000 aad for  s-ter-!,cling  buildings 
£1,000.  T.Jor;,ns  can also be  obtained by new  tennn-t.s  of crofts, who  are  requi::.-ed 
to  po..y  the  out.:,oing  tenan-t  or to the lm:dlord c·onpensation in respect  of  -the 
permanent  il.n:proveiJents  on the  crofto 
In Northern Ir9land,  coneys  e~re  r.Ede  c:.vailable by the Department  of 
Agriculture  - the  so-cr:Jlled D  ..  UH  loa:as
1 
- to assist in -the  purchase  of  nm,r 
a[;ricul-'c.ural  rJa.chiacry,  equipueat,  livestock,  seeds  and fert-ilizers,  to  fi:t.:.a.:nce 
the  erection and improvement  of'  farm buildiags and dlrelliLgs,  also for land 
improvement,  including aiforestatio:a.  Agriculturs.l contractors as 1-:-ell  as farners 
may  obtain loans for the  purchase  of  ne'\\'"  agricultural machinery.  Farr.1 
2 
amalgamation  loans are available for periods  of  up to 40 years.  (This  is the 
1.  U::.1der  tho  Devclo:pl:!elrt :~  Us-~ri_<:ul-Guro 0,ncl  ?isheries)  !j,c~t  (Norther:!.  Ircl:.:::.i) 
19()8,  the  r•3leval1-~  woneys,  \·Tilich  pc:.ss  tJ:-J.rpugh  r-~n l1gricultu:cal  Loai.lS  11\r:ci,  axe 
borroved from the  Co:.-tsolid.atecl  P1E:1d  ll<..'-naged  by  the Depar-tuo:ni:.  of Fincx..c e. 
z.  I:a  pr['.ctice,  the  D-vcracc  ar;tr:,lgauation  loa:2  is £10,000 for  15  years. -183-
only Drca in vhicir Diri'II provicl.es finnucc fcr  lai:d. pu.r'c}:ase a::rl, ir: -i;Lie r;bsc::ce
of 'bhe Al'.C1 ihis is -birereforc  a, fj-eiri oLilenqise  cs,'ir,ered for Iar.i,;eiy by-i;.:r, r)i'ij!s
I'Iith the exception of'agriculturcr,l ripchincry and. ecluipniei:.tr.nor.r.o\,'  is
ad.vancecl by loau rather than by hire pnrche,se. Irr botir fielus, tle  Depar-i:::e::.,,;
is in compe'bitiounith other lentling ag'eircies but, siirce rit'bes ere not sril-isi,Jisoci,
appa,rently without rosoutnen'b,  Incleerll it  is  only recer:t1y '!fue-b banlis lnve becor,le
ratber nore intercstocl. in. Ionger terr.r lending to agirj.culture, tirouglb over 6r i-o:rgi
periocl of years tlrey have assistect in 'bire f inancing of land. pr:rchase.
The size of a DANI loan d.epend.s on the rrotu.re of the tra.risacl;io:r, lij  nlal,y
be for as little  as 8IOO (e.g., for ari 5-nqpLenent) or n111 up to  fi'j,000. lhis
rroul'd. be the usual ra,nge, sinco the nnjority of fanrs in i"Iogbhern freLarui are
nod.est in size.  But applications for Largor anroun'bs are uot lm.comnon.
rlxclud.ing tlre araourrts nad.o available to finance farn einalge*:atio:s, rrhich
teud. to be long-term, 6O per cent. of the short- ar:rl nedl.iun-terra noneys r:nd.e
available by D.INI uould. be in the fora of Loane and aclvances to finarice the
purchase of ngriculturaL nachiuery (especiarly tractors)1 26 per cerit. for
Livestoclcr farn build.ings aud. la^nd. inprovorneatsl ancl B per cout. for fnr:ia d.rre1li1;;s.
Iroans are not llad.e avaiLab}e to trny off  cl,ebta or to finance tho purcbase ofl fcer).iug
stuffs
fhe teruu of h.1.re purcbase Loa.ns (for ne$ nachine{F aud. esuipr,renb) are sai.c1
to be nore generous than those a,vail.abl,e f.ron corilruercial houses - irx LgT4, *,ire
effective rate charged. was 15 per corrto on a roducing balaJrc€. :!ven sor 11re
Delnrtment is estiuoted to obtain only sone 25 per cent. of tbe total busii:ress
avail.able. fhis is probably tlue to tvo *tt  reasonsr
(i)  tne Delurtnent  iloes not pay corsrissiou to clealcrg.l through riiron tire
finance houses attract a significant proportion of their business; ancl
I  :,
'  (ii)  it  usually takes slightly lo4gcr to procass a Dir.IiI transe-e,,;io::  e;d.
the finance' b.ou.ses are perhaps more cornpe'bitive in this respec-b.
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As  G,  raa:~-i:;or  of policy,  every at,·ter.tion is po.,ill  -to  -Ghc  vir..bili·t.y  o:i:.' 
any loan proposi-tion a.nd  1vhcre  u  lor,n of nore  than £5,000 is involved  every 
feasibili-ty  study  i,:,o  be  carried.  o1xt.  'i'his  s-tu<l:;.·  hecone.s  one  of the major 
criteria  O!l  1-1hich  a  decision is taken as to \·Thetller  or not  L'l,  loan should be 
offered. 1 
The  to-tc,l  amotnts  macle  avc:.ilgble  u_0.cler  the Hire  Pu:cci1a.se  .B'ina.:n.ce 
' 
1  l  19r{  "  l  . 
0  '"''7  25  '11'  2  ~  • t  1 :J  Sc11ome  be-0\v-een  945  and  4  were  ox  t  10  order  Ol  JJ  •  _  nn  1.on  and  1  ·  "toTOU  (J. 
seem that c,reater usc  could be  r:1acl.e  of these i'ncilitieso 
received fn.irly regularly and 1-1itllou-G  t.o•J  r:mc~ di:i:':ficulty.3  For ·r.1S"chiiwry 
loans,  tb.o  repo.;yn(r:1t  period 1·1ill  be  one,  -tvo,  or three yee-rs,  cncl lor livG.c;;-tocL 
locns  up to  seven years;  for  erection and  improvement  of  farm buildings, it r.Jish·0 
be  from  4  to  10 years.'  Loans  for the  erec-biol.'l  of farE Ci"ellings 1vould be  for 
a  rather lo:1.eer  perioa.  - su.y,  15  years  or  more.  Usuell~r,  :repayt101Yiis  are  in 
quarterly or  half-yearly  inste~lJ.:Ients.  ur,  ,.;rhero  -the  f£l,ri~ler  is  a  tlill-;:  prouucer, 
rv  lo2..11  to  buy  cows  or lor sor:ie  o-l:,her  purpose  rola·bed  t.o  rJil~~;:  prodnctio:~l,  cn.:a  be 
repaid in nonthly install:wnts  on the b8.sis  of the  milk cheque.  1-i:  .. '·reover,  if it 
sui  is a  fr.rr.1er  to pay off  a  loa11  earlier thctn had been  £.,rre,n2~ed,  he  is tree  -bo 
do  so  and 1ri  thou·t  pe1:al  ty  he  only  pc- ... ys  interest for tho  -'dme  he  hc- ... s  actu2.lly 
had tho  use  of the  woncy  (the  only exception is farm  r:..Tit.eleu.mc.tion  loans vhic}lr  ...  ~e 
long-term) • 
1. Application forus  for  a  1:12.-C.i.nnery  loan f'rom  DAHl  can roc..dily be  obtr..i:;.lecl  i'ror.1 
the  loca.l  I:~chiucry dealer  or  t.hroueh  -t,he  Ulster  ~~a.rr:1~rs  1  U:.lion.  ]'or  other· 
loc.:ns,  it is necessar.f to apply to  the :UeyGrtr.!cnt itself. 
2.  'l
1otnl i'i[;·ures  for all lot>:.ns  ":7ero  bet,-,;ee:l  £9 n:illion  a:.::d  £10  millio:-1  (1970)  s.:-.c., 
in 19?4,  l~12.o million. 
3.  'l'he  accou:n.-!:,s  sho'r arrears  oi'  £50,781  n.s  at.  31  Larch,  1974,-tho  balance not ye-v 
due at thr.t date  bcin~ £2,4'7'3,74-5. - 185-
B:  Future .~~volution in the field of Agricul·t.t~ra~d:i.t 
Ch~pter 6:  ]'uture  DcveloEments  in the CaJ!ital  JvJa.rket  and  Possible J!  .. £tislat:!.ve 
_Qhanges 
Attempting to forecast what ,.,ill happen in the future 'is extremely 
difficult,  even for  economists that have  a  certain flair for intuitive 
judgements that s orne times turn out to be right.  In trying to  adumbrate  tho? 
future  capital needs  of agriculture and general  developments  in the United 
Kingdom  capital marlcet  to  1985  and  beyond,  all that the  p:!'esent author  can do 
is to identify some  of  the more  probably significant  or influential factors 
operating now  or likely to be  relevant in the years  ahead. 
Even if one  limits  oneself  in this way,  it is apparent that one  can  onl)-
proceed  on  the basis  of stated assumptions  tha.t  have at least some  degrea  c,f 
relevance.  The  assurnpti ons  that it is intended to make  wi 11  be  of  t1vo  kind.s: 
(a)  those deriving from  an analysis  of  our recent  experience  in the  economic 
field;  and 
(b)  those  deriving  from prescriptions that  one  might  put  for\varcl  as  sensible 
means  of bringing the present inflationary process  more  under control. 
More  positively, it is maintained  that, unless the  most  highly inclus-t.riali sed 
countries in the world do  bring inflation under  control,  there will be a  major 
financial and  economic  crash,  which will result in heavy tmemployment  that is 
likely to persist for  a  period of years.  Rather than run the risk that this 
might happen, it is assumed that the  governments  of the 1-1orld 1 s  major  econorr~es  i--:. _ 
be prepared to take effective action  calculat~d to eradicate inflationo  It will 
also be  assumed that the United Kingdom  wi 11  in fact stay \vi thin the European 
E.~onomic Community. 
Furthermore,  it is assumed - as is consistent with an inflationary 
situation - that there will be  continuing pressure  on the balance  of  payments. 
But this is a  symptom  rather than a  cause  of Britain's difficulties, - 186-
even  though in a  very  'open'  economy  the effects are  obviously most 
direct.  Nevertheless,  it is argued that the  main '-vay  in 1-vhich  to Tesolve 
the  problem of  continuing balance  of  payments deficits is to bring under 
control  (e.g.  by monetary and fiscal means)  the  inflationary pressures 
within the domestic  economy.  Other factors  may  modify the situation -
more  aggressive selling of  exports  (e.g.  by meeting delivery dates  and 
providing better post-sales servicing arrangements),  a  greater  emphasis  on 
the  domestic  production of  foods  and feedstuffs,  or the advent  of  North  Sea 
oil - but the major attack must  be  by restoring to health the domestic 
economy.  If that can be  achieved,  the balance  of  payments.will  look after 
itself. 
An  attempt to forecast the future  capital needs  of United Kingdom 
agriculture is not a  task that can be  undertaken in a  vacuum.  Some  attempt 
must  therefore first be  made  to establish what kind  of_  economic  climate is 
likely "to  obtain over the next ten to  twen-ty  years.  In general terms,  the 
answer  can be  given  on the basis  of  our  expectations with regard to the 
continuance  of inflation.  In this context,  the  most  obvious  expectation 
might  have  been further inflation and maintenance  of the  upward trend in 
world prices.  Quite  apart from the more  recent impact  of food  and  raw  material 
shortages,  the pressure  on scarce resources that has  been a  characteristic  of 
the whole  post-World War  II experience  - especially up to the  end  of  the  1960s 
would be  sufficient to  explain much  of the  upward  pressure  on  prices.  Initially, 
there were  the  immense  needs  of  post-war reconstruction to  be  met;  latterly, 
it has been a  pressure for higher  standards  of  living.  Over  these years, 
societies have  tended to become  more  affluent and,  over much  of the period, 
employment has been maintained at relatively high  levels.  In these 
circumstances,  domestic  consumption is also  likely to  be at high levels.  This 
1  'applies not  only to  the basic  essentials of food  and clothing,  but also to 
1.  The  demand  for the basic foods,  it may  be  argued,  is relatively inelastic, 
though this is  less true  of  'convenience'  foods.  But there is also likely 
to be an upward  pressure  on  food  consumption due  to  an  increasing world 
population. - 187-
housing and all the  incidental tools  of  living and gadgetry  (indeed,  in 
recent years,  the more  affluent have  frequently acquired a  second home  and 
furnishings);  again,  there is the family car  (and,  until the  energy crisis, 
increasingly a  second car);  and,  in the  public  sector,  expenditure  on defence, 
the social services, hospitals,  schools  (and other educational establishments), 
not to mention a  variety of  social amenities  (like  opera and  concert halls, 
community  and  sports centres,  and libraries), as well  as  communications  like 
sea and air ports and additional television and radio services.  Moreover, 
if there is to  be  consumption,  there must  be  investment - the  use  of  goods 
for the  production of further goods  and  services  - tl1e  importance  of which 
has  been increasing partly because  of a  technological  revolution and the 
incidence  of  obsolescence.  This  need to invest directly in the industrial 
process  (lrhich  includes agriculture) will be  there vhether  or not  industries 
are nationalised.  Finally,  there are the  demands  of  the 'l
1hird \·lorld.  For 
all these  reasons,  in relation to the  competing  demands  being made  upon them, 
resources are scarce.  In the  capital markets,  this means  that there will be 
strong upward  pressures  on interest rates,  modified perhaps at times when 
monetary and economic  policy force  up unemployment  and  create a  situation 
of temporary  reli~f from the  upward  pressure  on  prices.  It was  on these  groU11ds 
1  that  one  was ·able to forecast  some  five years ago  that money  rates  of  interest 
would  move  permanently to  a  higher  leveland,  despite  some  fluctuation,  would 
move  for the foreseeable  future within ahigher band.2 
Is there any  reason why  we  ·should  now  modify this forecast?  There are 
t'\'10  possible  reasons for  doing  so.  First, there  does  seem to be  less confidene;e 
1.  See J.S.G.  Wilson,  "The  Long-Term Future  of Interest Rates  in a  High 
Consumption gconomy"  published in L'avenir de  ).'Epargne  dans  la  societ~ 
de  consommation by Groupement  International Pour L'Etude  des  Probl~mes 
de  L'Epargne,  being proceedings  of a  Colloquium held at Munich  in October 
1969.  Brussels,  1970,  pp.  61-70. 
2.  In real terms,  however,  there has  probably been  some  fall. - 188-
about the future  both in Britain  and  in key w·orld  economies  like ·the  United 
States of America  and Japan.
1  Second,  there is the  possibility that we  are 
at the beginning 
2  of the  downward  sweep  of  one  of Kondratieff's  'long \raves'. 
So  far as Britain is concerned,  the  lack of  confidence  may  only be  a 
short- or at worst  medium-term  phenomenon.  It may  well be  based as  much  as 
anything  on  a  lack of political leadership.  But there is clear ev1dence  of 
gloom.  For  example,  the Confederation  of British Industry in surveying 
industrial prospects has  spoken  of  "a striking collapse in business  optimism" 
with a  deterioration in investment intentions and the value  of  expected new 
orders  "conspicuously weak".3  This  reading  of the  situation was  subsequently 
confirmed by the Financial Times  Monthly Survey of Business  Opinion also 
4 
published in August  1974  ~nd not materially amended  by later surveys.  Over 
the  medium-term,  the  Organisation for Economic  Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)  had forecast  in its bi-annual Economic  Outlook a  recession in Britain 
during the winter  of  ~974/75, with rising unemployment  and record rates  of 
5· 
inflation.  Heanwhile,  in the United States, analysts at the National Bureau 
of Economic  Research have  been trying to  gauge  economic  prospects  over the 
next ten years  or so.  In their view,  there will be  a  significant &owing  down 
in economic  expansion. 
"The  overriding fact that  emerges  from various  studies  of the country's 
long-term  economic  outlook is that a  marked  slowdown  in growth will occur 
late in the  1970s  and continue ,.,ell  on  into the  1980s. 116 
For  major  industries,  the  slowdo'<Tn  might  be quite traumatic.  One  indust~ that 
is most  likely to suffer is the United States automobile  industry,  which  in 
1.  See,  for  example,  "Inflation and Stagnation in Hajor Foreign Industrial 
Countries'',  in Federal Reserve Bulletin,  Vo~ 60,  Noo  10,  October  1974. 
2.  See Gottfried Haberler,  Prosperity and  Depression,  Third EnlargeclEdition. 
(Geneva,  1941),  pp.  272-4;  also Joseph A.  Schumpeter,  Business  Cycle~, New 
York,  1939,  Vol.  I,  pp.  164-5,  and 170. 
3.  See  The  Times  and Financial Times  2/8/74. 
4.  Financial  Times  5/8/74. 
5.  See  The  Times  24/7/74. 
6.  See Financial Times  9/8/74. - 189-
addition to  other factors will be  affected by the  likelihood of still 
higher fuel costs,  the  backlash of air pollu·ti on  problems,  and  increasingly 
congested roads.  Amongst  the  other factors  of  importance is the projected 
decline in the United States birth rate, which began in the late  1950s~
1 
If this persists,  the rate  of  growth in the  labour force will fall to 1.5  per 
cent.  per annum  in 1974/80 and to below 1  per cent.  per annum  during the 
1980/85  period  (as  compared with nearly 2  per cent.  per  annum  from  1965  to 
1973).  Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  other industries where  gro,rlh is  expected 
to be  slow include furniture,  household appliances,  and clothing.  On  the 
other hand, it was  expected that the  demand  for housing  would  be  maintained. 
About  the  same  time,  Japan was  officially reported to be at  11an historic 
turning point,  because its miraculously high  economic  growth had  come  to an 
end. 11  'fhis was  said to be  largely due  to the  sharp rise in the prices of 
commodities that put an  end to the nation's spectacular  economic  expansion. 
And  the Economic  Planning Agency,  which put  out the report in an  economic 
W11ite  Paper'argued that Japan should transform its industrial structure 
(as  may  well be  necessary also in the United Sta·tes)  with  more  emphasis  on 
social welfare and  economising in the  of  2  use  resources. 
What  now  of  the possibility that we  are at the beginning  of the 
downward  swe~p of  one  of Kondratieff's  'long ,..,aves 1?  The  evidence for these 
long waves  is statistical; the  reasons  for them appear  to be various.  Indeed, 
they may  be  due  to the impinging  of a  successbn of  exogenous  forces,  with 
little similarity of pattern frozn  one  period to the next,  but  inducing a 
reaction from the industrial system that results in fluctuations  {be  they in 
the form  of the shorter inventory cycles  or the nine  to twelve year  'business 
1.  In the United Kingdom,  the population is unlikely to change very much  from 
its present level of  just over  56  million between 1974 and  1981  and, 
between 1981  and  2011,  there is likely to be  a  slm-r  increase which will 
result in a  rise in the  population to 60.75  million at the  end  of  the  period 
-a rise of  about  8.5 per cent.  (See  The  Registrar General's Quarterly 
Return for England and Wales,  No.  501,  Appendix F.)  But again for 
demographic  reasons,  there is likely to be  some  diminution in the  rate of 
growth. 
2.  See  Financial  Times  10/8/74. - 190-
cycle') about  a  long  wave  trend  of  perhaps  50  years  in length.  If there 
is this  50-year recurring pattern 1-Ti th an upswing  lasting some  20 years 
follmved  by  30  years  \.'n  a  receding "'ivave,  the evidence  suggests that the 
United States  (if not  the rest of the world)  is likely to be  moving  about 
1975  on to the  downward  part  of the  long wave.  The  first of these great 
50-year cycles as  reflected in major  indicators like the  levels  of 
production,  wages,  and  prices  began about  the  1780s  and  ran to 1844/51. 
The  second went  to about  1890/96.  The  third cycle  reached its peak with 
1  World  War  I,  then slid into the Great  Depression of the  1930s.  It should 
have  ended in the  1950s,  if the  New  Deal  and llorld 'var II had not brought 
it to a  premature  end around 1940.  But if we  date  the upswing  from about 
1950,  the  do\vnward  phase  of  the  long 1vave  will begin about  1975  and last much 
of the rest of the century.  At  first, there "'i·lill  be  a  moderation in the 
rate of increase  of prices,  followed  by depression in the  1980s.  And  this 
is not  too greatly different from  some  of the  other forecasts for the United 
States  economy,  upon ;.,hich  the  prosperity of  much  of the rest of the  \'lor ld 
depends. 
This :is  interesting as  far as it goes,  but can 1·Te  now  find tangible 
reasons  to support  such  a  statistical projection?  First, there are  the 
effects of a  declining rate  of  population growth  in the United States  (and 
possibly in other countries);  this would  remove  one  of the  most  obvious  of 
the  stinrulants to  economic  expansion and these effects  can only be  offset by 
a  greater degree  of  restructuring of the  economy  (e.g.  to  meet the specific 
needs  of an ageing population)  than trade unions  and industrialists "'ivill  be 
willing - or able  - to  countenance,  since  few  vested interests are in fact 
1.  "Historically,  the first Kondratieff covered by  our material means  the 
industrial revolution,  including the protracted process  of its absorption. 
We  date it from the  eighties  of the eighteenth century to 1842.  The 
second  stretches  over what  has  beencalled the age  of  steam and steel.  It 
runs its course  between 1842  and  1897.  And  the third,  the Kondratieff  of 
electricity,  chemistry,  and motors,  we  date  fro1Jl  1898  on.  These  datings  do 
not  lack historical justification.  Yet  they are not  only tentative,  but 
also by nature  merely approximate."  Schumpeter,  op.  cit., p.  170. - 191-
capable  of reacting with s ufficien·b  speed to the  requirements  of  structural 
change.  Second,  and  on the  side  of Government,  one  of the results  of the 
impact  of inflation may  -vrell  be  the  recognition by the authorities in a 
number  of  countries  of the  need for greater fiscal and monetary discipline. 
There  may  also be  a  tendnecy to ac·cept  some  lov.rering  of  sights,  if not  some 
reduction in the material standard of  living.  1'hus,  there may  be  cut-backs 
in Government  expenditure affecting defence,  education,  the social services, 
housing,  and roads.  This w·ill  obviously affect levels  of demand,  much  of 
'\orhich  is  initiated by public  expenditure.  And  this will in turn influence 
attitudes towards  investment,  lTithout which the  engine  of  gro"\vth  will be 
missing.  This  may  be  offset to  some  extent by lmver taxation,  but in an 
uncertain world this may  tend to be drained off into savings  that are in 
excess  of the investment being undertaken.  Although it is unlikely that there 
would be  a  reduc·tion J.n  the rate at ¥Thien  innovations  come  fOMvard,  it is 
probable that there might  be  a  discinclination to introduce them into the 
industrial process  and to  ensure that they w·ill  become  commercially as well 
as technically viable.  The  disinclination to invest "\vi ll also  have  been 
affected by the  impact  on  costs  of the  energy crisis, resulting in Britain 
and Japan in some  loss  of competitiveness in export prices.  It is this 
range  of factors  that seemingly has  led to the failure  of  confidence  and 
leadership that has  persuaded industrialists and  economists  to become 
prophets  of  doom. 
At  the  same  time,  if recent  experience is any indication,  the British 
(and possibly other)  economies  may  not in fact wholly rid themselves  of 
inflation even though they are prepared toaccept measures  of fiscal and 
monetary discipline.  In short,  they may  find that,  despite a  measure  of 
deflation and  unemployment,  they still experience an  upward pressure  on  prices 
and continue to  suffer from the phenomenon  of  'stagflation'.  This  was  the 
change  that seemed to be in evidence  from the  early 1970s  onwards.  In Britain, 
a  more  optimistic  note has  latterly been struclt,  because  of the anticipated 
favourable  influence  of North Sea  oil.  This will not really have all that - 192-
much  effect until the early  1980s  and it 'wuld in any case  be  unwise  to expect 
this source  of  energy to  resolve all our  difficulties.  Also,  North Sea oil 
is already proving to be  enormously expensive  to  develop,  in addition to 
which. there are  the huge  debts that 1'/estern countries are meanwhile  incurring 
to the oil producing nations.  lvhen  North Sea oil finally comes  on stream, 
there "t-Till  be  a  lot of  debt and capital to service and the oil may  not 
turn out to be  as  cheap as has  sometimes  been assumed.  In addition,  there 
may  have  been some  fall in oil prices by then,  so that the returns against 
which  to set off the costs may  well be  lower than anticipated.  But oil 
revenues will remove  a  major  pressure  on the  then current balance  of  payments. 
It is pertinent,  therefore,  to look in a  little more  detail at this 
recent phenomenon  of  'stagflation', which  may  yet turn out to be  consistent 
witha  Kondratieff  long wave  theory that anticipates the probability that the 
entire Kondratieff cycle might  be lifted on  to  a  new  plateau,  such that future 
upward  and downw-ard  waves  JVill  b.e  at higher real  levels  of  income  than formerly. 
And  within this context,  the United States and other industrial countries might 
now  look forward to a  decade  of  more  stable prices  (it ~ight be  possible again 
to reduce  the rate of increase in prices to more  acceptable proportions), with 
balanced budgets and a  slowing down  of the rate of increase in the money  supply, 
but with slowly rising percentages  of  unemployment.1 
Probably not very many  economists would  today subscribe to the view 
that relatively high unemployment  levels  should be  invoked as  a  means  of 
applying discipline within the  economy.  Nor  is it socially desirable that 
the weapon  of unemployment  should be  so  employed  - not in this day and age. 
Yet  greater fiscal and monetary discipline is likely to discourage  investment 
and to  induce  higher  levels  of  unemployment.  At the  same  time,  as we  have  seen 
n recent years,  an  economy  may  experience  a  significant amount  of unemployment 
·and  still suffer from inflation. 
In this connection, it is worth  perhaps  loolcing again at the theory that 
attempted to  relate levels  of  unemployment to the rate of  change in money  ~~ge 
1.  See  Paul  Lewis  in Financial Times  1/8/74. - 193-
rates and which was  illustrated by the Phillips Curve.  When  the demand 
for  labour is high and there are few  unemployed,  ,.,e  should expect  employers 
to bid up wages  quite rapidly.  Conversely,  when the demand  for  labour ·is 
low  and  \memployment  is high,  '\vorkers it 1-ras  assumed w·ould  be  reluctant  to 
offer their services at less than the prevailing rates,  so that l·Tage  rates 
fell only very slowly.  Hence,  the  relation between unemployment  and the 
rate  of  change  of wage  rates was  likely to be  highly non-linear.  On  the 
basis  of statistical evidence  over the period 1861-1957,  Professor A.,.,.  Phillips 
then proceeded to argue that,  generally speaking,  the rate  of change  of  money 
wage  rates could be  explained by the  level of  unemployment.  Furthermore, 
if one  assumed  an  increase in productivity of  2  per cent.  per annum,  Phillips 
suggested that stable prices would have  been achieved  over the  period studied 
1  with a  level of  unemployment  a  little over 2t  per cent.  By  implication, 
if levels  of  unemployment  were  higher than that,  there  should have  been 
some  tendency for prices to fall.  And  over recent years,  we  have at times 
had levels  of  unemployment  higher than 2! per cent.,  but we  have also 
continued to experience a  rising price level.  'fhy? 
Why,  in other words,  does  unemployment  no  longer bite in the way  it 
once  used to?  Almost  certainly, it is because  of  changes  that have  taken 
place in our social fabric  - changes which  have  considerably modified the 
bases  on which the Phillips  Curve  was  constructed.  Whether  unemployment  is 
due  to  redundancy or  strikes,  the worker  (and his family)  are now  protected 
in a  variety of 11ays.  If a  man  loses his  employment  - or declines to  be 
employed  - he will first of all become  entitled to  income  tax rebates.  If he 
is made  'redundant',  there are  redundancy  payments.  In addition,  on  behalf 
of his wife  and family,  he  is entitled to  receive  supplementary benefits 
(which  cover rent and various  other  outgoings that can be  financed at the 
1.  A.W.  Phillips,  "The  Relation Between Unemployment  and the Rate  of  Change  of 
Noney  Wage  Rates  in the United Kingdom,  1861-1957",  Economica,  November,  1958 - 194-
discretion o.f  the  Supplementary Benefits  Com.~11ission;  there is also a  scale 
rate to keep the wife,  plus  amounts  that vary with the age  of  each child). 
Finally,  and helping to maintain a  minimwn  level of  income,  there are 
family allowances.  This  is  not  to argue against the  social services; it is 
merely to  remark  on  reasons  w·hy  unemployment  does  not  exert a  downward 
pressure  on wn.ges  and  "\olhy  the Phillips Curve  may  no  longer apply. 
In addition,  in a  situation where  prices are rising fairly rapidly and 
persistently,  the  effects  of  expectations  must  be  taken into account.  :t-lost 
simply,  if prices have  been rising  in the  past,  there is the expectation that 
they w·ill  go  on  rising in the future.  As  a  result,  people rush to get  out  of 
money  and  into goods.  Indeed,  if this process continues,  ultimately money 
will be  rejected altogether.  Ncanwhile,  the expectation that prices will 
continue  to rise results in a  continuing upward pressure  on wages  - to offset 
or  more  than offset rising prices  - and this is like"Iy to happen ,.,hatever the 
unemployment situation might  be. 
Hence,  there was  a  further  major reason  to~pect a  modification of  the 
Phillips Curve  analysis.  And  this  ~~s  refle~ted in the  development  of 
economic  theory during the  second half  of the  1960s.  Account was  now~ken 
of  the fact that although money  wages  are  determined by negotiations ,.,i thin 
the  framework  of  a  competitive  labour ma:tket,  both sides in the labour market 
will be attempting to influence real wages.  On  this basis,  certain economists1 
began to put forward the hypothesis that the rate  of  change in money  wages 
will be  equal to the expected rate of  change in prices,  plus  a  further 
adjustment that "\-Tould  depend  on the  degree  to which there "'as  an  excess  d.emand 
for labour  (it would  tend to increase the  lower was  the  unemployment  rate). 
Additional work by  some  of the }hnchester  moneta~ economists2  suggested that 
1.  See,  in particular,  Hilton Friedman in American Economic  Review,  :t<Iarch  1968, 
pp.  11-17 and E.  Phelps  in Economica,  August  1967,  pp.  254-281. 
2.  See J.  N.  Parkin,  N. T.  Sumner  and R.  1-Tard, "llage Behaviour in an Open  Economy: 
Excess  Denmnd,  Generalised Expectations  and  Incomes  Policies  in the UK", 
University of Nanchester Inflation Workshop  Discussion Paper 7402;forthcoming 
in K.  Brunner and A. H.  Nel  tzer  ( eds. ) ,  Proceedings  of the  Conference  on ''!age-
Price Controls  at Rochester  University,  Hovember  1973. - 195-
expectations  about price  changes  should be  based  on  a  1vider  range  of  expcrienc e 
that inc  lucled  both retail and  domestic  "l·lholesale  pr:i.c cs,  export  pric cs, 
income  and  payroll type  taxes,  and purchase taxes.  Furthermore,  they 
argued that expectatiOiiS  about  inflation are  formed  by an  'error learning' 
process,  in which ''the  expected inflation rate at the  time  a  wage  decision is 
nade  is the same  as that previously held plus  some  adjustment for  the  extent to 
1  which that previous  expectation turned out to be  w-rong."  They also accepted 
the  view,  for "lvhich  there was  a  lot of historical evidence in previous 
inflations, that if the  economy  is operating  "·with  permanent  excess  demancl, 
that is with unemployment  permanently belo"r its equilibrium level,  then 
inflation vlill not  simply be  persistent, it _"vill  persistently accelerate 
2  and,  eventually,  lead to money  having no  value at all." 
If one  looks at the  problem  of inflation realistically,  there can  be 
little doubt  that  one  of the  main  causes is the progressive rise in money 
incomes  derived from "lvages  and salaries.  There  has  at times  been a  lot of 
talk aoout cost-push inflation,  but costs are also  incomes  to  those  "lvho 
receive these payments.  So  that inflation is often quite as  much  demand-pull 
as  cost-push.  The  two  in fact go  together,  though the  emphasis  may  be  - and 
often is - more  on  the  one  than on the other.  Again,  one  can attribute the 
current situation at least in part to the  emergence  of new  social attitudes. 
This  came  with the affluent society of the  post-war years,  which  stood out in 
sharp contrast against the grim days  of the 1930s  and the war  years,  and built 
up  expectations  of a  happier "lvorld.  'ro  some  extent,  we  have  achieved a 
wealthier, if not a  happier,  world.  The  difficulty has  been that much  of  the 
population expects  income  and wealth to  go  on  increasing,  but it is not ahrays 
appreciated that for this to happen there  must  be  positive action - both 
employees and managers  must  be  prepared to work for it and there must  be  a 
1.  These hypotheses  have  now  been tested empirically by Parkin  and  others  and 
with some  success.  For a  useful bibliography in this field,  see  Nation~ 
Westminster  Banl..:  Quarterly H.evim·T,  Nay  1974,  pp.  45-47. 
2.  Nichael  Parkin,  "United Kingdom  Inflation:  The  Policy Alternatives", 
National lTestminster Bank  Quarterly Review,  Jvlay  1974,  p.  39. - 196-
rela-ted amount  of  nel.r  investment.  In this respect,  the 1vorld has  not 
changed very much,  but expectations have  and these  expectations a.re  being 
disappointed.  Frustration flares  up  into strikes and bloody-mindedness. 
Trade  unions  are prepared to tolerate a  rather higher  level  of  unemployment 
(whether voluntary or not)  in order to increase - or at least maintain -
the  living standards  of those in employment. 
Tlris is not  the whole  story.  Related to it is the feeling in a  growing 
number  of  sectors  of the  economy  that '"ages  are too  lo1-1  in relation to the 
importance  of the w·ork  being done  (e.g.  in the hospitals and the schools) 
and to the cost of living.  Much  of this feeling is justified and,  if a 
sense  of fairness  is to  be  impaxted to the social contract, it is implied 
that the  lolrest  levels  of wages  should be raised  (there may  indeed be  a  need 
to introduce  a  minimum  1-rage  to protect the interests of the  lmvest paid 
workers,  which  minimum  should be  adjusted from time  to time  lvi th a  view to 
maintaining its real value).  Fa.irness would also  imply some  concern for the 
maintenance  of differentials,1  even though the trend is towards  greater 
equality within the  frammvork  of the wages  structure,  as  a  result of w·hich 
many  in the higher and  perhaps  middle  income  groups  are likely to suffer 
some  diminution  of  living standards.  Indeed,  relative wages  is one  of the 
most  intractable of problems.  \vages  never do  move  upvTards  precisely in s-tep. 
Some  workers  put in a  claim earlier than others and for larger amounts.  Some 
get rises earlier than others  and for larger amounts.  There  is no  easy 1vay 
of keeping _all  these  competing  claims  in line and still maintaining margins 
for skill and responsibility. 
But if a  sense  of fairness  is to be  restored to  society,  1-re  must 
attempt to synchronise wages  claims  and thereafter make  arrangements for their 
1. If wages  are linked to productivity  (see  below)  there will neces."Sarily be son:e 
erosion of differentials and,  indeed,  that is the  long-term trend.  At  the 
same  time, it is agreed that some  attention must  be  given to differential 
payments; otherwise, there may  well be  a  marked falling off in the  supply of 
skills and of people  prepared to accept responsibility. - 197-
regular revision.  The  most  obvious  vTay  of  doing this is a  prices and 
incomes  policy that relates  increases in wages  and salaries to  achieved 
increases  in productivity.  It is true that not all jobs  lend themselves 
to increases in productivity.  Nursing  and  education probably do not.  And 
there are  others.  But  these callings  could readily be  accommodated within 
the framework  of the policy outlined by awarding them regular increases in 
income  that accorded with movements  in a  general productivity index for the 
economy  as a  whole.  No  problem is insuperable.  It will be  argued that this 
policy has  been tried and failed.  The  truth of the matter is that it has  never 
really been  tried.  1ihen  ~tt.  George  Brown  (now  Lord George-Brown),  the 
Socialist politician, attempted to  introduce it in 1964,  few  realised what  he 
was  attempting to do.  Most  of the  commentators  - and many  economists  -
regarded it as  just another attempt to introduce  a  wages  freeze.  It was 
nothing of the  sort.  It was  an attempt at revolution and there can be  no 
long-term solution unless there is a  revolution - a  revolution in social 
attitumes and in thought. 
It has  been well  said that the problem is  one  of  social justice, not 
of economics.  "If people accepted that wages md  rm·rards  1-1ere  just and fair, 
a  lot of the  inflationa~ pressure would go.  But to get  such acceptance, 
great changes  would be  needed:  the distribution of  incomes  would  actually 
have  to ~  more  fair. 111  The  wages  of the  lm.r  paid would need to  be  raised; 
an attempt would have  to  be  made  to get relative wages  on  to  some  kind of 
acceptable basis,  so that not too  many  workers were  out  of line;  and there 
would  probably have  to  be  some  levelling down  of top salaries.  Then the 
distribution of  incomes  might  be  seen to be  more  fair.  To  assist in this 
Herculean task,  we  might well require some  kind  of  independent Industrial 
rourt,  which would also  be in a  position to  see that further increases  in wages 
1. Bernard Crick in The  Observer 4/8/74. - 198-
were  only awarded when  there '\·Tere  achieved increases in productivity 
to  offset them.  One  could expect,  too,  that increases  in productivity 
would  tend to  take  place in industries 1-rhich  were  expanding  in response  to 
changing  patterns  of  demand. 
Another  means  of  ensuring fairness  might  be widespread resort to 
1 indexa-t,ion',  '"hereby prices  (like  rents  and rates  of  interest)  and  incor::es 
(such as ,.,ages  and salaries  )would  be  revised to  take  into account  changes  in 
th  t  f  1 .  .  l  e  cos·  o·  1v1.ng.  This  mig~L well  be  supported by the widened use  of 
1 inflation accounting  1 ,  '\vhich  '\vould,  for  exa1nple,  attempt to calculate 
profits and depreciation allmvances  on  a  real basis  and to deflate 
2  appropriately magnitudes  stated in inflated monetary values.  It may  be 
thought that acceptance  of  'indexation'  is an  acknowledgement that inflation 
has  come  to~~ay- an admission  of  defeat,  but it need not be.  On  a  limited 
basis,  indexation has  been tried before.  Thus,  in Finland,  which suffered 
from serious inflation throughout  much  of the earlier post-war period  (incleecl, 
the  'real'  rate  of  interest was  negative for  every year - except  1949  -
from  1938 to 1951),  the  banl\.s  decided in 1952  to  investigate the possibility 
of tying interest rates  for deposits  and business  loans  to the  cost of  living 
index.  If the  index  rose  above  a  specified level  as at a  specified date,  the 
banl\.s  vrould  apply a  surcharge  to the  ordinary interest rate charged to 
borrm·rers.  At  the  same  time,  they would grant their  depositors appropriate 
compensation in the  form  of  a  higher rate  of interest on  deposits.  The  sche-:::e 
was  first introduced in 1955  by the provincial  savings  banl\:s  and co-operatiYe 
credit societies.  The  cornmercial  banl\.s  also agreed to  offer these facilities 
1.  The  assets that have  been most  vddely suggested as  suitable for correc'!:Lon 
are Goverru'Tient  securities,  debentures,  savings  in life insurance  or buildir:.;-
societies,  and bank  loans and deposits.  In fact,  the United Kingdom 
Government  announced  hw forms  of  index--linked savings  schemes  on August  6, 
1974.  But there are  many  unresolved questions  surrounding  indexation,  not 
least of ,.,h:i.ch  is the  measure  of  inflation that should be  chosen - incleX  c-:f: 
retail prices  or  of wholesale  prices,_ or the gross  domestic  product  defla~~~~ 
all of wh:ichhave  tended to rise at different rates, withoocelerations  n.21d. 
decelerations that have  not been  synchronised.  See  Tim 
1Congdon  in 'l'he  '~i<.-.es 
8/8/74  •. 
2.  Some  steps have  now  been taken in this d.irection in the  November  1974  Budge~ 
to allow for  increases  in the value  of  stocks  on vrhich tax is payable.  'Ihi  s-
will no,.,  be  limited to  10  per cent.  of the trading profit.  (See  Financial 
Times  13/11/74. - 199-
as from January 1,  1957  and at one  time  (mid-1958)  index-tied deposits 
·rose to  one-quarter of  the total.  Then,  as  greater monetary  stability 
was  achieved,  the  indeoc-tied deposit  began to lose its appeal,  since if 
prices  ceased to rise the  return was  1  per cent. ~  the rate paid on 
ordinary accounts,  ,.,hich 1vere  now  again preferred.  Hence  resort to 
indexation need not mean  accep-tance  of inflation as  a  permanent  phenomenon, 
though  one 1vould  feel. less  confident about  the  indexation of wages,  which  is 
likelytoresult in an inbuilt inflationary pressure  of the cost-push variety. 
1  This  reservation would apply,  for  example,  to the threshold payments  that 
have been triggered off by rises in the cost  of  living and 1vhich  lvere  added 
to the lvages  paid after April  1974 under Phase III of the Government  1 s 
incomes  policy. 
Even  so,  a  prices  ancl  incomes  policy. can  only '\otork  (vhether statutory 
or'not) if the need for it is widely accepted throughout the  economy.  And 
all of the  experience to  date suggests that there is not likely to be  such a 
general  acceptan~~.  P€rhaps,  if it was  seen to be fair and had  a  positive 
ingredient by  liru~ing increases  in wages  to achieved increases in productivity, 
a  more  widely based acceptance might  be possible,  but  so  long as  a  prices and 
incomes  policy is-only another  name  for wages  restraint,  no  amount  of 
propaganda will persuade the  public  that it can  ever  be  otherwise.  And  there 
is a  case for  propaganda,  since,  even if policy is  made  more  positive,  people 
must  be _persuaded to  accept it.  As  already indicated,  what is required is 
a  social  revolution;  attitudes can  only be  changed if there is a  persistent 
flow  of propaganda having that  end in view. 
If,nevertheless,  the Government  of the  day fails in persuading large 
sectors  of the  economy to accept  a  prices and  incomes  policy liruced to achieved 
~ncreases in productivity,  what  are the alternative weapons  in the fight 
against inflation?  Ve1~ simply,  if we  are not to face total  economic  collapse 
1.  The  formula  devised in October/November  1973  required the  payment  of  an 
additional  40_ p  per ,.,eek to all those  cor:1ing  under  the 'threshold agreements• 
for every percentage point by which the  increase in the cost of living 
since October  1973  exceeded 6  per  cent~ - 200-
as  a  result of  slipping into a  state  of hyper-inflation,  these  must 
consist  of  monetary  and fiscal disciplineo  It may  be  true that much  of 
·our  inflation has  been imported.  Basically,  one  might  argue  tho.t the  inflatione:.:t~. 
upsurge ,.,as  due  to the  conjunc·ture  of  poor to average  seasons  and bad to 
moderate harvests  (in the United States, Russia,  China and Australia, 
especially in 1972/73),  1  ,.rhich  greatly reduced the supplies  of  foodc;;and 
feedstuffs that were available to  meet  the  demand.  In addition,  there 
'·ras  much  speculative buying,  which forced prices still higher.  There '\'Tere  also 
increases  in the  demand  for non-food  raw  materials as  a  result of the world-
wide  increase in levels  of  output.  There  cmbe little doubt that commodity 
shortages triggered off the  sharp rise in prices that hit all world  economies 
in the  early 1970s,  but the  situation ,.,as  certainly exacerbated by monetary 
and fiscal indiscipline.  Moreover,  even an active  moneta1~ policy CRn  achieve 
little, unless it is permitted to  operate "Tithin an appropriate fiscal frame-
w·ork.  The  two  must  go -together. 
'vhat  do  '"e  mean  by monetary and fiscal  discipline?  If we  have  a  sudden 
cut-back in the  supply of  money  to the  economy,  necessarily there would  be  a 
sharp fall in economic  activity and heavy unemployment.  Hence,  there is much 
to be  said in an  inflationary situation for a  gradual reduction -say,  over a 
period of three to five  years -'in the supply of  money,  with the  object  of 
also reducing the rate  of inflation to  something in the  region of  3  to  5  per 
cent.  Obviously,  a  sharp deflationary cut-back in the money  supply will result 
in a  sharp rise in bankruptcies  and unemployment,  because  no  economy  can adjust 
overnight to  a  significant loss  of liquidity.  However,  even if the reduction 
in the  money  supply is gradual  - giving time  for adjustments to be  made  by 
industrial managers  - it would  seem  inevitable that as  flows  of  money  are 
reduced throughout the  economy there will have  to  be  some  cut-backs in economic 
-activity and in employment,  '-Ti th the  percentage  of  unemployment  also  rising 
gradually,  though hopefully it will be  possible to keep it within manageable 
1.  The  1973/74 harvests were better,  though  poor in China,  and  1974/75  cood, 
except for  maize  (corn)  and  soya in the United States. - 201-
1 
limits.  Ultimately,  a  degree  of  'equilibrium'  might  be  achieved. 
If 1-1e  assume  that a  1  per cent.  incree.se  in the price  level will 
generally lead to a  1  per cent.  increase in  the  demand  for  money  balances, 
1vhich  experience suggests  is a  relatively accurate basis  for forecasting 
and,  if further  one  assumes  an  economy  again grmving at something  lil~e its 
productive potential - say 3  to  3!  per cent.  per annum  - some  degree  of 
'equilibrium'  might 'l'rell  be  maintained 1vith a  money  supply permitted to 
increase by  (say}  6  to 8  per cent.  per anntm.  Again,  this would  imply not 
only action by the  monetary authorities to  contain the rate of growth in 
the  money  supply,  but also maintenance  of fiscal discipline. 
And  by fiscal discipline is meant  not merely a  balanced budget,  but 
one  in ,.,hich there is also  some  significant reduction in the  levels  of  public 
expenditure,  in order to alleviate the pressure  of demand  on scarce resources 
and thereby the real basis  of inflationary pressure,  which  monetary factors 
only· serve to exacerbate.  At the  same  time,  it must  be  remembered that all 
modern  'mixed'  economies  are geared to certain levels  of Government  expendittrre. 
If, therefore,  there are  cut-baclrs,  private industry will have  to adjust to 
a  ne1.r  situation and this may  again moan  unemployment.  Noreover,  this will be 
true 1vhether  or not we  are  on the  dmvnvard  sweep  of  a  Kondratietf  'long 
wave'.  Hence,  the need in this case also to reduce  public  expenditure 
gradually,  thereby releasing resources that  in due  course  may  well be absorbed 
by new  private investment geared to an expansion of production in the private 
sector.  Indeed,  ov-er  the  longer run and  especially if accompanied by tax cuts, 
lower rates  of interest,  and industrial retraining programmes,  this may  be  the 
---------------------------------------··---
1.  Cp.  Parkin's  vie1.r,  loc. cit., p.  43  "A  five-year cure  could probably be 
achieved from inflation rates aronnd 10 per cent  with  a  very small margin 
of 1Ulemployment." - 202-
me<~.ns  of  res-torinr;  confidence  to  the  }?J'iva.tH  sector,  inducing  an 
increasing quarrt1JJn  of  ne"·T  investment  and thereby an  increase  in productivity. 
If at the  same  time  industrial relations  can  be  improved,  the  economy  as  a 
'\vhole  '\·rill  be  able to benefit from  the fruits  of the  new  investment. 
What  is the  relevance  of  thfu arcument  for  nariculture?  In the first 
place,  as the  rise in prices is modol·atGd,  one  can  expect  some  reduction in 
the  ru:te  of  risr;!  in costs  nncl  hopefully  some  '\•lid.ening  of profit margins. 
Secondly,  one  '\\1ould  expect  interest rates to fall to  lm-1er  levels  - pa.rtly 
for  monetary reasons,  but also bGcause  of the  reduced pressure  on resources 
deriving  from  ·the  lmv-er  luvels  of  public  expenditure.  It is lmlikely that 
money  rates  of  interest '\·ti 11  eve-r-- dec line again to  (say)  the levels  of  the 
early 1960s  ('\·lhcn  the  clearing hanks'  'blue chip'  rate varied betw·een  4-}  and  7-1 
per  cent.),  but  one  might  reasonably anticipate that they would be  low·er  than 
13  to  131  per cent.  (1974).  Perhaps,  they mir,ht  be  expected to  move  within 
a  band above  and  belm"  10  per  cent.  (perhaps  from  8  to  12  per cent.).  At 
such levels  - a.nd  given  o.pppropriately remunerative  end-prices  for its 
products  - agriculture might '\vell  invest.  profitably in its  0'\vll  expansion. 
No'\·1  that '\ve  hav·e  considered probable  developments  in the  economy as  a 
whole,  it is appropriate to  discuss  some  of the  likely characteristics  of the 
agricultural industry in the United Kingdom  over  the  cominG years.  Necessarily, 
this will be  based  on trends that are currently in evidence,  but which  are 
· lil<;ely to be  maintained.  Alternatively,  some  attention might  be  given to 
possible reactions  to current phenomena  like the  high prices  of fertilizers 
and  of feedstuffs. 
At  the present time  in the  Unii.ed Kingdom,  small businesses still 
predominate  in agriculture mainly because agricultural technology does  not in 
general favour  large  pieces  of  equip:nent that yield physical  economies  of 
scale;  in addition,  close  personal  s1Jpervision by an  individual  owner  scorns 
to have  been  a  relatively efficient uay  of  promoting  the crovth of  crops - 203-
and  livestock in climatic  conditions ,.;here  decisions are best taken 
·frequently.  In recent years, it is true that the  most  profitable scale 
of production has  undc,.lbtedly increased.  notably for poultry and  pigs. 
Indeed,  if British agriculture were  now  to  be  organised ab  initio, it would 
probably consist  of a  much  smaller number  of businesses,  possibly with 
some  vertical integration.  The  rate of concentration of British agriculture 
"is limited in part by the natural  rate  of  retirement  of the  owners  of 
existing businesses;1  hence,  there will be a  tendency for the typical 
small-scale organisation to persist.  To  the  extent that this situation 
remains typical,  the majority of farm businesses will continue to obtain 
finance for additional capital formation  ei-ther  from retained earnings  or 
by borrowing.  It will not  be  practicable for  them to  obtain finance  by 
issuing  share capital as  is possible for quoted companies. 
Nevertheless,  the trend does  seem to be  in the  direction of a  gradual 
and continual reorganisation of agricultural capital into a  smaller number 
of larger businesses.  2"  This will probably be accelerated by t'·TO  factor~: 
(1)  the tendency for farm labour to drift from the  land though  one  might 
expect that the rate of drift will slm-1  down  - and quite materially;  and  (2) 
the related tendency for agricultural wages  to rise.  Thus,  over the period 
1960/62 to 1970/72,  the price to the farmer  of hired labour increased by 31 
1.  This is one·reason,  too,  ,.,hy  it is difficult for the young  man  to break into 
farming. 
2.  Analyses  of the June Agricultural Census  returns_indicate the concentration of 
agricultural capital into a  smaller number  of  larger businesses.  It is 
estimated that between  1967  and  1973  the  number  of full-time  farm businesses 
(i.e., those that broadly speaking  have  enoughcrops  and  livestock to keep at 
least one  man  fully occupied)  decreased from  183,000 to  164,000 and their 
average total acreage  rose  from  212  acres  to  237  acres.  This  concentration 
involved  exchanges  bet,<Teen  farmers  and  growers  of moveable capital and current 
inputs,  e.g.,  ~~chinery, livestock,  feeding stuffs,  though such transactions 
also  occur without  one  business  growing at the  expense  of another.  The  annual 
value  of these  exchanges  in the  United Kingdom  cannot be assessed reliably. 
But  in England and 1•fales  the value  of annual  transactions in agricultural 
land  (excluding that sold for non-agricultural purposes)  can be  stated,  from 
the compulsory returns to the  Inland Revenue,  to have risen from an average 
of £73 million for 687,500 acres  in 1962/64 to £165  million for 472,000 acres 
in 1972/74.  Cp.  J.S.G. 1'lilson, Availability of Capital and Credit to United 
Kingdom  AgricultLrre,  1973,  p.  4. - 204-
per cent.  relatively to the  price  of buildings  and  by  35  per cent. 
in relation to  the  price  of  machin2ry.  Since  a[;l·iculture  employs  only 
about  1.4 per cent.  of  the total hired labour force  in the  country,  the 
level  of agricultural hired earnings  is  set  largely by the  general  level 
of wages  elsewhere.  Hcanwhile,  the  number  of  persons  engaged in United 
Kingdom  agriculture fell from  about  993,000  in 1962  to about  710,000  in 
1972. 
In terms  of  structure,  "'·hat  is likely to  emerge  is a  dichotomy -
on the  one  hand,  one  might  expect  (at least in the  medium  term)  greater 
emphasis  on the  family farm,  '\>Ti th members  of  the family 1¥orking  regularly 
on  ·Lhe  farm;  indeed,  they already mal\.e  up  55  per cent.  of the total labour 
1  force  and this is thought to be  a  continuing trend;  on  the  other hand,  one 
would feel that there is scope  for  the  formation  of  many  more  public  companies 
in farming,  especially in areas  of  production where  large-scale  organisation 
is possible  - pigs,  poultry,  extensive dairying,  and the fattening  of 
livestoclq  'vhere big industrial farming  units are  formed  (and  this would  no-~ 
applying to extensive dairying,  where  the  operation  seems  to  grow  by building 
up  a  number  of  similarly sized dairy units),  one  would  expect  them to be 
organised under  professional  management  and  t.o  employ  a  small highly sldllc:cl 
lb  f  ..  d  t.]  2  a  our  orce  payJ.ng  1n us  r1a .  ,.,.ages.  Under  both  of  our main heads,  one 
would expect  a  greater resort to  labour-saving  rr~chinery and installations, 
some  of which may  be  significantly more  expensive  than in the past. 
Necessarily,  this shift towards  more  capitalfutensive production would result 
in agriculture making  greater demands  on  the  capital market,  though  there  rnuy 
be  reservations  about the extent to  ,.,hich the  ex]_;ansion  w-i 11  be  continuous  1 
since British agriculture is already fairly heavily capitalised.  Thus,  gross 
1~  See Ruth Gassen of the  Department  of Land Econonw,  Cambridge  University,  as 
reported  in Financial Times  15/11/73. 
2.  With  greater emphasis  on  family farms,  ~n the  one  hand,  and  on  industrial 
farming,  on the  other,  it is likely that there will be  additional reasons 
for  phasing  out  the  'tied cottage'.  This  may  reduce  the capital needs  of  the 
individual farming  enterprise,  which  may  be  able  to sell  off redundant 
cottages,  but a  population has  to  live somewhere  and,  for  the  economy  as  a 
vhole,  one  w·ould  not  expect any significant net change  in capital needs  on 
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a.nnua.l  investment in buildings,  works,  plant,  machinery,  and vehicles  in 
farming  rose  from  an average  annual  rate  of  about£1.60 million in the years 
1960-62 to  about£296  million in the years  1970-72.  Net  investment,  i.e., 
after deducting  estinmted depreciation provisions,  rose  from  an average  of 
£44 million to an  average  of  £79 million.  These  estimates reflect in part 
increases in the  cost of the capital goods.  In terms  of volume,  at constant 
1970 prices,  gross  investment  rose  from  £211  million to £267  million,  and  net 
investment from £60 million to £71  million.  To  some  extent,  of  course,  the 
level of  investment in buildings and  "\vorks  has  been further assisted by 
Government  grants.  It must also be  remembered that where  an  industry is 
highly capi  talisecl,  this w·ill require a  related provision for replacement 
and not all of this will necessarily derive  from depreciation allowances. 
Some  replacement  (e.g.  of  more  technologically advanc-ed  machinery)  may 
represent new  investment. 
However,  to the  extent that  contractors and syndicates  organise 
arrangements that will  economise  in the  use  of.  expensive  machinery  (and this 
may  well  pr'.~\Te  to  be  a  facility that '\vill  require  considerable  expansion,  if 
the  needs  of the family  farm are to be  met  at all adequately),  one  '\<Tould 
expect  some  lowering  of the  demand  for capital and credit,  but not  sufficient 
to offset the general trend towards  more  capital-intensive  production. 
Another.factor that nmy  lead to an  increasing demand  by agriculture 
for  more  capital is the transfer of agricultural land to non-agricultural 
uses, W1ich  has  the  overall effect of driving up the prices  of  land,  including 
those  of agricultural land.  Some  idea of the magnitude  of  the  problem is 
given by the fact that,  on  average  over the  period 1966/67 to  1970/71,  there 
has  been an armual  net~ansfer of  about  120,000 acres  of  land from  agriculture 
to non-agric.ul  tural uses.  About  60,000 acres  of this has  been used for forestry; 
of the remainder,  the  m~rity has  been for  such uses as building development 
and roads.  This  transfer mainly reflects the fact that,  in a  society where - 206-
real  income  per head is tending  to  grm·;r,  the  demand  for  housing and 
communications  gro1·Ts  more  rapidly than  the  demand  for agricultural 
products.  The  economic  value  of  land for building,  for  example,  has 
therefore been much  hi~her than for agriculture,  and.  without planning 
controls  the  amonntof  land transferred from agriculture would probably 
have  been greater.  The  total of  land so  transferred between 1962  and  1972 
represented 2  to  3  per cent.  of the total for crops,  grass,  and rough 
grazings in the United Kingdom  in mid-1972. 
The  other  a,ren.  of  consideration  where  speculation may  prove to  be 
profitable relates to possible reactions to the  high prices  of  fertilizers 
and  of feedstuffs.  ID1atever  the  basis  of  the fertilizer produced,  there 
have  been sharp rises  in the prices  of  raw  materials  during  1973/741  and, 
over the  longer  run,  one  must  expect this higher level  of  prices at least 
to be  maintained.  This applies  to  phosphates,  potash,  and  ammonia.2  Imported 
feedstuffs  include maize  and  soya  beans  - two  of the major  ingredients  of 
animal  feedstuffs  that are not grown to any  extent in Europe.  Again,  they 
have  been  subject to sharp price increases  due  to drought  in North America. 
It is possible that,  given a  somew·hat  different  emphasis  in farming 
methods,  British agriculture could becon1e  rather less  dependent  on  these 
i1nported  inputs  than has  been the  case  in recent years.  'l'hus,  greater resort 
1. Since  mid-~9'70,  the  price  of  phosrha..tic  roclc.:.  has  increased four times, 
which ~ill tend to  result in expanded  production - e.g.  Jordan,  where  there 
are  proposals  to triple  production by  1976  (See  Pinancial  Times  23/10/74); 
the price  of  potash has  gone  up  by  50  per cent.;  and  sulphur by 40  per cent. 
Fluctuations in the  world  price  of  ammonia  have  been erratic;  in any  event, 
the  price  of N in the United Kingdom  is largely determined by the  ICI  ammonic 
price,  although their supplies are  insufficient to  meet  the United Kingdom 
demand.  On  an averaged  index basis  (since there are-variations in the prices 
charged by the  major United Kingdom  manufacturers),  taking an  ex ,.,orl\:s 
FebrUc'1ry/Nay  prjce published June  1,  1970 as  equal to  100,  the  index for 
equivalent prices  published August  1,  1974 would  be  approximately as  follows: 
2:1:1  compound. 
l:l:lt  " 
34.  5~~N 
Index 
210 
220 
161 
(Note:  the  2:1:1 cornpound·consists  of N-20  units;  phosphate- 10 ,units;  and 
K =potash- 10 units.) 
2.  One  of the processes  for  ex-tracting hydrogen,  1!hich  is an essential 
component  in the manufacture  of  amm~nia, is  ba~ed on  the 'cracking'  of  . 
petroleum
1  the price of which has  r1sen  dr~mat1cal~y as  a  result  of  act1on 
recently taJ\en  by the  oil producing countr1es.  ~h1s  proc~ss replaced an 
older process  based  on ·steam and coke.  Hmvever,  1f the  pr1ce  of  petroleum 
becomes  too high,  doubtless there ,.;rill  be  a  resort to other methods  of 
extracting hydrogen. - 207-
could be  made  in  areas  of  mild climate to  the  use  of  certain crop 
plants  (e.g.  the  legume  family)  which will fix atmospheric  nitrogen in the 
soil by forming  nodules  on their roots.  Greater resort to  'natural' 
fertilizing agents1  may  therefore be  the  means  of  reducing to  some  small 
degree  dependence  on  imports  of  fertili~ers. 
However,  fertilizers still only represent a  relatively small  proportion 
of total input costs for all crops  and it nmst  be  emphasised that for 
intensive grassland management  the  sensible use  of fertilizer is still 
essential.  Indeed,  on  a  balance  of considerations,  more  will he  achieved by 
applying fertilizer even  more  intensively to.existing grassland,  provided 
more  efficient methods  are  employed  to conserve grass.  Hany  farmers  knovr 
how  togrow grass,  but they are not  so  expert at conserving it pl  .. operly.  For 
maximum·results,  too,  much  more  capital would  have to  be  applied to provide 
for  the  inwintering  of cattle on  an intensive basis. 
Alternatively,  on the basis  of  a  rotation of  temporary grassland 
(ley) with cereals and  other crops,  output  (largely of C$reals}  may  be 
dramatically increasedo2  Such  a  response to fertilizer is,  of  course, 
far more  typical  of the lower  grades  of arable  land,  which means 
1. See Financial Times  31/7/74;  also The  Times  14/8/74. 
2.  Although it may  be  regarded as  a  special case,  the author  could quote  the 
specific  example  of  a  784-acre  farm  on  the Yorkshire  "folds,  ·where  the 
original 7-year rotation of  Ley;  Ley;  Ley;  Cereals;  Cereals;  Fodder Roots; 
Cereals '\vas  replaced by a  rotation as  follo¥rs:  Ley;  Cerea.ls;  Cereals; 
Cereals;  Fodder Roots  or Potatoes;  Cereals;  Cerealso  Fertilizer application 
over  a  20-year  period was  increased from  40  tons to  over  150 tons  e  heanw·hile, 
cereals  output increased dramatically - n1ore  than three-fold - and.  lamb 
output  (on  a  smaller area  of grass)  by more  than  50  per  cento  Part  of the 
increase in cereal  output vTOuld,  of course,  be due  to improvements .in  plant 
breeding. - 208-
1  a  relatively high proportion of the total land in the  count~. 
Clearly,  \·That  "\·Te  need is the  more  cffecti  ve  management  of gra.sslan.u, 
such that it provides  a  significantly higher proportion of the feed required 
both by dairy cattle  ~nd animals for fattening.  Already a  large part of 
Britain's surface is under  grass,  but its potential has been some,vhat 
neglected.  The  agricultural area of the United Kingdom  is about  47  million 
acreas,  of w·hich  more  than .16 million are classified as  rough grazing,  which 
may  mean  almost anything.  Cropped areas  - farming and horticulture - total 
about  12  million acres  and  permanent  grass  amounts  to  approximately the same 
area.  In addition,  there are nearly 6  million acres  of temporary grass  (~tich 
will include  some  legumes)  that fit in to  mainly arable  or ley rotations. 
This  18 million acres  of  grassland can be  converted into cash  only through the 
animals  that consume  it to· provide 'vool,  milk,  or  meat  and,  over  recent years, 
the value  of British animal  production has  been three _times  as great as that 
from all types  of  cropping.  But  only half of it comes  from grass-eating 
ruminant  animals  cattle and  sheep.  In addition,  cattle get a  good  deal of 
bought-in feed  as 'vell.  Purthermore, it has  been calculated that the average 
production of  used feed  from  each acre is equivalent to about  a  ton  of grain, 
whereas  an  optimum  use  could achieve  the  eqtrivalent  of 3t  to  5  tons,  depending 
on soil, weather,  and  management.  Clearly,  the potential of the  18  million 
acres  of  grassland is still not being fully realised. 
Quality of  management  is the main key to the  situation.  Full use  means 
tal{ing not merely one,  but virtually a  series  of  crops  from the  same  field 
in a  single  season,  either by immediate  grazing  or for  conservation as  hay, 
silage,  or dried grass.  It involves at all times  of the year constant 
1.  The  national breakdown into grades  of  land is as  follows:  Grade  I  - 2.7 per 
cent.;  Grade II- 14.5  per cent.;  Grade III- 49.3  per cent.;  Grade  IV~ 
18.7 per  ce~t.;  and Grade V- 14.-8  per cent. 
The  land referred to in the  example was  Grade  III land. - 209-
adjustment betvreen supply and the  foocl  needs  of the stock.  Grass 
management  IIlc.'tY  look easy where  temperatures are not severe and rainfall 
is relatively plentiful.  But,  historically, it is said "it has  often beeE 
1vhere  the conditions are easiest thai management  has  been slackest and 
production furthest  from its potential."  1  The  big difficulty, therefore, 
~s persuading farmers  to manage  their grassland better.  There is a  lot of 
inertia and,  in many  cases,  a  lack of lmm"ledgc.  Although the costs  of 
improving grassland management  are not very great  compared with  the  costs 
of many  other  types  of  farming  improvements  (e.g.  buildings),  the rate of 
~mprovement may  continue to be at a  low  level.  ~ruch potential may  merely 
remain potential. 
This  might  be  backed up  by resorting to  a  ne1v  process  whereby 
grass-drying fuel costs can be  cut by 40  per cent.  and yield a  valuable 
protein by-product as  well as the usual high quality dried grass.  Indeed, 
it has  been suggested that utilizing the  by-product  from  just 10  per cent.  of 
Britain's grass acreage  could lead eventually to a  reduction  of a  third in the 
country's  imports  of protein feed.2  There  is still a  lot  of  work to  be  done 
before the final staple protein feed could be  produced  co~nercially, but the 
new  process  is distinctly relevant when  ,.,e  are  looking 10 to ·20 years  ahead. 
At  the  same  time-,  it should be  remembered that the capital  required is likely 
to be considerable.  Even  the  simplest single screw press  costs £6,000 to 
£8,000 to instal with a  throughput  of  only a  few  tons  per hour,  in addition 
to which  {apart from fuel  and fertilizers)  storage vill also be necessary. 
Another source  of  animal feed could conceivably be the  st::ca1-1  left after 
harvesting cereal ·crops  and which is currently burnt off.  Experiments  have 
shown  that by a  new  technique it could be  turned into a  valuable  ani111c.~l  feed. 
In other words,  a  high proportion of the  energy represented by the straw 
1.  See Leonard Arney  in a  Special Report  on Grassland Hanagement,  'rhe  Times, 
13/5/74. 
2.  See Financial Times  18/4/74. - 210-
could be  recaptured via -the  digestive  systems  of  farm  livestock.  Inclcccl, 
experiments at  Nottingh~un University and  else1-1hcrc  have·  shmvn  that up  to. 
20 per cent.  of the cereal grain in feedin[S  beef cattle and dairy cmvs  can 
be  replaced by barley straw just as it comes  from the field.  Some  farmors 
are also  overcoming the disadvantage  of its bulk by drying  and  grinding  i·f:i 
into a  fine  powder  for  use as  an  ingredient in livestock feeds.  1\Thile  this 
procedure  certainly reduces  bulk,  it does little to  overcome  straw's other 
major handicap - its high content  of indigestible fibre.  It has  been  lu"'lm~·n 
for  a  long time  that the digestibility of  this fibre  can be  greatly improved 
by treating the  stra'\i with alkali4  But the  problem has  been ho'\\7  to do  this 
economically '\rrthout  consuming  large quantities  of  energy.  Nov,  as  a  result 
of  a  ten-year research programme,  BOCM/Silcock,  animal  feedstuffs  manufacturers, 
are installing a  pilot plant in April  1975  to process barley stra1v up to 
20,000 tons  of  straw per  annlli~.  By  this  means,  it is hoped to  double the 
digestibility of the  straw·  a.nd  to produce  an  end-product  sui  table for use  in 
compounding  feeds.1 
Full exploitation of the grasslands will necessarily involve  new 
investment.  In particular,  the water  regime  may  need  con~ction and,  over 
most  of Britain,  drainage  represents  a  bigger need than irrigation,  valuable 
thoogh  the latter may  be  in a  dry season.  vlhether  imported  or not,  and 
whether prices are high or not, it will often pay dividends also to  increase 
the  use  of fertilizers  on Britain's grasslands.  Tns  is often true even where 
clover can be  expected to contribute to the nitrogen needs  of  the  sward. 
Like'\vise,  the  return to the  land of  animal wastes  (w·here  cattle are housed) 
2 
is something that requires  more  emphasis.  Again,  if the farmer  keeps  more 
cattle, he will require  more  housing.  Overall,  therefore, if policies  such 
as  these were  followed,  there would  on balance be  a  significant amount  of  new 
investment in British agriculture and some  saving  of imports,  even if there 
1.  See  Sunday Times  8/9/74. 
2.  See  Leonard Arney,  loc. cit. - 211-
were  a  greater usc  of artificial fertilizers  on  grasslands. 
Obviously,  too,  there 1vould  be  implications for  the  balance  of 
payments  and,  indeed,  concern for this  problem is  one  of  the major reasons 
for attempting to develop British agriculture further,  especially if this 
can be  done "'i thout a  great increase in imported inputs.  North Sea oil 
may  help,  but it is doubtful  whether it will solve all of Britain's 
balance  of  payments  problems. As  a  result, Britain must  continue to explore 
the  import saving potential of  domestic  industries.  In the  present context, 
this  means  encouraging the  development  of a  prosperous  and more  productive 
agriculture and,  without prosperity,  British agriculture is clearly not 
likely to become  more  productive.  But,  "\vith  good prices as  an  incentive, 
an increase in agricultural production could help to  'save'  imports  and to 
make  the  country more  self-sufficient.  This clearly has  implications for  the 
capital market,  since any such  expansion 1vill require to be based  on  a 
significant amount  of new  inv-estment. 
Finally, what happens  to agriculture in the United Kingdom  over the 
next  ten to twenty years will depend  (a)  on  the cost  of inputs;  (b)  on 
the  end-prices for the products  of agriculture; 
agricultural support policy;  and  (d)  on  taxation. 
(c)  the  development  of 
A good  deal has  already been said about  inputs and "\vays  in which there 
may  be  a  substitution of  cheaper for  more  expensive  inputs  (especially if 
the latter have  to  be  imported).  Probably,  there is not very much  that can 
be  done  about fuel  oil until North Sea  oil comes  on  stream,  but  in any event 
British agriculture and horticulture  only make  a  relatively small  demand  on 
fuel  resources.  In total, it amounts  to about  2  per cent.  of  the oil used and 
less than 1  per cent.  of the coal.1  So  far as money  rates of interest are 
concerned, it is the author's  judgement that they will probably move  within 
a  band  above  and  belmv  10 per cent.  Obviously,  given the  level of such costs, 
1. Leonard  Arney  in The  Times  28/1/74.· - 212-
efficient farm  management  must try to  the greatest  exten·t possible t.1 
economise  in the use  of  the  expensive resources and,  wherever feasible, 
to  substitute cheaper resources  for  those which are more  expensive.  For 
the rest,  the profitability of agriculture - and therefore its ability to 
finance  additional  investment  - will depend  on  the end-prices received for 
its products.  Only in this way vrill a  sufficient cash  flow  be  generated to 
ensure  either moneys  for  ploughing back irrto  the  enterprise by way  of 
direct investment  or the  moneys  on  the basis  of 'vhich to  repay borrowed capital 
and to service it during the period of indebtedness.  Essentially,  end-prices 
'rill depend  on  the pricing policies  pursued by the European Economic  Community. 
It is difficult at this stage to establish what  modifications  the EEC 
is likely to  make  to its Common  Agricultural Policy and the matter will 
almost certainly remain under  discussion for  some  time to ·oome.  Basically, 
the  main ineredients  of  the  policy were  (i)  to increase agricultural 
productivity by promoting technical progress  and by  ensuring the rational 
development  of agricultural production as v:ell  as  the  optimum utilisation of 
the factors  of production  (and  labour in particular);  (ii) thereby to  ensure 
a  fair standard  of  living for  the agnbultural community  by increasing the 
individtml  earnings  of persons  engaged in agriculture and  providing European 
farmers with.an income  that would  compare  with the  earnings  in industry, 
though critics of the policy would maintain that it has  never really lived 
up to that objective;  in the early days  of the EEC,  an effort was  made  to 
dralv  up a  schedule  of prices,  such that farmers  in the different EEC  countries 
should receive approximately the  same  prices for grain,  meat,  fruit and 
vegetables,  and dairy products;  (iii) each year, it was  contemplated that there 
would be  a  ,.,idely ranging  farm prices  review,  the .details  of 'vhich vrere  to be 
debated in the European Parliament and then discussed by the  Council  of  Farm 
Ninisters;  (iv)  stabilisation of  markets  a:nd  assuring the availability of 
supplies to the consumer at reasonable prices;  (v)  following  the  entry of the - 213-
United Kingdom,  Britain's prices '\·Tere  gradually -to  be  brought into 
alignment ,.;i th the  general level  of  prices in the EEC;  this \vas  -to  be 
1  completed by 1978,  using transitional compensatory amounts  (see  below·} 
to bridge the prices gap during the transition period,  to which additional 
compensatory rumounts  have  since had to  be  added following  the further 
downward  float  of sterling;  meamvhile,  under the arrangements  laid dmrn  by 
the Treaty of Accession,  the  existing United Kingdom  system  of  guaranteed 
prices is being phased out  over the transitional period.  The  guarantees 
for  rye,  fat cattle,  eggs,  and  sugar beet have already disappeared;  the 
remaining guarantees are,  hmvever,  subject to  amendment  in the light of any 
increases  in c ammon  prices agreed by the  Cotmcil  of Ninisters. 
But  the  Common  Agricultural Policy as  orip,inally conceived ran into 
trouble especially in 1973/74,  because  of  the  chaos  tha-b  then developed in 
international currency markets.  In pcu·ticular,  it became  increasingly- difficult 
to negotiate farm prices  on  a  basis that would  be similar for  each member 
country,  when  currencfes were  floating at different rates and in different 
directions.  Ideally, what '\·las  required '\'las  a  'joint float'  against the clollar. 
Even if it was  only one  currency that was  devalued,  it remained  a  relatively 
simple  rna tter.  For  example,  \vhen  the  Prench franc  "'ivas  devalued in 1969, 
border taxes  or monetary compensation anounts 1vere  applied to French agricultural 
exports  and  imports to the  extent  of the  devaluation;  these 1vere  gradually 
phased  out  over two  years.  But it \oTas  quite a  different situation when  one 
had to try to keep  pace with  simultaneous fluctuations  in the parities  of 
several of  the  EEC  currencies as  in the  sununer  of  1971,  when  the German  mark 
and the Benelux currencies vere  allow·ed to floa-t  up1·rards;  and -t,his  was  before 
the first devaluation of  the dollar.  .Honetary compensatory amounts,  which 
--work  like a  rebate  on the revaluing com1try' s  farm  exports  and a  tax  on  those  0f' 
the devaluing country, were  introduced  once  more  to offset mos·t  of the effects 
1. Note  that the transi  tiona.l arrangen~ents apply only to  products  covered by 
the  Common  Agricultural Policy and  so  exclude,  for  example,  potatoes 
and  sheep meat,  the prices  of  which  do  not  depend  on  decisions  made  by the 
Council  of }linisters. - 214-
of the  upward float  on  EEC  farm trade,  though the German  Government was 
also given perm1ssion to protect its  own  farmers'  incomes  by means  of 
VAT.  concessions  (an upward  float  of the  mark  meant that they would 
othe~~ise receive lower EEC  prices as  expressed in marks).  Subsequently, 
there were the further complications  of aftoating British and Irish pound, 
and a  floating lira with a  possibility of  a  further upvard float in the 
mark  and  other currencies. 
Because  of this and  other difficulties - such as the cost  of the 
Common  Agricultural Policy,  i-t,s  tendency to produce  surpluses while at the 
same  time  making  food  expensive for the  consumer,  and its protectionist 
aspects  and  effects  on  international trade - the·  Cmnmon  Agricultural Policy 
has  been under  almost  continuous  review since 1973.1  It was  felt that 
producers  should bear  some  financial responsibility for surpluses  and that 
in future  farm prices  should be  fixed in relation to the  experience  of  a 
modern  efficient farm as well as  the  market situation,  in order to avoid 
exaggerated  price rises that  '~ill only serve to keep in production the 
small inefficient units.  Norilid  the  Commi~on favour  direct income  support 
for farmers;  it preferred measures  to encourage  structural reform,  the 
expansion  of  producers'  co-operatives and marketing  organisations,  and 
the  extension of reafforestation. 
Indeed, it may  be  said of the  Common  Agricultural Policy that  so far 
it has  been interpreted most flexibly and,  where  they have  been persistent 
enough,  every effort· has  been made  to meet  the specific requirements  of 
partic~lar countries.  It could be argued that the EEC  has  been too 
accommodating  and that, if this degree  of flexibility continues to be  evidenced, 
there will be  no  Common  Agricultural Policy left.  There  must  be  some  ground 
rules that are acceptable to all the  countries  of  the EEC  and,  once  they have 
1.  In this context,  see Rosemary Fennell,"The  Common  Agricultural Policy:  A 
Synthesis  of  Opinion",  Centre for European Agricultural Studies,  Wye 
College  (University of  London),  1973,  pp.  vi +  106. - 215-
been agreed,  they must  be  observed.  13ut  there are  other problems  lil'Ce 
high costs  and  lmr  returns  ("'vhich  have  particularly affected Dri·Gish 
agriculture)1  and  a  majo.,..  cloud that may  continue to hang  over the  effective 
operation of any  such  policy is a  continuance  of chaotic  conditions  in the 
international currency markets.  Very little real proaress  can be  made  until 
these difficulties can be  resolved.  At all times,  too,  the  Common  Agricult,ural 
Policy must  take  into account  the  "\'lorld  production  of  and  demand  for  foodst,uff::>. 
Further complications 1vill be  the  state of the  economics  of the  several 
f!!EC  countries,  the  balance that  comes  to be  struck bet"\veen agricultural 
products  from the north and  south  of  l~urope  (also  between cereals and 
livestocl{),  and the action taken in respect  of BEC  products that are 
over-supplied,  but "'vhich  can no  longer be  dealt 1vith  on the  'mn,na[(ed  marl\et  1 
formula  simply by adjusting the  flo1-r  of  imports  (·e.g.  poultry and  pit;  meats, 
eggs,  beef,  butter,  and certain types  of fruit).  Clearly,  vrithin  the 
frame"rork  of  agreed  ground rules,  the  Common  Agricullural  Policy "'dll have  to 
be  operated fairly flexibly.  Inevitably,  there will be  periodic  over- and 
under-supply situations, but  over  the  longer  run the  aim  should  be  to  ensure 
tl:at efficient family :farms  receive  a  reasonable  income.  Farm 1vorkers  and 
small farmers will continue to leave the industry,  though the  for1ner  at a 
declining rate;  farms  '\'Till  tend to  become  even  more  capital-intensive us 
a  result.  Large-scale  intensive  livestock enterprises vill con-tinue  to 
increase in number,  though  perhaps  rather  slmvly,  and this "\•Tillresult  in 
fairly substantial  demands  for  ne1v  investment capital. 
In addition to  income  tax and  the  inclirect taxes to vhich  the whole 
population is subject,  there are at present  t1vo  1vays  in which  farming  is 
directly and specifically affected by taxation provisions.  It 1vill be 
appropriate,  too,  to  consider the  possible  implications  of the proposed  nc1: 
1.  Indeed,  for  livestock producers,  the high  cost  of  inputs  (partly due  to 
bad w·eather)  and very  low  prices  has  rcsu.l  ted in damaging  losses 
(especially in 1974).  In addition,  cattle,  pigs  and  poultry 
purchased 1-ihen  end-prices 1vere  more  re\._rc.rding  have  during  a  period 1rhcn 
the  industry has  been facing heavy losses fallen by nearly 50  per cent. 
in  valu~.  Nuch  of this investment 1·1as  financed "'.ri th borl'01-7ed  money  - as 
vere  purchoses  of land  (land prices have  also fallen)  - and,  even if a 
borrower decided to sell up in order to  repay his debt,  the sale 
proceeds  may  "'·Wll  prove  to be  insufficic~nt to repay the  loan.  (Cp.  John 
Cherrington,  Financial  Times  15/11/74.) - 216-
gift and wealth taxeso  At  present  (1974),  if a  farmer  passes his  frr~ 
over to his  son during his  lifetime the  farmer will be  liable for  capital 
gains tax of  30  per cent.  due  to the much  higher prices for  land that had 
latterly obtained.  Formerly,  sales  of land for development  (at appropriately 
higher prices)  need not attract immediate  payment  of capital gains tax, 
provided the  proceeds  were  reinvested in land1  within 12  months  (increased to 
3  years  in the Finance Act  of  1973).  The  Finance Act  of  ~974 abolished 
roll-over relief on  development  gains that are used in acquiring  more  land 
(but not buildings  or  fixed  equipment). 
The  other major  advantage  that was  enjoyed ,.,as  the  45  per  cent. 
estate duty relief that applied not mer.ely  to agricultural holdings but to 
industrial hereditaments  as well.  But  over  recent years  - so far as  farmers 
were  concerned - this  ve~ advantage threatened to  be their undoing.  As 
a  hedge against inflation,  the  purchase  of  land "\vas  seen to have  many 
advantages.  In addition,  there was  for individual  owners  the added 
attraction of the  45  per cent.  estate duty relief.  Agricultural  land 
(especially in 1972)  also stimulated a  great deal  of  investmEnt interest 
from institutions  (and others)  seeking an  'inflation-proof'  outlet for 
their funds.  This  interest has  probably now  run its course.  Certainly,  there 
was  a  scramble to get into land as  a  hedge against inflation and this helped 
to force  up  prices,  but the insutu·tions  only wished to incorporate a  small 
percentage  of· land in their large investment portfolios and,  once this had 
been achieved,  their interest waned.  There was  also  some  support from 
issuers  of  property bonds  and private persons  of  means  with a  tax problem. 
Farmers who  themselves  sought additinnal farms  or parcels  of  land were  caught 
up in the  sruoe  process and,  in many  cases,  paid extravagant prices for  the 
additional  land required,  upon which  ca:pital base it must  nmv  be particularly 
1.  These  arrangements applied not merely to  agricultural land,  In fact,  they 
were  introduced for the benefit of  indust~ at large and applied equally 
(say)  to a  publishing firm that sold up its business near Covent Garden 
and  moved  to  a  factory outside London.  It W'Bs  merely necessary that the 
money  arising from the  sale  of  land be  reinvested in a  similar asset. - 217-
diffiqult to secure an adequate  return. 
But for all farmers  there  had  been a  sharp increase  in the value 
of their farms,  largely because  of the.rise in land prices.  In these 
circumstances,  a  farmer  could not afford to die and it seemed  inevitable 
that the liability for  taxation on  the  new  basis could  only be  met  by 
selling off parcels  of  land and the  fragmentation  of  existing farms.
1 
Subsequently,  there ,.,as  some  recession in land values,  which accelerated 
2  in the first six months  of  1974,  probably due  initially to the waning  of 
institutional interest and the liquidity problems  of property companies, 
and latterly to the  impact  of the Chancellor's new  tax proposals,  though 
the precise details are difficult to  establish on the  basis  of the availgble 
statistics.  3  As  a  consequence  of the rise in prices  over  recent yea,rs,  B::ri tish 
1. When  prices were  lmver,  this liability could probably have  been  covered quits-
adequately by life insurance,  but  today a  farmer ,.,ould  find it virtually 
impossible  to  countenance this additional burden  on  his  cash flow. 
2.  See Financial Times  7/3/74.  The  survey of  land values  realised in the 
first six  mo~ths of  1974 vas  carried out  by Farmland  Market  (published 
jointly by Estates Gazette and Farmers  l~eekly).  It monitored  sales 
worth  over £20 million,  but this  only included successful sales  (i.e., 
not farms  which were  offered and  then 1vi thdralrn,  to  be  sold subsequently 
at figures  much  lower than the apparent reserve price).  Nor  did it 
include private sales.  Hence,  the figures  should be  interpreted with 
caution.  To  the extent that they are typical  of  the vider· experience,  the 
decline has  been general throughout the country.  Farms  of more  than 200 
acres  and those  of under  150 acres  have suffered severely,  while those in 
the  150-200 acre  range have  on  the '"hole held their prices  o  The  prices 
of farms  of  over  200 acres  slumped  by as  much  as  15  per cent.  and this 
trend was  particularly noticeable in the South East.  It was  believed that, 
after June  1974,  the decline accelerated further.  The  main  reasons  given 
were high interest rates,  the collapse in the  market for  develop~ent land, 
fears  of the Chancellor's taxation plans,  and  the crisis in farming 
generally.  See Financial  Times  21/8/74. 
3.  In ad.di ti  on  to the  tables in the  text,  estimates have  been  pr~pared by 
Oxford University's  Institute of Agricultural Economics  based  on  data 
extracted from  the Estates Gazette  reports  of  farms  sold at auction.  (See 
Financial Times  7/2/7  4).  Ho,·TCver,  these sales are  nnly a  part,  and probably 
a  small part,  of all land disposals.  The  Hinistry of Agriculture,  on  the 
other hand  (see Table XXXVI),  publishes  the results  of all disposals at 
six-monthly intervals whether  by auction,  private sale,  or transfers 
between families;  these  include prices  paid  in public  sales agreed for  starr:p 
duty by the District Valuer.  But,  beca.use  of  delays  in collecting this 
information,  the figures  tend to be  badly out-of-date.  Also,  since the 
Ninistry figures  include  simple trans,fers as ,.,ell as  general  sales,  i-t  is 
thought that they can be  no  more  than a  rough  guide  to what  is happening. 
For this reason,  supplementary information has  been added in Table XXA\TII. - 218-
land prices, "hich for  a  long  time were  the  cheapest in Europe,  may  nm-r  be 
the  dearest for  land of  comparable  farming  potential,  though  - despite the 
more  businesslike approcich  of institutional landlords  and  some  private  owners 
rents  in Britain are  probably still amon§st  the  lowest for any cow1try that 
1  does  not restrict them by statute. 
If we  nmv- turn to the  new  tax proposals  put for,vard by the Chancellor 
of  the Exchequer  on August 8,  1974,  there is first the  proposed elimination of 
estate duty reliefs for  o~<mers  of agriculturn.l land and woodlands,  although the 
Government was  said to  be  considering the continuation of  some  relief for 
full-time w·orldng  farmers.  This change was  expected to have the  effect of 
reducing the  prices  of agricultural  land to  lo'\orer  levels.  It was  proposed that 
2  tlTO  new  taxes  should be  introduced - the  Capital 1'ransfer Tax  and a  'fealth 
'l'ax. 3 
The  Government's  proposals for  a  ,.real  th ·tax appeared to be  designed to 
collect something between £200  million and £500 million a  year  from the top 
1  per cent.  of ,,..eal th holders.  If the tax is introduced on the basis  of the 
4  Green Paper  published on August  8,  1974,  it will fall  on all realisable 
1.  See  John  Cherrington in Financial Times  Report  on Farms  and Estates,  15/6/74. 
2.  See  Cnnital Transfer Ta.x,  Cmnd.  5705 o  It was  in fact announced  by the 
Chan"C;;]~ior in his  Budeet  .Speech  on November  12,  19"(4  that estate duty and 
the  tax  on gifts would  be  replaced by capital transfer tax at rates  set out 
in the  vlhitc. Paper.  A  concession was  also announced w·hich would  permit  the 
working  farmer  to value his  land at  20  times  the  open  market  gross  rent, 
though it "tlaS  anticipated that this  ,.,.-ould  only apply to  a  minority  of  farrJs. 
Half  of  the  land  in Britain is tenantecl anrl  a  proportion of  the  remainder  is 
o,vned  by trading  companies  and not individuals.  It 'ms  expected that the 
latter would  be  very badly affectedu  (Vorking  farmers  have  been defined as 
those mainly  engaged  in farmin,s  in  5  of  the  7  -preceding  YP;ars  and  75  per cent. 
of whose  income  is derived  from  farming.  Relief will also be  available for 
farm houses  and buildings  occupied by the  farmer  for  up to  2  years  before  the 
transfer.  All these reliefs ''ill be  subject to  limits  of £250,000 in vcluc  or 
1,000 acres,  whichever  gives  the greater relief.  There  is also relief for 
controlling shareholdings  in farming  companies.)  It was  feared,  too,  that, 
unless  further  concessions '"ere  accorded,  capital transfer tax '\·TOuld  r.1ean  tile 
end  of private forestry in the United Kingdom.  It was  argued that the 
Government  shoul<l  take  into account  the  special case  of forestry as  a  very 
long-term investment.  (See  Financial 'l'in:tes  13/11/74 and  10/12/74.) 
3.  See  \t0alth  Tax,  Command  5704.  For details,  also  see Financial Times  and 
The  ~imes 9/8/74. 
4.  Note  - a  Green I)aper  comprises  proposals  put  fol"vard  as  a  basis for 
discussion. Note to Table 
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X X><. Y1 
Il~lf  ..  ~,·c~:r]~  ..  S:~J.-.:s of  /t~~·~~id~;.!t[,f I.J:1!!d in  r~:n~.L:n!i ;~nd ',''t/~~h.~s 
Al·cra~,e.~ cf  S;~r~':;: WH:1::l!~d \\'ItL(a>t V<;f;H;t l'u~  :;~:;sion 
(10 acres ar..d oYer) by P.d; ate Treaty ::.;:d hy Auctio11 
HalfYcarEnd;;;d 
31  !\-larch 19~5 
30 Sept.  19+5 
31  M::J1..::1  !9-:-5 
30Sept.  I<n'i 
31 Mard1 1947 
30Scpt.  !9-1-7 
31  f,f;:rch 19-tS 
30Sept.  19-l.S 
31  ~larch 1949 
30S<·rt.  J9..t'J 
3 t ~·l~rch 1953 
30S~pt.  1950 
31  ~larch l95l 
30SepL  1951 
31  March 1952 
30S~pt.  1952 
31 March 1953 
30Se9t.  1953 
31!\J:uch 1954 
30 s.~pt.  19  s.+ 
31  March 1955 
30Sept.  1955 
31 !l.·farch  19~6 
30 Sept.  1956 
31 March 1957 
30 S<!pt.  l':J57 
31  ~larch 1958 
30Scpt.  195S 
31  March 1959 
30Scpt.  1959 
31  ~.rarch 1  960 
30 Sept.  1960 
31  M~.:ch l%1 
30S'!pt.  1961 
31  March 1952 
3o  s~pt.  1  Y62 
31  M:t:ch g:·').l 
30S:rt.  19'J3 
31  ;\fare~ 196.+ 
30S~pt.  196-f 
31  March 1965 
30Sept.  1965 
31  \!arch l%6 
31 O,;t.  I %6(1) 
30Apr.  1967 
31 Oct.  1967 
30Apr.  19h8 
31 O.:t.  19L3 
30Apr.  J969(l) 
30 Sept.  1969(2) 
31  March  19~·o 
30S::pt.  19-:-0 
311brch 1971 
30Sept.  1971 
31 M:uch 1972 
30 Se!)t.  1972 
llf"\..rr.h l'iU 
~o S  .. pt:..  1<!13 
'311"'\o.W..  \C\llf. 
~  ~pt;.  \<{,'+-
Average Price 
£per acre 
36 
38 
38 
39 
41 
43 
45 
35 
53 
49 
57 
55 
57 
57 
63 
so 
58 
57 
56 
76 
54 
55 
58 
52 
57 
57 
60 
58 
64 
68 
77 
82 
93 
97 
100 
99 
113 
105 
119 
133 
161 
166 
170 
164 
173 
175 
181 
186 
202 
194 
201 
199 
195 
189 
208 
234 
~&0 
"SOb 
(,IJ. 
5&\ 
19-15-1972 
Numb..:r of 
Tr~•!l'>i:::io:Js 
3,966 
2,889 
3,797 
3,998 
4,131 
4,129 
4,743 
4,33<1 
4,755 
3,935 
4,636 
3,869 
4,406 
5.051 
s:669 
4,287 
4,900 
4,576 
5,059 
4,322 
4,830 
4,179 
4,599 
3,733 
4,358 
3,920 
4,702 
4,1-10 
5,210 
5,0-+9 
5,410 
4,490 
5,010 
4,4()0 
4,551 
3,956 
4,545 
3,610 
4,827 
4,031 
4,600 
3,801 
3,307 
3,062 
3,338 
3,359 
3,281 
2.976 
3:635 
2,6.!9 
2,915 
2,81S 
3,072 
3,136 
3,429 
2,758 
.:t,,o<o 
.J,:)IO 
.l,4-'S2 
N/A 
Ac1e:1gc 
Involved 
36!}.901) 
243,061 
3'10.787 
365:504 
387.187 
396,1~5 
432,200 
554,257 
422,R!O 
381A95 
379,57() 
337,363 
378.388 
449,513 
490,159 
350,949 
449,309 
381,152 
493,863 
254,772 
449,390 
344,818 
3SS,091 
328.556 
364,651 
332,673 
411.062 
329,795 
452,9(~. 
402,0-1.7 
454.903 
338.647 
395.622 
353.008 
360.860 
295,1-+4 
365,167 
274,204 
4l.J.,005 
339,175 
393,023 
290.354 
275,234 
238,928 
261,059 
2.J.7,3SO 
270,SO~ 
223.9~4 
317,765 
:09.356 
215.2!0 
209.213 
249,853 
237.315 
275,961 
224.320 
n1,~<!1 
.JJB,b'U. 
.).).1,184-
N/A 
Aggr~'r:<:e 
Valuc-w~;{, 
12,818 
9.201 
12,R69 
14,209 
15,713 
16,912 
20,551 
19,201 
22.3:9 
18,791 
21,702 
18,5i3 
21,495 
25,634 
30,8i6 
21,103 
25,879 
21,862 
27,570 
19.259 
24,0i0 
18,935 
22,6SI 
17.~29 
20,778 
18,931 
2·t615 
19,214 
~8~~(1!) 
27,331 
35,131 
27,630 
36.6-49 
3-1-,251 
36.061 
29,281 
41,354 
28.863 
49.260 
45,116 
63,~(·2 
48.063 
46,734 
39,203 
45,122 
43,323 
49.036 
41;613 
64,309 
40,582 
46,21S 
41.714 
43,642 
44,808 
57.830 
52,321 
~s.on 
\1'5,1..11 
13:,,\.,3\o 
NIA 
(!) i month:;. 
(') Induding ,\prillYS? in l.Joth  h~lfye.~;s. 
The trans<1ctio:1s recorded in this serie:;: 
Exclude sJ.lcs of Qgricu!luralland fer development and other non-
agricultu!...:.! pt:.t1)u;:;es, e.g., gravel workings. Saies of  agricultural land which 
may, in the purch:1ser's view,  ba\'~ an element of future development 
Source: Ministry oi  Agriculture, Fisheries and Fcod. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
value will however be included. 
Include sales ofhnd at prjc~s b-;low the ruli11g open market level between, 
for instance, members of  a family. But particularly low prices would not 
be agreed by 1ocal V  altUtion Otlicers since land valu:::s have to be properly 
assessed for Stamp D'..lty purposes. 
Exdu::le gifts and inherit2.nces. 
Exclude compulsory purchases. 
Include !>ales wh:::rc the vendor retains certain rights oYer the land, 
e.g., s~orting. 
Include sa~cs ofagricultur3l land, gcner::~!ly small areas, in \vbich the 
vaJue of  the farm dwc~ii!i;  rcpr~scnts a subsr:mtid r~rt of the total. 
Exclnde legal fees. and Stamp Duty. - 220-
Table XXXVII 
Farm $ale Prices  (En~land and Wales) 
Collected by the  Oxford University Agricultural  ~conomics Research 
Institute from  auction sale reports  in the Estates Gazette. 
AVERAGE  PRICES  £  PER  ACRE 
Vacant  Possession  Without Possession 
ALL  FAR1·1S  FAR~S UNDER  300  ACRES  FARMS  UNDER  300  ACRES 
1946-48  69  82  42 
1948-50  82  95  46 
1951  88  98  46 
1952  76  95  44 
1953  73  83  41 
1954  75  83  44 
1955  80  90  49 
1956  78  87  48 
1957  85  94  53 
1958  85  94  53 
1959  101  110  68 
1960  123  132  67 
1961  124  132  81 
1962  134  139  77 
1963  168  168  98 
1964  214  224  125 
1965  23j  238  150 
1966  234  246  154 
1967  258  264  135 
1968  280  287  152 
1969  299  302 
1970  259  273 
1971  317  335 
1972  662  640 
1973  924  929 - 221-
Table XXXVII  cont. 
Country Ln..ndolTners 1  Association 
AVERAGE  PRICES  £  PER  ACRE 
Vacant rossession 
ALL  FARl,fS  SALES  OVER  100  ACRES 
3  months  ending 
Excluding Hill land 
October 31,  1972  486 
January 31,  1973  791  776 
April  30,  1973  722  603  630* 
July 31,  1973  861  844  844* 
October  31,  1973  688  625 
January  31,  1974  576  477  725~..t 
April  30,  1974  781  767  845 
July 31,  1974  671  628  652 
* Estimated,  as  no  distinction between hill land and  lowland prior to April 
1974. 
assets, but where  investments already yield an income  subject to investment 
income  surcharge,  one  tax may  be  set off against the  oth~r,  so that the 
taxpayer  pays  only whichever is the higher.  On  the basis  of the Green Paper, 
the starting point for the tax would be wealth above  £100,000.  A number  cf 
basic principles were  listed:  (1)  liability is to be  based  on all realisable 
wealth,  net  of liabilities - including company assets,  farm  land and 
owner-occupied houses:  the test proposed is market value  (for  example,  the 
surrender value  of  a  lif~ insurance  policy or the actuarial value  of  a  reversion) 
or a  realistic balance sheet value.  Unseleable assets - notably pension rights -
are to be  exempt;  (2)  there is to be  some  ceiling on total tax liability under 
income  tax,  investment income  surcharge and '·Teal th  tax combined;  the Government  1 s 
aim is apparently to bear most  heavily on  lo,v-yielding assets ,.,hich  largely - 222-
escape  tax at present;  (3)  01\Tncrs  of assets ,,;rhich  cannot readily be 
realised piecemeal  - notP  ... bly businesses  and art treasures  - vill be  able 
to defer tax payments, .subject to an interest charge.  Special measures  to 
limit the burden  on 1<1orl(ing  farmers  are  also to be  discussed by the 
Government;  (4)  the Government  is determined to prevent  any avoidance  of 
the tax through the formation  of trusts:  trustees '"ill be  liable to  pay tax 
at top rate,  but  can claim an abatement where  the beneficiaries would not 
be  liable at this rate;  and  (5)  public  companies  and unincorporated 
associations will not generally be  liable,  nor will non-residents,  except 
on  land and premises in the United Kingdom.
1  One  of the most  important 
questions left open ,.,as  whether  married.  couples  should be  assessed jointly 
or separately:  the  Government  apparently leans  tm·rards  separate assessment 
(though it is implicit tha.t this  might  involve higher rates  of tax).  }finors, 
on  the other hand,  ,.,auld have  to  be  assessed along ,.,i th one  of their parents. 
The  tax would  be  based  on  self-assessment  (in principle property will be 
valued  on  an  open market  basis),  subject to  sample  checl(S.  It should be 
noted that this would place  a  considerable  b~den on the taxpayer. 
'l'he  underlying philosophy is that  income  by itself is not an adequate 
measure  of  taxable capacity.  The  ow·nership  of '"ealth, ,.;hether it produce1s 
income  or not,  adds  to the  economic  resources  of a  taxpayer,  so that the 
person who  has wealth as well as  income  of  a  given  size necessarily has  a 
greater  taxabl~ capacity than  one 'vho  has  only income  of that size.  At  the 
same  time,  consideration must  be  given to the  obvious  clash between reducing 
inequality and  running an efficient  economy.  Hence, the  possibility is 
envisaged of  a  ceiling provision.  Specific  reference was  made  to Swedish 
1. But  shareholders  of  companies will be  liable.  In addition,  the Green  ~aper 
suggests that in the  case  of private companies  the  shares 'vill be realised 
not  on  a  dividend yield basis but  on  the value  of the underlying assets. 
Forming a  company ,.,ould  therefore  provide  no  protection from wealth tax to 
an  individual  or  a  family.  'l'he  company as  such might  continue but it ¥ould 
be  starved of  cash because  of the necessity to  pay  out  money  to majority 
shareholders  so that they could pay the  taxes. - 223-
practice,  w·hich  limits the total liability of wealth tax and  inc  om a  tax 
combined.  A ceiling provision would also help "to  ease the burden  of 
wealth tax on  unincorporated businesses,  closely owned  conpanics,  and  farr.1s. 
Another  expedient  considered ·to  prevent the 1veal th tax from biting too hard 
1  into  producti-ve assets is a  deferment  of the  charge  on  m·rner-occupi ed  farms 
and closely owned  businesses until sale,  retirement,  or death. 
Nevertheless,  the very high  capital, value  of  farm  land 1vi 11 affec.t 
very directly a  farmer  1 s  liability to  ,.~al·th\ -t.ax,  unless  some  specific 
concession is in fact  made  to the  farming  community.  On  the other hand,  the 
abolition of  estate duty relief may  be  expected to  generate  a  downward 
pressure  on  land prices  and to  make  farmers  less  liable to the projected 
wealth tax.  J~ven so,  the  farmers  affected may  be  of the  order of  35,000, 
since if £100,000  threshold is fixed many  owner-occupied farms  of  more  than 
100 acres  could be  caught by i-to  Also,  although deferment  of  payment  of 
,.,eal  th tax until sale,  retirement,  or death may  protect the  farmer while· ha 
is actively farming,  is still threatens  fragmentation after the  farm passes 
from him. 
Host  of the discussion has  so far centred on  the  owner-occupier,  but 
it must  be  remembered  that the  large estates  (which are  landlords  to a  l~rge 
number  of tenants) lrill under the  proposed new  regime  inevitably have  to  pay 
very substantial taxes.  Rented  land in the United Kingdom  comprises  some 
45  per cent.  of total agricultural land.  Hence,  although tenant  farmers 
may  seem  to be better off  because  in ~~ny cases they lack the wealth to 
expose  themselves  to fiscal  attack,  they do  depend  on  their landlords  for cuch 
of their capital and,  if the position of  the  landlord is weakened,  this  may 
adversely affect a  large number  of tenants,  though  one  way  out  nmy  be  for 
1. Tenants lTould  be  affected less directly  (and approximately half of all 
farmers  in the United Kingdom  are tenants);  it is their landlords that 
will have to bear the initial impact,  though this must  have  long-term 
effects  on tenants also. - 224-
landlords to go  into partnership with a  farmer  ra-ther  than to have  a  formal 
tenancy.  On  the other·hand,  the  former  tenant may  lose  some  of'  his  security, 
since in England and Wales  a  tenancy is secure for the  life-time of the 
tenant as  long as  he  keeps  its terms  and accepts arbitration for rent;  the 
latter can be  applied for either by  landlord or tenant every three years 
(on the basis  of the rent a  w·illing tenant would  offer)  o  Also,  security of 
tenure  - sometimes  by consent in England  and  by  law in Scotland - passes  to  a 
competent heir.  This  is a  situation that could be greatly changed.  Almost 
inevitably,  there vill be  a  further breaking up  of the large estates and the 
need for  somebody  else to  provide the capital -that w-as  formerly  supplied by 
the _landlord.  1 
Noreover,  there is the fear both  of working  farmers  and  of  landlords 
that cash flow 1·lill be  inadequate both to meet  the tax liability and to 
provide capital for the  investment necessary to  keep  farming  efficient.. 
Already,  some  farmers  have had difficulty in providing  a  sufficient cash flow 
to  cover the  needs  of  worl~ing capital and longer-term investment  and  some  of 
the  1 solutions'  offered J.n  this context might  w·ell  also have  to_ be  looked at 
in connection 1vi th capital taxation.  Thus,  in order to avoid disruption of 
2  farming  management,  units in the agricultural indm try could borrow heavily 
as·capital taxation liabilities became  due,  while at the  same  time broadening 
their mmership base  so that duty payable  on  personal '\vealth will cease to be 
managerially disruptive.  One  way  in 1vhich  this might  be  achieved 1-rould  be  by 
allow·ing  o1mership  of the  land to  pass  to institutional landlords,  such as 
.. 
financial insti  tu·ti  ons,  better equipped to  provide  finance  and able to wait 
for  the gains that are  expected to accrue  over  the longer term.  Alternatively, 
1. Landlords  may  attempt  to offset the  increase in their taxes by charging 
tenants higher rents.  In these circumstances,  tenants vTonld  find that their 
working capital had been  reduced and this ,.,ould  mean  an increase in the 
demand  for capital and credit from  other suppliers. 
2. Cp.  Alan Harrison in The  Times  7/2/74. - 225-
resort might  be  made  to  the proposed  A~ricultural  ~1ortgage  Corporation 
'scheme  (see  pp. 226-7),  w·hereby  an unauthorised tmit trust would  purchase 
between 10 and.  49  per  ~ent.  of the  undivided shares in agricultural 
proper~ies, letting them ba,ck  to the original farmer  on  a  full agricultural 
l  tenancy '"'i th an option to repurchase aft  or ten years.  Or  the Government 
could step in and  offer sale and lease-back facilities as  of right,  though 
many  would  see  in that the thin end  of the '\vedge  of  land nationalisation. 
Similarly,  if instead of  paying taxes  in cash,  landowners were  to transfer 
the  equivalent in land to the State, while continuing to rent it. 
The  most  obvious area in '\'lhich  one  would  expect developments  in the 
provision of agricultural finance  in the United Kingdom  concerns the 
Agricultural Nortgage Corporation.  Already,  in 1973,  the  ANC  had  put 
2  fOl'\;;nrd  proposals to set up a  Land  Investment  Company.  These  proposals were 
to be  vie1-1ed  against the  bacl~ground  t:~f  rising land prices at a  time  \·Then 
the capital invested in the  indust~ was  producing  a  relatively ~or return 
{e.g., when  cqmpared with the yield on  industrial ordinary shares).  In 
addition and quite apart from  the  larger  sunls  nov  required '\vhen  purchasing 
land,  increasing amounts  of  capital were  seen to  be  necessary in the  farning 
operation as  a  result of rising costs  (including the increased cost of fa.rm 
1  This would  seem to be  a  more  viable  proposal than the Agricultural Equity 
•  Corporation discussed in Vilson,  op.  cit., pp.  214-215. 
'2.  See F.  Clive  de  l")aula,  Land Prices  and  Ne\v  Cn_Eital  for Agriculture,  pp.l8-l9, 
11/1/73 and Future Far1n  Structure and  Finance:  The  Prospects,  pp.  10-11, 
6/2/74. - 226-
implements  and  machinery)  as  "'i-lell  as  tho  incidence  of technological 
change.  There  -vrere  very real constraints inhibiting the  grO\vth  ooth  of 
individual farming enterpris  cs  ancl  agriculture as  an industry.  If 
agricul-ture "'i·Tas  to  obtain access  -to  the capital it required,  new  "'ivays  had 
to  be  found  of providing it. 
In particular, it -was  clear that  mauy  farmers  w·ould  be  unable  to 
find sufficient capital to finance  both  land ownership and the  operation 
of a  farming  business.  In addition,  -the  industry would have  to find the 
future  funds  to meet  the  increased demands  of  capital taxation.  At the 
same  time,  there has  been evidence  of  the availability of institutional 
funds  for  investment in agricultural  land.  With this in mind,  ANC  originally 
proposed that a  land  investment  company might  be  set up which vmuld buy 
from  an individual  landowner  a  share  in the  equity  of  his  land which  "'ivould 
then be  owned  by the  farmer  in partnership with the .A:Hc.  It was  envisaged 
that ANC  would take  not  less than 10  per  cent.  and not  more  than 49  per cent. 
of the  equity,  the  landowner  retaining  a  controlling interest.  If the 
landovnHr were  an  ovrner-occupier,  he  ,.,ould  continue  to  farm  the  land him.self. 
In this way,  capital would  be  made  available for the  o'mership  of 
land holdings,  which would not  come  on  to  the market  in the  normal  course  of 
events.  The  volume  of  land potentially ava.ilable for  such an  operation 1.;as 
therefore likely to be very  much  greater than that coming  on to the  open 
market.  It wss  also a means  of releasing capital for actual farming  operatio:1s. 
The  plan would  only be  open to  existing  O'\\rners  of agricultural hnd.  and  ,,~a_s 
not  designed to  provide  capital for  the acquisition of agricultural properties. 
Noreover,  AHC  Agriland Trust  - as it "'i'tould  be  called - would  be  in a  position 
to attract funds  from gross  pension fund  investors,  who  wished to  invest 
part of their portfolios in agricultural land.  It might also be  attractive 
to hold  moneys  in a  fund  managed  by a  com:pany  ,.,i thin A.HC,  which had a  special - 227-
kJ101tledge  of  agriculture  and agricultural  land and  a  degree  of  expertise 
"\-rhich  the  investors might '\vell  like.  1~here would  be  the further  udve..ntage 
of  spreading  investments  over  a  greater range  of holdings  of agricultural 
land than  each  of these  investors could obtain by direct land purchasing 
for their  own  account. 
It '\-laS  appreciated that there were  a  number  of  legal and tax probl oms 
still to be  resolved,  but if a  sufficient number  of  individual  Ovlners  of 
agriculture.!  land required capital to finance  themselves  in this way, it 
'vas  felt that there was  no  particular reason '\vhy  ANC  should not  be able 
to set up the  operation to  channel  the  funds  to  them.  At  the  same  time, 
it must  not  be  overlooked that under  current tax  la,.;rs  -the  landowner  ,...-ould 
incur  a  liability to  capital gains tax,  '\vhen  entering  upon  such  a 
transaction.  On  the  other hand,  in si  tua  ti  ons  ,.,here  a  family disposal gave 
rise to  a  capital gains  tax liability, the  sale  of  part  of  the  equity to 
A:t-iC  could be  a  convenient '\vay  of raising the  money required. 
1  Since  the  original proposal,  AHC  has  devised an outline  scheme 
which it has actively considered institutine;  this is called a  co-ownership 
plan.  The  basic  features  of  the  plan are  as  follm-,rs:  an unauthorised 
unit trust ·to attract gross  pension fund  investors;  the trust will purchase 
betrreen 10 per cent.  and  49  per cent. of undivided shares  in agricultural 
properties;  the  property '\·Till  be  simultaneously let back to the  original 
farwer  /landovmcr  on  a  full agricultural tenancy;  the  purchase  price ,,Till 
reflect this fact and  the  trust will acquire  an undivided share  only;  the 
normal  rules  of  joint  ownership ,.;ill apply;  mutual  pre-emption  rights 1-lill 
apply if ei  thor party 'vi  shes  to sell;  and  there ,.;ill be  an  option to 
re-purchase the trust's share at the  end  of'the tenth and  every succeeding 
\ 
fifth year  (~ving guaranteed  opportunities  to revert to full  landovner  status). 
In fact,  the  plan has  been designed as  a  partial sale and  leaseback operation 
which  allm~Ts  a  farmer  /lando"\'rner  to  retain a  majority interest in his  farm and 
to  mise capital at a  much  lo-y;er  annual  running cost. 
1.  See  Fo  Clive  de  Paula,  lococit.,  6/2/74,  pp.  11-12. - 228-
It is possible  t.ha-t  furth~r innovati.o:as  nny  be  put  forvrarcl  in the 
future  in addition to the  co-m\rnership plan.  'rhus,  a  finance  company 
might  be  set up under  th~ auspices  of  the ANC  to 
1 assist 'vi th the finance  of 
mrh:.eting  co-operatives  and other developments  linJdng the agricultural 
producer  more  effectively 'vith the  consumer'  (e.g.,  through producer grottps). 
A}1C  Finance  Co.  Ltd.,  which  was  the  name  proposed,  could - if the 
agricultural industry expressed an interest in it - 'act as  a  general  fim-..nce 
corporation for the industry,  on  some,vhat  the  same  sort of  lines as  the 
Industrial and Commercial  Finance Corporation Ltd.'  had  done vdthin its chosen 
sphere.  It wa.s  appreciated that  1 the  type  of  finance  provided by this pr·oj ected 
company would have  to  come  from  complementary but separate  sources  from  t,hose 
available to  AHC  for its traditional  lending operations.•1 
Given the  experience and  expertise possessed by the  AMC  in agricultural 
Imtters,  together with its acceptance  in the  City of  London as  a  creditworthy 
institution through w·hich  to channel  medium- and long-term funds to agriculture, 
it is logical that the ANC  should be  the appropriate vehicle  of  expansion in 
these fields.  There  is little point in setting up alternative institutions 
to  do  the  job.  IlmoTever,  from  an  organisation point  of view,  there is  a  case 
for mtablishing a  holding company to act as  a  kind  of  umbrella for  the various 
subsidiary activities of the  ANC  and it is  J:mm,rn  that  such  a  plan is nm-r  being 
actively cons·idered in Whitehall.  Shares in the holding company would  be 
held by the present shareholc1ers  of  the  ANC;  shares  in the subsidiaries  (of 
which  the  present ANC  ,.,ould become  one)  would.  be  held by the holding  company. 
1-ioreover,  such  a  form  of  organisation would  permit  the holding  company to 
undertake  any  ne1v  initiatives in the field of agricultural finance,  which 1.;cre 
considered desirable and 1vhich were  likely to  prove viable. 
1.  There  was  also  a  suggestion in F.  Clive  de  Paula,  locucit.,  11/1/73,  pp. 
19-20 that ANC  might  consicler the  estahlishment  of  a  Farm Pinance  Company 
as  a  means  of  securing  access  to  outside  equity capital to  finance  the 
farming  operation.  It 1vas  appreciated that the nature  of farming  risks 
was  likely to  inhibit the attraction of  such capital;  also that most 
farmers  were  unlikely to be  prepared to  sacrifice control over their 
enterprise.  For  these  reaons,  this  seer;1s  to  be  a  rather less viable 
proposition than that described in the text.  See  also Agricultural and 
Horticultural l'hrkcting,  Cmd.  5121,  1972,  particularly pam.  46. - 229-
In addition ·to  the  AHC,  the Central Council for Agr:i.cul tural and 
Horticultural Co-operation also has  plans.  In January  1974,  the  then 
Government  had already am1ounccd  their intention to make  available an 
additional  sum  of £250,000  per annrun  for three years  to  promote  producer 
marketing  through co-operation in the United Kingdom.  1'his  new  money  ·was 
to be  used in two  ways: 
( 1)  the  setting up  of a  Narh:eting Unit  1·Ti thin the  Council, which 
would  look at current marketing arrangements,  reconunend  the  strategies 
necessary to develop more  effective marketing  and  give advice  on  carrying these 
into effect.  The  work  of this Unit ,.,auld  be  guided by a  Narketing Policy 
Conunittee  mostly nominated by producer organisations  on  a  United Kingdom  basis 
but appointed by the Council;  and 
(2)  to provide  ruklitional  resources  to  the four  central co-operative 
organisations  in the  Uriited Kingdom  (for England,  Wales,  Scotland,  and 
Northern Ireland)  as  agents  of  the  Council to step up development work amongst 
producers  in the field.  In particular, it vas  envisaged that development effort 
would  be  directed to follow up  ideas that came  out  of  the work  of  the  Narl~eting 
Unit. 
These  proposals were  subsequently confirmed by the Hinister  of Agriculture 
in the House  of Commons  on  }larch  14,  1974 and  a  Narketing Policy Conunittee  of 
twelve  members  was  appointed in April. 
It planned to initiate development work in the field of agricultural 
co-operative marketing and has  given particular attention to the further 
development  of co-operative livestock enterprises already established,  but 
funds  were  also made  available for  development  posts  connected with cereals, 
fruit,  vegetables,  and ornamentals •1It ,.,as  foreseen that the  increased 
development work would result in an increased'requirement for legal advice. 
It was  therefore decided to consider the  appointment  of  a  lawyer for this  purposA 
1.  'Ornamentals'  are non-edible horticultural produce  (e.g.  pot plants). - 230-
in  one  of the Societies to  provide  a  service  on  a  Uni·Led  Kingdom basis. 
Similarly 11i th computing  - the  initial appointDont  of a  computer  officer  i!<J..s 
to  be  financed to  develop  stan(ta.rd  computer  programmes  f'or  marketing 
co-operatives.  It ,.,as  assumed that these  progrnmm,es  vrould  become  self-financing 
quite quickly.  The  Narketing  Policy Committee 1vill be  charged "..ri th the  duty 
of  monitoring the activities  of  the officers appointed and assessing the 
effects  of their actions  on the  marketing situation. 
Finally, it is felt that the Agricultural Credit  Corporation Limited 
(see  pp.  75-79)  c auld play a  wider  role 1d. thin the con-text  of the  EEC 
directives "\vhich  make  special provision for guarantee  support. - 231-
C:  Conclusions 
Conclusions  ---·-
1fuat finally are  our  conclusions  about  the future?  These  are 
dependent,  as  we  have  seen,  bo-th  on the  geneTal  e<?pnomic  climate that will 
obtain over the next ten to twenty years and  on  the more  specific factors 
that relate to agriculture in the United Kingdom. 
If the  leading industrial countries in the "mrld are to  get to grips 
with inflation, it ,.10uld  seem  that this can  only be achieved by an  emphasis  on 
monetary and fiscal discipline.  This  means,  on the  one  hand,  a  gradual decrease 
in the rate  of  increase in the supply of  money,  until it approximates  (say)  6  to 
8  per  cent.  per annum  (allowing for  economic  grmvth at - say - 3  to 3t per cent. 
per annum)  and,  on  the  other,  not  merely a  balanced budget but also  some 
significant reduction in the  levels  of  public  expenditure,  in order to 
alleviate the  pressure of  demand  on  scarce  resources and thereby the real basis 
of inflationary pressure,  which  monetary factors  only  serve to  exacerba-te.  In 
these ·ways,  the rate  of'  inflation  (percentage rise in  pric~s per  annum)  might 
be  reduced to something like  2  to  3  per cent.  or  eyen less.  ~Ioreover, if this 
objective  could be achieved in general  terms  in most  of the  leading industrial 
countries,  there '\orould  be little need to  worry about  imported inflation. 
On  bot,h  counts,  one  'wuld expect a  consequent  reduction in economic 
activity.  It would  seem  inevitable,  even if -the  reduction in the  supply of 
money  is gradual,  that there w'ill  be  cut-baclcs  in economic  activity and 
employment,  ,.,i th the  percentage  of  unemployment  also rising gradually  (say,  to 
approaching  1  million,  or about  4  per cent.  of  the '"or king  population),  though 
hopefully the  level  of  unemployment vlill be  kept "vi thin manageable  limits, 
ultimately reducing to  something like an  'equilibrium'  level of  2! to  3  per cent. 
So  far as  the  maintenance  of fiscal discipline is concerned, it must  be  accep~ed 
that all modern  'mixed'  economies  arc geared to certain levels  of Government 
expenditure.  If,  therefore,  there are  cut-bucks  in public  expenditure,  private - 232-
indus-try will have  to  adjus-t.  ·Go  a  ne1v  si  tua·Li on  and  - in -Lhe  short-rm1 -
this again means  unemploymen:t.  Hence s thG  need  in this  case  also to 
reduce  public  expenditure gradually,  -r..ncrcby  releasing resources  that in clue 
course  can be  absorbed  else1, 1here  in  the  economy.  This._, could be  greatly 
assisted by  lover interest rates,  tax cuts,  u,nd  retraining  programmes.  'i'hus, 
if there is a  tendency for the  demands  of agriculture to  increase,  there "'rv:i.ll 
be  slacl{  in the  economy  ·t.ha.t  can be  absorb  eel  '"'i  thout creating the pro!Jabili  ty 
of  resurgent inflation. 
Against this  background,  ,.,hat  are  likely to be  the  main influences that 
1·rill  determine  the  derllancls  made  by aericulture  on the supply of  capital in the 
United ICingdom  over the next ten to twenty years?  First, ther.e  are structural 
reasons  for believing that the capital demands  of agricnl  ture 1vi 11  tend to 
increase over the  coming :y··(;ars.  The  combination of the drift from the  land an<l 
higher agricultural wages  (in relation to  costs  of buildings  and  machinery) 
will force  farn1s  to become  even  more  capi·Lal  intensive and  effectively this 
"rill continue,  1v-hether- farms  ere  operated as  family units  or  by  public  companie2. 
And  this will  only be  offset to a  minor  extent by  organising  syndicates  or 
resorting to contractors for  the  purpose  of  economising  in the  purchase  of 
machinery.  Second,  if the potentialities of grassland management  are 
developed,  there will be  a  greater need  of  permanent  capital investment.  ThirC.., 
if from  a  balance  of  payments  point  of viev en increase in agricultural 
production is  seen as  a  major  savor  of  imports  (after allowing for  a~ny necesser:-
imported inputs for fertilizers  and.  feedstuffs),  this will likewise require  a 
significant 1ncrease in agricultural investment and therefore in the  demand for 
capital.  But servicing such additional capital 'vill require the  maintenance  of 
a  sufficient cash flow  on  the basis  of an appropriate relationship between 
costs  of  inputs and  end-prices.  'l'his  "\vi ll be  the  responsibility of the  BEG's 
Conunon  Agricultural  Policy.  Finally,  there is the question of taxation. 
Projected tax changes  may  result in some  do"\vrn;rard  pressure  on  land prices,  in - 233-
which  case  farmers  '\vill  require  less finance  for the  purchase  of  land  (but 
whether there '\·rill  be  any  change  in the net demand for capital for  the 
community as  a  vlhole  is a  more  open question);  and if land prices fall, 
farmers will become  less  liable to  any projected wealth tax.  Nevertheless, 
the  emphasis  of  capital taxation would  suggest that,  unless  farms  are 
operated increasingly by public  companies,  there w·ill  either be  a  slm·1ing 
do-vn  or reversal  of the  recent trend tm·Tards  improved structure,  or  o'\rnership 
of  farms  will pass  increasingly to institutional landlords and/or the State. 
In terms  of  the  demands  likely to  be  made  on the capital market,  it is 
probable that it will not  be  possible  fo~ farmers  to  meet  taxes  from cash flov 
and the moneys  vTill  have  to  be  found  by mortgaging  or selling off property, 
though possibly following  retirement  or death  of  the  farmer  concerned.  This 
'\-Till  incr.ease the  demands  made  by the private sector  on  the capital market. 
Thus,  though it may  be difficult to put a  figure  on  it, the  probability is 
that United Kingdom  agriculture will in realterms have  need  of  significant 
amounts  of additional capital  over the next  ten to twenty years. 
So  far as  institutional arrangements are concerned,  the present range 
of facilities that is  offered in the UnitBd  Kingdom  is already fairly adequate. 
There  is only one  existing area,  where  one  might anticipate  some  expansion and 
that is in clearing bank  term loans to agriculture,  where  the  development  so 
far has  been rather modest.  Areas  '\-There  nmv  developments  are  likely have 
been  examined in Chapter 6.  These  '\·rere  three-fold:  (1)  an extension  of  the 
functions  and activities of the Agricultural Hortgage  Corporation,  especially 
in fields  requiring medium- and  long-term finance,  with the  probability that 
a  holding company  might  be  established togetl1er with  a  number  of  subsidiaries, 
each  of which would  be  responsible for a  main function;  (2)  the further 
development  of  co-operative marketing under  the auspices  of the Central  Council 
for Agricultural and Horticultural Co-operation;  and  (3)  an  expansion in  th~ 
coverage ·provided by Agricultural Credit Corporation guarantees. - 234-
A further area to vrhich  some  consideration should be  given  conC2:..i.'Hs 
the  subsidisation of interest rates  on  loans to agriculture.  1vithin this 
context,  the \'Tilson Enquiry1  had reservations.  'rhere  seemed to be  some  merit 
in gearing economic  activity to the  judgements  of the  markets  - in this case, 
by attempting to  achieve  some  degree  of  approximation between the rates  of 
interest that apply in the  money  and capital markets  and the  expected rates of 
profit whether  on particular farming  enterprises  or arising  out  of movements 
in land values.  Resources are scarce and in this way  one  can ration out the 
total supply and allocate resources to what are likely to be their most 
profitable uses.  At  the  same  time,  it has  been a rgue.d that interest rates in 
other parts  of.  the  European Economic  Conununi ty tend to  be  lmver  than the United 
Kingdom  ~1d this distorts competition.  But interest rates are  only one  factor 
among  many  that involve differences  bet1veen the  Nember  States and,  until there 
is a  much  wider degree  of monetary  and fiscal harmonisation,  agricultural 
finance will presumably continue to  be  seen in the United Kingdom  rather than 
in a  Community  context.  Also,  interest rate  subsidies  encourage  borrowing, 
whereas  under  a  system of grants  (which  l~s been a  favoured method in the 
Unit~d Kingdom)2  the  farmer himself has  to put up  some  of  the  capital. 
Nevertheless,  if  c~pital gran~are set at too high a  level,  they might  lead a 
farmer  into some,vhat  uncritically c orruni tting investment moneys  to  new  projects. 
Subsidised loans  for  land purchase would also raise  problems;  for  example,  by 
increasing the  demand  for  ~.nd they could  induce  a  further rise in land prices 
and thereby largely defeat their objective. 
If  IIDt7  one  is to try to put  a  figure  on  the  probable  increase in the  demand 
for capital and credit by United Kingdom agriculture  over  (say)  the next  twenty 
1. J.S.G.  \{ilson,  Availability of  Capital  and.  Credit to United Kingdom Agriculture. 
H~so,  1973,  p.  230. 
2.  Under  EEC  directive  (72/159/EEC),  Hember  States may  choose whether to assist 
farm  improvements  by way  of interest rate subsidy  or  by way'of  granto - 235-
years  t  one  might  anticipate  on  t.ho  bn.siD  of tho  fac-tors  lis-ted above  +11nt  -~ 
in real terms,  i.e.,  ubstracL.i:':'lg  f'ruli1  chu\~es in price levels- it coul<1  be  of 
the  orclor  of  up  t.o  5  per cent.,  possibly as  high us  10  per  cent..  of'  the  presen-t 
provision.  'J.1his  i~ouJ.d be  substantinlly because  of  the greater  industriali~;::t.tion 
of agriculture.  At  the  sar.w  t. i.iile,  this is unlikely t.o  ere  ate  a.ny  difficult  ie s 
on  the  institutional side,  ~inco both tho  banl~s and the  .J\J.1C  apply much  the 
same criteria to  the  processinr:  of loan applications 'i·thatever the  size  of  the 
amount  or the nature  of  the business.  Furt.hermoro,·bccause  of  a  general 
reduction in the  pressure  on  real resources  (for reasons  already given),  one 
would also  expect  there  to  be  some  relnxation in the  upv1ard  pressures  on  interent 
rates,  '\.;hich  might  noH  move  idthin n.  band above  ancl  helov  (sny)  10  per cent. 
'l'his  in its turn vould help to reduce the  upl.·w,rcl.  pressure  on  cos-Ls  of  production. 
Horeover,  a.s  already indicated, it will be  possible  to  accommodate  an 
increase  of this  magnitude  in the  demand for capital and credit by agriculture, 
because  there  is lihely to be slack in the  economy  as  a  result of reductions  in 
the  levels  of  ec anomie  a,c-ti vi  ty  elsm~·here.  In financial  terms,  the  funds  liill 
come  p~u·t.ly from  -the  banks,  uhich "'·rill  no'\l  be  under  less pressure from  the 
non-ag:cicul  tural s ectors  of  the  economy,  and partly from  the capital market, 
where  the  A~~ for  similar reasons  can  now  expect  to  make  larger and  more  frequent 
issues  of  bonds  an<l  debentures  ivi th a  vicn1  to  supporting the  expansion of its 
activities in the  medium- and  long-term lending fields.  Finally,  funds 
to assist in developing marketing  co-operatives  (including grain storage and 
egg  packing  stations)  and  extending the  facilities  of the Agricultural Credit 
Corporation might  he  had  from  the  EEC's  Fonds  Europecn d'Orientation et de 
Garantie  A~ricole  (FEOGA). T
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e
d
.
 
D
e
c
.
 
4
,
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
u
x
.
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
e
d
.
 
(
I
)
 
r
:
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
B
u
d
g
e
t
,
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
1
4
 
:
 
£
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
~
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
m
e
a
s
u
N
s
,
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
7
:
 
£
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
1
9
7
0
/
7
1
 
F
u
l
l
 
y
e
a
r
 
1
9
7
0
/
7
1
 
1
9
7
1
/
7
2
 
F
u
l
l
 
y
e
a
r
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
•
•
 
-
1
4
5
 
-
2
0
3
 
(
t
)
 
+
 
1
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
C
u
s
t
o
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
c
i
s
e
 
-
3
4
 
_
N
_
'
e
_
t
_
e
_
f
f
_
c
_
c
_
t
 
.
.
;
.
(
i
_
n
_
c
l
_
u
_
d
_
i
n
.
.
.
;
g
~
S
E
_
T
_
c
_
h
_
a
•
.
.
.
;
,
g
:
;
.
.
.
e
.
:
.
.
)
 
_
_
_
 
-
'
-
-
-
-
~
 
7
_
9
.
.
.
;
1
~
.
.
_
_
-
.
2
0
2
t
(
 
~
)
 
(
t
)
 
E
x
c
.
l
u
d
e
s
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
a
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
s
 
o
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
c
x
p
c
n
r
i
;
t
u
r
c
 
b
d
c
r
c
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
5
.
 
~
9
7
2
.
 
o
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
:
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
a
x
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
t
a
x
 
-
6
0
 
-
9
0
 
-
1
0
0
 
-
-
3
1
5
 
-
3
5
0
 
I
 
>
<
 
t
"
f
 
I
 A
 
c
a
l
e
n
d
a
r
 
o
f
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
e
v
e
n
t
s
 
1
9
7
1
 
T
a
x
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
,
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
e
t
c
.
,
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
a
.
n
d
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
s
 
r
a
t
e
 
e
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
1
s
t
 
q
t
r
.
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
3
1
,
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
o
a
r
d
 
f
o
r
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
s
 
w
o
u
n
d
 
u
p
.
 
l
n
d
 
q
t
r
.
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
3
0
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
3
0
 
A
p
r
i
l
1
,
 
A
b
o
l
l
t
t
o
n
 
o
f
 
u
p
p
e
r
 
S
t
a
m
p
 
d
u
t
y
 
o
n
 
6
~
~
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
t
o
 
e
a
r
n
e
d
 
m
o
r
:
t
g
a
g
e
s
,
 
e
t
c
.
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
r
e
l
i
e
f
:
 
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
e
d
.
 
£
<
C
O
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
I
n
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
a
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
.
 
E
s
t
a
t
e
 
d
u
t
y
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
r
a
i
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
£
1
2
,
5
0
0
.
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
a
x
 
c
u
t
 
b
y
 
2
1
%
 
t
o
 
<
C
O
%
.
 
N
e
w
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
l
l
o
w
-
a
n
c
e
s
.
 
l
r
d
 
q
t
r
.
 
J
u
l
y
 
1
9
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
J
u
l
y
 
5
 
;
s
E
T
 
A
u
g
.
 
3
,
 
F
a
m
i
l
y
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
J
\
l
l
y
1
S
,
 
C
B
I
 
S
e
p
t
.
 
2
,
 
i
n
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
a
l
l
o
w
·
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
h
a
l
v
e
d
,
 
S
u
p
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
e
g
a
n
;
 
a
s
k
s
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
s
o
'
 
i
'
u
 
a
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
J
u
l
y
 
1
9
 
(
4
)
,
 
P
u
r
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
r
a
t
e
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
£
4
 
t
o
 
a
v
o
i
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
h
a
s
e
 
t
a
x
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
.
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
o
r
 
f
r
e
e
 
d
e
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
b
y
 
S
e
p
t
.
 
2
0
,
 
2
0
%
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
t
h
e
m
 
t
o
 
(
u
p
·
t
o
 
A
u
g
u
s
t
 
1
9
7
3
)
 
2
/
1
1
 
t
h
s
.
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
.
 
5
~
~
 
o
r
 
l
e
s
s
 
u
p
 
i
n
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
o
 
3
1
 
J
u
l
y
 
i
n
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
g
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
1
9
7
2
.
 
a
r
e
a
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
b
y
 
a
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
o
f
 
6
5
p
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
I
n
 
p
e
r
 
w
e
e
k
.
 
1
9
7
2
/
7
3
,
 
1
9
7
3
/
7
4
.
 
S
e
p
t
.
 
2
3
,
 
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
I
n
v
a
l
i
d
i
t
y
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
,
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
2
8
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
o
f
 
s
i
c
k
n
e
s
s
.
 
-
4
t
h
 
q
t
r
.
 
D
e
c
.
 
6
,
 
A
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
a
l
l
o
w
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
£
4
·
8
0
 
a
 
w
e
e
k
 
p
a
y
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
s
e
v
e
r
c
!
y
 
d
i
s
·
 
a
b
l
e
d
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
w
h
o
 
n
e
e
d
 
l
o
o
k
!
n
g
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
b
y
 
d
a
y
 
a
n
d
 
b
y
 
n
i
g
h
t
.
 
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
S
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
J
a
n
.
 
1
2
,
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
J
a
n
.
 
1
,
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
b
o
r
r
o
w
i
n
g
 
b
y
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
U
K
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
S
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
B
a
n
k
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
2
4
,
 
f
"
'
o
n
e
y
 
c
e
i
l
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
r
a
i
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
 
m
o
r
t
g
a
g
e
 
3
1
%
·
 
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
e
d
.
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
3
0
,
 
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
g
u
i
d
e
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
1
,
 
N
a
t
-
l
i
n
e
s
 
i
s
s
u
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
c
e
r
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
:
 
J
u
n
e
 
q
t
r
.
:
 
c
l
e
a
r
i
n
g
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
(
d
e
c
i
m
a
l
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
1
0
7
!
~
~
 
o
f
 
I
s
s
u
e
)
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
1
9
7
0
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
m
i
u
m
 
b
o
n
d
s
:
 
M
a
y
 
1
4
,
 
B
a
n
k
 
o
f
 
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
o
n
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
t
h
e
 
g
i
l
t
-
e
d
g
e
d
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
.
 
h
o
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
J
u
n
e
 
3
0
,
 
L
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
g
u
i
d
e
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
.
 
l
i
n
e
s
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
e
d
 
t
o
 
M
a
y
 
3
,
 
N
e
w
 
m
i
d
·
S
e
p
t
.
:
 
c
l
e
a
r
i
n
g
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
i
s
s
u
e
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
t
o
1
1
0
~
~
 
o
f
 
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
 
s
a
v
·
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
1
9
7
0
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
i
n
g
s
 
b
o
n
d
s
.
 
S
e
p
t
.
1
5
,
 
'
C
e
i
l
i
n
g
s
'
 
f
o
r
 
S
e
p
t
.
 
1
,
 
S
a
v
e
 
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
b
y
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
A
s
 
Y
o
u
 
E
a
r
n
:
 
a
b
o
l
i
s
h
e
d
.
 
O
u
t
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
r
e
p
a
i
d
.
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
S
e
p
t
.
 
1
6
,
 
M
o
r
e
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
l
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
r
a
i
s
e
d
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
o
f
 
f
r
o
m
 
£
1
0
 
t
o
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
s
.
 
£
2
0
;
 
m
i
n
i
-
A
!
 
I
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
o
b
·
 
m
u
m
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
s
e
r
v
e
 
a
 
r
e
~
e
r
v
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
s
t
a
r
t
·
 
1
2
f
 
"
,
~
,
a
n
d
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
c
a
l
f
s
 
i
n
g
 
a
 
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
.
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
r
e
·
 
(
L
a
r
g
e
r
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
s
 
d
u
c
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
1
0
%
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
 
1
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
o
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
 
1
 
m
o
n
t
h
.
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
a
 
y
e
a
r
.
)
 
O
c
t
.
 
1
,
 
C
l
e
a
r
i
n
g
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
a
b
a
n
d
o
n
e
d
.
 
N
o
v
.
,
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
 
s
o
c
i
e
t
i
e
s
 
n
e
w
 
m
o
r
t
g
a
g
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
c
u
t
 
b
y
 
t
%
 
t
o
 
8
%
.
 
O
c
t
.
f
N
o
v
.
 
C
l
e
a
r
i
n
g
 
b
l
n
k
s
 
c
u
t
 
b
~
s
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
t
o
 
<
4
~
%
.
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
d
i
s
p
u
t
e
s
 
J
a
n
.
 
2
0
 
t
o
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
6
,
 
S
t
r
i
k
e
 
b
y
 
P
o
s
t
 
O
f
f
.
c
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
J
a
n
.
 
2
9
 
t
o
 
A
p
r
i
l
 
7
,
 
S
t
o
p
p
a
g
e
 
i
n
 
m
o
t
o
r
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
 
J
u
l
y
 
1
,
 
U
S
A
 
d
o
c
k
 
s
t
r
i
k
e
 
b
e
g
a
n
 
o
n
 
W
e
s
t
 
a
n
d
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
c
o
a
s
t
s
.
 
S
e
p
t
.
 
6
 
t
o
 
N
o
v
.
1
5
,
 
O
n
e
 
d
a
y
 
a
 
w
e
e
k
 
s
t
o
p
·
 
p
a
g
e
s
 
b
y
 
C
o
v
e
n
t
r
y
 
t
o
o
l
 
r
o
o
m
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
O
c
t
 
.
1
,
 
U
S
A
 
d
o
c
k
 
s
t
r
i
k
e
:
 
E
a
s
t
 
c
o
a
s
t
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
c
a
m
e
 
o
u
t
,
 
W
e
s
t
 
c
o
a
s
t
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
b
e
g
a
n
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
o
 
w
o
r
k
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
e
v
.
e
n
t
s
 
F
e
b
.
 
1
5
,
 
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
d
e
c
i
m
a
l
i
s
e
d
.
 
F
e
b
.
 
1
8
,
 
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
n
e
w
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
;
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
g
r
a
n
t
s
 
t
o
 
3
C
~
~
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
'
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
i
l
l
.
 
A
p
r
l
l
 
1
,
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
I
n
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
d
e
n
t
a
l
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
,
 
m
i
l
k
 
a
n
d
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
m
e
a
l
s
.
 
J
u
l
y
 
1
,
 
T
V
 
l
i
c
e
n
c
e
 
f
e
e
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
.
 
J
u
l
y
 
1
4
,
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
·
 
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
 
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
u
p
 
~
o
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
1
9
7
3
;
 
£
1
6
-
'
l
m
.
 
w
a
s
 
e
v
e
n
t
u
a
l
l
y
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
s
e
d
.
 
J
u
l
y
 
2
0
,
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
 
h
i
r
e
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
,
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
s
a
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
n
t
a
l
 
a
g
r
e
e
f
T
i
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
m
o
v
e
d
.
 
A
u
g
.
 
1
5
,
 
U
S
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
 
m
a
d
e
 
n
o
n
-
c
o
n
v
e
r
t
i
b
l
e
:
 
1
0
%
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
s
u
r
c
h
a
r
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
1
0
~
/
~
 
c
u
t
 
i
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
a
i
d
.
 
A
u
g
.
 
2
3
.
 
£
s
t
e
r
l
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
f
l
o
a
t
.
 
N
o
v
.
 
2
2
,
 
A
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
s
e
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
o
(
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
£
1
O
O
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A calendar of economic events  1973 
Tax ch~ng,·s  National Insurance  Prices  Bank 
··- etc., contribution  ar.d  minimum  lending  Savings  Industrial  Other evu.u  Income and  Expenditure(')  and  benefits(')  Incomes  lending  disputes  capital  policy  rate 
1n qtr.  Jan. 17, St;;tutory  Jan. 19,  Jan. J to 4,  l'iost  Jan.  1,  National  Jan. 17 to March 23,  Jan.1, UK, Denmark and 
freeze on pnces.  Ill%  lonc!on cleanrg  5~vings  Bank  Inter·  Selective Hoppages  lmh RepubliC  became 
Incomes, rents and  banks raise base rate  est raoscd to 4% (8 X  and overtime ban by  members of the HC. 
dividends; Phase I  March 23,  to81%·  on investment  gos workers.  feb. 1, EEC Common 
extended by 60 days.  81%  feb. 15, further rise  accounts).  Feb. 28, One day  Agriculture Policy 
March 31,  Pay and  In  base  rate to 9i%·  feb., Building socie- stoppage by rail  applies to UK, Denmark 
dividend standstill  ties interest rate on  workers.  and Irish Republoc. 
under Phase I ended.  shares raised by  March 1, Industrial  Feb.13,10%dcvaluatlon  0·35% to 5-6%.  action begun by  of US  dollar against  March 7, NatioPal 
savings cert.ficate  hospital ancillary  SDRs. Yen and lira to 
(decimal issue) limit  workers.  float. 
on individual hold- March 8, One day  March 19, Joint float of 
lngs increased to  stoppage by  rail  all  EEC currencies ex· 
£1,500.  workers.  cept £sterling and lira. 
2nd qtr.  Budget('), New  E\udget('), VAT and  April 1, Phase II  Aprll13,  April 3 to 5, London  April, Building  April 2 to 6, Strike  April 13,  Electricity 
unif.ed system of  car tax introduced  brought into effect.  8%  clearing banks re- societies interest  by  london dockers.  Council to borrow 
of personal uxation  at 10%. Food, child·  Pay  Board and Price  duce base rate to 9%.  rate -on .!•ares raised  April 2 to June 25,  £400m. on Euro· 
introduced; rates of  ren's clothing a~d  Commission set up  April19,  Aprol  4,  £18m.  by  0·7% to 6·3%.  Dosputes in  motor  dollar markets. 
tax vary with Income  footwear relieved  to re6ulate pay  and  8;%  government 'brldg·  May,  Building  Industry.  Hay 21, Changes in 
from 30% to 75%.  from VAT.  Other  prices. Pay  increases  ing grant' to buildong  societies interest  April 17, Industrial  public expenditure 
Surcharge of 15%  taxes reduced to  restricted to £1  per  Hay11,  societies to keep  rate on shares raised  action by  hospital  annou need to save  on Investment  compensate for VAT.  week plus 4% of  8%  new mortgage inter·  by 0·45% to 6·75%.  ancilluy workers  £100m. in 1973/7'4  Income In  excess of  Purchase tax and  average wage bill,  est rate increase to  Hay 7, 81% British  ended.  rlsln&: to £SOOm.  In  £2,000.  SET ended,  with maximum of  May  18,  1% making rate  savings bond Issued.  Hay 1, One day strike  197i/7S (1972 Survey 
Surtax abolished.  £250 a year.  Rigid  7i%  9-f%.  by1imlllionworkers  prices). 
Corporation tax- control on prices.  Hay 22 to 23,london  In  protest against 
Imputation "heme  Dividend increases  June 22.  clearing banksreduce  Phase II  of counter- Introduced.  restncted to 5%.  7i%  base rate to Sf%·  inflation policy.  Arril 28,  Prices  June 15 to 26, 
st~l'dstill under  Further reduction in  Pha1e  I ended.  base rate to 8%. 
Hay 1, Controls on 
prices under Phase II 
to be based on 
allowable costs and 
profit mara:ins. 
3rd qtr.  Ju1~20,  July 19, Bank of  July 1, New pre- Sept. 5 to 21, 
%  England  calls for  mium savings bond  Dispute In  motor 
special deposits from  prize structure.  industry. 
July 27,  banks and finance  Pqze fund  Interest 
111%  houses (!% Aug. 6;  rate increased to 
1% Aug. 15).  4~%-
Aug., Suildong  Sept. 11,  Bank of 
societies raise new  England asks banks 
mortgage interest  to limit interest paid 
rate to 10%.  on deposit of less 
Aug. 2,  london  than £10,000 to 
clearing banks raise  91%· 
base rate to 1  0%. 
Aug. 22 to 23, 
Further rise In  base 
rate to 11%. 
Sept. 11,  Bank of 
England asks  banks 
to restrict personal 
credit, to further 
restrict lending 
on property and 
financial trans· 
actions and to 
Nov. 7, Under  1 1  I' :;>;~!~~·;;~•,;,~~-
Oct  .. Bulldlnz socle·  Nov.1,1~  Oct. 4 to Nov.12, Arab- 4tll qtr.  Oec.  17,1~,<; sur•  Oct. 1, Increases  ·Grct. 1'1,  Oct., Buildlng1ocie-
charze on 1972{73  In  national in- Phase Ill  pay In·  11i%  ties raise new mort·  ties Interest rate on  ICtlon by  elcc.lorti:.ity  Israeli War. 
assessmentofsurtax;  surance benefits  creases limited to  gage interest rate  shares raised by  power eng'"'"~  Oct.9,£115m. cuts In 
half payable on  and contribu·  £2·25 per week or  Nov.13,  to11%.  0·75% to 7·5%.  begins.  public expenditure. 
1 July 197-4  and hair  tions.  7% of average wage  13%  Nov. 13,  Balli< of  Nov. 21, Trustee  Nov.12, Coal ... i .e.rs  Oct. 18, Arab oil  pro- on 1 Jan. 1975.  Dec.,  Pensioners  bill, with maximum  England  calls for  savings banks in teres  t  start overtlmt! ban.  duction to be cut by 
In  197-4{75, capital  to receive £10  increase of £350 a  specoai dcpo!its from  raosed  to 9% on  In·  Dec. 12. Rl,i dnvers  SX  per month and 
zains ux to be  Christmas bonus.  year, plus 1% flexi·  b~nks and fonance  vestment accounts.  start ovtrt:me ban.  prices ir.co eased by70%. 
charged on the  bility margin.  ho"s~s  (}~~Nov.  28;  Dec. 1,  Introduction  and work-to-rule.  Nov. 13, Stat" of Emer·  'development gain'  Threshold agree·  !-~~ Dec.12; 1~~  of SA YE-Iinked share  ge~cy declared.  In  property values.  menu to run !or  eec. 27;  ! % Jan. 2).  savings scheme.  12  month! allowing  Nov. 14, Lor.don  Nov. 14,  Restrictions 
extra 40p(maxi- clearing banks raise  on use of electrocity for 
mum)  per week If  base rate to 13 %·  certaon  purposes. 
retail prices index  Nov. 19, Government 
rises by 7% over  Dec. 17, Stricter  orders cut of 10% in 
October 1973  level,  terms for  ~redit  oil deliveries. 
plus further 40p per  cards. Banks and 
Nov. 28, Government  finance  houses asked  week for every 
not to offer better  approves plans to spend  further percentage 
terms than those  £891 m.  over 5 years on  point rise. 
permitted f·~r hire  railways. 
Controls maintained 
on prices.  Interest  purchase.  Hore  pur•  British Gas Corporation 
chase controls re·  borrowed  £1 OCm.  from  on part of special  introduced; minimurr  abroad.  deposits to be  deposit 33!~-~; maxi·  Dec. 13,  U.se of elec- withheld.  mum  repayment  trici ty restricted for 
per,od 2 years for  most of industry and 
most goods.  commerce. 
St:ecial deposits due  Dec. 17,  Public expen· 
on 2 Jan. cancelled.  diture to be  cut by 
Further calls  of  bank  £1.2C0m.  in  1974/75 
deposits oncrease  by  (1973  Survey proces). 
mere than 8% In  Dec. 22. Crude ool prices  first half of 197-4.  doubled by  prodC~cing 
St3tes, effect ove  (rom 
1 Jan. 1974. 
( 1)  (1)  for further details sec AppendiK Tables 1 and 2.  (')Sec footnotes on paJ:c  ~·,; F
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Append~x C 
Table A 
Total·Bank Advances  .ANC  Total  loe.ns  SASC  Loans 
by Banks  in Gre~t  outstanding  Secured on Agric-
Britain to Agriculture  ultural Subjects 
£  million  £  million  £  million 
1964 February  458 
March  57.6  4.4 
l·hy  478 
August  502 
November  515 
1965  February  505 
Jtiarch  64.2  5.6 
Jvf..ay  513 
August  526 
November  524 
1966  February  523 
l1a.rch  71.5  5.9 
May  529 
August  530 
November  512 
1967  February  474 
!-~arch  87.1  6.3 
Jtla.y  477 
August  504 
Nov~rnber  511 
1968  Pebruary  490 
}\arch  103.1  6.6 
Nay  508 
August  528 
November  533 
1969  Februa1y  528 
1-larch  128.1  7.8 
Nay  519 
August  543 
November  527 
19'"(0  February  504 
1-larch  153.5  8.8 
May  505 
August  538 
November  536 
1971  February  528 
March  170.3  10.0 
May  537 
August  566 
November  591 
1972  February  575 
March  178.9  10.3 
May  608 
August  659 
November  690 
1973  F.ebruary  708 
March  205.8  10.9 
f.'ky  748 
August  793 
November  795  (806) 
1974 February  837 
March  244.2  11.6 
May  892 
August  973 
November  965 -XLVIII-
Table  B 
Date  Bank  Clearing  Average  Naximum  ANC  AMC  SASC 
Rate  Bank  'Blue  Clearing  Clearing  Fixed  Variable  Fixed 
Chip'  Rate*  Bank Rate*  Bank H.ate*  Hate  Rate  .f.  Rate 
(Minimum) 
%  %  %  %  %  %  % 
24/2/64  6! 
27/2/64  5  5!  6!-7  8-9  6t 
22/5/64  6t 
23/11/64  7  7t  8!-9  10-11 
22/1/65  71  4 
25/1/65  71  4 
26/5/65  7t 
27/5/65  7t 
3/6/65  6  6!  7!-8  9-10 
14/7/66  7  7!  st-9  10-11 
1/8/66  8t 
31/8/66  8t 
26/1/67  6!  7  8-8t  9t-1ot 
16/3/67  6  6t  7!-8  9-10 
19/4/67  7t 
4/5/67  5-l  6  7-7t  8-l-9!  71  •  2 
22/8/67  7t 
·19/10/67  6  6t  7!-8  9-10 
9/11/67  6!  7  8-8!  9t-1ot 
17/11/6'"{ 
0 
0 
20/11/67  8  st  9!-10  11-12 
8/12/6'"{  8!  8i 
21/3/68  7t  8  9-9t  10!-11! 
16/7/68  8t 
19/9/68  7  7!  st-9  10-11 
22/1/69  st 
13/2/69  9* 
18/2/69  9t 
27/2/69  8  st  9!-10  11-12 
29/4/69  lOt 
29/5/69  10! 
1/10/69  9 
5/3/70  7t  st  9-9t  10!-llt 
13/3/70  . 9t 
15/4/70  7  8  7!-8  10-11 
16/12/70  lOt 
17/12/70  11 
22/3/71  10~ 
1/4/71  6  7  7!-8  9-10 
2/9/71  5  6  6!-7  8-9 
10/9/71  9! 
16/9/71  10 
18/10/71  9 
Clearing 
Bank Base 
Rate 
26/11/71  4!  5!.  6-6!  7t-st 
16/12/71 
s-st~ 
9 
22/2/72  7 
1/6/72  (7) Table B cont. 
Date 
9/6/72 
30/6/72 
24/7/72 
1/8/72 
17/8/72 
13/10/72 
7/11/72 
1/12/72 
13/12/72 
3/1/73 
12/1/73 
14/2/73 
19/2/73 
2/4/73 
4/4/73 
19/4/73 
22/5/73 
1/6/73 
18/6/73 
26/6/73 
2/8/73 
15/8/73 
16/8/73 
23/8/73 
14/11/73 
1/12/73 
1/2/74 
21/3/74 
11/4/74 
13/5/74 
8/6/74 
6/8/74 
19/8/74 
1/12/74 
Clearing 
Bank Base 
Rate 
5 
6 
7 
9 
8! 
8 
10 
11 
13 
12! 
12 
Clea:r.inR 
Bank  'Blue 
Chi"D'  Ra.iie* 
(Hi~imum) 
uf  ,c 
st 
9
1 
2 
10 
9 
11 
12 
14 
13! 
13 
-XLI~-
Average 
Clearing 
Bank  Rate1:-
6t-7 
7!-8 
8!-9 
9-9! 
10!-11 
11!-12 
11-llt 
10}-11 
10-10! 
12-12t 
13-13! 
15-15t 
14!-15 
14-14! 
Hl.ximum 
Clearing 
Bank  Hate·* 
8-9 
9-10 
10-11 
10!-llt 
11!-12! 
12-13 
11-12 
13-14 
14-15 
16-17 
15t-16t 
15-16 
AID 
Pixed 
Rate 
10 
10~ 
13 
14 
AMJ 
Variable 
Rate~ 
% 
9 
(9) 
12 
12~-
15(15) 
SASC 
Fixed 
Rate 
% 
10 
tl 
12 
14 
15 
Note  - There is a  degree  of approximation in the rates charged by the  Clearing Baruts, 
especially for average and maximum  rates.  The average rate in Scotland may at tir;1cs 
have  been up to  1  per cent. higher than in England and  'vales and the  maximum  !per cent. 
higher.  In Northern Ireland,  up to September 1971,  the rates charged by banks  tended 
to be i  per cent. higher than in England and Wales.  After September 1971,  there was 
virtual parity.  This  Table is based on  Table XXXII  (not qualifications to  B13-se  Rate 
listed in the present Table);  Graph at p •.  85;  Table XXXIV A;  and Table XXXV A. 
·*These  are the rates charged on  overdrafts;  on  loan account,  t  to  1  per cent.  above 
the overdraft rate would be  charged and,  on  term loans,  1  to 2  per cent  ..  above  the 
overdraft rate. 
f.  For new  loans..  As  reviewed for  existing loans has  been  placed in brackets. 
~ First rate  r~lates to 8-10 year  loans and the  second to 10-40 year loans. -III-
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